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This  study  was  performed  within  a  major  drinks  company  in  the  UK.  The  overall 
objective  was  to  develop  a  formal,  structured  and  measurable  safety  management 
system  appropriate  for  the  company.  The  system  had  to  be  effective  for  all  sites  and 
operations  and  be  consistent  with  developing  international  standards.  A 
comprehensive  review  of  performance  measurement,  both  positive  and  negative,  was 
carried  out.  Measurements  had  to  be  practical  and  useful  within  the  operating 
environment  -  showing  real,  understandable  change  over  short  periods  of  time.  The 
study  also  considered  the  roles  of  individuals  in  relation  to  safety  and  pursued  the 
active  engagement  of  employees  in  the  safety  program. 
The  success  was  that  the  profile  of  safety  management  was  raised  beyond 
recognition  within  the  company;  and  was  eventually  integral  to  the  way  that  the 
company  managed  its  business.  The  system  provided  a  mechanism  to  allow  the 
company  to  progress. 
The  study  demonstrates  what  can  be  done,  and  what  cannot.  An  interesting  by- 
product  of  the  study  is  that  by  changing  hard  systems,  some  soft  factors  have  also 
changed.  The  study  was  intended  to  impact  upon  the  core  safety  management 
systems  and  control  measures,  but  over  the  period  of  study  some  people  have 
changed  their  attitude  and  perhaps  changed  their  behaviour. 
The  main  constraints  to  the  study  were  that  production  came  first  and  that  senior 
management  constantly  changed.  The  amount  of  money  available  to  spend  on  the 
improvement  of  safety  standards  was  limited  and  also  secondary  to  the  requirements 
of  production.  Within  the  company  there  was  almost  constant  change  of  personnel 
and  operating  structure.  This  problem  was  countered  in  part  by  the  development  of 
consistent,  documented  safety  management  systems.  It  was  clear,  however,  that 
lasting  improvements  in  safety  can  only  achieved  by  the  involvement  of  the  actual 
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vi 1  DEVELOPMENT  OF  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  WITHIN 
J&B  SCOTLAND 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
This  work  records  research  in  action.  The  author  was  attached  to  a  major  drinks 
producer,  J&B  Scotland,  as  a  researcher,  was  recruited  by  them  and  was  until 
February  2000,  Risk  Manager  responsible  for  risk  management  including  safety  at 
all  sites,  and  the  health  and  safety  of  740  employees.  This  work  spans  a  period  from 
January  1994  until  the  end  of  1997:  from  a  time  when  a  major  change  in  safety 
management  and  processes  was  conceptualised  in  J&B  Scotland,  to  a  date  when 
merger  of  the  organisation's  interests  with  another  major  producer  scores  a 
convenient  line  under  the  process  of  change. 
This  work  is  also  a  record  of  success.  Not  every  initiative  taken  succeeded,  not  every 
proposal  proved  practical  to  implement,  but  the  management  of  health  and  safety  at 
J&B  was  modernised.  Processes  were  defined,  standardised  and  moved  towards  the 
end  goal  of  being  fully  managed.  At  the  same  time,  responsibilities  were  emphasised 
and  new  techniques  implemented  to  drive  behaviour  towards  a  safer  norm. 
It  is  not  possible  to  record  all  the  actions  taken  and  the  general  day  to  day  work  of 
the  safety  manager  must  be  understood  as  the  foundation  for  the  work  reported  here. 
Issuing  safety  clothing,  organising  purchasing  deals,  involvement  in  the  site 
management  team  and  negotiating  redundancy  with  departmental  staff  are  examples 
of  interruptions  and  pressures  that  make  it  difficult  to  keep  an  eye  on  the  wider  goal. 
Safety  management  is  still  like  swimming  in  warm  treacle,  but  at  J&B  Scotland  it 
became,  at  least,  no  longer  a  swim  against  a  strong  tide. 
1.2  J&B  SCOTLAND'S  HISTORY 
J&B  Scotland  was  a  subsidiary  of  International  Distillers  and  Vintners  Ltd  (IDV), 
the  drinks  sector  of  Grand  Metropolitan  plc.,  before  merger  with  Guinness  PLC  in 1997  to  form  Diageo.  IDV  was  a  UK  based  multi-national  that  owned  a  range  of 
food  companies  including  the  Burger  King  chain  and  Pillsbury,  and  leading  drinks 
brands  such  as  Baileys,  Cinzano,  Smirnoff  and  an  extensive  range  of  Scotch  Whisky. 
This  research  study  focuses  on  J&B  Scotland  before  structural  change  as  a  result  of 
the  merger  impacted  the  organisation. 
The  Headquarters  of  J&B  Scotland  were  at  IDV  Operations  on  the  J&B  Scotland 
premises  in  Dumbarton,  one  of  seven  operational  sites  in  Scotland  wholly  owned  by 
the  company.  The  site,  also  known  as  Strathleven,  was  previously  a  contract  bottling 
plant  used  by  IDV  but  owned  by  Strathleven  Bonded  Warehouses  Ltd..  IDV  at  that 
time  owned  a  warehouse  and  filling/blending  plant  at  Blythswood,  the  Bonhill 
warehouses  and  four  Distilleries.  In  1987,  Strathleven  Bonded  Warehouses  was 
taken  over  by  IDV  and  the  combination  of  the  7  sites  was  known  as  J&B  Scotland 
Ltd.  This  take-over  date  provides  a  reasonable  foundation  point  for  a  history  of 
safety  management. 
1.3  J&B  SCOTLAND'S  ACTIVITIES  AND  SITES 
J&B  Scotland's  principal  activities  are  the  production,  maturation,  blending  and 
bottling  of  Scotch  Whisky  and  the  blending  and  bottling  of  other  spirits  such  as 
Smirnoff  Vodka,  Malibu  Rum  and  Archers  Peach  Schnapps. 
They  own  and  operate  four  malt  whisky  Distilleries  at  Auchroisk,  Glen  Spey, 
Knockando  and  Strathmill;  all  of  which  are  in  the  Speyside  region  of  the  North  of 
Scotland.  A  total  of  approximately  110  employees  are  based  at  the  Distilleries,  the 
majority  at  Auchroisk  the  largest  production  site  and  warehousing  complex.  The 
Distilleries  work  on  a  24-hour  ongoing  shift  basis,  with  a  maintenance  shut  down 
period  of  2  weeks  per  year. 
Raw  materials  are  delivered  to  the  Distilleries  for  Distilling  in  pot  stills.  The  process 
is  almost  fully  automated,  with  Stillroom  operators  overseeing  the  operations.  The 
work  performed  at  these  sites  is  primarily  warehousing,  process  control,  engineering 
1:  2 and  maintenance  and  as  distilling  operations  are  relatively  hands-off  for  employees, 
the  main  risks  are  created  during  cask  handling,  maintenance  operations  and 
coopering.  Spirit  is  exported  in  cask  or  bulk  spirit  tanker  by  road.  Fire  is  the  primary 
major  hazard,  although  flooding  has  produced  the  greatest  commercial  loss  in  recent 
years. 
Maturation  and  cask  storage  of  Scotch  Whisky  is  carried  out  principally  at 
Auchroisk,  Blythswood,  Bonhill  and  Strathleven  although  the  three  remaining 
distilleries  also  store  whisky  in  casks.  Blythswood  is  a  blending  and  maturation  site, 
with  approximately  80  employees  in  total.  It  operates  on  a  single  shift  basis  with 
overtime.  The  spirit  is  delivered  to  the  site  by  road  tankers  for  maturation  or 
blending  on  site.  Whisky  is  transferred  from  incoming  tankers  from  the  Distilleries 
to  casks  for  maturation.  It  is  then  decanted  from  matured  casks  for  blending  and 
eventual  transfer  by  tanker  to  Strathleven  for  bottling.  Tanker  drivers  are  based 
either  at  Blythswood  or  Auchroisk.  The  spirit  is  unloaded  from  the  tankers  at  each 
site  via  a  tanker  bay.  A  high  latent  fire  hazard  exists  at  all  spirit  storage  sites  and  fire 
and  explosion  risks  exist  whenever  spirit  is  transferred.  The  main  injury  risk  to 
employees  during  operations  at  Blythswood  is,  however,  from  handling  of  casks. 
Bonhill  is  an  unmanned  warehousing  site  used  for  maturation  and  cask  storage. 
When  cask  movements  are  required,  personnel  from  Blythswood  are  transferred  to 
the  site.  In  the  main,  operations  involve  cask  movement  such  as  cask  loading, 
unloading  and  racking  and  maintenance  work.  Like  the  other  sites,  the  major  hazard 
is  that  of  fire  and  explosion  as  a  result  of  high  strength  spirit  storage  and  transport. 
The  main  injury  risks  to  employees  working  on  the  site,  however,  tend  to  be  from 
handling  and  risks  resulting  from  maintenance  work. 
The  majority  of  bottle  filling  and  packaging  operations  are  performed  at  Strathleven, 
although  approved  sub-contract  companies  undertake  a  small  percentage  of 
packaging.  550  employees  are  based  at  Strathleven,  with  a  fluctuating  number  of 
temporary  employees  brought  in  to  cover  seasonal  fluctuations  in  production.  At  the 
start  of  the  study  in  1993  there  was  a  production  day  shift  and  maintenance  back 
1:  3 shift  in  operation.  The  site  then  moved  to  a  single  day  shift  for  production,  with 
evening  and  weekend  overtime.  The  excessive  levels  of  overtime  then  led  in  1997  to 
the  site  implementing  a  three  shift  system  for  production:  early,  day  and  back  shift, 
with  weekend  overtime  during  high  periods  of  production  and  stock  building. 
At  Strathleven  the  raw  materials  are  transported  to  the  site  by  road  haulage  -  whisky, 
neutral  grain  spirit,  sugar,  flavours,  glass,  cardboard  and  closures  -  and  stored  to  be 
used  in  scheduled  production.  The  materials  are  then  delivered  to  one  of  the 
production  lines  by  pipeline  or  forklift  truck  to  meet  the  requirements  of  an  order. 
The  production  lines  are  semi-automated,  with  line  operators  controlling  quality  and 
ensuring  production  falls  within  specifications.  The  finished  product  (in  cases) 
travels  from  the  production  line  via  a  conveyor  system  to  be  palletised  and  wrapped. 
The  final  product  is  stored  in  racks  and  stacks  in  Finished  Goods  warehouses 
awaiting  transfer  to  a  trailer  or  container  for  distribution.  At  the  outset  of  the  study 
there  were  19  production  lines  on  site,  but  in  1997  there  was  a  significant  investment 
programme  which  reduced  the  number  of  lines  to  13  by  improving  the  capability  and 
flexibility  of  the  remaining  production  lines.  The  new  lines  produced  spirit  at  higher 
speed,  and  were  more  fully  automated.  The  plant  produced  around  14  million  cases 
of  spirits  per  year  at  normal  production  rates. 
There  is  a  greater  variety  of  different  risk  exposures  created  by  operations  at 
Strathleven  than  at  the  other  sites  due  to  the  diverse  nature  of  its  activities.  The  most 
likely  exposure  in  the  materials  and  bottling  areas  is  that  of  cuts  due  to  materials 
handling  and  cleaning  operations.  Engineering  and  electrical  maintenance  of  plant, 
as  always,  is  hazardous  to  those  involved  and  to  others  and,  in  addition,  slips,  trips 
and  falls,  manual  handling  and  exposure  to  excessive  noise  levels  are  significant  risk 
exposures  on  site.  Increasingly  on  all  sites,  non-routine  operations  are  performed  by 
sub-contractors,  and  this  creates  risk  exposures  for  the  contractors  and  for  J&B's 
employees. 
1:  4 1.4  THE  STUDY 
1.4.1  SPECIFICATIONS  FOR  STUDY  AND  INITIAL  REVIE`V 
Concerns  had  been  raised  that  the  safety  control  systems  in  place  at  J&B  Scotland 
were  not  effective,  but  other  than  bringing  in  additional  resources  that  were  not 
certain  to  be  effective,  no  practical  long  term  solutions  had  been  identified.  The 
research  study  was  initiated  as  a  response  to  real  issues  within  the  company  and  the 
demand  for  effective  solutions. 
Money  could  have  been  spent  to  respond  to  these  safety  issues  but  would  not 
necessarily  have  identified  and  resolved  the  root  causes  and,  therefore,  might  have 
had  no  impact  on  safety  standards.  J&B  Scotland  required,  as  an  operating  company 
and  cost-centre,  a  cost  effective  solution  to  the  problem.  The  solution  had  to  be 
practical  in  terms  of  time  and  resource  (financial  and  human),  functional  constraints, 
and  most  importantly  realistic  on  the  basis  that  J&B  is  a  spirits  production 
company  that  operates  safely  not  a  safety  company  that  makes  spirits.  Any  solution 
that  was  to  be  implemented  had  to  be  practical  in  a  real  working  environment,  rather 
than  in  the  theoretical.  In  summary:  the  study  aimed  to  consider  all  options,  test 
possible  solutions  and  then  identify  what  worked,  what  did  not  work,  and  propose 
what  was  reasonably  practicable  to  implement. 
At  the  outset  of  the  study  reported  here,  an  initial  status  review  was  conducted  to 
evaluate  the  current  standards  and  styles  of  health  and  safety  management  within  the 
company.  The  status  review  aimed  to  identify  the  existing  issues  and  defects  and 
determine  a  baseline  level  of  performance  against  which  progress  could  be 
compared. 
The  initial  status  review  consisted  of  various  components: 
i)  A  health  and  safety  audit  to  determine  deficiencies  (and  attributes) 
in  terms  of  management  systems,  physical  evidence  and 
documentation. 
1:  5 ii)  Analysis  of  accident  data  to  determine  the  consistency  of 
information,  level  of  reporting,  actions,  patterns,  trends  and 
benchmarking. 
iii)  Analysis  of  a  study  by  Strathclyde  University  to  determine  other 
factors  and  findings. 
iv)  Evaluation  of  physical  evidence  across  all  7  sites,  and  a 
comparison  of  findings. 
The  results  of  the  initial  status  review  can  be  summarised  as, 
0  There  were  no  formal  safety  management  systems  and  there  was 
inadequate  documentation  of  health  and  safety 
"  There  were  inconsistencies  in  the  treatment  of  health  and  safety 
between  sites  and  standards  varied  within  and  between  sites 
9  Each  site  had  different  policies,  procedures  and  related  documentation 
that  created  gaps  and  overlaps  in  coverage  and  inconsistency  of 
standards 
0  Health  and  Safety  was  seen  as  the  responsibility  of  the  Health  and 
Safety  Manager,  not  of  the  individual. 
0  Health  and  Safety  performance  was  measured  in  negative  terms  only 
and  inconsistently,  using  a  single  measure  -  the  number  of  accidents 
that  occurred  per  month. 
9  There  was  no  continuity  planning  within  the  management  of  safety 
1.4.2  OBJECTIVES  OF  THE  STUDY 
After  these  main  deficiencies  were  identified,  the  task  was  to  consider  what  would  be 
required  to  correct  them  and  to  establish  proactive,  positive  safety  management. 
The  objective  of  the  study  was  taken  to  be  the  development  and  implementation  of  a 
formal,  structured,  but  practical  and  measurable  health  and  safety  management 
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all  sites  and  operations  and,  furthermore,  was  to  be  developed  with  the  objective  of 
integration  into  the  ISO  Quality  Management  system  that  was  already  in  place  for 
products.  The  systems  had  to  be  consistent  and  appropriate  for  effective  integration 
into  a  Group-wide  Total  Quality  Management  environment  within  the  corporate 
Business  Management  System. 
It  was  determined  that,  alongside  the  management  system,  a  comprehensive  system 
of  performance  measurement,  incorporating  both  positive  and  negative  performance 
measures  should  be  developed,  to  provide  a  system  for  ensuring  continuous 
improvement.  Again,  the  measurement  system  had  to  be  practical  and  workable 
within  the  operating  environment,  although  not  all  measures  would  necessarily  be 
performed  locally. 
The  study  also  aimed  to  consider  the  role  of  individuals  within  a  working 
environment  in  relation  to  safety  and  a  principal  objective  was  pursue  the  active 
involvement  and  participation  of  employees  in  safety  management. 
The  safety  management  system  and  performance  measures  developed  were  then  to 
be  evaluated  for  their  effectiveness  and,  finally,  the  output  was  to  be  a 
comprehensive,  workable  safety  management  and  performance  measurement  system. 
1.5  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  IN  J&B 
SCOTLAND 
1.5.1  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  (1977-1992):  ITS  RELATIONSHIP  TO  OTHER 
MANAGEMENT  PROCESSES  AND  THE  REASONS  FOR  CHANGE 
In  1977,  Strathleven  Bonded  Warehouses  recruited  its  first  Health  and  Safety 
Manager  (W  Adamson),  who  had,  in  addition,  responsibility  for  security  on  the  site. 
This  recruitment  was  in  response  to  the  requirements  of  the  Health  and  Safety  at 
Work  Act  1974.  After  the  1987  take-over  by  IDV  Operations  and  the  setting  up  of 
J&B  Scotland  in  its  final  format  with  7  sites,  he  was  given  responsibility  for  health, 
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there  was  a  clear  conflict  of  personalities  and  issues  in  this  structure. 
At  this  time  Personnel  Management  at  J&B  Scotland  could  be  fairly  said  to  be  in 
transition.  Positive  steps  were  being  taken  towards  some  of  the  features  of  `hard' 
Human  Resource  Management,  but  the  system  was  essentially  tightly  controlled  and 
hierarchical.  The  ethos  was  centred  on  management  from  the  top  and  it  was  on  the 
crux  of  devolution  of  responsibilities  that  conflict  existed  -  Personnel  insisting  that 
their  control  and  involvement  in  detail  be  extended  to  the  Health  and  Safety 
function. 
In  1989,  a  Health  and  Safety  Advisor  was  recruited  for  the  4  Distilleries,  and  a 
Security  Manager  at  Blythswood.  The  Health  and  Safety  Manager  for  Strathleven 
had  taken  responsibility  for  Blythswood  (and  notionally  for  the  Distilleries)  and  he 
now  transferred  responsibility  for  all  security  issues  to  the  new  Security  Manager. 
The  Health  and  Safety  Manager's  role  was,  by  this  time,  essentially  to  police  safety 
on  site,  rather  than  delegating  responsibility. 
The  tiger  was  caged  and  remained  the  sole  responsibility  of  its  keeper  with  the 
audience  observing  from  within  the  cage!  The  difficulty  was  that  with  one  keeper 
and  3  key  sites,  plus  the  Distilleries,  the  task  of  policing  and  enforcement  was  nigh 
on  impossible.  It  is,  however,  a  credit  to  those  involved  that  the  tiger  was  reasonably 
controlled  and  could  only  bite  occasionally.  As  with  all  tigers,  the  keeper  exercised  a 
finely  tuned  mixture  of  threat,  reward  and  psychology  using  limited  resources. 
In  this  era,  an  assistant  Health  and  Safety  Manager  was  based  at  Strathleven,  but  the 
post  was  made  redundant  in  November  1992  as  part  of  an  across  the  board 
percentage  staff  cut  imposed  by  Grand  Metropolitan  -  the  post  being  seen  as 
superfluous  to  the  mainstream  of  the  Personnel  function.  This  redundancy  increased 
the  workload  but  in  a  way  facilitated  the  changes  that  were  required  to  move  health 
and  safety  forward. 
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there  were  gaps  in  health  and  safety  resource  and  that  the  existing  resources  might 
not  have  the  skill  to  take  the  company  forward.  A  general  skills  review  was  carried 
out  and,  concerned  about  deficiencies,  the  Executive  Management  decided  that  to 
raise  the  profile  of  health  and  safety  external  recruitment  into  a  higher  profile  role 
was  required.  By  mid  1992,  however,  action  had  only  just  been  taken  to  recruit  such 
an  individual. 
In  the  period  when  interviews  were  finally  taking  place  for  the  new  post,  a  fatal 
accident  occurred  at  Blythswood,  immediately  followed  by  2  other  serious  accidents 
within  one  week.  The  Operations  Director  of  IDV,  himself  previously  Managing 
Director  at  Strathleven,  insisted  upon  an  investigation  of  the  safety  control  systems 
and  this  confirmed  that  additional  resource  and  organisational  changes  were 
required.  The  new  Health  and  Safety  Manager  was  recruited  externally  from  the 
Health  and  Safety  Executive  in  May  1993  specifically  to  provide  a  modem  vision 
and  strategic  leadership  on  health  and  safety.  This  recruitment,  however,  effectively 
demoted  the  previous  manager  to  an  assistant! 
Immediately  there  was  conflict  between  the  old  guard  and  the  new  regime.  The  new 
Health  and  Safety  Manager,  had  been  brought  in  with  the  same  job  title,  but  in  a 
more  senior  position.  Leaving  this  slight  aside  there  was  also  a  clear  conflict 
between  the  two  styles  of  management. 
The  existing  style  had  been  to  tell  rather  than  show;  to  be  hands-on  and  police  site 
safety  in  keeping  with  the  requirements  of  the  old  Factories  Acts.  This  was 
consistent  with  an  older  style  of  safety  management  (and  Personnel  Management) 
when  legislation  of  that  period  had  been  prescriptive.  By  contrast,  the  new  style 
focused  on  guidance,  support,  a  hands-off  approach  and  strategic  leadership. 
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Control  Manager,  while  his  predecessor  kept  his  title.  Responsibilities  were  split 
with  the  Risk  Control  Manager  having  a  more  strategic  group  role,  and  the  Health 
and  Safety  Manager  focusing  on  day  to  day  issues  at  Strathleven  and  Blythswood. 
In  this  period  J&B  also  commissioned  a  joint  team  from  Strathclyde  University  and 
Imperial  College  to  investigate  any  major  defects  in  safety  control  systems,  and  to 
suggest  actions  for  improvement.  This  work  took  place  in  late  1992  and  early  1993. 
The  main  conclusions  and  recommendations  of  this  joint  Universities'  report, 
published  in  draft  in  June  1993,  were, 
i)  Safety  management  required  a  strategic  lead  and  the  Executive  team 
should  set  safety  policy  and  commit  to  it. 
ii)  The  management  of  safety  should  be  fully  integrated  with  all  other 
management  systems,  and,  in  particular,  operations  should  take 
responsibility  for  their  own  safety 
iii)  The  Health  and  Safety  function  should  be  advisory  and  should  focus 
on  specialist  support  and  planning. 
iv)  The  Health  and  Safety  function  should  report  to  the  Quality  and 
Blends  Director  rather  than  the  Personnel  Director. 
v)  Additional  resources  should  be  brought  in  to  manage  health  and 
safety 
The  report  was  overly  complex  and  discursive  in  draft  form  and  was  finally  issued  in 
a  more  concise  style  in  March  1994.  The  company,  however,  adopted  the  principles 
behind  most  recommendations  and  began  implementing  many  of  them  immediately. 
1.5.2  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  AT  PROJECT  START  -  1993 
The  performance  of  the  research  study  reported  here  within  J&B  Scotland  was  one 
outcome  of  the  Strathclyde  report.  It  allowed  additional,  cost-effective  specialist 
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and  was  organised  within  the  Teaching  Company  Scheme. 
At  the  project  outset  there  was  a  Group  Risk  Manager  and  a  Health  and  Safety 
Manager  (Strathleven  &  Blythswood)  to  cover  health  and  safety  on  all  7  sites.  The 
Risk  Control  Function  as  it  had  been  renamed,  now  reported  to  the  Quality  and 
Blends  Director.  The  Universities'  report  had  suggested  this  because, 
i)  There  were  more  synergies  between  Health  and  Safety  and  a  modem  approach 
to  Quality  Management  than  with  Personnel  Management  even  though  this 
was  continuing  to  move  towards  a  more  "human  resource"  dimension. 
ii)  It  had  the  desired  effect  of  bringing  Health  and  Safety  close  to  production. 
iii)  In  J&B,  the  Quality  Management  systems  were  relatively  mature,  and  were 
accredited  and  audited  under  ISO  and,  although  there  was  currently  no  safety 
management  system,  there  was  some  recognition  that  occupational  health  and 
safety  was  a  critical  management  area. 
iv)  The  Quality  function  had  independence  from  Operations,  and  this  was 
essential  when  functional  priorities  clashed.  It  had  not  been  deemed 
appropriate  to  place  safety  management  in  the  Operations  Department  at  that 
time  as  the  functional  director  without  experience  and  knowledge  could  be 
presented  with  a  conflict  of  interests. 
v)  Placing  health  and  safety  with  the  Quality  team  also  created  immediate 
movement  in  the  system  based  on  the  momentum  acquired  in  the  ISO 
accreditation  drive. 
In  response  to  the  Universities'  Report,  a  new  Health  and  Safety  Advisor  had  been 
appointed  and  trained  to  NEBOSH  Certificate  level  at  the  Distilleries,  and  a  part- 
time  Safety  Co-ordinator  trained  at  Blythswood.  These  roles  were  intended  to 
provide  locally  accessible  advice  and  co-ordination  of  health  and  safety.  There  were 
safety  committees  in  place  at  each  of  Strathleven,  Blythswood,  and  a  joint  committee 
for  the  four  Distilleries  fed  by  four  local  groups. Other  external  consultants  also  provided  specialist  advice  over  the  years  as  and  when 
required.  Typically  this  might  be  for  a  noise  survey,  although  there  had  also  been  a 
communications  survey  in  1992  which  produced  little  observable  effect  -  probably 
because  it  simply  reported  rather  than  offered  guidance  or  direction. 
1.5.3  OVERVIEW  OF  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  IN 
THE  PROJECT  PERIOD  (1993-1997) 
When  the  research  project  started,  the  strategy  of  the  new  Risk  Control  Manager  was 
a  mixture  of  acceptance  of  the  existing,  functional  system  and  a  desire  to  manage 
health  and  safety  in  a  systematic  manner  with  implementation  and  responsibility 
being  taken  at  a  local  level.  This  was  significantly  different  from  the  previous 
reactive,  involved  way  of  managing  safety. 
It  was  fortunate  that,  in  this  period,  the  original  Health  and  Safety  Manager  chose  to 
stay  on  with  the  company  to  assist  in  the  period  of  transition  despite  his  personal 
feelings.  In  January  1995,  however,  he  announced  that  he  would  retire  from  the 
company  in  June  creating  a  further  need  and  opportunity  for  change  on  the 
Strathleven  site.  Instead  of  replacing  him  directly,  5  part-time  safety  co-ordinators 
each  having  Health  and  Safety  responsibility  as  part  of  their  work  function  were 
appointed.  The  co-ordinators  (all  middle  management  level)  were  allocated  a  section 
or  zone  of  the  site  and  had  day  to  day  responsibility  for  co-ordinating  health  and 
safety  in  this  area  as  well  as  their  own  Departments. 
This  exemplified  the  early  stages  of  the  process  of  transferring  health  and  safety 
responsibility  clearly  from  the  specialist  function  to  the  general  line  managers  and 
their  workforce.  The  safety  co-ordinators  reported  directly  to  their  functional  line 
management  on  all  other  issues,  creating  the  first  stages  of  ownership.  The  co- 
ordinators  were  trained  to  provide  them  with  enough  expertise  to  give  their  line 
management  specific  advice  and  legislative  interpretation  where  required.  The 
individuals  selected  for  the  roles  by  the  Risk  Control  Manager  and  Health  and  Safety 
Manager  were  all  in  line  management  positions  and  had  skills  and  commitment  that 
suggested  they  would  be  suitable  for  the  roles.  The  initial  co-ordinators  selected 
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Laboratories  &  Offices  (1) 
Training  was  provided  for  the  safety  co-ordinators  in  the  period  before  the  Health 
and  Safety  Manager's  departure,  and  then  further  support  was  provided  until  they 
were  confident  to  take  on  more  and  more  of  the  responsibility.  At  the  same  time,  new 
initiatives  were  developed  both  to  assess  areas  of  deficiency  in  safety  systems  (if  not 
safety  behaviour)  and  to  reinforce  this  through  incorporation  within  the  management 
incentive  scheme. 
Strategic  lead  was  provided  from  the  central  Risk  Control  function  by  the  Risk 
Control  Manager  and  the  researcher.  Each  site  now  had  specialist  health  and  safety 
resource  in  place  to  implement  strategy,  and  co-ordinate  day  to  day  issues. 
In  January  1997,  two  years  after  the  original  Health  and  Safety  Manager  retired  and 
with  the  same  structure  in  place  the  Risk  Control  Manager  left  the  company  and  the 
researcher  was  promoted  to  the  position  of  Risk  Manager.  At  this  stage  the  remit  of 
the  Risk  Department  was  widened  to  cover  all  aspects  of  Risk  Management  to  reflect 
her  background.  In  addition  to  health  and  safety,  the  department  now  also  had 
responsibility  for  business  interruption  and  recovery,  environmental  management, 
crisis  management,  product  safety  and  liability  insurance.  This  extended  and  very 
comprehensive  remit  was  to  be  managed  by  one  person. 
To  compound  this  workload,  in  July  1997,  the  Security  Manager  was  offered  early 
retirement.  When  he  left,  Security  transferred  to  the  Quality  function  from  Personnel 
and  the  Risk  Manager  was  given  responsibility  for  Security  management  for  the 
group,  and  direct  line  management  responsibility  for  the  Security  team.  With  this 
transfer,  all  aspects  of  risk  fell  within  the  remit  of  one  functional  director  of  the 
business  -  Quality  -  and  all  but  Product  Quality  was  the  responsibility  of  the  Risk 
Manager.  On  the  bright  side,  this  allowed  all  aspects  of  risk  management,  including 
health  and  safety  to  be  fully  integrated. 
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change  of  shift  patterns  at  Strathleven,  and  as  a  result  an  additional  safety  co- 
ordinator  was  appointed  at  Strathleven.  At  the  end  of  1997,  a  graduate  in  Risk 
Management  was  recruited  to  provide  additional  support  to  the  Risk  Manager  and  to 
the  site  Safety  Co-ordinators.  At  the  other  sites,  a  Safety  Advisor  was  still  in  place  at 
the  Distilleries,  and  although  there  had  been  a  personnel  change  in  Safety  Advisor 
for  the  Blythswood  and  Bonhill  sites,  this  individual  was  also  trained  to  the 
necessary  level.  As  before,  the  central  Risk  Management  function  provides  strategic 
lead  and  support  to  all  seven  sites  on  all  aspects  of  risk  management. 
1.6  MANAGING  SAFETY  IN  A  FLUX 
The  extent  of  change  within  the  Risk  function  of  J&B  Scotland,  described  above, 
was  typical  for  all  functional  areas  within  the  business.  During  the  study  period 
there  were  many  further  changes,  some  planned,  but  many  others  as  a  result  of 
numerous  organisational  and  personnel  changes.  This  constant  flux  of  change  - 
particularly  at  senior  management  level  -is  a  distinctive  feature  of  the  study  and 
would  appear  to  be  typical  of  much  of  the  industry  in  the  period.  The  company 
constantly  evolved,  it  restructured  and  key  personnel  and  policies  changed.  Against 
that  backdrop,  the  researcher  aimed  to  design  an  effective  safety  management  system 
that  incorporated  positive  performance  measures  to  aid  continuous  improvement. 
This  system  had  to  be  flexible  so  that  it  evolved  as  the  company  changed,  but  also 
had  to  maintain  consistency  in  standards  and  commitment. 
The  process  of  planning  and  managing  change  within  companies  has  been  studied 
and  there  exist  plenty  of  more  or  less  theoretical  commentaries  and  a  few  analyses  of 
case  histories.  Typically  a  case  study  might  consider  the  introduction  of  new 
technology  and  would  consider  the  stages  of  identifying  need,  planning  the  change, 
implementing  the  process  of  change  and  auditing/modifying  as  required. 
There  proved  to  be  little  of  immediate  value  from  a  review  of  the  literature  of 
management  change.  When  the  project  started  no  company  in  the  UK  had 
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project  differed  fundamentally  from  many  of  the  change  processes  that  were 
reported.  Clearly  there  was  a  need  to  develop  a  strategic  plan  that  defined  and 
integrated  all  the  components  of  the  final  system.  Clearly  also,  the  process  of 
introducing  an  all  pervading  safety  management  system  would  require  both 
involvement  of  the  staff  in  defining  ways  and  means  of  doing  things  safely  and  the 
conversion  of  so-called  opinion  leaders  who  could  be  persuaded  to  lead  the  changes. 
Both  of  these  are  presented  in  literature  as  key  components  of  change  management, 
but  already  formed  part  of  the  implicit  structure  of  changing  safety  performance 
because  of  the  human  nature  of  the  problem.  It  was  also  clear  that  the  work  had  to 
be  in-house.  It  would  be  impossible  to  develop  a  system  that  impacted  correctly  and 
continuously  throughout  the  organisation  if  it  were  imposed  by  an  external  agent. 
These  lessons  had  already  been  learned  in  the  development  of  the  quality  systems. 
Perhaps  the  only  flavour  that  was  added  to  the  planned  recipe  was  the  alternation  of 
theoretical  training  with  practical  learning  to  ensure  transmission  of  knowledge  and 
skills,  but  that,  too  was  implicit  in  the  involvement  of  the  staff  in  the  change. 
Ultimately,  therefore,  little  of  real  value  was  learned  from  the  review. 
1.7  SUMMARY 
This  thesis  records  research  in  action: 
i)  In  an  industrial  framework  characterised  by  change.  Change  in 
organisation,  change  in  senior  staff  and  their  methods,  in  short  and  long 
term  strategic  plans  and  in  the  resources  prioritised  to  the  Occupational 
Health  and  Safety  function. 
ii)  In  an  organisation  (IDV)  dominated  by  marketing  needs  where  the 
immediate  production  priorities  could  change  on  a  daily  basis. 
In  these  interesting  times  management  of  health  and  safety  was  developed  and 
successfully  integrated  into  the  operational  management  of  the  Company.  A 
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but  loses  the  effort  ! 
1.8  STRUCTURE  OF  THESIS 
This  thesis  is  essentially  split  into  3  parts  and  a  conclusion.  The  first  part  considers 
safety  management  systems  and  their  implementation  within  J&B  Scotland.  It  is 
important  to  note  that  this  work  pre-dated  publication  of  the  new  British  Standard 
BS8800. 
The  second  part  considers  a  number  of  safety  performance  measures  and  assesses  the 
utility  of  different  techniques.  Utility,  in  the  real  world,  is  unity  for  Operational 
Management  and  Production  Managers  -  and  this  is  the  test  applied  to  each 
technique. 
The  third  part  considers  people  and  their  participation  in  the  development  and 
enforcement  of  safety  management  systems.  It  discusses  methods  by  which  to 
involve  and  engage  employees  in  a  safety  management  program. 
Finally,  the  J&B  Scotland  system  is  summarised  and  both  positive  aspects  and 
deficiencies  are  discussed.  A  brief  plan  is  outlined  that  could  be  used  at  the  start  of  a 
new  safety  management  program.  This  plan  outlines  the  key  aspects  to  implement 
and  discusses  why  each  of  these  aspects  is  critical  to  safety  management.  Clearly, 
much  would  depend  on  the  state  of  the  company's  existing  systems  and  a  pick  and 
mix  philosophy  might  seem  possible.  It  is  axiomatic,  however,  that  the  system  is 
developed  as  a  whole  and  it  would  be  unwise  to  pin  together  disparate  items  to  form 
the  final  system  -  even  though,  practically,  that  would  be  necessary  in  the  early 
stages. 
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2.1  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  AND  ITS  RELATIONSHIP  TO  QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT 
2.1.1  INTRODUCTION 
Central  to  the  process  of  change  that  was  planned  for  J&B  was  the  relationship  with 
quality  management.  Driven  by  the  need  to  bring  safety  close  to  production,  but 
thwarted  by  the  practicalities  of  deficient  safety  knowledge  and  awareness  in  the 
operations  management,  quality  was  an  apparently  natural  home.  The  relationship 
was  also  justified  on  the  grounds  that  it  gave  safety  an  executive  level  champion  (the 
Quality  Director)  with  an  enthusiasm  for  change  and  experience  in  implementation 
and  it  was  hoped  that  safety  could  ride  piggy  back  on  the  quality  structures  and  gain 
from  the  momentum  of  the  quality  process.  How  useful  was  this  relationship? 
Those  who  are  committed  to  Total  Quality  Management  (TQM)  believe  that  Safety 
Management  is  encompassed  within  their  philosophy,  along  with  all  other  types  of 
management.  Although  there  are  indeed  significant  overlaps  and  synergies  between 
safety  and  quality  management,  there  are  also  critical  differences.  In  fact,  there  may 
be  considerable  conflict  between  the  needs  of  safety  management  and  those  of  quality 
management. 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  common  management  process  of  implementing,  recording, 
monitoring  and  controlling  of  processes  is  shared  by  safety  management  and  TQM, 
and  therefore  safety  is  fully  encompassed  by  the  TQM  philosophy.  At  a  practical 
level,  however,  specific  references  to  safety  management  are  rarely  made  within 
literature  designed  for  practitioners  of  quality  management.  If  safety  were  implicit 
within  practical  TQM,  then  it  would  be  expected  to  appear  in  such  texts. 
For  example,  quality  is  defined  by  different  authors 
`Conformance  to  agreed  customer  requirements'  (Crosby) 
0  `Fitness  for  purpose  or  use'  (Juran) 
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ability  to  satisfy  stated  or  implied  needs'  BS  4778  (1987) 
"  `Total  composite  product  and  service  characteristics  of  marketing,  engineering, 
manufacture,  and  maintenance  through  which  the  product  and  service  in  use  will 
meet  the  expectation  by  the  customer'  (Feigenbaum) 
In  none  of  these  is  safety  mentioned.  Only  in  the  last  definition  by  Feigenbaum  could 
safety  be  implied  within  the  engineering  and  manufacture  terms.  Even  here,  however, 
the  last  clause  emphasises  the  customer's  view  and  it  is  unlikely  that  a  customer  for  a 
hard  product  will  place  much  importance  on  a  supplier's  internal  safety  performance 
except  as  it  impacts  on  delivery  time.  Where  a  service  is  offered  there  might  be  more 
emphasis  on  safe  provision  -  for  example  a  building  contractor's  performance  might 
be  checked,  but  that  is  not  explicit  in  these  classical  definitions  of  quality. 
One  argument  why  this  is  so  is  that  there  is  strong  pressure  to  limit  the  scope  of 
quality  management  systems  so  that  the  chances  of  non-compliance  and,  hence,  of 
incurring  the  penalty  of  losing  accreditation  are  reduced.  If  Safety  Management  were 
seen  as  an  essential  component  in  the  achievement  of  TQM,  it  would  be  a  mandatory 
part  of  the  accreditation  of  a  quality  system  whereas,  in  practical  quality  management, 
extraneous  or  difficult  areas  may  in  fact  be  ignored.  Safety  management  appears  to 
fall  into  one  or  other  of  these  areas,  and  is  therefore  excluded. 
2.1.2  CONFLICT  BETWEEN  SAFETY  AND  QUALITY  MANAGEMENT 
Practical  Total  Quality  Management  is  essentially  about  the  product  and  the 
management  of  production.  As  would  be  expected  in  a  production  environment,  all 
systems  are  focused  on  the  needs  of  the  customer  in  respect  of  the  provision  of  a 
quality  product.  As  a  contrast  to  this,  safety  management  relates  instead  to  the  process 
of  operation  and  the  safety  of  people  working  within  the  production  process.  Often 
there  may  actually  be  conflict  between  the  needs  of  production  and  the  safety  of  the 
work  force. 
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production  or  safety  process  and  the  costs  of  those  failures  to  the  company.  It 
revolves  around  the  impetus  that  drives  product  quality  and  safety,  the  ability  to 
control  both  outputs  and  the  question  whether  they  have  equal  access  to  funds  in  a 
commercial  environment  -  the  true  conflict. 
2.1.2.1  Levels  of  acceptable  failure 
An  organisation  can  aim  for  total  quality,  but  not  at  total  safety.  It  is  possible  that  in  a 
total  quality  environment,  a  situation  can  be  achieved  where  there  are  zero  defects  in 
terms  of  the  product  specification.  This  is  possible  because  improvements  in  the 
quality  of  a  product  are  driven  by  the  requirements  and  resources  of  the  customer,  and 
therefore  it  is  possible  to  improve  processes  so  that  these  needs  are  met. 
It  is,  on  the  other  hand,  unrealistic  to  aim  for  zero  accidents  in  any  environment.  It  is 
most  unlikely  that  any  individual  will  'intend'  to  have  an  accident,  but  in  any  situation 
where  people  are  present,  there  will  be  mistakes  -  'to  err  is  human'.  In  any  event  it  is 
clear  that  many  accidents  have  little  relationship  to  human  error  in  the  simple  sense 
(Section  4.2) 
The  automation  of  a  plant  may,  for  example,  reduce  the  number  of  accidents  that 
occur  as  there  are  fewer  people  involved  in  the  production  process  -  replaced  by 
machinery  and  with  equipment.  This  will  not  however,  eliminate  all  accidents,  it  will 
instead  alter  the  nature  of  the  accidents  -a  higher  proportion  will  now  be  related  to 
repair,  maintenance  and  change-over,  and  will  shift  away  from  production  and 
operational  activities  (Parry,  1994). 
The  effect  on  quality  however  of  automating  a  plant  is  that,  with  enough  capital 
investment,  quality  errors  can  realistically  be  reduced  to  zero,  although  it  may  not  be 
economically  viable  to  do  so.  At  the  same  time,  it  has  to  be  recognised  that  as  humans 
are  also  responsible  for  the  design  and  operation  of  automated  plant  this  may  limit  the 
ability  of  the  plant  to  produce  at  zero  defects.  The  difference  is,  however,  clear  and 
becomes  clearer  when  profit  and  loss  are  considered. 
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company.  Safety  on  the  other  hand  is  driven  by  the  needs  of  the  employees  and  by 
statutory  legislation  and  to  some  extent  by  the  sense  of  moral  obligation  of  the 
company  to  these  employees.  Minimum  standards  of  safety  are  legal  requirements, 
and  therefore  mandatory.  Above  this  minimum  requirement,  it  is  the  choice  of  the 
company  and  here  there  is  some  equivalence  with  quality,  because  quality  standards 
are  not  mandatory  requirements  although  consideration  of  safety  issues  such  as 
flammability  of  toys  are  required  to  protect  the  consumer.  Companies  will  aim  for 
different  shares  of  the  market  -  low  quality,  medium  or  premium  quality  -  and 
consistent  production  of  a  product  to  cost  and  to  the  quality  and  specifications 
required  by  the  customer  are  probably  the  most  important  aspects  of  quality 
management.  The  company  will  also  have  to  ensure  the  safety  of  the  product  insofar 
as  they  wish  to  have  a  'due  diligence'  defence  against  any  claims,  and  this  too  will  be 
provided  with  resources,  not  because  it  brings  a  return  on  investment,  but  because  it 
minimises  loss.  This  is  exactly  the  case  with  safety  -  often  called  loss  prevention. 
It  has  to  be  recognised  that  as  expenditure  on  safety  increases,  the  standard  will 
improve  until  a  point  where  any  further  expenditure  will  only  bring  a  marginal 
improvement  or  no  significant  improvement  at  all.  Expenditure  on  quality  will  also 
eventually  bring  only  a  marginal  improvement  after  a  certain  point,  but  it  may  be 
possible  to  eliminate  all  machinery  related  defects  by  increasing  investment.  The 
80/20  rule  applies  to  both,  but  for  products  the  option  exists  to  change  the  item  - 
humanity  may  be  cloned,  but  not  yet  altered! 
2.1.2.2  Ability  to  measure 
Typically  with  a  product,  goals  or  criteria  are  set  and  performance  is  measured  against 
them.  These  goals  are  set  depending  upon  the  ultimate  function  of  the  product  and  the 
requirements  of  the  customer  :  reliability,  meeting  of  all  specifications,  minimisation 
of  rejects  internally  or  externally.  For  physical  products,  it  will  be  possible  to  set  and 
measure  whatever  level  of  quality  is  selected.  In  the  service  industry,  this  is  rather 
more  difficult  as  critical  areas  are  transactions  with  people  -  for  example,  speed  of 
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Quality  Management  has  some  difficulty  in  addressing  this,  as  staff  attitudes  and 
customer  perceptions  become  the  independent  and  dependent  variables.  One  example 
may  be  that  in  a  bank,  one  customer  may  perceive  a  waiting  time  of  more  than  2 
minutes  unacceptable,  where  another  will  find  it  satisfactory  if  the  waiting  time  does 
not  exceed  10  minutes.  These  differences  in  attitude  will  also  exist  among  the 
employees  who  are  responsible  for  providing  the  service.  Typically  the  answer  is  to 
set  measures  that  are  related  to  quality,  but  are  physical.  This  may  be  the  number  of 
times  a  table  is  cleaned,  an  audit  of  the  use  of  standard  phrases,  a  smile  count  or  the 
amount  of  time  to  serve  a  customer. 
In  the  service  industry,  companies  are  trying  to  address  the  perception  of  individual 
customers,  and  the  behaviour  of  individual  employees.  There  is  commonality  here 
with  safety  management  where  failures  are  not  easily  observable,  require  subjective 
judgement  and  close  observation.  The  basis  of  quality  management,  however,  is  the 
setting  of  targets  and  observations  of  results  and,  by  definition,  product  quality  is 
observable.  Where  goals  are  defined  in  physical  terms,  the  techniques  of  quality 
management  are  appropriate  and  it  is  fortunate  for  the  Service  industries  that  the 
major  `perceptions'  of  quality  of  service  -  speed,  cheerfulness,  respect  and  remedying 
of  mistakes  -  are  well  documented  and  understood. 
In  safety,  where  not  all  failures  are  observable,  there  are  three  main  techniques  used  to 
measure  industrial  safety  performance. 
i)  Monitoring  is  generally  a  post  facto  measure  of  incidents  and  events 
ii)  Audit/rating  systems  assess  factors  that  are  claimed  to  be  indicators  of  safe 
working  systems 
iii)  Concentrated  behaviour  observation  over  short  time  scales  seeks  to  count 
unsafe  or  non-standard  actions  and,  hence,  to  predict  future  behaviour 
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appreciated  or  perhaps  fully  understood.  The  methods  are  complementary  and  will  all 
have  a  place  within  a  comprehensive  safety  management  system. 
Monitoring  either  provides  statistically  unstable  or  excessive  amounts  of  information. 
In  any  event,  although  'raw'  statistical  measures  are  useful  for  cross  company  or 
industry  bench  marking,  they  are  not  at  all  useful  for  line  managers  at  task  level 
because  of  the  time  required  for  stability.  Attempts  to  make  statistics  more  stable  by 
introducing  incidents  as  well  as  accidents  has  been  shown  to  introduce  bias  and 
requires  very  significant  resources  that  are  unlikely  to  be  available.  Often  it  is  very 
difficult  to  determine  the  link  between  cause  and  effect,  that  is,  cause  of  error  and 
incident  or  accident.  In  terms  of  human  processes,  errors  are  made  for  a  number  of 
reasons  -  lack  of  understanding,  training,  capability,  education,  intelligence, 
concentration-  and  the  specific  cause  of  an  accident  will  be  very  difficult  to  identify 
and  even  harder  to  eliminate.  By  contrast,  the  cause  and  effect  of  quality  failures  will 
be  readily  identifiable  and  measurable  and  the  corrective  action  easier  to  implement. 
The  corrective  action  for  quality  will  relate  to  materials,  equipment,  machinery  or 
some  other  tangible  source  rather  than  lack  of  concentration,  lack  of  co-ordination, 
laziness  or  poor  understanding. 
Rating  systems  (linked  to  audits)  on  the  other  hand  require  the  belief  that  factors  that 
are  measured  and  controlled  have  a  direct,  positive  impact  on  safety,  and  while  some 
factors  seem  intuitively  to  affect  safety,  others  have  no  direct  impact  and,  at  worst,  the 
factors  themselves  become  goals  or  checklists  without  impact.  Rating  systems  seek  to 
bring  about  safety  improvements  and  record,  measure  and  control  them,  and  they  may 
fail  if  the  measures  are  not  directly  linked  with  safety  performance.  They  do, 
however,  formalise  aspects  of  management  and  provide  a  framework  for 
improvement  of  safety.  Here,  there  is  a  similarity  between  safety  and  quality 
management.  In  quality  what  is  measured  must  also  be  tangible,  and  measurable,  and 
the  factors  measured  must  have  an  impact  on  quality  if  there  is  to  be  any  benefit. 
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has  clear  links  with  incidents  and  accidents  so  it  should  be  possible  to  determine  a 
distribution  function  for  unsafe  acts  and  extrapolate  it  to  accidents.  The  amount  of 
resource  that  this  requires  and  the  skill  needs  of  this  resource,  however,  make  this 
method  costly. 
It  is  clear  then  that  matters  concerned  with  product 
quality  will  be  measurable  whereas  factors  affecting 
What  is  observable  gets 
safety  are  rather  less  tangible  and  direct.  It  has  been  measured 
said  that  'what  gets  measured  gets  done',  but  it  is 
What  is  measured  gets 
equally  likely  that  what  is  observable  gets  measured.  done 
Certain  aspects  of  human  behaviour,  and  especially 
attitudes,  are  very  difficult  to  observe.  To  further  complicate  issues,  individuals  may 
have  flawed  attitudes  to  safety  or  limited  awareness  of  risks,  but  may  not  act  unsafely, 
or  may  have  positive  attitudes  or  awareness  of  risk  and  act  in  an  unsafe  manner  due  to 
external  pressures.  The  complexity  of  human  thought  and  behaviour  means  that  safety 
improvements  cannot  be  achieved  by  simply  treating  people  as  if  they  were  machines 
or  products  that  can  be  adjusted,  measured,  monitored  and  readjusted.  Humans  will 
not  respond  rationally  by  improving  their  safety  performance  in  a  logical  and 
predictable  manner,  if  performance  in  fact  improves  at  all  (Section  4.1) 
2.1.2.3  Ability  to  control 
Statistical  Process  Control  (SPC)  is  used  to  improve  the  quality  of  products  and  the 
efficiency  of  a  production  process.  In  SPC,  upper  and  lower  limits  are  set,  based,  say, 
on  the  volume  of  spirit  in  a  bottle,  and  all  products  that  fall  within  these  limits  are 
passed  or  acceptable.  Outwith  these  limits,  the  product  may  be  rejected  -  certainly  the 
process  will  be  investigated.  Obviously  there  are  a  number  of  attributes  that  can  be 
measured  in  this  manner  such  as  weight  of  a  product,  dimensions,  timing,  number 
produced  and  orders  met.  It  is  apparent  then,  that  SPC  can  be  comfortably  used  when 
it  monitors  a  process  that  can  be  measured  objectively,  but  it  does  not  fit  so 
comfortably  with  a  function  requiring  subjectivity.  It  is  even  the  case  that  although 
SPC  can  be  used  to  control  a  production  process  and  all  tangible  aspects  of  it,  there 
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amount  of  adhesive  used  or  the  legibility  of  print.  The  judgement  of  people  is  used  to 
pass  or  reject  in  these  cases  using  subjective  criteria  based  on  experience,  training  and 
psyche  because  automated  systems  lack  cost  effectiveness  at  present. 
It  is  obviously  very  difficult  to  apply  SPC  to  human  performance  and  behaviour.  For  a 
start,  not  all  human  errors  will  result  in  accidents  or  affect  a  product  and  therefore  may 
be  difficult  to  identify  and  assess.  The  only  errors  in  performance  that  will  be  captured 
will  be  those  with  high  visibility  -  such  as  injury  accidents  and  property  damage  -  and 
these  are  output  failures  rather  than  signs  that  limits  have  been  exceeded.  When  a 
measurable  product  attribute  goes  outwith  the  tolerated  upper  or  lower  limits, 
adjustments  are  made  to  bring  the  process  back  into  control.  This  can  be  accomplished 
by  the  adjustment  or  replacement  of  machinery  and,  while  there  may  be  some  items 
scrapped,  the  output  as  a  whole  does  not  contain  failures  The  obvious  difficulty  is  that 
of  not  only  measuring  human  performance  continuously,  but  also  identifying  when  it 
is  about  to  go  outwith  control  limits,  and  adjusting  it  when  it  does.  Errors  in  thought 
processes  cannot  be  measured,  so  safety  related  issues  will  only  be  captured  when 
they  have  resulted  in  unsafe  action,  and  perhaps  an  accident. 
A  first  problem  then  is  of  insensitive  control  limits.  The  second  is  of  limited  feed- 
back  ability.  If,  by  whatever  means,  a  deviation  in  safety  behaviour  is  noted  before  a 
failure  occurs,  how  can  corrective  measures  be  defined  and  taken?  This  requires  some 
understanding  of  human  behaviour  (Section  4.1) 
2.1.2.4  Visibility,  costs  and  insurance 
Safety  management  has  an  impact  on  processes  within  a  company,  or  'internal 
processes'.  Failures  in  safety  have  an  impact  internally,  and  this  may  result  in  delays 
to  production  or  other  processes,  but  these  delays  and  failures  will  not  be  visible  to  the 
external  customer.  In  certain  circumstances,  where  a  company  is  prosecuted  and 
receives  media  attention,  this  will  be  visible  externally  as  well.  Quality  failures 
however,  will  be  visible  both  internally  and  externally.  A  sub-standard  product  will  be 
visible  within  the  process  (and  perhaps  rejected),  but  if  it  reaches  the  customer,  it  will 
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internal  impact  and  indirect  external  impact,  whereas  quality  failures  have  visibility 
and  direct  impact  both  internally  and  externally. 
One  of  the  reasons  that  priority  is  placed  upon  the  management  of  quality  is  the 
potential  impact  of  poor  quality  on  the  customer,  customer  relations,  profitability  and 
also  on  public  image.  Also,  and  for  obvious  reasons,  as  a  production  company,  the 
production  and  delivery  of  a  quality  product  is  paramount.  Resources,  therefore,  will 
be  used  to  ensure  that  what  is  seen  in  the  external  marketplace  is  to  the  correct 
specifications. 
It  is  very  seldom  that  safety  failures  affect  the  marketing  or  sales  ability  of  the 
organisation.  At  the  limit,  there  may  be  some  market  reluctance  arising  from  a 
catastrophic  failure  in  safety  -  for  example  with  Exxon  Valdez,  Union  Carbide  at 
Bhopal  and  others  -  but  it  is  only  very  severe  events  or  a  series  of  major  failings  that 
will  influence  the  market  and  corporate  reputation.  By  contrast,  a  failure  of  quality  or 
alleged  contamination  has  had  severe  impact  on  individual  products  and  on  the 
companies  that  produce  them,  for  example  Perrier  Water,  Johnson  &  Johnson,  and 
Dow  Corning.  Safety  management  on  the  other  hand  may  only  avoid  financial  loss 
rather  than  generate  additional  return  on  investment,  but  it  does  save  lives  and  reduce 
human  suffering.  An  additional  problem  here  is  that  much  of  human  cost  cannot  be  (or 
is  not)  quantified.  Whereas  the  loss  of  a  plant  or  of  stocks  can  naturally  be  covered 
under  a  risk  management  programme,  many  of  the  effects  of  the  injury  or  death  of  an 
individual  will  not. 
There  is  also  a  commonly  held  perception  that  failures  in  safety  can  be  and  are  insured 
against,  but  failures  in  quality  cannot  be  covered,  thus  increasing  the  requirement  to 
get  it  'right  first  time'.  To  address  the  issue  of  insurance  first  of  all  let  us  consider  an 
event  that  crosses  the  product  quality  cut-off  -a  reject  -  and  the  safety  cut-off  -  an 
accident/injury. 
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(injuries,  claims);  and  property  insurance  will  cover  all  aspects  of  property  damage 
(buildings,  vehicles,  equipment).  Quality  failures  within  production  are  not,  on  the 
other  hand,  insurable  and  the  company  retains  all  the  costs  of  frozen  stock  and  rework. 
In  product  liability  insurance,  the  cover  will  often  exclude  product  recall  costs.  These 
internalised  losses  due  to  failures  in  quality  will  appear  to  the  shareholder  as  a 
reduction  in  profit,  or  increased  overheads. 
The  attitude  to  and  management  of  safety  and  quality  failures,  may  relate  in  part  to 
this  perception  that  safety  failures  can  be  recovered  externally  and  quality  failures 
cannot.  Less  emphasis  may  be  placed  upon  safety,  firstly  because  the  penalty  for 
deteriorating  performance,  in  terms  of  increased  premium,  will  come  later  in  time  and 
secondly,  because  this  penalty  may  not  be  significant  -  premiums  are  based  on  an 
industry  or  group  average  performance.  It  may,  thus,  be  difficult  to  gain  advantage  by 
a  reduction  in  premiums  for  an  improved  performance  due  to  the  effect  of  averages 
and,  for  a  less  than  average  company,  it  is  effective  to  `insure'  against  safety  losses. 
Set  against  this  perception  is  the  fact  that  insurance  cover  does  not  and  will  not  cover 
all  aspects  of  safety  losses.  The  vast  majority  may  be  left  unclaimed  and  therefore  are 
a  drain  upon  a  company.  Research  of  losses  at  J&B  and  by  other  studies  suggest  that 
at  least  80%  of  loss  is  uninsured  (Heinrich  1959;  Bird  1976;  HSE  1993;  HSE  1997). 
In  Employers  Liability,  the  following  costs  are  not  insured  or  insurable  :  fines;  lost 
time;  investigation  time;  lost  production  time;  replacement  labour  costs;  fixed  costs; 
training  and  re-skilling  costs.  Therefore,  every  time  there  is  an  injury  accident,  the 
majority  of  the  costs  are  retained  by  the  company,  often  without  its  knowledge.  On  the 
property  side,  there  may  be  an  excess  on  the  policy  and  in  J&B  this  is  £25,000.  That 
is,  the  company  will  have  to  pay  the  first  £25,000  of  each  and  every  damage  incident 
cost,  and  the  insurer  will  cover  the  risk  above  this  limit.  The  annual  Employer's 
Liability  premium  was  £70,462.  Analysis  by  the  researcher  in  J&B  of  the  dispersion 
of  claims  and  losses  shows  that  the  majority  of  losses  fall  below  this  threshold  which 
means  that  the  company  is  retaining  the  risk  and  costs  of  a  significant  proportion  of 
damage  losses. 
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A  crucial  part  of  the  conflict  between  safety  and  production,  is  that  improved  quality 
has  the  ability  to  increase  profitability  and  ensure  the  continued  existence  of  the 
company,  whereas  improved  safety  will  only  limit  losses.  Brehmer  has  discussed 
safety  management  at  senior  levels  within  companies  (Brehmer,  1993).  Citing 
Prospect  Theory,  he  suggests  there  will  be  intrinsic  bias  against  safety  and  towards 
production/  quality  goals  because, 
i)  Loss  is  emphasised  over  gain. 
ii)  The  more  immediate  the  loss,  the  greater  the  emphasis. 
iii)  Certainty  is  preferentially  selected  over  uncertainty. 
The  theory  suggests  that,  when  presented  with  a  choice  of  loss  or  gain  with  limited 
resource,  losses  are  focused  upon  and  if  that  loss  is  one  that  will  be  suffered 
immediately,  or  in  the  near  future,  it  is  seen  as  even  more  important  or  critical  than 
one  that  will  occur  in  the  distant  future.  Prospect  theory  also  proposes  that  when 
presented  with  the  choice  of  certainty  over  uncertainty,  people  are  inclined  to  select 
certainty.  Considering  the  effect  on  safety,  it  is  suggested  that  expenditure  on  safety 
management  will  be  seen  as  an  immediate  loss  compared  to  investment  on  production, 
and  that  safety  gains  are  not  only  uncertain,  but  in  the  future.  Safety  gains  are,  in  real 
terms,  losses  that  have  been  avoided  or  limited,  and  are  therefore  both  deferred  and 
exponentially  limited. 
In  most  instances  in  industry,  there  is  intense  competition  for  funding  between 
organisational  functions  and  the  disadvantages  to  production  of  increased  spending  on 
safety  will  almost  always  be  more  firmly  and  immediately  quantified,  than  the  long 
terms  benefits  that  may  be  gained.  The  uncertainty  of  any  improvement  in  safety  and 
any  return  in  financial  terms,  where  there  has  been  an  increased  investment,  causes 
difficulty  in  the  justification  of  such  an  investment.  As  discussed,  where  production 
can  increase  profitability  of  an  organisation,  safety  can  only  limit  loss  and  the  term 
loss  control  is  often  used  because  enhanced  safety  can  only  provide  savings  that 
approach  a  limit  defined  by  loss  due  to  unsafe  actions.  Naturally,  companies  will  tend 
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safety  management  as  an  onerous  legal  requirement  that  removes  resources  from  this 
effort.  It  must  be  emphasised  that  this  is  not  to  suggest  some  sort  of  criminality:  an 
organisation  exists  to  produce,  but  it  does  mean  that  the  incentive  to  manage  safety 
will  be  different  from  that  of  quality  within  an  organisation. 
Given  that  Total  Quality  Management  will  usually  be  based  within  the  production 
function  or  similar  whereas  safety  can  be  found  in  various  places  within  the 
organisational  structure  (often  Personnel),  it  will  be  seen  that  there  is  an  underlying 
bias  against  expenditure  on  safety.  This  bias  will  not  be  corrected  by  the  simple 
incorporation  of  safety  within  TQM;  it  has  to  be  explicitly  addressed  and  fully 
incorporated  at  a  functional  and  operational  level. 
2.1.3  COHESION  OR  SIMILARITIES  BETWEEN  SAFETY  AND  QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT 
For  all  that  has  been  said  on  the  considerable  differences  and  conflicts  between  safety 
management  and  quality  management,  there  is  also  a  great  deal  of  cohesion.  It  has 
been  suggested  by  the  Health  and  Safety  Executive  that  companies  should  use  the 
models  for  quality  management  upon  which  to  develop  a  structured  safety 
management  system  and  this  is  good  advice.  A  systematic  approach  to  safety 
management  as  taken  with  quality  management  can  have  many  benefits  in  terms  of 
consistency  of  approach,  avoidance  of  the  duplication  of  resources,  and  prevention  of 
gaps  in  treatment  of  safety  issues.  That  last  point  is  of  particular  importance  as  it  is 
for  any  situations  where  there  is  reliance  on  the  vagaries  of  human  behaviour. 
Here,  then,  the  arguments  can  be  framed  in  terms  of 
i)  the  benefits  of  a  unified,  systems  approach, 
ii)  the  synergy  that  should  exist  between  all  forms  of  good  management  that 
increases  profits, 
iii)  the  very  substantial  similarities  in  administrative  techniques  employed  and 
the  enthusiasm  that  can  be  generated  to  do  a  better  job. 
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within  management  and  TQM  should,  if  an  honest  system,  encompass  safety 
management  within  its  remit.  In  common,  therefore,  with  other  management  systems 
there  should  be  mechanisms  to  set  and  react  to  targets  and  respond  to  non 
conformances.  There  should  be  cost  savings  arising  from  integration  of  training  and 
from  the  same  areas  that  TQM  claims  to  target  -  lost  time,  lost  production  etc.. 
Finally,  the  drive  for  continuous  improvement  that  is  central  to  TQM  is  also  very 
appropriate  for  safety  management. 
In  J&B  it  was  recognised  that  these  were  the  main  benefits  to  be  gained  from  the 
location  of  the  risk  function  within  the  Quality  Group.  Thoughts  of  applying  the  hard 
numeric  techniques  of  SPC  would  take  second  place  to  developing  the  administrative 
framework  of  policies  and  procedures  and  populating  it  with  ways  of  working  that 
would  be  developed  by  those  who  both  produced  and  bore  the  risk  -  the  operational 
workforce. 
2.1.4  DEVELOPING  A  PROACTIVE  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  SYSTEM  IN  J&B 
2.1.4.1  Need 
The  approach  to  health  and  safety  within  J&B  Scotland  prior  to  1994  was  very 
traditional,  more  reactive  than  proactive  and  based  more  on  the  performance  of 
machines  than  of  humans.  There  was  little  documentation  or  consistency  in  the 
management  of  health  and  safety  across  sites  or  departments,  and  problems  were  dealt 
with  as  they  arose,  rather  than  in  advance  through  strategic  planning.  The  traditional 
role  of  the  safety  specialist  was  that  of  a  policeman  for  when  things  had  already  gone 
wrong,  rather  than  as  a  planner  and  advisor  on  continuous  improvement. 
Chronological  Order  of  Events 
1977  Health  and  Safety  Manager  appointed  in  an  enforcement  role. 
1987  Strathleven  Bonded  Warehouses  taken  over  by  IDV 
1992  Risk  Control  Manager  appointed  into  strategic  role. 
1993  Initial  study  by  Strathclyde  University 
1994-1997  Study  period  -  development  of  safety  management  system  and  case 
studies. 
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a  review  of  safety  across  the  company  revealed  that  a  formal,  structured  safety 
management  system  would  be  beneficial  in  many  ways.  The  audit  aimed  to  evaluate 
the  current  position  of  safety,  and  to  determine  what  improvements  were  required  to 
advance  the  standard  of  health  and  safety  in  the  short,  medium  and  long  term.  It  was 
determined  that  a  structured  system  would  help  to  avoid  gaps  in  safety  coverage, 
either  between  departments  or  between  sites,  and  prevent  the  duplication  of  resources 
allocated  to  safety  management  in  terms  of  time  or  finance.  A  consistent  approach  to 
safety  across  the  company  would  ensure  that  standards  and  systems  were  uniform.  In 
fact,  a  system  covering  all  sites  was  intended  to  encourage  closer  working 
relationships  between  the  safety  personnel  at  each  site,  including  the  sharing  of  'best 
practice'  and  resources.  This  was  a  very  important  aspect  -  safety  is  allocated  fairly 
limited  resources  as  it  is  not  generally  viewed  as  a  contributor  to  the  profitability  of 
the  organisation.  Even  in  proactive  organisations,  safety  has  a  difficult  task  in 
convincing  management  that  it  is  worthwhile  investing  in  the  minimisation  of  loss, 
when  resources  can  alternatively  be  invested  in  production  and  a  more  certain  return 
on  investment. 
Without  a  formal  system  to  deal  with  safety  within  the  company,  when  safety 
personnel  changed  the  treatment  of  safety  changed,  losing  consistency  of  approach 
and  reporting.  When  personnel  left  the  company  their  expert  knowledge  was  lost.  A 
written  system  was  intended  to  provide  continuity  and  transfer  of  information  without 
being  rigid  and  inflexible,  the  system  acting  as  a  reference  book  for  company  safety 
policies,  standards  and  procedures  to  follow.  This  clear  communication  of  the 
company's  treatment  of  safety  was  intended  to  be  available  to  all  personnel,  as  it  had 
never  been  previously.  Inconsistency  had  led  to  disagreements  between  employees 
under  different  managers,  in  different  departments  and  across  sites  as  some  were 
operating  at  basic  minimum  legal  compliance,  and  some  at  higher  standards. 
Another  perspective  was  that  executives  could  now  be  prosecuted  as  individuals  for 
'corporate  manslaughter'  due  to  their  criminal  negligence  of  Health  and  Safety  duties. 
Managers  can  be  made  personally  liable  for  any  failures  in  these  obligations,  without 
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charged  with  'corporate  manslaughter'  receive  suspended  sentences  and  substantial 
fines  from  personal  assets,  a  Managing  Director  in  the  UK  was  recently  sentenced  to 
three  years  imprisonment  following  the  trends  in  the  USA  (OLL,  1994).  It  is  likely 
that  this  is  a  precedent  that  will  be  followed.  An  effective  Safety  Management  System 
can  provide  evidence  that  the  senior  management  and  executive  within  J&B  are 
committed  to  and  active  in  health  and  safety.  It  is  also  the  case  that  effective 
management  of  safety  will  enable  the  prevention  of  a  serious  accident,  or  in  the  event 
of  such  an  accident  occurring  a  visible,  proactive  attempt  to  manage  as  safely  as 
possible  can  protect  the  corporate  image  from  damage. 
From  a  defensibility  perspective,  the  prior  regime  had  very  little  documentation  and 
therefore  little  evidence  in  event  of  a  court  case.  An  effective  safety  management 
system  can  be  used  towards  a  defence  in  court  in  event  of  an  unforeseen  liability  or 
negligence  claim.  Clear  record  keeping  procedures  and  systems  act  as  proof  of 
compliance  to  legislation  and  codes  of  practice.  They  are,  however,  hostages  to 
fortune  if  not  usable  and  used. 
The  design,  development  and  implementation  of  the  safety  management  system  would 
raise  the  profile  of  safety  in  the  eyes  of  the  work  force  and  increase  the  feeling  of 
ownership  of  safety  within  the  company.  It  would,  therefore,  be  a  safety  initiative  in 
itself. 
It  was  intended  that  all  personnel  on  site  would  take  responsibility  for  their  actions 
and  decisions  in  relation  to  safety  using  the  concept  of  'safety  on  the  line  by  the  line'. 
This  would  be  achieved  by  incorporation  of  safety  units  and  safe  systems  into  the 
training  of  all  new  personnel  and  into  the  refresher  training  of  existing  personnel.  This 
training  would  be  fully  documented  enabling  it  to  be  updated  regularly.  The  active 
involvement  of  employees  and  management  from  the  developmental  stage  of  the 
system  onwards  would  also  increase  understanding  and  commitment  to  safety. 
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A  good  opportunity  to  design  and  implement  a  new  safety  management  system  existed 
when  the  Risk  Control  Department  was  undergoing  redesign.  It  could  be  relatively 
cost-effective  as  the  resources  for  developing  the  system  already  existed  within  J&B. 
When  the  company  originally  achieved  accreditation  to  the  quality  standard  ISO  9002 
in  1992,  safety  was  not  specifically  included  in  the  system,  and  often  the  contents  of 
the  quality  system  contravened  legal  requirements  and  or  good  safety  practice.  In  fact, 
arguably  it  had  been  excluded  as  it  was  not  managed  consistently  and  systematically 
and  therefore  may  have  jeopardised  the  achievement  of  the  ISO  accreditation.  It  is 
often  the  case  that  companies  will  leave  out  apparently  difficult  or  peripheral  areas 
such  as  safety  from  quality  management  systems.  Strangely,  however,  it  is  safety  and 
not  quality  management  that  has  legal  requirements  to  fulfil. 
2.1.4.3  Integration 
It  was  intended  to  design  a  complete  safety  management  system  for  integration  into 
the  ISO  system  as  a  stage  towards  achieving  a  total  management  system.  Around  one 
year  into  the  development  of  the  safety  system,  there  was  another  progression  -  the 
J&B  business  management  system.  This  system  combined  and  integrated  all  of  the 
other  management  specialisms  that  were  not  included  in  the  original  ISO  system  and 
health  and  safety  management  was  now  recognised  as  sufficiently  coherent  for 
incorporation. 
2.1.5  FORMALISED  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  SYSTEMS 
2.1.5.1  Introduction 
Studies  undertaken  by  the  Health  and  Safety  Executive,  and  other  organisations, 
during  the  1980's  identified  that  up  to  80%  of  all  accidents  could  have  been  avoided 
by  taking  reasonably  practical  precautions.  These  studies  also  found  that  in  nearly 
70%  of  all  cases  positive  management  action  could  have  prevented  injury  to 
employees  (HSE,  1993 
. 
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0  "hardware"  failures  such  as  deficient  plant  design,  physical  safety 
control  system  failure,  non-suitability  of  equipment  and  tools. 
0  "software"  failures  such  as  inadequate  training,  deficient  systems  of 
work  and  procedures,  inadequate  instruction  and  supervision,  lack  of 
knowledge. 
Early  health  and  safety  legislation  was  focused  almost  entirely  on  the  hardware  or 
physical  control  systems  required  to  deal  with  specific  risks.  This  legislation  was 
prescriptive;  specifying  the  requirements  in  terms  of  machinery  and  equipment 
controls  and  standards  rather  than  concentrating  on  humans  in  the  workplace.  As 
proactive  companies  met  their  physical  control  requirements,  they  recognised  that 
accidents  still  existed  in  the  workplace,  albeit  that  the  main  type  of  accidents  had 
shifted  over  time.  Instead  of  crush,  fracture  and  amputation  injuries  -  the  main  type  of 
accidents  had  moved  towards  slips,  trips  and  falls,  back  injuries  and  stress  related 
illness. 
Since  the  introduction  of  the  Health  and  Safety  at  Work  Act  in  1974,  corporate 
attention  has  gradually  been  diverted  away  from  purely  hardware  failures  and  control 
systems  and  moved  towards  the  impact  of  software  failures.  This  trend  has  been  seen 
at  J&B  Scotland  where  high  standards  of  hardware  control  were  implemented  in  the 
1970's  and  1980's  including  machinery  guarding  and  other  physical  control 
mechanisms  to  separate  the  employee  from  machinery.  Physical  control  measures 
have  helped  to  prevent  certain  types  of  accidents,  especially  those  caused  by  contact 
with  moving  machinery,  but  inconsistencies  in  standards  of  training  and  lack  of 
procedures  have  contributed  to  the  accidents  that  have  continued  to  occur. 
The  HSE  have  also  demonstrated  that  there  is  a  positive  correlation  between 
organisations  that  demonstrate  high  standards  of  general  business  management  and 
a 
high  standards  of  Health  and  Safety  management  (HSE,  1993).  This  is  achieved 
through  self-regulation  of  legal  requirements  as  well  as  the  creation  and  maintenance 
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their  business. 
To  achieve  the  high  standards  required,  Health  and  Safety  must  be  treated  in  the  same 
way  as  all  other  corporate  goals.  Potential  conflicts  of  interest  do  exist  between 
production  or  quality  management  and  safety  management,  but  a  fully  developed, 
formal  Safety  Management  System,  taking  into  account  the  specific  issues  that 
separate  it  from  other  management  systems,  would,  help  to  achieve  high  standards  and 
it  was  clear  that  a  complete  safety  management  system  incorporating  all  aspects  of 
proactive  safety  management  should  be  developed. 
Certain  aspects  require  particular  attention  in  such  a  system:  specific  legal 
requirements;  measurement  and  improvement  systems;  human  behaviour;  and 
employee  knowledge  (safety  training).  The  most  critical  aspects  are  to  do  with 
people. 
Coincidentally,  around  nine  months  after  the  project  was  initiated  -  in  December  1994 
-a  draft  British  Standard  BS  8800  "  The  Introduction  of  a  Safety  Management 
System"(BSI,  1996),  was  released  for  comment.  This  standard  was  re-drafted  and 
finally  released  formally  as  BS  8800  "A  Guide  to  Safety  Management  Systems"  in 
May  1996. 
2.1.5.2  The  safety  guidance  model 
BS  8800:  Occupational  Health  and  Safety  Management 
BS  8800  had  been  developed  using  as  guidance  the  models  taken  from  the  Quality 
Management  Standard  ISO  9002  and  a  Health  and  Safety  Executive  document,  HS 
(G)  65  'Successful  health  and  safety  management'.  In  addition,  BS  8800  is  similar  in 
overall  philosophy  and  structure  to  the  environmental  management  and  quality 
standard  BS  7750. 
This  project  was  launched  ahead  of  the  inception  of  BS8800  and  work  was  already 
underway  as  BS8800  was  being  developed.  The  J&B  safety  management  system  and 
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finally  released.  A  decision  was  made,  and  confirmed  at  executive  level,  that  J&B 
would  aim  for  early  accreditation  to  this  standard,  and  to  facilitate  integration  the 
work  performed  under  the  project  to  date  was  compared  with  BS  8750,  with  revision 
where  appropriate.  No  significant  changes  were,  however,  required. 
British  Standard  BS  8800  provides  guidance  on  occupational  health  and  safety 
management  systems  (OHS)  to  assist  in  compliance  with  stated  OHS  policies  and 
objectives,  and  on  how  OHS  should  be  implemented  in  an  organisation's  overall 
management  system.  The  Standard  takes  the  form  of  guidance  and  recommendations 
rather  than  prescriptive  specifications. 
There  has  been  some  debate  over  the  introduction  of  a  health  and  safety  standard. 
Critics  raise  the  concern  that  companies  who  have  been  accredited  against  BS8800 
may  become  complacent  in  attitude  to  health  and  safety,  believing  that  compliance 
with  that  standard  relieves  them  of  any  further  responsibility,  in  particular,  for 
continuous  improvement  of  safety  standards  -a  worry  that  is  common  among  safety 
(and  quality)  practitioners.  Experience  shows  that  companies,  in  fact,  are  correct  in 
believing  that  a  protection  against  HSE  prosecution,  if  not  a  defence  in  a  civil  court, 
could  rest  on  having  an  accepted  system  for  health  and  safety  -a  view  that  could  be 
taken  as  in  part  releasing  them  from  further  duties  of  care.  Advocates  of  the  system, 
on  the  other  hand,  suggest  that  by  working  towards  certification  and  maintenance  of 
this  accreditation,  at  the  least  the  company  will  be  aware  of  all  of  its  statutory 
obligations,  and  will  implement  and  maintain  a  comprehensive  system  for  the 
continuous  improvement  of  standards  of  health  and  safety  above  and  beyond  those 
required  by  law.  Few  specialists,  however,  doubt  the  need  for  a  formalised  safety 
system. 
As  in  quality  management  systems,  it  is 
possible  to  achieve  accreditation  and 
maintain  it  as  long  as  standards  as  consistent 
Unlike  quality  management, 
the  baseline  of  safety 
management 
is  set  by  law. 
It  is  not  possible  to  achieve  and 
maintain  accreditation  without 
meeting  at  least  minimum  legal 
compliance 
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governs  the  baseline  standard  for  safety  management.  Therefore,  it  would  not  be 
possible  to  achieve  and  maintain  accreditation  without  meeting  at  least  minimum 
legal  compliance. 
From  a  safety  perspective,  it  is  perhaps  true  that  some  companies  may  use  their 
accreditation  as  a  method  of  achieving  and  maintaining  minimum  legal  compliance 
alone.  It  is  already  true,  unfortunately,  that  many  companies  do  not  even  meet  this 
minimum  standard  at  present.  At  the  very  least,  therefore,  certification  and  a  full 
occupational  safety  and  health  management  system  would  ensure  that  minimum  legal 
standards  are  met  and  make  companies  aware  of  their  obligations.  Proactive 
companies  however,  will  have  a  powerful  catalyst  to  facilitate  continuous 
improvement  via  a  fully  structured  safety  management  system.  In  this  environment, 
the  safety  system  could  be  fully  integrated  into  the  other  key  business  management 
systems,  rather  than  standing  alone. 
A  comprehensive  system  for  managing  occupational  health  and  safety  must 
incorporate  all  relevant  activities:  setting  of  policy,  promulgation  of  standards,  risk 
assessments,  training,  auditing,  communication  and  review.  BS  8800,  the  guidance  to 
occupational  health  and  safety  systems,  has  provisions  to  cover  all  of  these 
components. 
Just  as  ISO  9002  aims  to  create  a  competitive  advantage  for  the  company  in  terms  of 
cost-effective  product  quality,  BS  8800  can  also  create  an  advantage.  The  safety 
management  system  will  lay  out  formal  procedures  for  dealing  with  health  and  safety, 
and  provide  a  fully  integrated,  consistent  system  reducing  waste  due  to  duplication 
and  confusion.  Effective  safety  management  will  reduce  the  cost  of  production 
increased  by  safety  failures,  and  it  can  provide  a  positive  contribution  to  the  efficiency 
of  operations  in  line  with  other  functional  areas.  The  following  table  summarises  the 
advantages  and  disadvantages  (in  no  particular  order)  of  a  formal  safety  management 
system. 
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BENEFITS  PROBLEMS 
Greater  legal  compliance  System  may  not  be  used 
Consistent  approach  to  safety  Extensive  paperwork 
Clear  standards  set  as  goals  Time  consuming  to  implement 
Increased  employee  involvement.  No  direct  impact  on  safety  outputs 
Greater  commitment  to  safety  Hijacking  by  production  unless  protected 
Potential  accreditation  to  BS  8800 
Poorly  constructed  system  may  be 
dangerous 
Evidence  in  court  or  to  avoid  prosecution 
Improved  communication 
Integration  into  other  management  systems 
Safety  perceived  as  equal  in  importance  to 
other  functional  areas 
It  is  one  of  the  many  facts  of  life  and  safety  management  that  while  it  is  hard  to 
manage  safety  well  without  a  formal  system,  the  formal  system  will  itself  create  risk  if 
not  well  produced,  relevant  and  active. 
Following  BS8800,  therefore,  enables  rather  than  produces  effective  management  of 
all  aspects  of  health  and  safety.  It  provides  two  optional  models  on  which  to  base  an 
Occupational  Health  and  Safety  Management  system.  One  is  HSG  (65)  'Successful 
Health  and  Safety  Management',  and  the  other  is  BS  EN  ISO  14001,  the  international 
environmental  management  model. 
To  be  effective,  BS8800  had  to  be  simple  and  easy  to  implement  for  businesses  small 
and  large.  It  was  important  that  it  did  not  conflict  with  already  existing  health  and 
safety  guidance  published  by  the  Health  and  Safety  Executive  and  it  also  had  to  be 
complementary  to  an  organisation's  existing  management  systems  -  perhaps  BS5750. 
The  committee  developing  the  guidance  standard  recognised  that,  if  it  was  to  be 
successful,  the  guidance  would  have  to  provide  benefit  to  business  by  reducing  risk  to 
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management  systems.  All  elements  of  the  system,  from  the  manner  and  extent  of 
application  are,  however,  dependent  on  organisation  scale  and  operating  activities  and 
the  nature  of  the  industry  itself  dictates  the  level  and  type  of  risks  present. 
The  two  models  within  BS8800  contain  the  same  elements,  although  there  are 
differences  in  respect  to  the  order  -  in  particular  in  initial  and  periodic  review, 
organising,  planning  and  implementing  safety  management.  At  first  glance  it  is  clear 
that  the  model  based  on  ISO  14001  has  many  similarities  to  ISO  9001. 
2.1.5.3  A  Discussion  of  the  Main  Components  of  BS8800 
Initial  Status  Review 
With  either  approach,  a  comprehensive  study  into  the  current  status  and  position  of 
existing  health  and  safety  management  within  an  organisation  must  be  carried  out  at 
the  outset.  This  enables  a  baseline  position  to  be  ascertained,  against  which  future 
standards  and  status  and  any  progress  can  be  compared.  The  study  will  cover  the 
extent  to  which  relevant  legislation  has  been  implemented  to  date,  the  systems  in 
place,  the  procedures  and  standards  that  already  exist  in  relation  to  health  and  safety. 
The  results  of  prior  audits  are  a  useful  tool  for  an  initial  status  review,  they  illustrate 
what  health  and  safety  measures  have  been  implemented  and  the  action  points  that 
have  not  yet  been  introduced  indicate  what  has  still  to  be  done.  In  addition  a  large 
scale  attitude  survey  could  be  carried  out  to  enable  an  evaluation  of  the  current  'safety 
culture'  within  the  company  although  (Section  3.3)  comments  later  on  the  benefits  or 
otherwise  of  such  surveys. 
A  review  of  the  management  of  health  and  safety  and  organisation  of  responsibilities 
should  also  be  conducted.  This  should  be  examined  in  relation  to  the  current 
resources,  and  future  requirements.  Plans  have  to  be  made  by  the  system  to  enable  the 
initial  status  review  to  be  updated  at  periodic  intervals  after  implementation  of  the 
initial  system.  The  review  will  consider  accident  rates,  gaps  in  current  coverage, 
resources  and  organisational  set-up.  It  will  also  examine  best  practice  in  industry  or 
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health  and  safety,  industry  standards.  The  requirements  for  an  initial  status  review  are 
the  same  under  either  model. 
An  initial  review  had  been  performed  at  J&B  and  had  proved  very  useful  if  not 
essential.  It  should  be  made  clear,  however,  that  such  a  review  requires  a  relatively 
advanced  level  of  knowledge  and  this  may  not  exist  within  a  company.  The 
temptation  is  to  employ  consultants  (as  indeed  J&B  Scotland  had  done),  but  this  will 
seldom  have  the  depth  required  and  does  not  result  in  knowledge  residing  in  the 
organisation.  Indeed,  there  have  been  recent  moves  by  HSE  Offshore  Safety  Division 
to  require  Health  and  Safety  knowledge  and  skills  within  companies  as  excessive  use 
of  consultants  was  not  proving  effective.  A  first  move  by  any  organisation,  therefore, 
must  be  to  employ  relevant  H&S  skills. 
Definition  of  Occupational  Health  and  Safety  Policy 
Once  the  initial  status  review  has  been  performed,  the  organisation  should  have  a  clear 
understanding  of  what  has  currently  been  achieved,  and  what  deficiencies  there  are. 
The  policy  of  the  company  and  the  system  can  then  be  devised. 
If  there  is  an  existing  environmental  or  quality  management  system  in  place,  this 
would  shape  the  choice  between  the  models  proposed  by  BS8800.  The  ground  rules 
are  laid  down  in  the  policy:  commitment  by  senior  management  to  objectives  of  the 
company  for  health  and  safety;  definition  of  the  responsibilities  and  accountabilities  of 
personnel;  and  the  setting  of  standards.  The  policy  must  be  endorsed  by  the  senior 
management  team,  and  displayed  for  all  employees. 
In  later  sections  the  question  of  executive  commitment  is  discussed.  Here  it  is, 
perhaps,  sufficient  to  note  that  frequent  change  at  senior  management  level  seems 
common  in  larger  organisations  and,  although  this  may  not  change  the  terms  of  the 
HSE  policy,  it  will  change  the  emphasis  of  commitment  and,  by  changing 
organisational  structures  can  create  a  state  of  flux  equivalent  to  a  leadership  vacuum. 
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The  key  features  are: 
1)  compliance  to  legal  standards  as  a  minimum 
2)  continual  cost  effective  improvement  in  performance 
3)  provision  of  adequate  and  appropriate  resource 
4)  definition  and  publishing  of  OHS  objectives 
5)  placing  management  of  OHS  as  the  prime  responsibility  of  line  management 
from  Executive  to  supervisor 
6)  ensure  understanding  and  implement  and  maintain  at  all  levels  of  the  business 
7)  ensure  employee  involvement  and  consultation  to  gain  commitment 
8)  periodic  review  of  policy,  of  management  system,  and  audit  of  compliance 
with  policy 
9)  train  all  employees  at  all  levels  appropriately  so  they  are  competent  to  carry 
out  duties  and  responsibilities 
Organisation 
Although  the  stipulations  are  listed  under  different  sections  in  the  two  models,  the 
organisational  requirements  are  the  same.  The  company  is  required  to  consider 
responsibilities,  organisation  and  documentation.  The  standard  stresses  that 
documentation  is  the  key  to  the  success  and  consistency  of  an  OHS  system. 
Documentation  is  the  key  in  assembling  and  retaining  critical  information  and  for 
planning,  but  it  is  important  that  it  is  kept  to  a  minimum  to  avoid  bureaucracy,  and 
must  be  appropriate  for  that  company,  its  activities  and  level  of  risk.  The  system 
should  not  create  the  opportunity  to  swamp  the  organisation  with  excessive  paperwork 
and  bureaucracy. 
At  this  level  we  are  below  the  executive  and  within  the  body  of  the  organisation.  Here 
too  there  can  be  frequent  upheavals,  but  there  is  a  greater  inertia  to  resist  change  in 
that  things  that  were  done  continue  to  be  done.  From  the  J&B  experience,  this  level  of 
organisation  is  considered  critical  to  success  and  efforts  should  be  made  to  optimise 
the  OHS  organisational  structure  in  advance  of  implementing  the  H&S  plan. 
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across  into  the  organisational  functions  that  produce  risk  -  production,  process  and 
maintenance. 
Planning 
Both  models  suggested  by  BS8800  require  an  organisation  to  identify  its  OHS  aims 
and  objectives,  determine  plans  to  action  to  achieve  these  aims,  identify  who  is 
responsible,  the  timescales  in  which  action  is  required,  and  the  outcome  to  be 
achieved.  The  two  models  contain  the  same  requirements  albeit  set  out  in  a  different 
manner. 
In  practice  this  is  possible  at  first  only  for  development  of  the  hard  components  of  the 
SMS  such  as  procedure  documents.  That  is,  a  deadline  might  be  set  for  completion  of 
various  levels  of  these.  It  is  less  easy,  for  example,  to  be  firm  about  when  safety 
training  is  to  be  integrated  with  induction  or  task  training. 
Risk  assessments  are  required  to  identify  hazards  and  evaluate  them  in  terms  of  levels 
of  risk,  relevant  legal  and  other  requirements  should  be  identified  and  appropriate 
controls  implemented.  These  have  to  be  performed  by  those  who  produce  and  work 
with  the  hazards. 
Implementation  and  Operation 
This  section  focuses  on  the  structure,  organisation  and  responsibilities  required  of  a 
company  for  effective  occupational  health  and  safety  management.  It  sets  out 
requirements  for  adequate  training,  ensuring  awareness,  competence,  effective 
communications  and  documentation. 
Measuring  performance 
A  section  of  both  models  provides  focus  on  measuring  performance,  the  key  to 
providing  feedback  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  occupational  safety  management 
system.  It  requires  that  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  measures  should  be 
considered.  It  requires  monitoring  of  the  extent  to  which  policy  and  objectives  are 
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documentation  required  to  demonstrate  legal  compliance,  checks  of  Permits  and  Safe 
Systems  of  Work  and  investigation  of  accidents,  near-misses  and  historical  data.  The 
measures  should  be  chosen  by  selecting  a  mixture  appropriate  to  the  needs  of  the 
organisation. 
This  project  is  greatly  concerned  with  the  effectiveness  of  various  measures  of  safety. 
It  is  essential,  to  devise  measures  of  how  effectively  the  SMS  is  being  implemented 
and  managed  and  these  measures  must  be  agreed  with  those  involved. 
Periodic  Status  Review 
The  standard  requires  that  reviews  are  performed  to  consider  the  overall  performance 
of  the  OHS  system;  performance  of  individual  elements;  findings  of  the  audits; 
internal  and  external  factors  that  may  have  changed.  The  factors  that  may  have 
changed  could  have  been  organisational  structure  or  policy,  operating  activities, 
legislation  or  technology.  One  clear  lesson  from  the  J&B  experience  is  that  it  is 
essential  that  the  OHS  system  can  adapt  to  changes  whether  from  an  internal  or 
external  source  over  a  period  of  time.  The  reviews  should  identify  if  action  is  required 
to  remedy  deficiencies  or  cope  with  changes.  The  overall  performance  of  the  system 
and  influence  of  internal  and  external  factors  should  be  used  to  minimise  risk,  improve 
the  system  and  improve  business  performance. 
Internal  and  External  Factors 
Both  models  require  that  both  internal  and  external  factors  be  considered  on  an 
ongoing  basis.  Internal  factors  have  a  significant  impact  on  occupational  health  and 
safety  management  within  an  organisation,  and  will  change  over  time.  Typical  factors 
to  be  considered  include:  the  level  of  senior  management  commitment;  size  and 
organisational  structure  of  the  organisation;  nature  of  activities,  business,  and  risk; 
resource  and  skills;  priority  within  the  business;  policy  and  objectives.  External 
factors  impacting  an  organisation  or  site  can  include:  legislative  change;  merger  or 
downsizing;  development  of  information,  knowledge  or  technology;  changes  to  other 
businesses  sharing  premises;  change  in  political  or  economic  or  social  environment. 
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change  in  Global  OHS  policy  or  change  in  industry  guidance  or  work  practices.  Even 
significant  changes  in  the  economy  or  political  changes  can  affect  and  organisation 
over  a  period  of  time,  perhaps  changing  OHS  requirements. 
Internal  changes  can  be  addressed  as  effectively  Hard  Fact  1 
under  a  structured  safety  management  system. 
These  factors  are  constantly  changing  from  small 
There  will  always  be 
internal  and  external 
incremental  changes  to  major  organisational  changes  imposed  that  are 
changes.  Typical  examples  of  change  affecting  all 
designed  to  destroy  your 
plans,  your  projects  and 
organisations,  probably  constantly(!  ),  are  your  sanity 
management  structure,  financial  resource,  people 
resource,  change  of  activities,  management  attitude  and  commitment,  safety  culture, 
product  volume  and  so  on. 
2.1.5.4  Similarities  between  HS(G)  and  BS  EN  ISO  14001,  the  International 
Environmental  Management  Model. 
The  model  that  an  organisation  selects  will  be  partly  dependent  upon  the  systems  that 
are  already  in  place.  The  overall  contents  of  the  two  models  are  the  same,  but  the 
structure  of  the  models  is  slightly  different. 
The  initial  status  review  is  the  same  regardless  of  model;  both  require  an  organisation 
to  consider  all  aspects  of  occupational  health  and  safety.  In  the  Policy  section  of  both 
models,  the  organisation  is  required  to  determine  and  make  commitments  to  the 
effective  management  of  occupational  health  and  safety. 
The  next  stage  'Organising'  relates  to  structure,  organisation  and  responsibilities. 
Organising  is  a  separate  section  under  HSG  (65),  but  it  is  integrated  into  2  separate 
sections  -Planning  and  Implementing  in  ISO14001.  The  requirements  are  the  same, 
but  they  are  listed  in  separate  sections.  The  ISO  model  differs  to  help  companies 
already  with  accredited  ISO  systems  to  follow  the  existing  system. 
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Management  Review  section  of  ISO  14001  and  a  separate  section  of  HSG 
'Performance  Status  Review'. 
It  is  important  to  remember  that  the  requirements  of  the  2  models  are  the  same,  and 
the  different  layouts  aim  to  make  it  easier  for  an  organisation  to  integrate  into  already 
existing  management  systems,  or  provide  an  option  to  start  from  the  beginning. 
2.1.5.5  Similarities  between  BS  8800  and  EN  ISO  9000,  the  International  Quality 
Management  Model 
British  Standard  (BS)  EN  ISO  9000  is  a  national  standard  for  quality  management 
systems,  first  published  in  1979.  The  standard  itself  is  fairly  general  and  provides  a 
number  of  requirements,  which  an  organisation  should  follow  to  ensure  the  quality  of 
their  products  or  service. 
Areas  such  as  management  responsibility,  corrective  actions,  planning  and  purchasing 
are  covered  by  the  standard.  It  aims  to  provide  a  proactive  system  that  will  prevent 
quality  errors  occurring  and  provide  a  system  with  which  to  manage  corrective  actions 
if  an  error  has  occurred.  The  quality  management  system  then  helps  control  internal 
processes  that  aim  to  satisfy  the  customers  needs,  to  reduce  costs  and  to  improve 
internal  management  processes. 
The  standard  is  not  intended  to  stifle  creativity  and  innovation  by  a  strict  control 
regime,  instead  it  aims  to  limit  inefficiency  and  lack  of  control  over  processes  and 
systems,  providing  an  environment  of  continuous  improvement.  In  principle,  as 
processes  are  controlled  and  errors  eliminated,  it  should  provide  for  a  more  economic 
method  of  operating  throughout  the  process,  to  the  customer.  In  a  quality  system,  a 
fully  controlled  documented  system  can  help  to  demonstrate  'due  diligence'  in  relation 
to  a  product  liability  claim. 
2:  44 The  guidance  standard  BS  8800  sticks  fairly 
closely  to  the  layout  and  contents  of  ISO  9000. 
The  standard  states  that  if  the  company  already 
has  ISO  9000  or  ISO  14000,  then  that  model  can 
be  used  to  form  the  basis  of  the  safety 
management  system.  If  an  organisation  already 
has  accreditation,  then  a  large  volume  of  the 
workload  will  be  saved.  Also,  and  perhaps  more 
importantly,  using  a  similar  model  for 
management  systems  should  enable  their 
There  are  critical 
differences  between 
occupational  health  and  safety 
and  product  quality 
management. 
These  must  be  managed  if  a 
safety  management  system  is 
to  be  successful. 
Those  who  disagree 
-  are  wrong! 
integration  at  a  later  date.  It  will  also  be  easier  for  a  work  force  to  use  a  Safety 
Management  System  if  it  has  been  written  with  a  familiar  structure  and  layout. 
There  are,  however,  critical  differences  between  occupational  health  and  safety  and 
product  quality  management,  and  these  must  be  managed  if  a  safety  management 
system  is  to  be  successful. 
Primarily,  the  differences  between  safety  and  quality  are,  firstly  that  OHS  is  governed 
by  legal  requirements  whereas  product  quality  is  not;  secondly,  that  safety  relates  to 
people  and  quality  to  product  and  thirdly,  safety  performance  cannot  be  measured 
with  the  same  techniques  as  product  quality.  The  potential  conflict  between  these 
fields,  the  differences,  and  the  method  of  overcoming  these  differences  are  discussed 
in  detail  in  another  section. 
2.2  DEVELOPMENT  AND  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  A  SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT  SYSTEM  AT  LOCAL  AND  INTERNATIONAL 
LEVEL 
2.2.1  INTRODUCTION 
The  SMS  was  designed  initially  to  cover  all  7  sites  within  J&B  Scotland,  with 
flexibility  to  address  the  different  management  structures  and  operations  at  each  site. 
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constant  and  consistent,  others  can  be  adapted  for  local  factors.  It  was  envisaged  that 
eventually  the  system  might  be  transferred  to  non-UK  operating  units,  firstly  within 
then  European  sites  and  eventually  across  the  rest  of  the  group.  As  there  is  common 
European  safety  law  and  standards,  the  transfer  to  the  European  sites  was  not  expected 
to  require  extensive  modification  other  than  to  the  accountabilities  and  management 
structure.  It  was  envisaged  that  more  extensive  modification  would  be  required  for  the 
rest  of  the  world,  particularly  in  relation  to  cultural  differences. 
The  system,  when  it  had  been  fully  developed  and  trialed  was  also  intended  to  act  as  a 
model  for  the  drinks  division  of  Grand  Metropolitan.  This  aimed  to  achieve  further 
consistency  firstly  in  the  UK  and  Europe  and  eventually  worldwide.  This  approach 
fitted  well  with  the  programme  for  worldwide  implementation  of  ISO  9000.  Also,  the 
companies  within  the  group  that  already  had  accreditation  with  ISO  9000  would  have 
a  model  for  the  addition,  albeit  retrospectively,  of  a  comprehensive  safety 
management  system.  All  operating  sites  that  were  to  be  accredited  with  ISO  in  the 
future  would  be  able  to  introduce  a  complete  quality  system  incorporating  the 
requirements  of  BS  8800  from  the  outset. 
Critically,  there  would  be  no  point  in  devoting  time  and  resource  to  the  development 
and  implementation  of  a  system  that  acted  as  no  more  than  proof  of  an  attempt  to 
improve  safety  on  site.  There  was  genuine  belief  that  having  a  full  understanding  of 
the  companies  current  status  in  safety  terms  would  enable  clear  identification  of  all 
legal  requirements  and  safety  issues,  methods  of  loss  control,  communications  and 
training  that  would  facilitate  the  continuous  improvement  of  safety  within  the 
company.  To  ensure  that  the  system  is  used,  it  is  required  that  rational  practical 
procedures,  written  by  the  users  themselves  are  developed.  Auditing  and  safety 
performance  measures  must  be  implemented  to  check  that,  one:  the  system  is  being 
used,  and  two:  the  system  is  having  a  positive  impact  on  the  standards  on  site.  If  there 
is  intelligent  development,  monitoring  and  continuous  improvement  of  the  system, 
safety  standards  should  improve,  thereby  reducing  the  cost  of  risk  and  the  cost  of  non- 
conformance's  within  J&B  in  both  the  medium  and  long  term. 
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competitors.  Efficient  effective  operations  can  be  achieved  with  safety  and  loss 
control  having  valuable  contributions  to  make.  It  was  determined  that  a  systematic 
approach  to  safety  would  incorporate  all  hardware  and  software  measures  that  will 
help  to  facilitate  continuous  improvement. 
2.2.2  ORGANISING  AND  DEVELOPING  THE  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  SYSTEM 
2.2.2.1  Organising 
Differences  in  standards  across  sites 
The  seven  sites  within  the  company  had  different  cultures  but  the  biggest  contrast  was 
probably  between  the  packaging  site  and  the  Distilleries.  There  were  clear  social  or 
cultural  differences  in  terms  of  work  pace  and  unionisation,  but  also  differences  in 
working  operations,  responsibilities,  tasks  and  activities.  Further,  each  site  had 
different  organisational  structures,  resources,  skills,  activities  and  job  descriptions  and 
the  smaller  sites  tended  to  have  flatter,  less  hierarchical  structures  with  more 
integration  of  tasks  and  job  descriptions.  As  a  result  of  these  differences,  a  single 
system  designed  to  `fit  all'  sites  would  not  be  effective  for  any  site  and  it  was 
important  to  involve  all  sites  in  the  development  of  the  safety  management  system  at 
an  early  stage,  rather  than  simply  imposing  a  system  designed  by  the  `centre'  and  risk 
it  being  rejected.  Importantly,  involvement  of  the  safety  advisors  from  the  other  sites 
would  help  to  ensure  their  commitment  and  bring  in  diverse  ideas. 
Standardisation  and  flexibility 
It  was  agreed  that  a  single,  standard  company  Occupational  Health  and  Safety  policy 
(and  associated  standards)  must  apply  for  consistency,  but  that  there  should  be 
flexibility  in  procedures,  documentation,  reporting  structures,  communication  and  safe 
systems  of  work  to  reflect  the  differences  between  sites.  This  approach  aimed  to 
ensure  that  corporate  objectives,  policies,  commitments  and  standards  were  consistent 
and  uniform,  whilst  recognising  organisational  (structural)  and  operational  (task) 
differences.  All  sites  had  to  comply  with  legal  standards,  Grand  Metropolitan/  IDV 
standards  and  J&B  Scotland  standards,  but  there  was  flexibility  allowed  in  the 
implementation  of  these  standards. 
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To  ensure  the  process  was  managed  effectively,  a  cross-site  Steering  group  was  set- 
up.  The  Steering  Group  consisted  of  the  researcher  as  Chair  (and  Secretary)  and  the 
site  safety  advisors  from  Blythswood  and  the  Distilleries,  with  Risk  Control  Manager 
and  Quality  &  Blends  Director  being  involved  as  required.  The  involvement  of  key 
players  from  each  of  the  sites  enabled  site  input  into  standards. 
At  each  of  the  sites,  a  Working  Party  was  set  up,  typical  membership  being  the  site 
safety  representative,  a  production  manager  and  safety  committee  members.  The  site 
Working  Parties  ensured  that  there  was  commitment  and  feedback  at  each  site,  regular 
input  and  communication  to  and  from  that  site.  These  teams  were  involved  in  all 
aspects  of  the  development  and  launch  of  the  safety  management  system. 
Initial  Status  Review 
The  initial  status  review  was  carried  out  to  determine  the  status  or  standing  of 
occupational  health  and  safety  within  J&B  Scotland,  before  implementation  of  a 
different  structure.  All  aspects  of  OHS  were  considered  including  the  current 
organisational  structure;  human  and  financial  resources;  historical  accident  statistics; 
previous  OHS  audit  results;  safety  committee  minutes;  OHS  policies  and  standards 
and  parent  company  policies  and  standards.  In  addition  to  a  documentary  search, 
structured  interviews  were  carried  out  with  members  of  the  Executive  team, 
management  team,  safety  committee,  safety  co-ordinators  and  safety  specialists. 
As  noted  in  Section  1,  a  comprehensive  initial  assessment  had  been  performed  by  a 
University  team.  That  had  covered  many  aspects  through  management  interviews,  site 
inspections,  and  assessment  of  existing  policies  and  standards.  The  results  of  this 
study  were  considered  alongside  the  internal  and  external  factors  influencing  the 
organisation  -  that  is,  the  management  structure  and  the  customer  requirements. 
An  awareness  study  was  carried  out  by  the  researcher,  focusing  around  the  COSHH 
Regulations  but  also  capturing  information  on  general  OHS  awareness,  training 
preferences  and  effectiveness  of  communication  on  OHS. 
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covered  all  sites  within  the  group.  The  results  enabled  a  benchmark  to  establish  what 
was  already  in  place,  what  standards  were  to  be  set,  what  improvements  were 
required,  gaps  in  OHS  cover,  and  the  future  impact  of  internal  and  external  factors.  A 
strategy  was  then  developed  by  the  Steering  Group  to  move  the  company  standards 
forward. 
Strategy  for  developing  the  OHS  Policy  Statement 
With  all  the  information  provided  by  the  Initial  Status  Review,  a  strategy  was 
formulated.  The  Executive  team,  apart  from  the  Blends  and  Quality  Director,  would 
not  be  involved  in  the  detail  of  the  policy  during  its  development.  For  effectiveness, 
the  Steering  Group  worked  on  the  initial  detail,  and  presented  it  to  the  Executive  team. 
The  Steering  Group  first  discussed  the  key  elements  listed  by  BS  8800,  and  integrated 
them  with  the  corporate  strategy  into  a  Policy  Statement.  The  contents  and 
commitments  section  of  the  Policy  was  then  drafted  by  the  Executive  team  members 
before  being  re-drafted  by  the  Steering  Group  and  sent  back  for  approval. 
The  key  elements  included  accountabilities;  resources;  review  and  measurement; 
responsibilities;  legal  compliance;  employee  involvement;  communication;  training; 
audit  of  compliance  and  continuous  improvement.  The  commitments  were  written  into 
the  Policy  Statements  and  signed  off  by  the  Executive  Team.  The  Policy  Statement 
was  communicated  to  all  employees  by  display  on  walls  in  each  area  on  the  sites.  It 
was  also  issued  to  all  existing  employees  with  wages  slips,  and  issued  to  new 
employees  with  their  starter  packs. 
The  process  to  develop  and  issue  the  policy  was  more  onerous  and  time  consuming 
than  had  been  anticipated.  There  was  lengthy  debate  at  each  stage  of  development  - 
this  process  was  not  fluid  and  was  often  protracted.  Eventually  a  balance  had  to  be 
struck  to  ensure  that  key  players  had  an  input,  but  avoid  change  for  change  sake.  That 
aside,  it  was  relatively  easy  to  get  approval  for  the  policy  to  be  issued,  but  not  so 
simple  to  get  genuine  commitment  to  proactive  management  of  safety.  As  has  always 
been  the  difficulty  with  safety,  there  will  always  be  other  business  priorities,  some  of 
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power  to  change  these  priorities,  only  a  change  in  level  and  nature  of  senior 
management  commitment  can.  To  add  further  difficulty,  measurement  of  commitment 
(or  a  lack  of  commitment)  is  largely  based  on  perception. 
2.2.2.2  Developing  the  safety  management  system 
Organisation  Section 
The  company  had  an  existing  ISO  9001  system;  therefore  it  seemed  reasonable  to 
adopt  the  model  based  on  ISO  14001  for  OHS  [discussed  in  detail  in  Section  2.1  ].  The 
organising  section  of  the  Policy  Manual  outlined  the  major  roles  with  regards  to  OHS 
within  the  business,  discussing  the  roles  of  the  Managing  Director,  Executive  Member 
with  ultimate  responsibility,  Risk  Department,  Safety  Co-ordinators,  Safety 
Committee,  Line  Managers,  and  that  of  all  other  employees. 
For  each  of  these  roles  the  responsibilities  and  accountabilities  were  outlined  with  the 
focus  on  the  structure,  organisation  and  responsibilities  required  within  the  company 
to  ensure  effective  management  of  occupational  health  and  safety. 
Most  importantly,  this  section  allocated 
appropriate  levels  of  authority  and  financial 
resources  to  ensure  that  OHS  policy  could  be 
effective.  The  commitment  was  made  that 
where  in-house  expertise  was  not  adequate, 
specialist  advice  would  be  readily  sought 
from  outwith  the  organisation. 
Critical  requirements  for 
the  organisational  structure:  - 
Authority 
and  financial  resources 
to  ensure 
the  policy  would  be 
effectively  implemented 
An  organisational  chart  was  constructed  showing  lines  of  communication  between 
these  key  roles  and  also  from  Strathleven  to  and  from  the  other  sites. 
It  was  important  that,  although  strategic  lead  came  from  Strathleven,  this  lead  was 
after  consultation  with  and  involvement  of  the  other  sites  and  their  local  teams.  These 
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communication,  training  and  other  matters. 
Priorities 
After  the  policy  and  organisation  sections,  there  followed  a  series  of  brief  specific 
policies  on  the  priority  commitments  made  by  the  company.  The  Steering  Group 
highlighted  key  areas  of  concern  from  the  Initial  Status  Review  either  because  it  was 
felt  that  they  had  been  inadequately  managed  or  because  of  the  level  of  risk,  perhaps 
inherent  to  the  drinks  industry  or  the  company.  Safety  aspects  that  were  specifically 
mentioned  in  these  policies  were  -  fire  prevention  and  control;  task  and  project 
control;  risk  assessment;  training  and  development  and  employee  involvement.  For 
each  of  the  commitments  made  in  the  Policy  Statement,  there  was  a  brief  specific 
policy  and  each  of  these  specific  policies  was  linked  to  related  company  standards, 
safe  systems  of  work  and  relevant  documentation.  These  links  were  listed  with  the 
policies  for  cross-reference. 
2.2.2.3  Communication  of  safety  policy 
Once  the  Policy  Manual  and  its  commitments  were  agreed  by  the  Steering  Group  and 
the  site  Working  Parties,  the  Policy  was  communicated  to  the  Executive  Team  for 
agreement  and  authorisation.  The  OHS  Policy  Statement  was  then  posted  in  locations 
around  the  sites,  on  notice  boards,  communicated  at  team  briefs,  at  safety  committee 
meetings  and  management  meetings.  A  copy  of  the  Policy  Statement  and 
arrangements  section  was  posted  to  all  employees  with  their  wages  slip.  The  Group 
aimed  to  communicate  the  OHS  priorities  to  all  employees  and  visitors. 
2.2.2.4  Resources  review  and  actions 
Groupings 
As  the  Steering  Group  considered  the  results  of  the  Initial  Status  Review,  it  became 
clear  that  the  resources  allocated  for  OHS  must  be  reassessed.  Prior  to  the  assessment, 
a  member  of  the  Executive  Team  (Quality  and  Blends  Director)  had  been  given 
organisational  responsibility  for  OHS,  with  the  Steering  Group  also  reporting  to  him. 
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to  be  managed  from  a  central  site,  but  that  there  must  be  a  communication  link 
between  the  sites  to  ensure  consistency  of  standards.  It  was  clear  that  the  four 
Distilleries  could  be  treated  as  a  `group'  due  to  their  shared  organisational  structure, 
location,  similar  operations  and  culture,  and  that  for  the  same  reasons  Blythswood  and 
Bonhill  might  also  be  grouped.  For  each  of  these  groups,  a  local  safety  advisor  was 
appointed  and  given  appropriate  training.  The  Safety  Advisor  of  Blythswood  and  that 
of  the  Distilleries  reported  to  the  OHS  Team  at  Strathleven  on  OHS/Risk  issues,  and 
to  their  local  management  team  on  other  issues.  The  site  Working  Parties  aimed  to 
ensure  that  adequate  local  resources  were  in  place  to  implement  the  policies. 
Employee  involvement:  Safety  Committees  and  Representatives 
At  each  of  the  sites,  safety  committees  were 
already  in  place.  The  Steering  Group  recognised  Issues  raised 
that,  for  these  to  be  effective,  there  had  to  be  at  safety  meetings 
must 
regular  (monthly)  meetings,  the  right  people  at  be  actioned. 
these  meetings  and,  critically,  that  issues  raised  at 
meetings  must  be  actioned. 
At  each  of  these  sites,  members  of  the  Executive  Management  Team  were  asked  to 
head  the  Safety  Committees  to  give  the  committee  authority  to  make  policy  decisions 
and  implement  real  changes.  It  was  also  recognised  that  the  Safety  Manager  or 
Advisor,  Safety  Co-ordinators,  plus  Managers  from  high  incidence  rate  departments 
on  site  must  attend,  alongside  the  safety  representatives.  In  most  cases,  the  safety 
representatives  were  Union  elected,  but  the  company  also  appointed  and  trained 
representatives  from  the  workforce  where  an  area  required  additional  focus.  In  some 
cases  this  gave  a  development  role  to  individuals  with  an  interest  in  occupational 
health  and  safety  training. 
The  Steering  Group  recognised  that  the  Safety  Representatives  role  could  be  expanded 
from  the  basic  statutory  rights  to  site  inspection  and  consultation  about  changes  to 
plant  and  premises  detailed  in  the  Safety  Representative  and  Safety  Committee 
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exercised  but  in  addition,  with  the  right  training  the  safety  reps  could  audit  against 
specific  standards,  procedures  and  safe  systems  of  work.  The  Safety  Reps  would  help 
identify  non-conformances  and  raise  them  as  corrective  actions,  before  an  accident 
happened. 
Line  management  involvement:  Safety  Co-ordinators 
The  Initial  Status  Review  had  suggested  that,  for  OHS  to  be  effective  at  a  site  as  large 
as  Strathleven,  the  responsibility  must  be  taken  on  by  Line  Managers  and  their 
employees  rather  than  by  the  OHS  department.  As  a  first  step  in  providing  the  skills 
on  site,  6  middle  managers  with  structural  and  departmental  responsibility,  were  given 
NEBOSH  Certificate  training  and  a  higher  level  of  responsibility  for  safety  of 
employees  in  their  area.  These  Safety  Co-ordinators  attended  the  safety  committee 
meetings  along  with  their  safety  representative  on  behalf  of  their  area. 
The  Co-ordinators  were  required  to  manage  the  safety  management  system  and  apply 
the  standards,  procedures  and  safe  systems  of  work  on  an  on-going  day-to-day  basis. 
They  were  required  to  identify  training  needs  and  to  arrange  for  appropriate  training  to 
be  carried  out.  Within  this  role  they  would  fulfil  the  legal  requirement  under  the 
Management  of  Health  and  Safety  at  Work  Regulations  1992  to  appoint  persons 
competent  in  OHS  noting  that  this  legislation  requires  the  company  have  appropriate 
`in  house'  expertise. 
At  the  Distilleries  and  Blythswood,  the  Safety  Advisor  reported  on  safety  issues  to 
each  Production  Manager,  and  communicated  directly  with  the  Line  Managers  on 
each  site.  The  Co-ordinators  were  responsible  to  their  existing  (usually  production) 
line  management. 
2.2.2.5  Practical  implementation  of  safety  standards 
The  Steering  Group  had  already  decided  that  the  Policy  and  associated  standards  must 
be  universal  to  all  sites  as  there  had  to  be  a  consistent  standard  for  occupational  health 
and  safety  within  the  business.  The  Group  had  then  determined  the  OHS  standards  to 
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on  these  commitments  and  on  risks  inherent  to  the  business.  In  the  next  stage,  the 
group  decided  how  the  standards  would  be  implemented  and  communicated  and  what 
documentation  would  be  required.  This  was  by  far  the  greater  intellectual  and  physical 
real-world  challenge. 
Dissemination  of  information 
The  method  of  implementation  was, 
i)  through  the  issue  of  the  Policy  Manual  to  all  key  individuals, 
ii)  setting  out  safety  standards  and  procedures  through  on-site  work  instructions 
and  training. 
The  key  individuals  included  the  Managing  Director,  the  Executive  team,  the 
Management  team,  the  Safety  team  and  the  Safety  Co-ordinators.  Clearly  tasks  varied 
from  site  to  site,  but  the  actual  safety  standard  remained  consistent.  For  example  the 
need  for  and  height  of  guard  rails,  or  minimum  working  temperatures. 
Risk  assessment 
All  operational  tasks  on  the  sites  had  related  work  instructions,  as  required  under  the 
ISO  system.  The  ISR  had  revealed  that  many  of  the  work  instructions  did  not  include 
safety  requirements,  and  in  some  cases  contradicted  OHS  requirements  -a  very  clear 
argument  against  the  separation  of  quality  from  safety.  The  original  work  instructions 
had  been  written  to  ensure  a  quality  product,  rather  than  focus  on  the  human  interface 
with  the  operation. 
At  each  site,  therefore,  all  tasks  were  risk  assessed  by  a  nominee  from  the  site  risk 
assessment  team  who  were  accompanied  by  the  area  safety  representative.  The 
relevant  employees  based  at  the  workstation  or  task  were  also  involved.  The  initial 
risk  assessment  team  were  trained  by  a2  day  in-house  risk  assessment  training  course. 
The  course  started  off  in  the  classroom  focusing  on  the  principals  of  risk  assessment 
and  then  took  a  practical  focus  with  case  studies  relevant  to  the  participants  and 
assessment  of  actual  work  areas.  The  team  were  not  given  additional  payment  for 
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Advisors,  Safety  Co-ordinators,  Safety  Representatives  and  most  Line  Managers. 
After  the  initial  series  of  courses,  additional  risk  assessment  training  was  given  on- 
the-job  on  an  adhoc  basis  by  the  Risk  Manager  and  site  Safety  Advisors.  A  work 
instruction  -  comprising  a  worked  example  and  checklist  -  was  drawn  up  to  help 
prompt  those  that  carried  out  risk  assessments  infrequently.  A  follow-on  set  of  risk 
assessment  courses  was  carried  out  after  two  years,  in  addition  to  adhoc  training  on 
request. 
In  most  cases  risk  assessments  had  previously  been  carried  out,  but  these  operations 
were  reviewed  to  ensure  the  assessments  were  up  to  date  and  reflected  current  work 
practice,  legal  and  company  standards.  Risks  were  identified  and  evaluated  for  all 
tasks  and  operating  areas  and  then  appropriate  controls  (corrective  actions)  were 
identified  for  each  of  these  risks:  whether  to  retain  the  risk  and  monitor  the  situation, 
eliminate  the  risk  altogether,  or  implement  an  engineering  or  human  solution.  To 
guide  this  process  it  was  clearly  essential  that  the  standards  were  simple,  easy  to 
follow,  non-bureaucratic,  brief  and  useable. 
The  Working  Party  at  each  site  considered  the  Case  Study 
original  Work  Instructions  and  the  results  of  An  original  ISO  9001 
instruction  focused  on  the 
the  risk  assessments,  integrated  them  with  product  instead  of  safe  access. 
OHS  requirements,  and  reissued  them  via  the  It  required  the  employee  to 
collect  a  sample  bottle,  stating 
ISO  9001  system  as  `Safe  Systems  of  Work'.  that  access  should  be  gained 
to  the  machine  by  opening  a 
These  were  communicated  by  local  team  interlocked  guard  door, 
rather  than  stopping  the 
briefs,  safety  notices,  by  Line  Managers,  and  machine  first. 
during  training  and  retraining. 
Management  Review 
A  periodic  status  review  was  also  designed  to  assess  the  overall  performance  of  the 
safety  management  system.  The  Steering  group  decided  that  the  system  should  be 
reviewed  in  full  every  year  with  an  interim  review  on  a6  monthly  basis.  The  review 
was  to  assess  a  variety  of  factors  including  :  audit  findings;  results  of  safety 
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all  other  relevant  internal  and  external  factors  that  may  influence  the  system.  The 
information  for  the  management  review  was  collated  by  the  Health  and  Safety  team  at 
each  site,  and  evaluated  by  the  Working  parties  and  Steering  Group.  This  review  is 
intended  to, 
i)  maintain  the  freshness  of  the  Safety  Management  System, 
ii)  establish  if  the  Safety  Management  System  is  adding  any  value, 
iii)  collate  the  results  of  the  ongoing  performance  measures  for  presentation  to 
Senior  Management. 
Other  reviews 
In  addition,  periodic  reviews  were  built  in  to  ensure  the  components  of  the  system 
were  still  relevant  and  continued  to  be  effective.  The  SMS  was  maintained  in  a  similar 
manner  to  the  ISO  system  with  the  Policy  and  Organisation  Section  being  reviewed 
annually  or  if  there  had  been  Organisational  change.  The  standards  and  procedures 
are  also  reviewed  annually  or  in  the  event  of  a  change  in  legislation  or  standards,  new 
information,  operational  change  or  if  a  need  for  improvement  is  identified  (or  enforced 
by  HSE!  ). 
The  safe  systems  of  work  are  amended  every  two  years  or,  as  a  result  of  risk 
assessments,  corrective  actions,  new  equipment,  new  tasks  or  investment,  audit 
findings  and  safety  inspections. 
Finally,  documentation  is  reviewed  every  1  to  2  years  to  identify  improvements  and 
eliminate  excessive  paperwork. 
As  a  whole,  the  components  and  priorities  of  the  safety  management  system  are 
reviewed  and  amended  as  a  result  of  the  safety  performance  measures.  The  set  of 
safety  performance  measures  implemented  on  each  site,  and  by  the  company  overall 
are  of  no  value  if  they  do  not  indicate  where  standards  have  improved  or  deteriorated, 
what  areas  required  focus,  and  what  methods  of  achieving  focus  have  worked. 
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Communication  is  key  to  the  introduction  of  a  SMS  and  a  number  of  techniques  were 
used  to  ensure  effective  transmission  of  information,  primarily  the  involvement  of  all 
sites  through  the  Working  Parties,  Safety  Committees  and  the  Steering  Group.  This 
aimed  to  ensure  that  employees  at  all  sites  were  involved  right  through  the  process. 
Many  employees  were  involved  in  the  initial  status  review  and  again  during  the 
identification  and  assessment  of  risks  in  their  own  work  place.  The  site  safety 
committees  were  kept  up  to  date  regularly  during  the  first  year  of  system 
development.  To  retain  their  interest  it  was  vital  that  they  were  involved  in  the  process 
and  that  there  was  regular  flow  of  two  way  information. 
The  Safety  Management  System  was  launched  at  each  site  by  presentation  to  all 
employees  by  the  site  Working  Party,  and  further  presentations  were  made  to  the 
management  team  and  Safety  Committees. 
Finally,  the  training  team  and  line  managers  in  each  area  launched  the  safe  systems  of 
work,  as  they  are  task  specific.  The  involvement  and  participation  of  employees  in 
safety  management  is discussed  in  more  detail  in  Section  4  'People  and  Participation'. 
2.2.2.7  Performance  measurement 
The  OHS  management  system  was  implemented  to  improve  the  standard  of 
occupational  health  and  safety  across  the  business,  so  clearly  performance  measures 
were  required  to  assess  whether  this  had  happened  or  not,  and  where  there  was  room 
for  improvement.  There  is  a  difference  between  performance  measurement  and  the 
overall  management  review.  The  management  review  assesses  the  overall 
effectiveness  and  directs  the  emphasis  of  the  management  system,  whereas 
performance  measures  assess  the  standard  of  safety  itself. 
Safety  performance  measures  must  be  a  combination  of  quantitative  and  qualitative 
measures,  such  as  accident  rates,  audits,  surveys,  awareness  and  the  cost  of 
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appropriate  for  each  individual  site,  and  for  the  company  as  a  whole. 
Depending  upon  the  nature  of  the  measure,  it  could  be  used  daily  (hazard 
identification),  weekly,  monthly,  annually  or  as  infrequently  as  every  2-3  years 
(employee  interview).  The  combination  and  frequency  of  these  measures  and  a 
discussion  of  their  effectiveness  is  considered  in  Section  3  'Performance  Measures'. 
The  key  point  here  is  that  performance  measures  are  only  of  value  if  the  information 
they  provide  is  accurate,  timely,  comprehensible,  provides  a  valid  indicator  of 
performance  and,  critically,  a  path  to  improvement  of  that  performance. 
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3.1  WHY  HAVE  SAFETY  PERFORMANCE  MEASURES  ? 
Concentrated  effort  and  resources  can  be  focused  on  safety  management  with  the 
aim  of  improving  the  status  quo.  However,  without  knowing  the  starting  point  or 
baseline,  an  organisation  can  have  no  idea  of  how  far  it  has  progressed  or  digressed 
in  the  pursuit  of  continuous  improvement. 
Initial  status  reviews,  which  were  mentioned  earlier,  aim  to  establish  the  baseline 
safety  status  of  an  organisation  after  which  a  series  of  modifications  will  be 
implemented.  The  results  of  this  review  will  highlight  deficiencies  and  indicate  what 
changes  are  actually  required.  However,  this  is  only  possible  if  the  initial  status 
review  has  been  conducted  proficiently  and  covered  all  aspects  of  safety.  As  an 
initial  status  review  is  an  isolated  study,  many  different  discrete  techniques  can  be 
applied,  however,  a  different  approach  may  and  will  be  required  for  ongoing 
measurement  of  performance. 
To  further  complicate  matters,  the  performance  indicators  that  are  commonly 
associated  with  production,  Quality  or  Engineering,  and  familiar  to  managers,  are  not 
necessarily  suitable  for  the  measurement  of  safety  management.  Safety  has  different 
concerns  in  that  it  focuses  on  people  and  legal  requirements  rather  than  on  product 
quality  or  process  efficiency.  Many  aspects  of  safety  are  entirely  subjective,  such  as 
attitude,  and  may  not  actually  indicate  how  people  perform.  Safety  performance 
measures  then  have  a  dual  requirement  in  the  inclusion  of  both  hard  and  soft 
measures.  'Hard'  or  objective  measures  include  accident  statistics,  a  contrast  to  soft 
measures  like  attitudinal  surveys  or  the  impact  on  safety  awareness  of  training.  It  is 
also  important  that  at  least  some  of  the  indicators  selected  are  positive  and  proactive 
rather  than  reactive  and  post-facto. 
In  the  1997  edition  of  Successful  Health  and  Safety  Management,  the  HSE  propose 
that  a  business  implements  a  combination  of  active  and  reactive  measures.  They 
propose  that  a  company  measures  and  rewards  achievement  instead  of  focusing 
3:  59 purely  on  safety  failures  and  deficiencies.  The  HSE  suggest  that  whilst  investigation 
into  deficiencies  creates  an  opportunity  to  `learn  from  mistakes',  valuable  knowledge 
should  also  be  gained  with  proactive  techniques  such  as  behavioural  observation, 
inspections  and  auditing.  In  contrast,  in  the  first  edition  of  this  publication  in  1991, 
the  focus  had  been  on  reactive  (negative)  measures  of  safety  performance  such  as 
accident  and  incident  investigation.  In  the  interim  period,  the  HSE  have  recognised 
that  a  combination  of  both  active  and  reactive,  hard  and  soft  measures  of  safety  is 
more  effective  in  gauging  performance  and  enabling  improvements.  It  may  be  that 
intermittent  contact  by  the  J&B  study  group  with  key  HSE  specialists  from  the 
Accident  Prevention  Advisory  Unit  (APAU)  played  a  small  part  in  the  this  change  in 
emphasis  as  the  inadequacy  in  practice  of  the  reactive  systems  proposed  in  the  1991 
(and  earlier)  documents  was  very  firmly  stressed.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  clear  in 
those  discussion  that  within  HSE  there  existed  recognition  of  the  same  problem  - 
that  management  could  only  react  to  the  older  measures,  whereas  there  was  a  need  to 
drive  the  performance  of  the  organisation. 
Performance  measures  must  also  be  appropriate  to  a  company's  culture,  management 
structure,  expertise,  risks  and  resources.  It  is  obvious  that  a  complex  tailor-made 
comprehensive  system  may  not  be  suitable  for  a  small  company  or  site  with  few 
operational  risks  and  fewer  resources.  In  contrast,  companies  in  the  nuclear  and  oil 
industries  often  use  very  complex  systems  of  measurement  and  monitoring.  Leading 
on  from  that,  it  is  also  true  that  a  system  or  technique  of  measurement  should  be  also 
be  understandable  and  usable  by  those  who  will  be  required  to  operate  it.  The 
measures  of  performance  must  also  be  useful  in  practical  time-scales  to  line 
management,  rather  than  waiting  for  years  for  useful  results.  They  must  have 
consistency  of  approach  and  meaningful  results  to  allow  year  on  year  comparisons. 
The  techniques  must  reflect  the  current  set-up  of  the  company,  and  it  must  be  noted 
that  some  historical  data  will  be  rendered  meaningless  if  there  has  been  a  series  of 
organisational  changes. 
There  are  many  techniques  available  to  companies,  from  self-administered  systems 
to  elaborate  techniques  that  require  specialist  assistance.  Companies  can  custom 
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system  is  chosen  that  they  perform  fulfil  certain  functions  :  continuity;  accuracy; 
consistency;  utility;  meaningful  information.  This  information  should  indicate 
current  status,  identify  areas  of  concern  and  help  to  facilitate  continuous 
improvement.  This  is  unlikely  to  be  achievable  through  one  technique  alone.  This 
section  aims  to  consider  the  different  techniques  that  are  available,  and  suggest 
solutions  for  practical  implementation  into  the  work  place. 
3.1.1  SAFETY  PERFORMANCE  INDICATORS 
A  technique  that  measures  health  and  safety  performance  in  the  workplace  should 
provide  an  accurate  picture  of  current  status  whilst  providing  useful  information  that 
will  enable  positive  improvements  to  be  implemented.  An  ideal  technique  will  not 
require  a  health  and  safety  expert  to  use  it,  nor  be  cost  prohibitive  for  smaller 
companies  yet  will  provide  useful  information  at  intermediate  and  higher  levels.  It 
should  be  available,  accessible  and  provide  timely  information  for  all  interested 
parties,  especially  those  who  implement  safety  tools,  the  success  of  which  should  be 
measurable  using  the  technique. 
As  may  be  expected,  the  ideal  health  and  safety  performance  measure  does  not  exist 
in  isolation  and  commonly  one  or  more  complementary  measure  will  be  used  for 
their  individual  properties. 
In  industry,  three  main  techniques  are  currently  used,  occasionally  together,  to 
provide  the  feedback  required  for  management  and  improvement  of  safety 
performance: 
"  Monitoring 
"  Auditing 
"  Intensive  studies 
This  section  offers  criticism  and  appraisal  of  the  three  techniques  commonly  used  to 
monitor  and  control  safety  performance. 
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The  technique  of  'monitoring',  otherwise  known  as  the  study  of  accident  data,  is 
almost  certainly  the  most  commonly  used  health  and  safety  performance  measure 
used  across  all  industries.  Monitoring  is  the  collection  and  analysis  of  data  on 
accidents,  whether  injury  or  non-injury,  near-misses,  or  costs  that  have  occurred  over 
a  period  of  time.  The  analysis  will  generally  focus  on  comparison  of  accident 
experience  by  quantity,  frequency  or  type  over  a  period  of  time.  Other  comparisons 
maybe  made,  for  example  :  across  departments;  sites;  within  an  industry  or  against 
national  averages. 
Perhaps  one  reason  for  its  widespread  use  is  that  it  is,  and  has  been,  a  legal 
requirement  to  collect  and  disseminate  information  about  'reportable'  accidents  to  the 
enforcement  bodies  since  the  introduction  of  the  Notification  of  Accidents  and 
Dangerous  Occurrences  Regulations  in  1981.  The  majority  of  companies  already 
collect  accident  data  so  it  is  readily  available  to  them  and  in  some  respects  it  is  the 
most  accessible  performance  measure  to  non-safety  professionals.  However  by  the 
nature  of  its  simplicity,  it  is  also  the  technique  easiest  to  misinterpret  and  it  is  open  to 
abuse. 
One  thing  is  immediately  clear,  monitoring  is  the  numerical  comparison  of  events 
against  those  occurring  at  different  locations  or  periods  of  time.  The  critical 
assumption  in  relation  to  monitoring  is  therefore  that  100%  reporting  of  all  events 
that  take  place,  collected  in  the  same  manner,  to  allow  'true'  numerical  comparisons. 
If  there  is  incomplete  collection  of  all  event  data,  there  will  not  be  an  accurate 
comparison.  Typical  scenarios  such  as  a  change  in  a  reporting  system,  change  of 
emphasis  on  accident  reporting,  change  of  management  team  or  fear  of  blame,  will 
alone  be  significant  enough  to  influence  the  number  of  events  recorded  on  a  year  on 
year  basis. 
These  scenarios  are  independent  of  an  actual  improvement  or  decline  in  health  and 
safety  performance  and  can  easily  produce  misleading  results.  For  example  a  new 
3:  62 management  policy  introducing  bonuses  for  a  10%  reduction  in  the  number  of 
accidents  in  one  year  is  likely  to  result  in  under  reporting  of  accidents  across  the 
board,  rather  than  an  actual  reduction  of  accidents.  These  circumstances  will 
demonstrate  a  significant  improvement  in  performance,  whilst  inadvertently  creating 
a  'blame'  culture.  Alternative  scenarios  that  will  render  prior  data  as  meaningless  are 
the  down-sizing  of  the  work  force  or  introduction  of  temporary  workers,  change  in 
work  practices  (for  example,  automation),  fluctuation  in  the  number  of  working 
hours  -  specifically  change  in  shifts,  or  overtime  or  any  other  similar  factors.  Data 
can  be  compared  using  ratios  in  some  circumstances,  but  direct  comparison  of  raw 
accident  data  will  no  longer  be  valid. 
Alternatively  there  is  a  risk  of  collecting  too  much  information.  This  has  been 
described  by  Shannon  (1993)  as  opening  a  window  to  get  a  clearer  view,  but  letting 
in  more  dust  to  obscure  it.  Vast  quantities  of  information  will  result  in  data  handling 
problems.  Even  with  the  aid  of  an  appropriate  database,  data  logging  and  analysis 
will  be  time  consuming.  This  may  result  in  more  emphasis  on  the  collection  of 
information  than  on  the  interpretation  of  the  results. 
To  add  further  complications,  the  amount  of  accident  data  that  has  to  be  gathered 
will  have  to  be  large  in  order  to  achieve  statistical  stability,  if  it  is  assumed  that  the 
event  rate  follows  a  Poisson  Distribution.  In  Table  2  it  is  demonstrated  that  with  a 
current  annual  rate  of  20  reportable  accidents,  it  would  take  19  months  at  a  50% 
reduced  rate  for  the  change  in  the  mean  rate  to  be  identified  with  statistical 
confidence.  The  impact  of  training  or  any  other  campaign  would  not  become  clear 
for  almost  two  years.  If  there  are  large  number  of  events,  a  statistically  identifiable 
reduction  will  take  a  shorter  period  of  time,  but  as  a  company  improves  its  accident 
performance,  it  will  become  increasingly  difficult  to  demonstrate  that  there  has  been 
any  change  at  all.  In  addition,  and  very  importantly,  at  this  level  accident  data  is 
distorted  by  one  or  two  individuals  who  have  been  affected  by  events  external  to  the 
workplace.  See  Table  2: 
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Time  to  register  a  50%  reduction  in  accident  rate  from  initial  rate 
Initial  accident  rate 
(events  per  year) 
No  of  months  for  50%  reduction 
to  be  significant  at  95% 
confidence  interval 
400  1 
50  8 
20  19 
10  38 
2  192 
In  summary,  monitoring  has  benefits  as  a  benchmark  against  which  to  compare 
health  and  safety  performance.  The  technique  is,  however,  a  post-facto  measure  of 
performance  as  it  only  reports  what  has  already  gone  wrong  and  results  in  the 
negative  image  of  the  safety  professional  who  'always  provides  the  bad  news'.  For 
this  reason  and  those  outlined  above  this  technique  must  be  used  with  caution,  and 
preferably  with  a  positive  performance  measure  to  complement  it. 
3.1.1.2  Rating  systems 
An  Audit  or  Rating  system  is  typically  a  system  -  either  proprietary  or  custom  -  that 
describes  areas  of  management  and  asks  a  formalised  series  of  questions  about 
factors  within  each  of  these  areas.  A  rating  is  produced  for  each  area  and  an  overall 
assessment  is  based  on  these  scores  and  the  distribution  of  scores  across  areas. 
Although  much  of  the  rating  is  performed  by  interview,  hard  evidence  is  also 
assessed  to  show  that  an  organisation's  systems  or  procedures  are  in  place  and  are 
being  followed  through  site  inspections  and  documentary  assessments. 
Rating  systems  require  belief  that  the  factors  controlled  have  a  direct  positive  impact 
on  safety.  It  is,  however,  probable  that  although  they  do  have  a  direct  effect,  the 
main  impact  is  indirect  through  enhanced  management  performance.  At  worst,  the 
rating  factors  themselves  become  goals  or  check  lists  with  no  impact. 
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Weighting  problems 
Most  systems  place  high  value  on  having  formalised  management  systems  in  place 
as  opposed  to  in  operation.  Although  it  is  true  that  such  systems  are  necessary  it  is 
not  true  that  existence  alone  justifies  this  high  rating. 
Subjectivity  of  respondent  and  false  positive  answering 
The  belief  that  an  organisation  is  good  can  be  reflected  in  the  responses  to  questions 
and,  because  physical  checks  are  generally  limited  by  time,  this  can  permeate 
through  to  a  rating  `hike'.  More  critically,  individuals  who  are  brutally  honest  during 
the  audit  may  achieve  a  reduced  score  in  comparison  with  others  who  paint  a  rose 
tinted  vision  of  their  department. 
Subjectivity  of  audit  team 
To  obtain  any  sort  of  trend  analysis  from  audit  to  audit  there  has  to  be  continuity  in 
the  marking  of  the  audit  and  comprehensive  records  must  be  kept  of  the  definitions 
used  and  those  scores  that  are  produced  after  discussion.  The  audit  team  must  have 
health  and  safety  expertise,  which  may not  be  available  within  a  company. 
Emphasis  on  larger  sites  &  organisations 
Most  audit  systems  are  appropriate  to  organisations  with  layered  structures  of 
management.  Where  smaller  sites  are  being  considered,  results  can  be  skewed  by 
the  knowledge/responses  of  a  few  people.  Audit  systems  for  smaller  sites  exist,  but 
there  are  difficulties  in  integrating  these  into  one  unifying  report  if  part  of  a  larger 
organisation. 
Personal  reactions 
First  is  the  effect  of  repetition  on  boredom  thresholds  -  without  a  doubt  such  auditing 
can  be  monotonous  for  the  interviewer  and  interviewee  alike.  This  is  of  course 
subjective.  Furthermore,  the  questioning  can  become  overly  interrogative  and  lead  to 
positive  acquiescence  or  defensive  answering.  Ignorance  can  be  identified,  but  false 
3:  65 answering,  especially  at  higher  levels  in  an  organisation,  cannot.  Reliance  then  falls 
on  the  auditor  to  reveal  the  truth  behind  all  of  the  answers  given  in  interviews,  a  time 
consuming  task  and  difficult  task. 
Audit  systems,  it  is  suggested,  have  an  effect  at  higher  levels  in  an  organisation  by 
ensuring  that  `good'  management  systems  exist.  They  do  not,  therefore,  offer 
assistance  in  the  day  to  day  management  of  safety  other  than  by  providing 
framework  systems  for  operating  safely.  In  any  event,  the  ratings  achieved  year  on 
year  or  compared  across  organisations  can  have  no  true  significance,  as  they  would 
require  truly  objective  standards  of  assessment.  Each  audit  should  be  seen  as  one 
unique  observation  to  highlight  areas  of  management  in  general  that  requires  some 
action. 
An  auditor  however  will  create  a  summary  report  of  system  failures,  defects  from  the 
physical  inspection  and  lack  of  documentary  evidence.  Enhanced  management 
performance  can  be  achieved  by  the  inclusion  of  safety  objectives  from  defects 
identified  in  the  audit  into  managers'  annual  bonus  objectives  for  example:  ensuring 
that  risk  assessments  are  completed  in  their  area;  ensuring  that  safe  systems  of  work 
for  all  tasks  are  written;  or  carrying  out  monthly  safety  inspections.  Obviously,  the 
objectives  must  cover  areas  other  than  accident  performance. 
3.1.1.3  Intensive  studies 
Behaviour 
Concentrated  observation  is  carried  out  by  an  individual  or  a  team  who  have  a 
description  of  a  'safe  system  of  work'  for  an  individual.  The  actual  behaviour  of  the 
target  individual  is  compared  with  the  safe  system  of  work  in  the  attempt  to  identify 
where  errors  are  being  made,  with  the  aim  of  pro-actively  identifying  the  cause  of 
accidents.  For  example  :  failure  to  wear  personal  protective  equipment;  failure  to 
isolate  machinery  before  maintenance;  failure  to  follow  procedures.  Controls  can 
then  be  implemented  before  an  accident  has  actually  happened. 
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alternative  to  or  in  addition  to  recording  of  incidents  and  accidents  this,  also, 
requires  a  great  deal  of  resources.  Intensive  observation  of  behaviour,  however,  is 
based  on  the  theory  that  unsafe  behaviour  is  directly  linked  with  the  occurrence  of 
incidents  and  accidents.  It  is  likely,  however,  that  the  simple  assumption  of  a 
continuous  distribution  from  unsafe  act  to  large  accident  will  be  incorrect.  It  might 
be  conservative  because  major  accidents  tend  to  bring  together  a  number  of  unsafe 
acts,  the  combination  of  which  is  difficult  to  anticipate.  As  Waagenar  (1988),  for 
example,  has  demonstrated,  the  number  of  errors  required  by  each  individual  to  lead 
to  an  accident  will  decrease  with  the  number  of  people  involved. 
A  more  basic  problem  is  the  resource  required  for  the  concentrated  observation  and 
the  nature  of  the  assessment.  Only  skilled  observers  can  assure  that  events  are  being 
counted  on  an  equal  basis,  and  yet  even  so  observation  is,  by  inference,  subjective. 
The  addition  of  another  person  to  'verify'  the  observations  requires  additional 
resource.  It  is  unlikely  that  intensive  observation  can  be  used  as  a  measurement 
system  by  middle  management,  it  is  time  consuming  and  requires  specialist  trained 
resource. 
It  is  worth  repeating,  however,  that  the  basic  premise  of  this  technique  is  sound  -  that 
unsafe  acts  or  errors  may  lead  to  the  occurrence  of  accidents,  either  in  isolation  or  by 
combination,  and  therefore  the  identification  and  control  of  these  may  lead  to 
improved  safety  performance.  A  more  cost  and  resource  effective  technique  may  be 
the  introduction  of  near-miss  reporting  and  a  system  of  hazard  notification  where  all 
personnel  are  actively  encouraged  to  report  situations  before  an  accident  occurs.  The 
side  effect  of  this  is  importantly,  the  active  involvement  of  all  personnel  in  the 
system  irrespective  of  their  skill  or  training  in  'observation'. 
For  companies  who  operate  using  ISO  (International  Standards  Organisation) 
systems,  it  will  be  possible  to  analyse  non-conforming  behaviour  against  procedures 
and  safe  systems  of  work  as  an  integral  part  of  their  auditing  system.  The 
identification  of  non-conforming  behaviour  will  indicate  that  the  safety  management 
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errors,  indicates  that  the  system  has  already  failed. 
Attitude 
An  attitudinal  study,  in  this  context,  sets  out  to  capture  the  attitude  of  a  work  force  or 
management  towards  health  and  safety  in  the  workplace.  Such  a  study  may  be 
carried  out  by  interview  or  questionnaire.  The  results  of  the  study  will,  in  principle, 
provide  a  benchmark  for  comparison  with  previous  studies  to  determine  if  the 
company  has  an  improved  attitude  towards  safety. 
Value  from  the  performance  of  an  attitudinal  study  would  come  if  there  were  a 
definite  link  between  safety  attitude  and  resultant  behaviour  and  therefore  the 
occurrence  of  accidents.  That  is,  improved  attitude  towards  safety  will  result  in  a 
reduction  of  accidents  and  improved  safety  performance.  Research  studies,  however, 
suggest  that  this  link  is  tenuous  if  it  exists  at  all.  For  example,  very  few  individuals 
will  respond  in  a  study  that  they  have  a  negative  attitude  towards  safety,  and  yet 
clearly  accidents  still  occur.  Attitudinal  studies  capture  the  'expressed'  attitude  or 
'intention  to  act'  of  an  individual.  This  may  not  be  indicative  of  actual  behaviour. 
Glendon  and  McKenna  (1995)  give  the  example  of  workers  who  wear  personal 
protective  equipment  when  working  alone,  but  fail  to  do  so  when  operating  within  a 
group.  How  then  can  attitude  be  a  reliable  predictor  of  safety  output,  if  behaviour  is 
modified  so  precisely  by  circumstances  ? 
Instead,  the  study  should  set  out  to  capture  information  about  levels  of  safety 
awareness  or  knowledge  for  it  to  be  of  any  practical  value  at  all.  It  is  suggested  that 
an  'awareness'  study  that  focuses  on  the  knowledge  and  understanding  of  very 
specific  issues  will  be  more  indicative  of  actual  behaviour  than  those  on  more 
general  issues. 
An  awareness  study  may  be  useful  for  the  identification  of  training  or  information 
needs  for  the  study  group  and  it  may  also  suggest  reasons  why  accidents  of  a 
particular  type  have  been  repeated  in  an  area.  It  is  not,  however,  an  accurate  or 
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designed  so  as  to  avoid  providing  meaningless  or  misleading  information,  or 
confusion  for  the  respondent  and  the  method  of  data  analysis  must  be  carefully 
considered  beforehand  to  avoid  non-causal  correlation's  such  as  'the  awareness  of 
the  need  for  hearing  protection  has  increased  with  paper  consumption  on  site'.  Issues 
of  interpretation  of  such  studies  require  expertise  in  design,  performance  and 
analysis  of  an  awareness  study.  Expertise  that  may  not  be  available  within  a 
company.  The  performance  of  a  study  will  require  the  availability  and  time  of  all 
participating  individuals. 
It  is  suggested  then,  that  a  specific  awareness  study  may  be  worthwhile  if  it  is 
expertly  carried  out  on  a  3-5  yearly  basis.  It  should  be  used  as  a  bench  marking 
exercise  only,  rather  than  a  true  measure  of  health  and  safety  performance. 
3.1.2  SUMMARY 
Each  of  the  techniques  has  a  specific  role  in  the  measurement  of  health  and  safety 
performance.  Every  organisation  will  have  different  issues,  standards  of  safety, 
resources  and  development  needs,  much  like  the  individuals  within  their  business.  A 
tailored  system  of  performance  measurement  that  will  facilitate  continuous 
improvement  should  be  introduced,  with  enough  flexibility  to  assure  continuity  and 
yet  provide  for  modifications  as  standards  of  health  and  safety  progress.  Only  the 
measurement  of  health  and  safety  performance  using  an  optimum  mix  of  techniques, 
relevant  to  each  situation,  will  result  in  the  desired  improvement. 
What  follows  is  a  series  of  Case  Studies  implemented  within  J&B  Scotland  between 
1994  and  1997.  In  each  Case  Study,  a  performance  measure  has  been  implemented, 
and  it  is  appraised  in  terms  of  how  practical  it  was,  and  the  benefit,  if  any  that  it 
provided  in  the  pursuit  for  continuous  improvement. 
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3.2.1  AIMS 
For  a  system  to  be  controlled  it  has  to  be  measured.  Monitoring  of  accident  (or 
incident)  rates  is  the  most  widely  used  performance  measure.  Its  combination  of  the 
apparent  hardness  of  numerical  measuring  with  easy  and  vivid  graphical 
presentation  makes  it  attractive.  Its  utility  has  not,  however,  been  widely  discussed. 
The  aims  here  were  to, 
i)  identify  and  test  techniques  to  detect  changes  in  the  statistics  of  the  accident 
process. 
ii)  analyse  the  accident  information  for  the  period  1990-1999  to  determine  if  there 
had  been  (statistically)  significant  changes  in  the  number  of  accidents  in  this 
period 
iii)  create  a  statistical  model  that  would  indicate  (forecast)  accident  rates  in  the 
future  based  on  past  results  for  certain  work  periods  and  situations.  The 
obvious  inverse  of  this  is  the  ability  to  highlight  those  work  processes  with 
higher  accident  rates. 
Clearly,  the  last  two  objectives  depend  to  some  extent  on  the  first.  Before  any 
analysis,  however,  the  information  that  is  available  has  to  be  reviewed  and  checked 
for  quality. 
3.2.2  REVIEW  OF  DATA 
3.2.2.1  Form  of  information 
The  form  of  information  available  is  important.  At  J&B  we  have  incident 
occurrences  that  have  been  gathered  as  raw  rates  in  time.  There  is  the  potential  to 
normalise  the  rates  using  information  about  other  variables  (for  example  man  hours) 
that  may  be  important  to  the  rate  of  incidents  and  by  doing  that  to  test  the  linkage. 
We  also  have  the  incidents  categorised  by  type  -  serious,  first  aid,  non-injury  etc. 
and  this  allows  investigation  of  the  relationships  between  type  of  accident. 
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variables  on  a  monthly  basis.  They  exist  only  as  annual  values.  Attempts  were 
made  to  obtain  the  information  and  to  persuade  the  relevant  production  groups  to 
record  useful  monthly  information,  but  because  of  Group  recording  procedures  this 
was  not  possible.  That  represents  a  serious  problem  for  analysis  as  one  would  not 
wish  to  use  accident  measures  without  taking  account  of  the  intensity  of  work.  This 
inability  to  record  useful  data  at  site  level  may  very  well  be  a  feature  of  the  industrial 
setting  where  holding  groups  drive  the  marketing  and  production  effort  and 
individual  companies  are  accounted  within  an  overall  scheme. 
3.2.2.2  Rates  and  development  of  mean  rates  in  time 
Figure  1,  therefore,  shows  only  the  raw  information  for  minor  and  reportable 
accidents.  Although  one  should  not  attempt  to  read  to  much  into  this,  it  seems  that 
there  is  a  period  from  mid  1993  to  early  1996  where  the  rate  for  the  minor  injury 
category  is  lower  than  elsewhere.  There  is  a  rise  through  1997  and  then  a  fall  to  the 
end  of  1998.  For  clarification,  J&B  defined  minor  accidents  as  injury  accidents  that 
incur  less  than  4  days  lost  time  from  normal  work,  and  reportable  accidents  as  injury 
accidents  resulting  in  more  than  3  days  lost  time  from  normal  work. 
The  structure  of  the  information  is,  however,  more  clearly  seen  in  Figures  2  and  3. 
These  show  the  development  of  the  mean  rates  for  minor  and  reportable  accidents 
respectively.  They  also  show  the  development  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
results  and  the  95%  confidence  intervals  of  the  mean.  On  Figure  2  it  seems  clearer 
that  the  mean  rate  of  minor  accidents  has  fallen  slightly  over  time  -  certainly  since 
early  1993  -  so  that  it  now  lies  around  6.8  from  a  value  around  8  prior  to  1993.  The 
reportable  accidents  shown  in  Figure  3  show  an  apparently  more  dramatic  fall,  but 
the  reader  should  be  beware  of  scales  and  their  effect  -  useful  when  presenting  to 
senior  management.  The  rate  does  fall  from  around  2  in  January  1992  to  1.15  at  the 
end  of  the  recording  interval. 
On  both  figures  it  is  interesting  to  look  at  the  standard  deviation  of  the  data  and  the 
standard  deviation  of  the  mean  (more  usually  called  the  standard  error).  It  is 
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(Chatfield,  1983).  It  is  supposed  that  accidents  occur  randomly  in  time  about  a  mean 
rate.  An  important  feature  of  the  Poisson  model  is  that  the  variance  is  equal  to  the 
mean  so  that  the  standard  deviation  is  the  square  root  of  the  mean. 
Table  3 
Category  N1(mean)  Standard  deviation 
Minor  2.6  2.9 
Reportable  1.1  1.2 
This  is  almost  true  for  both  of  the  processes  shown  here  and  that  is  re-assuring. 
It  is  also  worthwhile  pointing  out  the  relative  stability  of  the  standard  deviation  (and 
hence  the  variance)  in  both  cases  as  this  makes  some  of  the  possible  tests  for  changes 
in  the  mean  easier. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  built  into  the  Poisson  process  that  variations  are  random 
about  a  mean  rate.  For  raw  accident  data  this  may  very  well  be  true,  but  for 
information  that  takes  account  of  work  load  -  that  is  normalised  values  there  will  be 
confounding  factors  that  destroy  the  theoretical  process. 
3.2.2.3  Frequency  analysis 
One  of  the  (apparently)  easiest  tests  is  of  cyclic  frequency  as  many  standard 
packages  will  perform  Fourier  analysis  of  the  data  to  identify  recurrent  cycles.  It  is 
possible,  however,  for  an  inexperienced  person  to  obtain  widely  different  results 
from  the  many  different  manipulations  that  are  required  on  the  data.  For  this  study 
help  was  sought  from  an  experienced  analyst  and  the  results  are  given  in  Tables  4 
and  5. 
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Minor  accidents 
Frequency 
sec-1 
Period 
(months) 
Period 
(days) 
Raw  0.333  3.0  91 
0.416  2.4  73 
With  filter  0.333  3.0  91 
0.416  2.4  73 
For  minor  accidents  there  is  a  clear  3  monthly  cycle  that  ties  in  well  with  the  cyclic 
nature  of  whisky  production  centred  around  the  major  holidays  -  still  quarter  days  in 
the  UK  and  Anglo  centric  world.  The  2.4  months  or  73  days  cycle  is  less 
pronounced  and  may  (I  am  told)  be  a  function  of  variations  produced  by  world-wide 
trading.  Filtering  of  the  data  retains  the  same  frequency  peaks  so  that  they  seem 
solid  effects  rather  than  artefacts  of  analysis. 
The  true  production  cycle  of  the  Company  cannot  be  reproduced  from  production 
information,  however  an  increase  in  production  coincides  with  the  lead  up  to 
Christmas  and  New  Year,  and  the  summer  holiday  period. 
Table  5 
Major  (reportable)  accidents 
Frequency 
(sec-) 
Period 
(months) 
Period 
(days) 
Raw  0.073  13.7  417 
0.163  6.1  187 
With  filter  0.073  13.7  417 
0.16  6.3  190 
0.32  3.1  95 
0.35  2.9  87 
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less  clear.  There  is  a  (possibly)  annual  cycle  that  may  be  a  function  of  the  limited 
period  of  data  capture.  There  is  a  clear  6  month  cycle  and  a  probable  3  month  cycle 
that,  again,  are  likely  to  be  tied  to  production  demands  from  Group  Marketing. 
Overall  we  learn  little  from  such  analysis  except  that  it  requires  experienced 
personnel  to  separate  the  wheat  from  the  chaff  -  even  to  produce  wheat. 
3.2.2.4  Cumulative  sums  of  differences 
Two  possible  techniques  exist  to  detect  changes  in  the  mean  of  a  process.  One  uses 
the  `student  t'  distribution  and  the  other  the  cumulative  sum  (CUSUM)  process  that 
derives  from  quality  control  experience.  They  are  essentially  the  same  in  that  they 
are  an  extension  to  standard  quality  control  procedures  where  excursions  beyond  a 
limit  are  measured,  to  take  account  of  the  time  period.  (Leavenworth  1996; 
Ryan  2000) 
Both  cumulative  sums  and  tests  for  changes  in  the  mean  provide  quicker 
identification  of  underlying  changes  than  most  QC  Shewart  charts  where  only  the 
immediate  level  is  tested.  The  cumulative  sum  adds  up  the  differences  over  time 
from  some  assumed  mean  level  and  looks  for  changes  in  slope.  If  the  line  is  flat 
there  is  no  change.  If  there  is  a  slope  over  several  readings  then  a  change  in  the 
mean  has  occurred.  It  is  possible  to  set  slope  limits  that  identify  shifts  in  the  mean  of 
the  process  being  considered.  Student's  `t'  test  performs  essentially  the  same  task 
for  small  numbers  of  samples,  but  is  less  visual. 
Figures  4,5  and  6  apply  these  techniques  to  the  minor  accident  category.  Figures  7, 
8  and  9  are  similar  for  reportable  incidents. 
Considering,  first,  Figure  4,  we  see  a  rise  in  slope  of  the  CUSUM  until  about  April 
1993  when  it  falls  steadily  until  January  1996.  It  then  rises  again  to  a  flat  period  in 
mid  1997  before  falling  to  the  end  of  the  recording  interval.  On  this  Figure  are  also 
shown  points  in  time  where  the  `t'  test  (taken  over  5  points)  suggest  a  probability 
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facto.  Furthermore,  it  is  taken  over  a  five  month  interval  before  and  after  the  date  in 
question  where  the  five  month  interval  avoids  possible  three  monthly  and  six 
monthly  resonance's,  but  this  would  not  be  obvious  to  anyone  who  started  such  a 
scheme. 
Figures  5  and  6  split  the  CUSUM  process  into  those  changes  that  are  above  the  mean 
level  and  those  below  it.  To  remove  any  noise  from  the  Figures,  those  changes  that 
are  less  than  half  a  standard  deviation  of  the  overall  process  are  neglected.  Figure  6 
takes  out  and  plots  the  local  mean  value  and  shows  what  is  left  -  the  residuals. 
The  CUSUM  (Figure  4)  suggests,  for  example  a  change  in  April  1993,  whereas  the 
`t'  test  suggests  January  1993.  Differences  are  small,  however,  and  the  lag  is  a 
matter  of  months.  The  CUSUM,  therefore  has  possibilities  as  a  guide  to  significant 
(in  the  statistical  sense)  changes  in  what  is  going  on.  It  is  not,  however,  as  quick  as 
may  be  thought  from  the  plot  in  Figure  4.  It  is  not  immediately  obvious,  for 
example,  in  May  1997  when  the  underlying  process  changes  -  it  could  be  May  or 
June  or  July.  As  noted  in  Ryan  (2000),  the  CUSUM  technique  is  at  its  best  when 
there  is  a  sudden  and  quite  large  change  in  the  mean. 
Figures  5  and  6  show  this  more  clearly.  Although  there  is  a  general  trend 
downwards  in  minor  accident  rate,  the  changes  are  small  and  the  scatter  (residuals  in 
Figure  6)  is  quite  wide.  The  most  significant  (not  in  a  statistical  sense)  change  from 
our  point  of  view  is  round  about  June  1997  when  there  is  a  drop  in  the  minor 
accident  rate. 
Again  it  has  to  be  stressed,  however,  that  these  tests  are  operating  over  periods  of 
months  (5  or  more).  That  has  little  value  for  a  production  manager. 
The  same  analysis  is  provided  in  Figures  7,8  and  9  for  the  reportable  accidents.  The 
huge  problem  is  that,  whereas  Figure  7  seems  to  show  a  clear  change  in  April  1997 
in  the  CUSUM,  this  is  not  reported  (at  any  level  above  0.3  probability)  by  the  `t'  test. 
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observation  of  Figure  7  shows  relatively  wide  scatter  from  1994  to  1997  and  a  slow 
decrease  in  the  CUSUM.  The  test  cannot  distinguish  the  change  in  early  1997  well. 
Much  of  this  is  due  to  the  very  small  level  of  events  taken  on  a  monthly  basis. 
Events  are  discrete  at  one,  two  or  three  a  month  (see  Figure  1)  and  it  is  not 
mathematically  possible  to  detect  slow  changes  in  any  reasonable  interval.  Again, 
not  useful  for  a  Production  Manager. 
Figures  7,8  and  9  are,  however,  interesting  as  they  confirm  a  steady  drop  in 
reportable  accident  rate  over  the  period  of  the  study.  Or  do  they?? 
3.2.2.5  Normalised  data 
Perhaps  they  don't  when  normalised  variables  are  used.  Figure  10  gives  annual 
information  about  the  obvious  normalising  variables  such  as  cases  of  spirit  produced, 
hours  worked  and  staff  numbers  and  Figures  11  and  12  present  the  minor  and 
reportable  accident  rates  (on  an  annual  basis)  once  they  have  been  divided  by  these 
normalising  variables.  There  is  quite  a  change  from  the  raw  information. 
No  statistical  tests  provide  useful  information  on  these  results  over  the  time  intervals. 
A  mean  line  is  about  all  that  could  be  plotted  and  that  without  any  confidence 
(statistical  or  otherwise).  What  can  be  said,  however,  is  that  the  rate  of  minor 
accidents  per  million  cases  has  either  dropped  or  stayed  constant,  but  the  rate  per 
hours  worked  and  staff  employed  grew  over  the  time  of  recording.  The  same  is 
probably  true  of  the  reportable  injuries  where,  certainly,  the  rate  per  hours  worked 
has  increased. 
Many  factors  other  than  an  improved  or  degraded  performance  in  safety  can  lead  to 
reduced  or  different  accident  rates.  The  restructure  or  downsizing  of  a  company  or 
other  significant  organisational  change  can  impact  on  accident  data.  It  is  therefore 
critical  in  year  on  year  comparisons  that  the  comparable  number  and  type  of 
employees  and  activities  are  considered.  Similarly,  seasonal  fluctuations  should  be 
kept  in  mind  as  rates  will  generally  vary  with  production  rate  and  hours  worked.  In 
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be  required  between  actual  rate  and  number  of  hours  worked. 
3.2.2.6  Accidents  and  production  series 
Figure  13  shows  production  efficiency  over  the  same  period  where  this  is  taken  as 
production  per  employee  and  production  per  hours  worked.  These  are  essentially  the 
same  variables.  The  production  efficiency  is  seen  to  have  risen  dramatically  (by  a 
factor  of  2.2  from  94/95  to  98/99). 
If  the  increasing  production  was  due  to  improvement  in  technology,  then  production 
would  be  directly  related  to  the  number  of  working  hours  plus  the  benefits  of  the 
improved  level  of  technology  available.  If  this  were  achieved  without  an  increase  in 
risk  then  the  accident  series  per  hour  worked  and  by  cases  produced,  the  two  series 
might  show  a  similar  shape  and  be  in  proportion.  Figures  11  to  13  do  not  show  this. 
Figure  13  suggests  that  numbers  employed  and  hours  worked  are  the  same  and  that 
productivity  has  increased  dramatically.  Figures  11  and  12  do,  however,  show 
precisely  similar  patterns  for  accident  rates  per  hours/employees  and  for  production 
(millions  of  cases)  with  the  values  for  1998/99  being  the  odd  ones  out.  The 
correlations  are  of  interest.  The  correlation  coefficient  between  cases  produced  and 
hours  worked  (and  employed  numbers)  is  about  0.5.  Emphasising  the  increased 
production  per  unit  resource  and  although  only  small  numbers  of  points  are 
compared,  this  suggests  that  there  may  be  a  significant  technology  effect. 
It  would  be  interesting  to  examine  the  effect  of  overtime  on  accident  frequency  rate. 
It  would  be  interesting  to  determine  whether  an  increase  in  accident  rate  is  due  to 
increased  pressure  to  produce,  longer  hours,  tiredness,  or  shift  work  or  a  combination 
of  these.  It  would  be  interesting  to  try  to  confirm  what  is  generally  known  by  safety 
professionals  -  that  when  there  is  more  work  pressure,  when  more  overtime  is 
worked,  when  casual  labour  is  brought  in  to  cover  for  redundancies  and  when  lay- 
offs  occur;  then  the  rate  of  accidents  rises.  Human  resource  management  takes  little 
account  of  this  cost.  All  interesting  but  impossible  as  the  information  is  not 
available  over  a  period  longer  than  one  year,  and  therefore  is  not  stable.  The 
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of  using  accident  data. 
3.2.2.7  Multi-variate  regression  techniques 
One  possible  way  to  isolate  calendar/production  rate  influences  would  be  by 
modelling  these  effects  to  modify  the  recorded  levels  -  much  as  the  Government  do 
with  unemployment  and  other  indices. 
The  advantages  of  statistical  models  that  summarise  data  and  test  hypotheses  are 
well  documented.  Regression  analysis,  for  example,  examines  the  relationship 
between  a  dependent  variable  and  a  set  of  independent  variables.  Analysis  of 
variance  techniques  provide  tests  for  the  effects  of  various  factors  on  a  dependent 
variable.  Neither  technique,  however,  is  appropriate  for  categorical  data  or  fully 
appropriate  where  the  observations  are  not  from  a  normally  distributed  population 
with  constant  variance  -  generally,  therefore,  where  sample  size  is  small. 
A  special  class  of  statistical  technique,  called  Poisson  regression  or  log-linear 
modelling,  has  been  formulated  for  the  analysis  of  categorical  data  and  it  has  been 
shown  above  that  the  raw  data  seem  to  follow  the  Poisson  model  well.  This 
technique  can  be  used  in  calculations  where  the  response  variable  represents  the 
number  of  events  occurring  in  a  fixed  period  of  time  and  the  models  are  useful  for 
uncovering  the  potentially  complex  relationships  among  variables  in  a  multi-way 
cross  tabulation.  Log-linear  models  are  similar  to  multiple  regression  models  and  in 
the  J&B  case,  the  classifications  (year,  month  and  class  of  accident  -  whether  minor 
or  lost  time)  are  used  as  independent  variables,  and  the  dependent  variable  is  the 
number  of  events,  (accidents). 
3.2.2.8  Accident  data  defined 
The  data  set  contained  the  number  of  accidents  per  month  within  J&B  in  the  period 
January  1990  to  December  1998  divided  into  three  classes  as  follows, 
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associated  lost  time 
2  Minor  injury  accident:  An  injury  which,  although  more  serious  than  a  first  aid 
accident,  leads  to  less  than  4  days  lost  time  from  normal  work 
3  Reportable  accident  :  Four  or  more  days  lost  from  normal  work  and/or  reportable 
under  the  RIDDOR  Regulations. 
This  differs  from  the  previous  analysis  in  that  the  minor  accidents  have  been  further 
subdivided  to  examine  the  nature  of  the  smallest  incidents. 
3.2.2.9  Significance  of  categories 
Preliminary  evaluation  suggests  that  all  the  main  effects  of  class,  month  and  year  are 
very  significant.  This  means  that  the  rate  of  accidents  differs  significantly  depending 
on  class,  month  and  year. 
Class  of  accident 
The  fitted  value  of  first  aid  treatable  accidents  is  positive  and  much  higher  than  that 
of  the  others,  meaning  that  the  frequency  of  first  aid  accidents  is  significantly  higher 
than  the  other  two  classes.  The  second  highest  class  is  that  of  minor  injury  accidents, 
and  the  lowest,  reportable  accidents.  This  dispersion  is  to  be  expected  under  normal 
operating  and  reporting  conditions,  and  follows  the  pattern  suggested  by  the  accident 
triangle. 
Seasonal  Variation 
The  critical  level  of  the  factor  'month'  is  very  small.  This  suggests  that  seasonal 
variation  does  exist.  From  the  fitted  value  of  'month',  we  find  that  the  number  of 
accidents  are  significantly  higher  around  the  period  September  to  November.  The 
lowest  occurrence  is  in  July  and  the  fitted  value  suggests  that  it  is  markedly  lower 
than  the  other  months.  In  the  period  from  January  to  February  and  from  April  to 
May,  the  expected  numbers  of  accidents  are  lower  than  the  average. 
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company  the  highest  period  of  production  is  in  fact,  September  to  November  where 
there  are  also  high  levels  of  overtime  worked.  In  July,  there  are  only  2  weeks  of 
production  due  to  the  summer  maintenance  shut-down.  The  quiet  period  is  January, 
February.  In  April,  there  is  also  a  two  week  shutdown  period,  after  which 
production  steadily  increases.  Evidently,  the  rate  of  accidents  is  linked  to  periods  of 
production  activity. 
3.2.2.10  The  second  order  interaction  effect  -  all  data 
A  significant  three  way  interaction  effect  does  not  exist.  However,  the  two  level 
interaction  effect  of  class*year  and  month*year  are  significant.  In  essence,  the 
class*year  interaction  means  that  the  three  different  classes  of  accidents  have 
different  distributions  across  the  period  1990-1995.  The  frequencies  of  first  aid 
accidents  decreased  rapidly  but  the  frequency  of  the  other  two  classes  of  accident 
were  quite  stable  in  yearly  figures  with  only  small  fluctuations.  This  was  further 
proved  by  analysis  of  only  minor  and  reportable  accidents.  Although  first  aid 
accidents  decreased  significantly,  the  other  classes  remained  fairly  stable,  whilst 
maintaining  their  relationship  to  one  another.  The  implication  is  that  they  behave 
similarly  -  first  aid  accidents  are  the  odd  ones  out. 
The  other  second  order  effect  of  month*year  is  also  significant.  Accident  rates  were 
lower  in  July,  April  and  January  and  higher  in  September  to  November,  perhaps 
showing  a  positive  correlation  to  rates  of  production  whilst  low  and  then  high. 
No  significant  interaction  effect  was  observed  for  either  the  three  way  effect  or  for 
the  second  order  effect  of  class*month.  Hence,  all  the  first  order  effects  and  only 
two  of  the  second  order  effects  (class*year  and  month*year)  could  be  used  to 
represent  the  data 
Analysis  was  then  performed  using  only  the  two  more  severe  classes  of  accident 
(minor  and  reportable),  the  result  showed  that  there  was  no  interaction  effect  on 
class*month  or  class*year.  This  means  that  the  distribution  of  the  two  different 
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Therefore  we  can  combine  these  classes  of  accidents  into  one.  As  a  result  of  this,  the 
frequencies  within  the  cells  were  higher  such  that  no  cell  contains  less  than  5 
accidents.  The  benefit  of  this  is  that  the  number  of  accidents  within  the  sample 
increases,  and  as  a  result  the  estimation  becomes  more  accurate. 
3.2.2.11  Estimating  the  expected  frequencies  of  accidents 
Based  on  these  results  and  selecting  only  those  variables  that  are  shown  to  be 
significant,  models  can  be  produced  to  estimate  the  expected  frequencies  of 
accidents  in  the  time  interval  considered  or  to  develop  a  model  of  the  correction  for 
each  month.  Pragmatically,  there  seems  little  value  in  this. 
3.2.3  OVERVIEW  AND  UTILITY  OF  STATISTICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  DATA 
Whereas  raw  accident  information  seems  to  show  slight  falls  in  rates  over  time,  the 
true  picture  is  of  a  rise  in  both  minor  and  reportable  accidents  per  unit  volumes  of 
work  over  the  period  of  the  study  -  essentially  from  1996.  This  could  be 
disheartening  if  it  were  not  for  the  knowledge  that  revision  of  the  system  of 
recording  to  make  it  simpler,  encouragement  to  record  events  and  increased 
involvement  in  safety  would  all  act  to  confound  the  results.  Where  emphasis  is  put 
on  safety  event  records  are  expected  to  rise. 
It  is  clear  that  the  tests  for  changes  in  accident  rates  can  be  applied  to  the  raw  data, 
but  that  they  have  little  value  for  real-time  management  as  opposed  to  management 
presentations.  It  is  also  clear  that  normalised  variables  are  essential  to  allow 
understanding  of  what  is  happening  in  a  plant.  They  were,  unfortunately,  not 
available  for  this  study. 
Given  that  monthly  or  weekly  production  information  should  be  available,  it  would 
seem  sensible  to  use  the  CUSUM  or  students  t  methods  to  identify  changes  in 
performance.  It  is  an  open  question,  however,  whether  the  cyclic  nature  of  the 
production  could  be  fully  removed  from  the  analysis.  Regression  techniques  hold 
out  the  hope  of  doing  this,  but  add  their  own  uncertainty.  In  any  event,  it  would  take 
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The  multi-variate  analysis  of  the  data  did  produce  some  interesting  information. 
First  aid  incidents  -  the  lowest  level  of  accident  were  found  to  follow  a  different 
distribution  from  the  minor  and  reportable  accidents  -  the  last  two  being  essentially 
similar  in  form  although  not  magnitude.  That  is  encouraging  when  we  come  to 
consider  accident  triangles  (Section  3.4). 
Statistical  analysis  of  accidents  can  enable  significant  changes  to  be  identified.  It 
can  be  useful  to  identify  changes  over  time,  such  as  a  change  in  the  severity  of 
accidents.  However,  because  of  the  nature  of  the  analysis,  it  requires  statistical 
expertise  (not  always  available),  accurate  data  (again  often  not  available),  and  results 
can  be  open  to  misinterpretation.  The  statistical  instability  of  accident  data  means 
that,  even  if  the  data  fluctuates  and  suggests  an  improvement  in  the  overall  trend, 
this  may  in  fact  be  inconclusive.  The  statistical  tests  that  can  be  performed  to 
identify  if  there  are  significant  effects  are  unlikely  to  be  used  by  the  practical  safety 
manager.  When  a  company  sets  key  point  indicators  such  as  the  reduction  in 
accident  rates  year  on  year,  it  will  be  tempting  to  use  raw  data  that  shows  apparent 
rate  reductions.  This  will  however  be  inherently  inaccurate,  unless  supporting 
statistical  tests  are  performed. 
Fundamentally,  accident  monitoring  is  a  negative  measure.  The  techniques  could, 
however,  be  used  every  2  to  3  years  to  illustrate  over  time  whether  overall  strategies 
have  been  successful  and  to  start  discussion,  but  they  will  not  help  individual 
managers. 
There  may  be  benefits  in  the  comparison  of  units,  sites  and  companies  using  accident 
rates,  but  there  are  several  basic  rules  that  must  be  applied  for  accuracy:  that  there 
are  consistency  in  reporting;  accurate  data;  and  understanding  of  the  limitations  of 
the  formulae.  The  formulae  cannot  isolate  small  improvements  in  safety  performance 
-  as  often  as  not  these  will  not  be  statistically  significant,  and  caused  by  other  factors. 
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pragmatic  basis.  It  is  also  invalid  to  make  direct  numerical  comparisons  of 
operations  with  different  risk  exposures,  although,  again,  trends  upwards  or 
downwards  could  be  compared.  Attention  must  be  paid  to  other  underlying  factors 
that  may  have  affected  the  ratios  (or  individual  incidents),  and  to  other  general 
matters  that  affect  performance  such  as  seasonal  trends,  motivation  and  accident 
triangles.  In  essence,  there  are  advantages  to  be  gained  from  analysing  accidents,  but 
techniques  have  to  be  used  accurately,  consistently  and  with  expertise  to  avoid 
misinterpretation. 
Finally,  a  very  serious/catastrophic  incident  is  caused  by  a  rare  combination  of 
events  and  may  not  be  indicative  of  a  poor  general  performance.  Poor  or 
deteriorating  safety  performance  in  general  can  be  identified  instead  by  a  large 
number  of  events  of  all  types  and  in  particular  lost  time  incidents.  The  tests  here 
suggest  that  minor  and  reportable  accidents  can  be  grouped  together  to  increase  the 
numbers  and,  perhaps,  speed  up  the  testing  for  changes.  Not  all  incidents  have  the 
potential  to  be  fatal,  but  certainly  in  some  cases  if  there  has  been  a  large  number  of 
potentially  serious  accidents,  it  is  a  fair  assumption  that  one  will  eventually  lead  to  a 
fatality  or  permanent  disability. 
It  can  be  difficult  to  collect  accurate  data  over  a  long  period  of  time.  There  is  a  risk 
of  collecting  volumes  of  information  and  never  analysing  it,  or  analysing  it  but 
failing  to  recognise  the  key  areas  where  action  is  required.  In  many  cases,  Safety 
Departments  do  not  have  the  time  or  the  expertise  to  analyse  the  data  properly,  and 
make  false  assumptions  about  improvements  or  progress  being  made.  Accident 
monitoring  has  its  place  for  infrequent  progress  checks,  and  evaluation  of  types  and 
patterns  of  accidents.  Monitoring  can  be  used  to  check  rolling  progress  of  accident 
rates  over  periods  counted  in  years  and  more  frequently,  perhaps  annually,  to 
evaluate  trends  and  patterns  in  type  of  accident. 
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An  attitudinal  study,  as  commonly  understood,  sets  out  to  capture  the  expressed 
attitude  of  a  work  force  or  management  towards  health  and  safety  in  the  workplace. 
Such  a  study  may  be  carried  out  by  interview  or  questionnaire  and  the  results  of  the 
study  will,  in  theory,  provide  a  benchmark  for  comparison  with  preceding  or  later 
studies  to  determine  if  there  has  been  any  significant  change  over  time. 
It  would  be  a  wonderful  thing  if  peoples'  attitudes  were  fixed,  but  as  discussed  at 
length  in  Section  4.1,  attitudinal  studies  suffer  from  differences  between  expressed 
attitude,  underlying  action  causes  and  physical  behaviour.  People  have  attitudes  and 
so  attitudes  can  be  measured,  but  have  these  measurements  any  value  to  safety 
management? 
Awareness,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  different  beast.  Studies  of  how  much  people 
know  and  understand  are  'firmer'  in  that  they  test  knowledge  and  the  depth  and 
extent  of  knowledge. 
In  this  section  we  suspend  disbelief  and  discuss  a  study  of  attitude  and  awareness  to 
find  out  what  value  it  might  have  and  what  difficulties  there  are  in  its  execution. 
Two  methods  of  capture  are  used,  a  questionnaire  and  structured  interviews  as,  for 
example  discussed  in  Frankfort-Nachmias  et  al.  (1996)  in  order  to  demonstrate  two 
methods  by  which  expressed  attitude  and  awareness  can  be  captured. 
3.3.1  QUESTIONNAIRE  STUDY 
A  questionnaire  aims  to  capture  on  paper  the  responses  to  a  series  of  set  questions.  A 
number  of  formats  can  be  used  to  capture  these  responses.  First,  a  questionnaire  can 
be  issued  to  individuals  or  groups,  it  can  be  completed  with  discussion  or  in 
isolation,  it  can  be  sent  out,  or  handed  out,  there  can  be  time  set  aside  for  completion 
or  it  can  be  completed  in  the  respondent's  own  time.  There  is  also  the  option  of  an 
interviewer  asking  these  questions,  interpreting  the  results  and  completing  them  for 
the  respondent. 
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advantage  of  being  relatively  low  cost  to  distribute  and  analyse,  accessible  to  many 
respondents  at  once  and  allow  the  individual  time  to  consider  his  or  her  answers. 
However  as  the  respondent  has  to  answer  the  series  of  questions  without  clarification 
from  an  interviewer,  only  simple  questions  can  be  set  (De  Vaus,  1991).  As  the 
interviewer  is  remote,  there  is  no  opportunity  to  probe  further  to  gain  greater 
understanding  of  the  rationale  behind  the  responses. 
One  of  the  greatest  drawbacks  of  a  paper/mail  questionnaire  is  that  there  is  often  a 
relatively  low  response  rate  from  the  targeted  group.  The  response  rate  can  be 
increased  by  careful  timing  of  questionnaire  distribution,  for  example  avoiding 
holiday  periods,  plant  shutdowns.  In  the  workplace,  one  would  avoid  disseminating 
questionnaires  at  peak  production  periods,  or  during  corporate  restructuring,  unless 
of  course  the  questionnaire  aimed  to  capture  employees  thoughts  on  that  process  ! 
An  inducement  to  respond  such  as  a  free  prize  draw,  and  an  effortless  way  to  return 
the  questionnaire  -  perhaps  pre-paid  envelope,  or  return  to  ones  manager  -  may  also 
increase  response  rate.  It  should  be  noted  however,  that  return  via  a  Department 
Manager  may  also  decrease  the  response  rate,  depending  upon  the  content  of  the 
questionnaire  and  responses,  and  on  the  individuals  relationship  with  that  manager. 
A  telephone  led  survey  is  another  cost  effective  way  to  capture  responses,  and 
attracts  a  higher  response  rate  (Fowler  1993).  Direct  contact  with  the  respondent 
enables  the  interviewer  to  explain  more  difficult  concepts,  and  probe  further  for 
answers  to  ensure  quality  of  data,  however  respondents  may  be  reluctant  to  discuss 
sensitive  issues,  especially  if  the  survey  takes  place  in  the  work  place.  Telephone 
survey  can  be  a  useful  tool,  but  is  not  really  appropriate  for  capturing  responses  from 
all  employees  in  the  workplace.  Of  course  this  would  be  dependant  on  the  nature  of 
operations,  but  in  some  environments  many  employees  will  not  even  have  ready 
access  to  a  telephone. 
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appropriate. 
3.3.2  CASE  STUDY  1:  COSHH  QUESTIONNAIRE 
3.3.2.1  Initial  study 
In  1994,  an  initial  study  was  implemented  to  determine  site  compliance  with  the 
COSHH  (Control  of  substances  Hazardous  to  Health)  Regulations  1989.  In  brief,  the 
Regulations  require  a  company  to  identify  all  substances  on  site  and  assess  them  in 
terms  of  risks  to  the  health  of  the  workforce.  Once  the  risks  have  been  identified, 
they  must  be  controlled  by  either  elimination,  reduction  or  prevention,  such  as 
eliminating  a  process;  using  another  substance  instead;  using  ventilation;  and  use  of 
personal  protective  equipment  (PPE).  The  workforce  must  be  provided  with 
adequate  information  and  training  on  the  risks,  the  safe  use  of  substances,  control 
measures,  and  provided  with  health  monitoring  where  relevant.  Use  of  PPE  is 
important  at  J&B  in  controlling  the  affects  of  common  hazards. 
The  initial  study  focused  on  the  system  in  place  to  deal  with  the  regulatory 
requirements.  It  focused  on  physical  evidence  on  site  for  instance  what  could  be  seen 
on  site,  plus  procedures  and  documentation  used  by  employees  to  comply  with  the 
regulations.  The  study  revealed  that  whilst  information  about  hazardous  substances 
is  kept  centrally,  adequate  information  about  these  substances  was  not  distributed 
adequately  to  those  actually  using  the  substances.  It  was  concluded  that  whilst  the 
information  was  available,  it  was  not  adequately  communicated,  and  that  employees 
appeared  to  be  relatively  unaware  of  the  risks  present.  A  detailed  report  was 
presented  and  action  taken  on  the  findings. 
There  was  interest  expressed  by  the  company  into  finding  out  the  true  extent  of 
knowledge,  information  and  training,  in  relation  to  these  regulations.  In  light  of  these 
findings,  it  seemed  appropriate  to  conduct  an  awareness  questionnaire  to  establish 
what  level  of  awareness  was  present  on  site,  to  identify  areas  for  improvement  and 
prioritise  them.  From  this  an  action  plan  would  be  developed  and  implemented  to 
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developed. 
3.2.2.2  Development  of  questionnaire 
It  was  determined  that  a  questionnaire  would  be  able  to  establish  what  level  of 
knowledge  and  awareness  existed  on  site  generally,  and  specifically  in  particular 
work  areas.  The  more  often  employees  were  exposed  to  `hazardous  substances'  the 
greater  their  understanding  was  expected  to  be.  The  questionnaire  would  aim  to 
establish  what  training  and  information  they  had  received,  and  what  methods  were 
seen  as  most  effective  for  learning.  The  questionnaire  also  aimed  to  cover  the  use  of 
PPE  and  training  to  use  this  in  the  workplace.  Finally,  it  aimed  to  gather  information 
on  people's  perceptions  and  awareness  of  the  main  risks  in  the  workplace,  other  than 
and  including  COSHH  risks. 
Different  methods  of  implementation  were  considered.  A  paper  based  questionnaire 
had  the  ability  to  cover  all  these  aspects  and  allow  people  time  to  complete  them 
either  in  their  own  time  or  in  normal  work  time.  It  would  be  able  to  categorise 
answers,  and  remove  the  subjectivity  that  would  be  introduced  by  an  interviewer.  An 
interview  style  survey  would  limit  the  number  of  respondents  that  could  be  taken 
into  the  study,  for  logistical  reasons.  A  structured  interview  would  be  too  time 
consuming  if  it  was  to  capture  detail,  but  more  importantly,  would  prevent  collection 
of  comparable  information  that  could  be  analysed  scientifically. 
3.3.2.3  Design  of  the  questionnaire 
The  questionnaire  aimed,  for  the  most  part,  to  ask  employees  to  make  a  positive 
choice  between  responses,  and  to  remove  for  the  most  part,  subjectivity  on  meaning 
of  questions  and  therefore  interpretation  of  responses.  Plain  language  was  used  for 
the  questions  to  avoid  any  difficulties  with  understanding  and  the  options  to  be 
selected  were  designed  to  be  simple  and  straightforward.  It  was  determined  that  any 
respondent  having  difficulty  in  completing  the  questionnaire  would  likely  fail  to 
complete  it,  or  respond  with  guesses,  therefore  removing  the  meaning  from  the 
overall  result.  One  main  problem  with  questionnaires  of  this  type  is  that  there  is  a 
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`yes',  therefore  reducing  the  meaning  of  the  final  analysis.  A  questionnaire  is  at  most 
risk  of  this  if  it  is  lengthy  or  vague,  but  this  can  be  avoided  by  providing  specific 
options,  by  avoiding  having  middle  categories,  and  by  keeping  the  questions  brief 
and  simple. 
The  following  questions  were  presented  in  the  questionnaire 
1  Could  you  circle  your  department  number  on  the  list  below  ? 
This  question  listed  the  department  names.  It  aimed  to  capture  information  on  the 
understanding  of  the  Regulations  by  each  department  and  the  training  they  had 
received.  This  could  be  checked  against  the  usage  of  hazardous  substances  in  each 
department. 
2  How  long  have  you  worked  for  J&B  Scotland  ? 
The  question  aimed  to  check  length  of  service  with  the  company  to  see  if  there  was  a 
relationship  between  this  and  training  received,  and  or  understanding  of  the 
Regulations.  It  listed  an  option  of  5  categories  of  service,  aiming  to  capture  relatively 
new  employees,  and  those  with  short,  medium  and  long  service. 
3  Which  aspects  of  your  job  involve  the  handling  or  use  of  chemicals  ? 
This  aimed  to  establish  whether  individuals  were  aware  of  the  specific  tasks  within 
their  departments  or  tasks  that  created  contact  with  substances.  For  example,  an 
individual  when  cleaning  up,  or  performing  maintenance  tasks  would  almost 
certainly  be  exposed  to  substances,  whether  hazardous  or  not.  This  question  aimed  to 
establish  if  employees  were  aware  of  this  exposure  and  when  it  occurs. 
The  question  listed  6  options,  with  the  addition  of  an  option  of  `other'.  This  aimed  to 
be  fairly  flexible  but  ask  employees  to  select  positive  choices. 
3:  88 4  Have  you  heard  of  the  Control  of  Substances  Hazardous  to  Health 
Regulations  (COSHH)  ? 
The  question  is  self  explanatory,  but  as  a  result  of  positive  acquiescence,  it  was 
expected  that  most  people  would  answer  `yes'  to  this  anyway.  The  employee  was 
forced  to  make  a  choice  between  `yes'  and  `no'  only.  A  second  part  to  this  question 
aimed  to  establish  what  the  individuals  understanding  of  the  Regulations  themselves 
actually  was. 
Could  you  tick  any  categories  below  that  apply  to  the  COSHH  Regulations  ? 
A  list  of  5  categories  were  provided,  where  1  option  was  the  full  answer,  with 
another  3  categories  being  parts  of  the  Regulations,  and  a  final  response  a  specific 
exclusion.  It  was  determined  that  by  responding  positively  to  the  4  correct  answers 
only,  the  employee  showed  good  understanding.  The  question  aimed  to  capture  the 
respondent's  perception  of  the  Regulations,  and  for  analysis  `yes'  or  `no'  responses 
applied  to  each  option. 
5  How  frequently  would  you  say  that  you  handled  or  used  chemicals  in  the 
course  of  your  work  ? 
This  question  listed  possible  answers  from  never  to  more  than  one  per  hour  per  shift. 
On  the  basis  that  the  more  frequently  they  are  used,  the  more  understanding  would 
be  required,  the  questionnaire  responses  would  be  cross  checked  against 
departments.  The  closed  question  asked  the  respondent  again  to  choose  between  5 
options,  rather  than  leave  it  open  to  interpretation  at  the  analysis  stage. 
6  What  training  has  been  given  in  relation  to  the  safe  handling  and  usage  of 
chemicals  in  the  workplace  ? 
All  employees  received  information  at  the  induction  stage  on  COSHH  Regulations, 
there  was  also  information  posted.  The  question  aimed  to  check  if  this  information 
had  been  understood  as  connected  to  hazardous  chemicals  in  the  workplace. 
Employees  were  given  a  number  of  options  where  they  could  select  more  than  one 
type  of  training,  and  in  addition  the  option  of  `no  training'. 
Did  your  training  lead  to  a  formal  qualification 
3:  89 A  straight  yes  or  no  response  would  check  those  that  had  received  certificates  from 
courses  that  they  had  attended. 
By  what  methods,  other  than  actual  training,  have  you  been  given  information 
about  the  safe  handling  and  usage  of  chemicals  in  the  workplace  ? 
The  question  listed  methods  such  as  briefing,  posters  and  videos  to  establish  what 
other  means  the  information  had  come  across,  if  any.  In  some  cases  the  employees 
may  never  have  received  this  information,  and  this  would  be  checked  against 
departments.  Employees  were  provided  with  4  methods  of  communication,  but  were 
also  given  the  option  of  listing  another  type. 
7  How  would  you  rate  your  level  of  understanding  about  the  safe  handling 
and  use  of  chemicals  at  work  ? 
The  options  range  from  no  understanding  to  excellent  understanding,  the  respondent 
having  to  select  one  of  the  6  options.  There  was  no  middle  response  to  prevent  a 
middle-of-the  road  response  being  given.  It  aimed  to  capture  a  definite  choice.  The 
option  were  written  on  a  scale  to  make  the  range  more  visual.  The  question  is 
intended  to  match  the  perceived  understanding  to  the  actual  level  of  understanding.  It 
would  be  evaluated  against  the  frequency  of  use  of  chemicals  and  therefore  if  the 
employee  has  concern  that  he  or  she  does  not  have  enough  information  to  perform 
the  tasks. 
8  What  training  have  you  received  on  the  use  of  personal  protective 
equipment  in  the  workplace  ? 
The  options  vary  from  training  in  induction,  on  the  job  training  and  off  the  job 
training,  aiming  to  capture  what  different  types  of  training  the  individual  has 
received.  A  range  of  5  options  were  presented  with  a  sixth  of  `no  training'.  One  of 
these  choices  was  that  of  other  to  capture  what  techniques  that  respondents 
remembered  being  used  for  training.  If  the  frequency  of  use  of  chemicals  in  the 
workplace  is  high,  the  individual  should  have  received  some  training  in  the  safe  and 
correct  use  of  personal  protective  training.  The  amount  of  training  can  also  be 
evaluated  against  the  individual's  department,  and  the  amount  of  service  that  they 
3:  90 have.  Clearly,  certain  jobs,  departments  and  tasks  will  have  a  greater  need  for  PPE 
and  awareness  of  safe  chemicals  handling  than  others. 
Did  your  training  lead  to  a  formal  qualification  ? 
A  straight  yes  or  no  response  aimed  check  those  that  had  received  certificates  from 
courses  that  they  had  attended. 
9  Which  of  the  following  methods  do  you  feel  are  most  effective  for  learning 
information  in  the  workplace  ? 
This  question  requires  the  respondent  to  select  three  methods  of  providing 
information  from  a  list  of  seven,  and  rank  them  in  order  of  their  effectiveness  as 
learning  tools.  This  question  aims  to  capture  the  perceived  preferred  ways  of  being 
trained,  and  was  intended  to  assess  the  most  effective  method  of  providing  future 
training.  It  was  also  intended  to  be  assessed  against  their  perception  of  their  own 
understanding  of  the  regulations.  The  overall  results  would  be  collated  to  provide 
information  for  future  training  campaigns. 
10  In  terms  of  your  job,  what  do  you  consider  to  be  the  main  risks  to  yourself 
and  your  colleagues  ?  `Risks'  can  include  any  risks  that  have  occurred  and 
any  that  can  occur  in  areas  of  concern. 
The  respondents  were  asked  to  list  three  risks  in  order  of  significance  in  their 
workplace.  This  was  the  only  open  ended  question  in  the  questionnaire.  A  group  of 
nine  categories  were  built  up  on  the  basis  of  what  answers  were  expected,  and  could 
be  extended  if  these  were  proved  insufficient.  This  question  was  intended  to  check  a 
general  awareness  of  risk  in  the  workplace,  and  to  understand  if  further  awareness 
sessions  were  required  on  specific  hazards.  The  risks  were  those  significant  to  a 
specific  workplace,  and  therefore  were  expected  to  vary  from  one  respondent  to 
another.  This  was  to  be  evaluated  against  their  area  of  work. 
3:  91 3.3.2.4  Implementation  of  survey 
Pilot 
After  the  design  of  the  questionnaire  was  complete,  a  pilot  group  was  selected  to  test 
the  wording  of  questions  and  ease  of  response.  The  health  and  safety  committee  at 
the  Blythswood  site  was  selected  as  the  pilot  group.  The  researcher  was  present  in 
the  room  at  the  time,  to  capture  comments  on  the  survey  content  and  format.  After 
these  comments  had  been  considered,  improvements  in  wording  were  made  to  the 
original  questionnaire. 
Full  study 
The  actual  questionnaire  was  launched  at  the  Strathleven  site  in  September  1994.  It 
was  distributed  in  two  main  ways,  first  by  issue  to  the  health  and  safety  committee 
and  second,  by  handing  copies  to  line  managers  on  site  for  distribution  to  their 
employees.  The  purpose  of  the  questionnaire  was  explained  to  those  members  of  the 
safety  committee  that  had  not  previously  been  involved,  and  their  support  requested 
in  encouraging  their  work  colleagues  to  complete  the  survey. 
The  rest  of  the  work  force  were  provided  copies  of  the  questionnaire  by  their  line 
manager  or  team  leader  with  a  front  page  explaining  the  purpose  of  the  questionnaire 
and  return  details. 
3.3.2.5  Results  of  questionnaire  : 
The  analysis  of  the  COSHH  (Control  of  Substances  Hazardous  to  Health)  survey 
questionnaire  was  to  determine  correlation  between  the  sets  of  data  that  has  been 
collected. 
There  were  54  simple  random  samples  returned  from  a  population  size  of  500  on  the 
site.  The  20  different  departments  were  grouped  into  5  subsections  according  to 
exposure  to  chemicals  and  hazardous  substances  :  Engineering  and  maintenance, 
General  site,  Office  and  development,  Spirit  handling,  Production. 
3:  92 Statistical  procedures  used 
Most  of  the  statistical  procedures  require  assumptions  about  the  populations  from 
which  the  samples  are  selected.  For  example,  in  the  two-sample  t-test,  we  have  to 
assume  that  the  data  are  from  populations  that  have  normal  distributions,  or  that  the 
sample  sizes  are  large  enough  so  that  the  distribution  of  sample  mean  is  normal.  To 
use  a  "pooled"  t-test,  we  also  have  to  assume  that,  in  the  population,  the  two 
variances  are  equal.  Procedures  that  require  assumptions  about  the  shapes  of  the 
distributions  from  which  data  originate  are  known  as  parametric  procedures.  Many 
parametric  procedures  depend  on  the  assumption  of  'normality'. 
To  analyse  the  COSHH  dataset,  however,  the  assumption  of  normality  does  not 
appear  reasonable,  since  the  sample  size  was  quite  small  and  there  is  little 
information  about  the  distribution  of  the  data.  In  addition,  interval  data  may  originate 
from  markedly  non-normal  distributions  (positive  or  negative  skew).  In  those 
situations,  procedures  that  require  very  limited  assumptions  about  the  distribution  of 
the  data  can  be  used.  Collectively,  these  procedures  are  called  non-parametric  tests. 
The  advantage  of  non-parametric  tests  is,  that  they  require  few  assumptions  about 
the  data.  However,  the  disadvantage  of  non-parametric  tests,  is  that  they  are  usually 
less  powerful  than  parametric  tests  at  finding  differences  between  groups  or 
variables  when  the  differences  do  in  fact  exist.  They  usually  ignore  some  of  the 
available  information,  for  example:  they  replace  actual  data  values  with  ranks.  By 
losing  the  actual  values  of  the  data,  ranking  does  not  provide  information  about  the 
distance  between  the  ranks  -whether  very  small  or  very  large.  The  only  information 
we  have  after  ranking  is  that  they  are  one  level  higher  or  one  level  lower.  In  general, 
if  the  assumptions  of  a  parametric  procedure  can  be  met,  the  parametric  procedure 
should  be  used.  It  is  common  but  incorrect  for  parametric  analysis  to  be  performed 
when  such  assumptions  are  not  valid. 
For  this  dataset  non-parametric  sets  are  favoured  because  of  the  respondent  sample 
size  and  the  sparsity  within  Departments.  In  addition  because  many  of  the  variables 
are  in  terms  of  sets  of  ordered  categories  (ranking  data)  such  as  an  understanding 
3:  93 level  of  nil,  poor,  adequate,  fair,  good,  and  excellent,  the  results  cannot  be  given  any 
precise  numerical  value.  This  too  is  a  common  fault  in  'amateur'  surveys  where  false 
numerical  accuracy  is  sought  and  given  as  if  the  numbers  themselves  have  some 
power.  Although  ranking  does  not  provide  information  about  the  distance  between 
the  ranks,  many  properties  are  measured  that  cannot  in  any  event  be  given  any 
precise  numerical  value. 
Following  are  several  procedures  that  were  used  to  analyse  the  dataset. 
The  Mann-Whitney  test 
The  Mann-Whitney  test,  also  known  as  the  Wilcoxon  test,  can  be  used  to  test  the 
hypothesis  that  two  independent  samples  come  from  populations  having  the  same 
distribution.  The  type  of  distribution  does  not  require  to  be  specified.  The  test 
requires  only  that  the  observations  are  a  random  sample  and  that  values  can  ordered 
from  smallest  to  largest.  Normality  and  equality-of-variance  assumptions  are  not 
needed.  The  hypotheses  tested  by  the  Mann-Whitney  test  are  shown  below: 
Null  hypothesis  :  The  mean  of  two  groups  are  same 
Alternative  hypothesis  :  The  mean  of  two  groups  are  different 
The  Kruskal-  Wallis  Test 
The  Kruskal-Wallis  test  may  be  used  to  test  for  a  difference  in  the  means  of  several 
samples  (groups).  The  two  basic  assumptions  are  :(i)  experimental  units  are 
assigned  to  the  samples  at  random;  and  (ii)  the  responses  in  each  sample  have  a 
symmetrical  distribution  and  only  differ,  if  at  all,  in  their  medians  or  means.  If  the 
distribution  of  error  is  markedly  asymmetric,  the  safest  test  is  the  median  test,  this 
can  be  inspected  by  creating  a  histogram. 
The  Chi-square  statistic  and  Fisher's  exact  Test 
The  chi-square  statistics  are  useful  for  measuring  the  strength  and  nature  of 
associations  when  the  two  variables  are  categorical.  These  variables  have  a  limited 
number  of  possible  values,  and  their  distribution  can  be  examined  with  a  cross- 
tabulation  table. 
3:  94 The  chi-square  test  hypotheses  are: 
Ho  :  The  two  variables  (row  and  column)  are  associated  with  each  other. 
H1  :  The  two  variables  are  independent. 
If  some  of  the  expected  values  in  a  two-way  table  are  less  than  5,  the  observed 
significance  level  based  on  the  chi-square  distribution  may  not  be  accurate.  In 
general,  the  chi-square  test  should  not  be  used  if  more  than  20%  of  the  cells  have 
expected  values  less  than  5.  In  addition,  none  of  the  expected  values  are  less  than  1. 
If  any  of  the  expected  values  in  a  table  with  just  two  rows  and  two  columns  is  less 
than  5,  an  additional  test  called  Fisher's  exact  test  may  be  performed.  This  tests  the 
same  hypotheses  as  the  chi-square  test,  and  is  most  useful  when  the  total  sample  size 
and  the  expected  values  are  small.  It  can,  for  example,  be  used  to  test  the  association 
between  "heard  about  COSHH  regulations  and  training  received". 
3.3.2.6  Data  analysis  and  commentary 
There  were  54  simple  random  samples  returned  from  a  population  size  of 
approximately  500  employees. 
1  Perception/Awareness  Tests  v  Training 
A  test  was  carried  out  to  test  employee  perception  of  their  understanding  of  the  safe 
use  of  chemicals  against  the  training  received.  The  test  showed  that  perceived 
understanding  of  safe  handling  and  use  of  chemicals  in  workplace  is  significantly 
associated  with  training  received.  From  the  value  of  the  mean  rank,  we  can  see  that 
people  from  the  trained  group  are  more  confident  of  understanding  the  safe  use  of 
chemicals  than  people  who  are  untrained. 
No  employees  responded  that  they  had  nil  or  poor  understanding  in  the  trained 
group;  but  41  %  of  people  in  the  untrained  group  said  they  had  nil  or  poor 
understanding  of  the  safe  use  of  chemicals  and  hazardous  substances.  When  this  was 
checked  against  their  'knowledge'  it  was  found  that  25%  of  employees  that  had 
3:  95 received  training  scored  full  marks  in  the  knowledge  test,  yet  in  comparison  only  3% 
of  those  who  had  not  received  training  scored  full  marks. 
2  Knowledge  Tests 
A  knowledge  test  was  carried  out  to  test  employee  knowledge  of  the  COSHH 
Regulations  against  the  training  they  had  received.  The  results  showed  that  no 
employee  who  had  received  training  achieved  less  than  50%  in  the  COSHH 
regulations  test.  Only  one  out  of  37  (3%)  employee  from  the  untrained  group  got  full 
marks  compared  with  3  out  of  12  in  the  trained  group  (25%),  figures  that  suggest  that 
people  who  had  received  training  are  more  likely  to  get  a  higher  score  in  this  test  of 
knowledge.  A  Mann-Whitney  test  finds  that  the  significance  p-value  is  less  than 
0.01.  That  is,  that  the  mean  of  the  two  groups  is  different  at  a  confidence  level  of  1% 
or  better  -  we  would  only  expect  this  to  happen  by  chance  in  one  case  in  100.  Thus, 
there  is  evidence  that  there  is  a  significant  association  between  the  variables  of 
training  received  and  results  obtained  in  the  test.  As  the  mean  rank  of  trained  group 
is  higher  than  the  mean  rank  of  untrained  group,  it  means  that  trained  employees  are 
more  likely  to  score  higher  marks  for  knowledge. 
By  the  same  procedure,  we  can  check  whether  different  kinds  of  training  would 
affect  the  results  of  COSHH  regulation  test.  From  this,  all  p-values  are  greater  than 
0.05.  That  means  that  the  use  of  different  training  methods  does  not  affect  the 
knowledge  of  the  COSHH  Regulations  test  results  at  the  5%  level  -a  commonly 
used  cut-off.  Thus,  it  is  the  fact  that  training  has  been  received,  rather  than  the  type 
of  training,  that  influences  the  variable. 
In  order  to  check  whether  employees  who  had  received  training  had  heard  of 
COSHH,  i.  e.  they  are  correlated  to  each  other,  the  chi-square  test  was  used. 
Analysis  shows  that  all  trained  employees  had  heard  of  the  COSHH  Regulations,  and 
that  36%  of  untrained  employees  had  not  heard  of  the  Regulations.  The  test  result 
shows  the  association  between  employees  who  had  received  training  and  heard  about 
3:  96 the  COSHH  is  significant  at  5  %,  confirming  the  result  of  the  test  knowledge  against 
training. 
A  test  was  performed  to  see  if  there  was  a  difference  in  knowledge  about  the 
COSHH  Regulations  across  different  departments.  Significant  differences  were 
found.  The  results  suggested  that  the  engineering  and  maintenance  departments  had 
the  best  understanding  of  the  regulations  compared  to  other  departments.  The 
production  department  had  the  poorest  knowledge  of  the  regulations,  and  it  should 
be  noted  that  a  high  number  of  chemicals  are  used  in  this  area. 
The  statistical  test  results  in  this  section  suggested  that  the  training  given  was  useful 
for  providing  understanding  of  the  COSHH  regulations.  This  was  not  affected  by  the 
method  by  which  the  training  was  provided  :  on  the  job,  off  the  job  or  during 
induction. 
The  test  also  showed  that  employees  who  frequently  use  chemicals  were  more  likely 
to  be  trained,  as  would  be  expected.  Another  reason  however,  might  be  since  the 
people  had  been  trained,  they  then  understand  that  what  they  are  using  are,  in  fact 
chemicals.  This  is  a  base  problem  with  all  such  assessments. 
3  Effective  methods  for  learning  information 
The  order  in  which  employees  selected  methods  for  learning  information  are  shown 
below,  in  order  of  effectiveness  : 
1  On  the  job  training 
2  Off  the  job  training 
3  Video  session 
4  Briefing  sessions 
5  Posters 
6  Leaflets/Bulletins 
3:  97 Most  effective  method  of  learning  by  department 
There  are  five  samples  (departments)  for  testing  a  difference  in  the  means,  therefore 
we  can  use  the  Kruskal-Wallis  test  (one  way  analysis  of  variance).  If  there  are  only 
two  samples,  the  Kruskal-Wallis  test  is  equivalent  to  the  Mann-Whitney  test. 
The  `preference'  for  three  of  the  methods  is  different  for  different  departments.  They 
are  (i)off  the  job  training,  (ii)briefing  sessions  and  (iii)posters.  All  of  them  are 
significant  at  5%.  The  remaining  methods  do  not  appear  to  be  different  in  preference 
for  employees  across  different  departments. 
From  the  output  of  the  mean  rank  values,  we  can  see  which  department  most  prefers 
certain  methods.  The  results  are  shown  below  (in  order)  : 
Off  the  job  training 
1  Engineer  &  maintenance 
2  Spirit 
3  Production  line  /  Office  and  management 
4  General  site 
Briefing  sessions 
1  Office  and  management  /  Production  line 
2  Engineer  &  maintenance  /  General  site 
3  Spirit 
Poster 
1  Spirit  * 
2  Engineer  &  maintenance 
3  Production  line  /  Office  and  management  /  General  site 
A  further  test  was  carried  out  to  assess  if  there  was  a  link  between  number  of  years 
experience  and  training.  We  can  see  that  people  in  the  trained  group  had  worked  for 
a  significantly  shorter  period  of  time  than  the  untrained  group.  People  with  less  than 
*  significantly  regarded  as  an  effective  method 
3:  98 15  years  service  had  a  greater  understanding  of  chemical  handling,  and  demonstrated 
better  test  results  than  people  who  had  worked  for  over  15  years.  However,  the 
number  of  years  service  did  not  appear  to  affect  whether  the  employee  had  heard 
about  the  COSHH  regulations  or  not. 
These  results  suggest  that  attention  should  be  paid  to  retraining  and  refresher  courses 
-  employees  with  longer  service  may  have  received  the  information  before  and  then 
forgotten  it,  or  may  not  have  received  it  in  the  first  place. 
4  Perception  of  main  risks  on  site  v  Department 
The  following  list  resulted  from  the  question  `what  main  risks  concern  you?  ',  it  is 
listed  in  order  of  concern. 
1  Chemical 
2  Slip  and  Fall 
3  Machinery 
4  Fire  and  explosion 
5  Kinetic  /  Vehicles 
6  VDU 
7  Smoking 
A  test  was  carried  out  to  assess  if  there  is  a  relationship  between  an  employee 
perceiving  chemicals  as  the  highest  risk  and  training  received  on  the  COSHH 
Regulations.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  people  who  had  training  were  more  likely  to 
perceive  chemicals  as  the  highest  risk.  Perhaps  the  additional  insight  into  chemicals 
as  a  hazard  increased  an  awareness  that  was  not  matched  by  training  in  other 
relatively  more  significant  risks.  Alternatively,  those  responding  that  chemical  risk 
was  highest  may  also  handle  chemicals  frequently  as  part  of  their  job,  and  have 
responded  with  their  perceived  personal  exposure. 
On  this  basis,  a  further  test  aimed  to  evaluate  if  different  risks  were  rated  as  the 
`main'  threat  by  employees  of  different  departments.  The  charts  shows  that  most 
employees  working  in  the  group  `general  site'  regarded  chemicals  as  the  highest  risk 
-  this  category  includes  cleaners  and  the  security  team.  Most  of  people  working  in 
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maintenance  workers  regarded  machinery  as  the  highest  risk.  Therefore,  the  link 
between  experience  of  risk  in  their  individual  work  context  and  their  perception  of 
main  risks  is  very  clear. 
3.3.2.7  Summary  /  conclusion  of  survey 
Survey  results  indicated  that  all  training  given  contributed  positively  to  the 
understanding  of  the  COSHH  regulations.  It  also  showed  that  employees  were  more 
likely  to  be  trained  if  they  use  obviously  hazardous  chemicals  frequently.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  however  that,  technically,  all  employees  on  site  (outwith  office 
areas)  deal  with  chemicals,  whether  the  product  itself  (alcohol/  ethanol),  cleaning 
chemicals,  glues,  inks,  or  oil.  Therefore,  employees  who  had  received  training  may 
respond  better  in  the  survey  as  they  understand  that  what  others  may  overlook,  are 
actually  chemicals  too. 
The  knowledge  test  suggested  significant  differences  between  departments,  it 
suggests  that  the  engineering  and  maintenance  departments  have  the  best 
understanding  of  the  regulations  and  the  production  department  has  the  poorest 
knowledge  of  the  regulations.  Both  departments  are  exposed  to  chemicals  on  an 
equal  basis,  but  with  the  engineering  department  having  a  slightly  more  hands-on 
approach.  This  suggested  that  there  is  a  serious  deficiency  of  knowledge  in  the 
production  areas  over  the  exposure  to,  and  safe  handling  of  chemicals. 
The  survey  provided  useful  information  on  the  methods  of  training  which  employees 
prefer.  Overall,  the  study  group  preferred  (in  order)  :  on  the  job  training;  off  the  job 
training;  videos;  briefing  sessions;  posters  and  finally  leaflets.  This  information  can 
help  shape  future  training/  information  campaigns.  As  there  appears  to  be  no 
significant  difference  in  the  knowledge  gained  between  different  training  methods,  it 
would  be  preferable  to  select  training  methods  to  which  employees  can  relate. 
It  appeared  that  all  employees  had  heard  of  the  regulations  but  those  with  a  shorter 
service  history  had  more  detailed  knowledge  than  those  who  had  worked  for  a  longer 
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information,  but  also  that  there  is  a  strong  case  for  refresher  training. 
When  asked  for  the  main  risks  on  site  to  be  listed,  it  appears  that  all  individuals  have 
listed  risks  in  their  own  experience  as  the  main  risks  on  site,  e.  g.  engineers  listed 
machinery,  cleaners  listed  chemicals,  and  operators  in  production  listed  slips,  trips 
and  falls.  Overall  the  four  main  risks  listed  were  chemicals,  slips,  machinery  and  fire 
in  that  order.  It  is  possible  that  because  the  survey  focused  specifically  on  chemicals, 
it  skewed  employees  responses  to  list  this  as  the  highest  risk.  Factually,  the  most 
frequent  causes  of  accidents  on  site  are  slips,  trips  and  falls,  and  cuts,  and  the  main 
serious  risk  is  fire.  Both  of  these  categories  can  affect  all  employees  on  site. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  people  who  had  training  are  more  likely  to  regard 
chemicals  as  the  highest  risk.  Perhaps  the  additional  insight  into  chemicals  as  a 
hazard,  increased  an  awareness  that  was  not  matched  by  training  in  other  risks. 
Alternatively,  those  responding  that  chemical  risk  was  highest  may  also  handle 
chemicals  frequently  as  part  of  their  job. 
Some  general  points  can  be  made  by  this  study.  The  question  as  to  whether  training 
produces  knowledge,  or  whether  training  is  given  to  those  who  work  with  chemicals 
and  have  knowledge  is  a  common  one  -  chicken  and  egg.  The  expressed  preferences 
for  training  methods  also  point  to  a  common  difficulty  -  respondents  clearly  prefer 
certain  methods,  but  there  is  no  internal  evidence  on  efficacy.  External  studies, 
carefully  controlled  to  remove  bias,  must  then  be  accessed  to  find  the  most  (cost) 
effective  method. 
3.3.2.8  Summary  of  the  utility  of  the  technique  itself 
A  survey  questionnaire  in  this  format  is  limited  in  usefulness  in  a  number  of  ways. 
First,  the  responses  that  one  receives  and  their  accuracy  is  directly  influenced  by 
how  well  the  questions  are  written.  If  the  questions  are  confusing,  difficult  to 
interpret  or  contradictory,  then  the  answers  will  be  the  same.  This  can  be  minimised 
by  making  the  questionnaire  as  simple  as  possible,  and  by  providing  answers  to  be 
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is  difficult  to  interpret  and  analyse  overall.  The  response  is  also  then  open  to  the 
subjectivity  of  the  analyst. 
Questionnaires  can  help  to  capture  attitude  and  awareness  of  specific  issues,  but 
cannot  predict  behaviour.  They  are  a  useful  tool  with  which  to  evaluate  a  change  in 
awareness  and  perception  over  time.  They  can  also  be  useful  in  checking  whether 
training  has  had  an  impact  on  awareness  and  knowledge  of  a  specific  issue.  As 
discussed  in  Section  4.1,  it  is  unwise  to  infer  behaviour  from  expressed  attitude  or 
even  from  recorded  awareness.  This  is  probably  one  of  the  most  frustrating  aspects 
of  safety  management  -  there  is  no  reliable  or  common  sense  link  between  attitude 
and  resultant  behaviour.  Perhaps  the  only  thing  we  can  rely  on  arising  from 
awareness  of  risk  is  the  knowledge  that  you  are  doing  something  silly  as  you  do  it. 
A  survey  in  this  format  has  most  value  in  capturing  the  levels  of  awareness  and 
knowledge  of  a  specific  issue.  The  survey  can  then  be  repeated  after  a  set  interval, 
perhaps  after  a  training  programme  or  after  a1  year  period,  to  identify  any  changes 
over  time,  but  this  raises  the  question  of  how  to  sample  -  the  same  people  or  a  new 
random  sample.  It  can  also  be  used  to  identify  problem  areas  -  in  this  case  the 
production  based  employees  appear  to  have  very  little  knowledge  and  awareness  of 
the  Regulations  -  and  from  this  information  implement  targeted  improvement  plans. 
3.3.3  STRUCTURED  INTERVIEWS 
As  an  alternative  to  the  written  questionnaire,  a  structured  interview  study  was 
conducted  in  January  1996.  A  set  of  key  questions  were  posed  to  a  broad  cross- 
section  of  around  20  Managers,  Supervisors  and  Safety  Representatives  across  all  7 
sites.  The  interviews  were  not  intended  to  cover  the  opinions  and  attitudes  of  all 
employees,  only  to  capture  a  snapshot  of  a  cross-section  of  employees.  Therefore, 
specific  individuals  were  selected  rather  than  randomly  selected  from  the  work- 
force.  Several  methods  of  data  collection  were  considered  before  the  decision  was 
taken  to  use  personal  interviews. 
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A  personal  interview  survey  has  advantages  against  a  paper  questionnaire  when  there 
are  certain  outcomes  required  from  the  survey.  Firstly,  and  most  importantly,  the 
interviewer  has  the  opportunity  to  discuss  complex  questions  and  to  follow  up 
answers.  It  enables  the  interviewer  to  get  to  the  base  of  an  issue,  and  capture  the 
answer  for  that  respondent.  This  type  of  questioning  cannot  be  simulated  in  a  paper 
questionnaire.  Difficult  concepts  can  be  explained  by  the  interviewer,  and  the 
answers  given  can  be  readily  followed  up  in  further  interviews  if  required.  Such 
information  and  leads  would  not  be  so  readily  available  through  other  mediums. 
Each  individual  respondent  may  be  more  or  less  likely  to  be  forthcoming  and  honest 
in  a  one  to  one  dialogue.  Many  different  mediums  can  be  used  by  the  interviewer  to 
illustrate  his  or  her  point  or  line  of  questioning  allowing  technical  questions  to  be 
included  in  the  survey  where  required.  It  is  also  possible  to  capture  a  greater  amount 
of  time  and  attention  from  a  respondent  in  a  face  to  face  interview  than  through  a 
self-administered  questionnaire.  Common  difficulties  with  paper  questionnaires 
(especially  lengthy  or  vague  ones)  such  as  positive  acquiescence,  can  be  avoided 
more  readily  by  a  personal  interview. 
There  are,  however,  many  disadvantages  to  this  type  of  survey.  Probably  the  greatest 
disadvantage  of  the  survey  style  is  that  the  responses  given,  and  even  the  way  in 
which  questions  are  asked  are  open  to  interpretation,  therefore  there  can  be 
inconsistencies  in  the  survey  response.  It  is  also  very  time  consuming  for  the 
interviewer  to  arrange  interviews  at  mutual  times,  and  to  perform  them  for  all 
respondents.  In  addition,  significant  follow-up  time  is  required  after  each  interview. 
If  an  external  resource  is  used  for  such  a  survey,  it  is  liable  to  be  costly,  but  this  has 
to  balanced  against  the  skills  required  in-house.  In  addition,  the  interviewees  have  to 
be  comfortable  that  they  can  answer  fully,  honestly,  without  prejudice  and  with 
assurance  of  total  confidentiality. 
Telephone  interviews  could  have  been  used  to  conduct  the  surveys  but  would  have 
removed  all  the  advantages  of  face  to  face  rapport  in  an  interview.  In  addition,  it  did 
not  seem  appropriate  to  carry  out  this  style  of  interviewing  within  a  company. 
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perhaps  controversial)  views,  it  was  not  appropriate  to  use  group  interviews  either. 
In  all,  the  use  of  personal  interviews,  albeit  time  consuming,  was  selected  as  the 
most  appropriate  method  for  the  scope  of  the  survey. 
For  this  reason,  the  survey  was  carried  out  on  small  target  groups  only,  most  of 
whom  had  been  interviewed  in  a  survey  in  1993,  carried  out  by  Strathclyde 
University.  The  replacements  for  those  individuals  who  had  left  the  company  since 
the  original  survey  were  generally  interviewed.  Additional  individuals  were  also 
selected  as  their  views  were  of  interest  to  the  survey,  the  most  significant  of  those 
being  the  safety  co-ordinators  and  site  safety  advisors.  These  individuals  had  been 
put  in  place  in  the  interim  period  of  time. 
The  same  interviewer  was  used  for  all  interviews  to  ensure  that  there  was  consistent 
style  in  questioning  and  interpretation.  All  interviews  were  recorded  to  avoid  future 
misunderstandings,  and  to  allow  the  interviewer  to  focus  on  the  interview  itself,  not 
writing  down  answers.  A  period  of  approximately  1-1'/2  hours  was  allocated  for  each 
interview,  with  additional  time  scoped  in  for  key  interviews. 
The  interviews  aimed  to  determine  attitude  and  change  of  attitude  towards  safety 
management  over  a  three  year  period.  These  questions  aimed  to  establish  :  if  and 
why  the  managers'  had  changed  their  personal  attitude  to  safety  over  this  period  ;  if 
and  why  the  company  had  changed  it's  attitude  over  time  ;  and  the  perceived  main 
risk  exposures  that  existed.  The  structured  questions  are  listed  on  page  106  of  this 
section. 
At  Executive  level  the  following  spread  of  individuals  participated  in  the  interview 
study  :  Managing  Director;  Operations  Director;  Quality  Director  and  Site  Directors 
(Blythswood,  Distilleries).  They  were  selected  as  they  had  overall  functional 
responsibility  for  safety,  or  a  had  a  large  number  of  people  reporting  to  them  that 
were  affected  by  safety  issues.  At  Management  level  -  site  Production  Manager, 
Team  leader/Line  Managers,  Site  Safety  advisor,  Risk  Manager,  Strathleven  safety 
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supervisors  were  chosen  due  to  their  responsibility  for  people,  the  others  were 
selected  as  they  had  a  particular  role  for  safety  on  their  site. 
3.3.4.1  Structured  interview  questions 
The  main  objective  of  the  interview  study  was  to  establish  the  awareness  of  and 
commitment  to  safety  from  key  individuals  influential  within  the  business.  A 
comparison  with  the  study  results  three  years  earlier  would  be  performed  to 
determine  if  there  was  any  change,  positive  or  negative.  Another  key  reason  was  to 
establish  that,  with  the  many  changes  of  personnel,  the  commitment  to  safety 
improvement  that  had  been  previously  indicated,  been  carried  on  by  the  new  team. 
The  survey  aimed  to  establish  the  key  turning  points  within  the  company,  whether 
internal  or  external  pressure,  for  example  :  court  cases,  or  specific  campaigns  or 
incidents.  This  information  could  then  be  used  positively,  where  appropriate,  to 
improve  awareness  and  commitment  again. 
It  was  recognised  that  while  the  survey  can  cover  a  range  of  topics,  the  main  pitfall  is 
that  the  respondent  answered  with  `what  the  interviewer  wants  to  hear'.  The  survey 
aimed  to  ask  specific  questions  to  ensure  that  responses  given  were  validated.  In 
addition,  leading  questions  were  avoided  at  all  times. 
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1  What  are  your  current  position  and  main  responsibilities  in  the  organisation  in  1996  ? 
2  What  has  been  your  personal  history  since  joining  the  company  -  and  what  were  your 
position  and  responsibilities  in  1993  ? 
3  What  was  your  personal  attitude  towards  safety  in  1993  ?  And  why  did  you  have  this 
attitude  ? 
4  In  your  opinion,  what  was  the  company's  'attitude'  to  safety  in  1993  ?  What  was  the 
safety  culture  ? 
5  How  has  the  company  changed  it's  safety  culture,  if  at  all  between  1993  and  1996  ? 
6  What  has  changed  -  what  are  the  main  factors  or  reasons  for  this  change  ? 
7  How  has  your  own  attitude  changed  in  these  3  years  if  at  all,  and  what  are  the  reasons 
for  this  ? 
8  What  is  your  attitude  to  safety  as  an  individual  now  ? 
9  How  has  the  emphasis  on  safety  within  the  company  changed,  and  has  it  changed  for 
better  or  worse  in  your  opinion? 
10  What  systems  are  in  play  to  manage  safety? 
11  Where  do  you  feel  the  company  is  exposed  -  what  do  you  see  as  the  main  problem  areas 
or  deficiencies  in  safety  management?  What  keeps  you  asleep  at  night? 
12  Where  do  you  feel  exposed  as  an  individual  and/or  as  a  manager  in  relation  to  exposures 
in  your  area  of  responsibility  ? 
13  In  light  of  recent  prosecutions  in  Corporate  Manslaughter  cases,  what  affect  has  this  had 
on  your  thinking  in  relation  to  personal  responsibilities  ? 
14  What  effect,  if  any,  does  the  CHASE  Audit  have  ? 
15  What  are  your  views  on  the  use  of  disciplinary  action  to  enforce  safety  standards  ? 
16  What  percentage  of  injury  and  non-injury  accidents  do  you  think  are  reported  on  site  ? 
17  What  effect  do  you  think  the  Safety  Management  system  will  have,  if  any,  on  safety 
standards  ? 
18  Have  you  any  suggestions  or  ideas  for  improvement  of  safety  management  within  J&B 
Scotland  ? 
19  Have  you  any  other  comments  that  you  would  like  to  make  in  relation  to  this  interview  ? 
3.3.4.2  Summary  of  findings  from  interview  study 
Individuals  from  both  the  Blythswood  site  and  Strathleven  were  interviewed.  Several 
of  the  respondents  had  company  wide  responsibility. 
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The  following  general  main  findings  were  raised  by  respondents  across  both  sites. 
1  The  fatality  and  a  few  other  serious  accidents  made  the  company  and 
management  team  sit  up  and  pay  attention  to  safety  issues  on  sites. 
2  As  a  driver,  the  CHASE  audit  system  has  had  a  significant  impact  on  health  and 
safety  by  providing  focus  and  co-ordination  of  company  goals. 
3  There  were  no  formal  systems  in  1993,  there  is  now  a  more  systematic  approach 
4  The  real  focus  is  on  production,  safety  is  taken  seriously  but  resources  are  not  put 
into  safety,  such  as  the  writing  of  safe  systems  of  work,  or  training  of  the 
management  team. 
5  Initiatives  that  are  started  with  the  best  intention  are  often  suspended  due  to  other 
'priorities'. 
6  Commitment  from  management  needs  to  be  demonstrated  in  action  rather  than 
just  words. 
7  Genuine  support  in  terms  of  resource  is  required  rather  than  expecting  limited 
number  of  people  to  take  on  more  and  more. 
Blythswood 
The  following  comments  were  made  by  respondents  at  Blythswood  on  the  evidence 
that  they  have  seen  of  changes  on  site  in  the  3  year  period. 
1  The  site  safety  co-ordinator  with  specific  responsibility  for  safety  has  increased 
focus  and  profile  of  safety  on  site  (agreed  by  all  interviewees).  There  is  now 
support  available  on  site,  it  is  now  more  accessible  than  a  central  resource 
visiting  from  Strathleven. 
2  Further  cultural  change  can  be  achieved  by  discipline  against  safety  breaches. 
3  Some  operators  still  have  a  belief  that  supervisors  are  paid  `extra'  to  take 
responsibility  for  safety. 
4  The  main  indications  of  increased  safety  commitment  by  management  are  seen  as 
:  the  CHASE  Audit,  Risk  Assessments,  Operator  Training  Group,  "more  focus  on 
health  and  safety  in  last  3  years  than  on  most  things",  but  health  and  safety  is 
now  bogged  down  in  a  paper  chase. 
3:  107 5  Company  and  site  direction  on  health  and  safety  comes  from  Strathleven,  the 
Blythswood  team  would  like  more  involvement  at  strategic  level. 
6  The  company  is  sincere  about  health  and  safety  and  relevant  training,  but  do  not 
resource  it  with  people  -  either  to  carry  out  additional  tasks,  or  provide  cover  for 
health  and  safety  training  and  activities. 
7  "All  accidents  are  reported"  commented  one  supervisor,  stating  that  this  is 
because  the  site  safety  co-ordinator  requires  investigations  to  be  carried  out  on 
the  same  day.  As  a  contrast,  a  warehouseman  stated  that  the  company  will  "never 
get  100%  reporting,  especially  for  minor  and  property  damage  accidents". 
8  Some  tasks  on  site  have  inherent  risks  which  are  manual  related  and  difficult  to 
remove. 
9  Initiatives  that  are  started  with  the  best  intention  are  often  suspended  due  to  other 
'priorities'.  The  example  given  was  the  Operator  Training  Group,  written  safe 
systems  of  work  and  performance  of  Risk  Assessments  on  site. 
10  Disciplinary  action  is  more  common  now  than  3  years  ago  against  safety 
breaches. 
11  The  company  seems  fairly  serious  about  safety. 
12  The  company  shows  increased  commitment  to  safety 
Strathleven 
These  comments  were  made  by  a  cross  section  of  employees  at  Strathleven,  they 
were  picked  out  as  common  threads. 
1  The  most  significant  driver  for  the  improvement  of  safety  standards  in  the  last  3 
years  has  been  the  introduction  of  safety  co-ordinators. 
2  Several  serious  accidents  have  had  significant  impact  on  behaviour  as  managers. 
Realisation  that  it  can  happen  to  you. 
3  The  CHASE  audit  has  provided  the  impetus  for  continuous  improvement  of 
safety  standards  on  site. 
4A  portion  of  the  management  bonus  being  based  on  performance  in  the  CHASE 
audit  has  helped  to  focus  the  management  team. 
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The  management/  employee  personal  interview  study  had  several  benefits  to  J&B.  It 
provided  a  view  of  the  changes  in  safety  standards,  systems,  commitment  through 
the  eyes  of  different  levels  of  employee.  This  can  then  be  checked  against  those 
responses  given  in  a  previous  study,  perhaps  three  years  before.  Many  safety 
campaigns,  systems  or  programs  take  as  much  as  three  years  to  implement,  and 
perhaps  longer  before  results,  if  any,  are  visible.  An  interview  study  helps  provide  a 
longer  term  view  where  people  are  asked  to  compare  the  past  to  the  present  and 
identify  differences. 
Therein  lies  the  difficulty  as  people  are  asked  for  their  opinions  which  may  not  be 
representative  of  all  employees.  The  aim  was  to  pick  a  cross  section  of  employees 
from  Executive  level  to  safety  rep  who  could  be  asked  say  in  1993  and  then  again  in 
1996.  This  can  prove  difficult  if  there  is  a  high  turn  over  of  staff  on  a  site 
(Strathleven)  or  within  a  company  as  a  whole,  as  no  consistency  with  which  to 
benchmark  can  be  achieved. 
An  interview  study  would  have  no  great  return  if  repeated  say  annually,  it  has  its 
greatest  benefit  as  a  benchmarking  exercise  over  longer  periods  of  time.  As 
discussed  earlier,  there  is  much  doubt  whether  there  is  a  link  between  attitude  and 
behaviour,  but  this  study  aims  to  capture  changing  levels  of  understanding, 
communication  and  awareness.  It  focuses  on  the  actual  changes  within  a  company 
over  time  and  aims  to  identify  what  has  worked,  what  has  not  worked. 
The  findings  of  this  study  were  useful,  and  reinforced  what  the  research  had 
suggested.  Many  of  the  remarks  also  echoed  the  thoughts  of  the  external  auditor  and 
his  beliefs  of  what  the  progressions  were  and  why.  It  was  useful  to  know  that  whilst 
senior  managers  felt  committed  to  the  improvement  of  health  and  safety,  supervisor 
and  employees  felt  that  their  commitment  was  mainly  in  words  not  action  and 
required  greater  demonstrated  commitment.  One  of  the  greatest  criticism  was  the 
lack  of  resource  and  the  constant  change  of  initiatives  which  had  been  visible  to  the 
researcher,  if  not  to  Senior  Management. 
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Any  study  should  set  out  to  capture  information  about  levels  of  safety  awareness  or 
knowledge  for  it  to  be  of  any  practical  value  at  all.  It  is  suggested  that  an  'awareness' 
study  that  focuses  on  the  knowledge  and  understanding  of  very  specific  issues  will 
be  more  indicative  of  actual  behaviour  than  those  on  more  general  issues. 
An  awareness  study,  perhaps  by  questionnaire,  may  be  useful  for  the  identification  of 
training  or  information  needs  for  the  study  group  and  it  may  also  suggest  reasons 
why  accidents  of  a  particular  type  have  been  repeated  in  an  area.  It  is  not,  however, 
an  accurate  or  scientific  guide  to  health  and  safety  performance.  The  study  must  be 
carefully  designed  so  as  to  avoid  providing  meaningless  or  misleading  information, 
or  confusion  for  the  respondent  and  the  method  of  data  analysis  must  be  carefully 
considered  beforehand  to  avoid  non-causal  correlation's  such  as  'the  awareness  of 
the  need  for  hearing  protection  has  increased  with  paper  consumption  on  site'.  Issues 
of  interpretation  of  such  studies  require  expertise  in  design,  performance  and 
analysis  of  an  awareness  study.  Expertise  that  may  not  be  available  within  a 
company.  The  performance  of  a  study  will  require  the  availability  and  time  of  all 
participating  individuals. 
It  is  suggested  then,  that  a  specific  awareness  study,  by  personal  interview,  may  be 
worthwhile  if  it  is  expertly  carried  out  on  a  3-5  yearly  basis.  It  should  be  used  as  a 
bench  marking  exercise  only,  rather  than  a  true  measure  of  health  and  safety 
performance.  The  key  is  that  common  issues  raised  by  respondents  in  the  interviews 
are  followed  up  to  seek  specific  improvements  in  performance.  An  interview  study  is 
useful  when  used  as  a  benchmark  over  time. 
3.3.5  COMPARISON  OF  METHODS  AND  UTILITY 
To  determine  which  technique  to  use,  the  following  factors  should  be  considered  : 
1.  What  information  do  you  wish  to  collect 
2.  Is  this  information  complex  or  threatening,  will  the  questionnaire  be  lengthy 
3.  How  much  finance  is  available  to  fund  the  survey 
4.  What  is  the  geographical  spread  of  the  respondents 
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6.  What  special  circumstances  exist 
If  the  information  that  one  wishes  to  collect  is  complex  or  detailed,  a  one  to  one  or  a 
telephone  interview  would  be  the  most  effective  techniques  -  in  both  cases  the 
interviewer  can  explain  each  question,  and  probe  for  further  information.  Paper 
questionnaires  cannot  explain  complex  concepts  behind  questions,  and  therefore  they 
can  only  address  simple  self-explanatory  questions  effectively.  However,  if  the 
information  is  sensitive,  it  may  be  more  effective  to  collect  it  by  a  mail  questionnaire 
where  the  respondent  feels  that  he  or  she  has  complete  anonymity. 
The  most  expensive  method  of  collecting  information  is  the  one  to  one  interview,  it 
is  also  the  most  time  consuming  for  the  interviewer,  and  most  difficult  to  arrange 
logistically.  As  a  contrast,  the  mail  questionnaire  is  least  expensive  to  implement,  but 
has  the  disadvantage  of  a  lower  response  rate,  the  telephone  interview  provides  the 
middle  ground.  For  the  same  reasons,  the  geographical  spread  of  the  respondents  will 
influence  the  method  of  survey  -  if  there  is  a  large  spread  in  the  survey  group,  one  to 
one  interviews  will  not  be  cost  effective,  and  mail  or  paper  questionnaires  will  be 
most  practical  and  cost  effective.  If  respondents  are  clustered,  for  example  on  several 
company  sites,  personal  interviews  may  be  viable,  but  the  number  of  people  to  be 
interviewed  would  influence  whether  this  is  practical  or  not. 
Another  factor  to  consider  is  whether  an  individuals  background  circumstances  need 
to  be  evaluated,  whether  this  is  their  working  or  home  environment.  In  many  cases 
this  will  not  be  relevant  to  a  occupational  based  questionnaire,  but  where  it  is,  the 
survey  will  have  to  be  conducted  in  that  environment  to  enable  the  interviewer  to 
evaluate  it.  This  in  turn  would  require  the  survey  to  be  carried  out  via  a  personal 
interview  which  has  it's  disadvantages  in  terms  of  cost  and  time,  as  mentioned 
earlier. 
Finally,  other  factors  need  to  be  considered  to  ensure  that  the  survey  is  successful 
and  provides  the  right  type  and  volume  of  information.  These  factors  would  include 
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peak  production  where  applicable,  and  having  the  required  management  support  to 
ensure  an  adequate  response  rate.  Another  critical  factor  in  the  success  of  a  survey  is 
the  route  for  the  return  of  the  responses  if  it  is  a  mail/paper  questionnaire.  A  route 
must  be  established  that  provides  the  respondent  with  assurance  of  confidentiality, 
and  that  does  not  require  much  effort.  In  an  occupational  safety  questionnaire,  the 
questionnaire  could  be  returned  directly  to  the  Safety  Department  or  via  Safety 
Representatives,  rather  than  through  the  Line  Manager.  In  addition,  there  must  be  an 
awareness  of  all  external  factors  that  can  directly  influence  the  responses  given,  and 
whether  this  gives  an  accurate  picture  or  not.  For  example,  factors  can  include 
downsizing,  restructure,  merger,  time  of  year,  seasonal  fluctuations  in  production. 
The  survey  can  then  be  conducted  (or  postponed)  with  this  knowledge  in  mind. 
The  optimum  survey  method  then  depends  upon  what  type  of  information  you  aim  to 
collect,  from  whom  and  how.  In  general,  the  personal  interview  is  most  appropriate 
for  the  collection  of  detailed  information  from  a  smaller  group  of  individuals,  where 
a  high  response  rate  is  required  and  the  time  pressure  to  complete  the  interviews  is 
not  as  high.  As  a  contrast,  the  paper  questionnaire  is  ideal  to  collect  simple 
information  for  a  large  number  of  respondents  over  a  geographically  large  area,  at 
relatively  low  cost.  However  the  negative  side  is  that  the  response  rate  may  not  be  as 
high,  and  it  may  take  a  long  period  of  time  for  responses  to  be  returned,  but  this  part 
of  the  process  can  be  managed  by  implementing  a  follow  up  process. 
3.4  COST  OF  ACCIDENTS  STUDY 
3.4.1  OBJECTIVES 
Accidental  loss  has  a  direct  impact  on  the  profitability  and  efficiency  of  an 
organisation,  affecting  employees,  customers,  the  company  and  society  at  large.  As 
Drucker  stated  "  the  first  duty  of  business  is  to  survive  and  the  guiding  principle  of 
business  economics  is  not  maximisation  of  profit,  rather  it  is  the  avoidance  of  loss". 
The  process  of  measurement  and  analysis  of  the  cost  of  financial  and  opportunity 
costs  to  a  company  through  accidental  loss  does  not  directly  reduce  the  number  of 
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nature  of  accidents,  their  spread,  cost  and  type,  and  from  this  understanding,  more 
effective  safety  decisions  can  be  made.  Risk  can  be  avoided  or  reduced  to  the  lowest 
cost  effective  level  if  actual  cumulative  costs  are  known. 
The  study  aimed  to, 
i)  Evaluate  patterns  of  loss  within  the  company  and  to  identify  if  there  were 
deficiencies  in  the  safety  management  system  that  could  be  cost-effectively 
improved. 
ii)  Evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  the  risk  financing  arrangements  and  to  make 
recommendations  for  improvement  where  it  was  required. 
iii)  Determine  an  average  cost  of  accident  per  'class',  to  enable  projections  of 
future  loss  to  be  made  and  thus  determine  the  annual  cost  of  risk  to  the 
company. 
iv)  Develop,  if  possible,  a  general  purpose  costing  tool  that  could  be  applied  at 
least  within  the  drinks  industry  and,  perhaps,  more  widely. 
3.4.2  BACKGROUND  TO  THE  STUDY 
The  Health  and  Safety  Executive  carried  out  a  study  into  the  cost  of  accidents  in  5 
organisations  in  the  UK  in  the  period  1990/1991  (HSE,  1993).  The  study  was  carried 
out  using  research  teams  from  the  HSE  who  developed  a  methodology  that  aimed  to 
capture  accurately  the  total  cost  of  injury  and  non-injury  accidents  to  the  selected 
organisations  during  the  period  of  the  study.  A  study  was  implemented  in  each  of  the 
organisations  lasting  13-18  weeks. 
There  were  limitations  placed  upon  the  HSE  Cost  of  Accidents  study,  firstly 
although  all  identified  injury  accidents  were  included  in  the  study,  only  property 
damage  incidents  above  a  specified  minimum  level  were  included.  This  minimum 
level  was  set  at  a  minimum  unit  of  production  or  its  financial  equivalent.  Below  this 
level  the  concentrated  observation  methods  used  were  determined  to  be  an  inefficient 
use  of  resource. 
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and  within  the  control  of  the  participating  organisations  to  prevent.  The  study  was 
further  limited  to  those  losses  that  were  directly  borne  by  the  organisation,  that  is,  it 
excluded  insurable  costs. 
The  HSE  study  was  performed  by  the  development  of  data  collection  forms  for 
dissemination  to  the  work  force  for  capture  of  cost  information.  There  were  initial 
discussions  held  to  agree  the  overall  objectives  of  the  study  and  the  most  effective 
method  of  data  collection  using  the  specific  reporting  structures  within  the 
organisations.  Four  data  collection  forms  were  designed  for  the  study: 
Form  1  Departmental  Accident  Form  -  for  completion  by  the  Department  where 
the  accident  occurred  and  collects  data  on  all  costs  arising  from  that 
accident. 
Form  2  Secondary  Stage  Form  -  for  capture  of  costs  to  other  Departments  from 
the  occurrence  of  the  accident. 
Form  3  Continuing  Costs  Form  -  for  completion  on  a  weekly  basis  by  each 
Department  on  long  term  absentees  and  replacement  labour  costs  on  an 
ongoing  basis. 
Form  4  Management  Report  -a  weekly  report  for  completion  by  management  on 
personal  involvement  and  that  of  administrative  staff  in  accident 
investigation. 
The  study  to  cost  accidents  was  then  carried  out  by  HSE  research  team  using 
methodology  briefings  and  concentrated  observation  in  each  of  the  organisations. 
The  data  were  collected,  evaluated  and  the  results  published.  Various 
recommendations  were  published  along  with  the  results  of  the  research.  Firstly,  the 
HSE  considered  the  method  that  they  used  to  be  suitable  for  reproduction  by  other 
UK  companies  of  small  to  medium  size,  where  there  was  a  suitable  sample  size  upon 
which  to  base  conclusions  about  overall  costs.  Secondly,  the  HSE  recognised  that, 
because  their  study  aimed  to  collect  one  hundred  percent  of  accident  costs  in  the 
study  period,  it  was,  therefore,  very  resource  intensive.  It  was  acknowledged  that 
3:  114 this  would  not  be  practical  or  even  desirable  for  companies  with  limited  resources  to 
attempt.  There  was  a  suggestion  that  modification  of  the  original  study  for  an 
individual  company's  culture,  reporting  structure  and  resources  would  be 
appropriate. 
At  this  time  an  accident  costing  study  was  being  developed  in  J&B  and  the 
publication  of  the  HSE  work  lead  to  contact  and  meetings  between  the  J&B  study 
group  and  the  HSE.  HSE  were  encouraging  other  companies  to  use  their  method  of 
costing  accidents  or  to  modify  it  for  their  own  circumstances  an/d  requirements  as 
outlined  above.  This  encouraged  the  tailoring  of  the  prototype  system  at  J&B  to 
follow  where  possible  the  HSE  format,  but  to  remove  certain  idiosyncrasies  from  the 
methodology.  The  intensity  of  observation  and  the  expertise  that  the  HSE  study 
required  were  clear  negatives.  In  addition,  it  was  judged  that  a  short  intensive  study 
would  fail  to  capture  any  seasonal  effects  and  variations.  Seasonal  effects  on 
accidents  are  likely  to  exist  in  any  organisation  with  fluctuating  production  rates  and, 
therefore,  a  longer  period  of  study  is  required.  For  J&B  this  implied  a  study  to  be 
performed  over  a  period  of  at  least  one  year. 
The  observational  intensity  required  by  the  HSE  study  could  not  be  matched,  in 
addition  it  was  appropriate  to  develop  a  system  that  could  continue  to  be  used.  This 
suggested  a  simplified  reporting  scheme  should  be  used,  at  risk  of  missing  some 
financial  data.  This  system  should  be  `truthed',  by  a  detailed  study  of  a  limited 
number  of  events. 
In  summary,  therefore,  J&B  (and  by  implication  most  of  industry)  required  a 
continuous  method  of  costing  that  required  little  specialist  resource  and  did  not  add 
to  the  losses  that  had  already  been  incurred  in  the  incident  being  studied.  Resources 
are  always  limited.  There  is  a  practical  need  to  balance  the  cost  of  investigation 
against  the  losses  involved  and  learning  from  incidents  cannot  take  priority  over 
making  improvements  to  the  safety  systems. 
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As  an  essential  part  of  a  Process  Maturity  model  (Paulk,  1995),  a  Cost  of  Accidents 
study  can  be  used  as  a  bench  mark  to  position  the  performance  of  the  company  at 
any  time.  The  study  was  expected  to  show  the  cost  of  risk  to  the  company  in  a 
period  of  a  year.  It  would  demonstrate  how  far  the  company  had  moved  in  terms  of 
reducing  accidental  loss  and  related  costs,  and  the  distance  still  to  be  travelled  in  the 
quest  for  'total  safety'.  The  study  would  not  improve  safety  in  its  own  right,  but  it 
was  intended  to  facilitate  such  an  improvement.  The  information  gained  from  the 
study  was  also  intended  to  help  reduce  accidental  loss,  by  providing  a  baseline  upon 
which  improvements  could  be  identified  and  implemented. 
The  study  also  intended  to  highlight  problem  areas  within  the  company,  so  that 
changes  could  be  made.  It  aimed  to  analyse  accidental  loss:  the  length  of  absences 
related  to  accidents,  repeated  accidents  and  accident  black  spots  within  the 
workplace.  Control  measures  could  be  identified  to  resolve  key  problem  areas,  and 
they  must  be  cost-effective.  The  study  aimed  to  provide  information  with  which 
cost-benefit  analysis  could  be  carried  out.  The  control  measures  and  accident 
experience  were  to  be  measured  against  the  risk  financing  arrangements,  to  ensure 
that  the  most  effective  cover  was  in  place.  The  study  would  then  enable  the  risk 
financing  arrangements  to  be  optimised. 
The  study  aimed  to  determine  average  costs  of  accidents,  and  produce  average  costs 
per  class  of  accident.  The  initial  benchmark  costs  could  then  be  used  as  multipliers 
in  futuristic  studies,  without  requiring  human  resource  and  administration  costs  each 
time.  It  is  known  that  accidental  loss  has  higher  costs  than  the  amount  that  is  claimed 
from  an  insurance  company.  For  a  start,  many  costs  relating  to  accidents  are  not 
claimed  from  insurers,  and  in  some  cases  cannot  be  collected.  The  study  intended  to 
determine  what  the  ratio  of  insured  loss  against  uninsured  loss  actually  is,  in  the 
period  of  study.  Another  aim  of  the  study  was  to  identify  any  relationships  and 
ratios  between  severe  injury  accidents  (e.  g.  reportables)  and  non  serious  injury 
accidents  (e.  g  first  aid  treatment  only  injuries). 
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impact  of  an  accident,  is  not  only  felt  by  the  company  that  suffers  loss,  but  also 
various  external  parties  outlined  briefly  below.  Many  of  these  costs  are  intangible  to 
a  large  extent  and  are  felt  to  be  outwith  the  remit  of  a  company,  but  not  outwith  a 
social  conscience. 
3.4.3.1  Individuals  and  dependants 
There  will  be  an  adverse  impact  on  the  individual  and  his  dependants  as  a  result  of 
an  injury  accident.  Either  in  short  or  long  term  there  will  be  a  loss  of  earnings  of  the 
individual,  perhaps  due  to  a  loss  of  overtime  or  bonuses  that  would  otherwise  be 
paid,  or  perhaps  due  to  a  reduced  level  of  pay  when  there  has  been  a  long  period  of 
absence.  There  may  be  an  increased  cost  of  living  due  to  additional  expenditure  on 
heating,  purchase  of  medicines,  hospital  attendance  and  other  rehabilitation  methods. 
Perhaps  there  will  be  a  loss  of  amenity  due  to  permanent  incapacity  which  will  have 
a  severe  impact  on  the  quality  of  that  individuals  life,  and  that  of  his  or  her 
dependants,  this  reduced  quality  of  life  has  its  own  costs.  The  worry  and  grief  of  the 
dependants,  family  and  friends  also  reduced  their  quality  of  life  and  welfare.  As  a 
result  of  an  accident  an  individual  may  face  the  risk  of  unemployment  and  so,  the 
risk  of  long  term  debt,  homelessness  and  poverty  is  increased.  Individuals  who  suffer 
serious  accidents,  and  those  who  witness  them  are  also  at  risk  from  Post-traumatic 
shock  syndrome,  with  the  potential  of  long  term  mental  health  problems  and  an 
inability  to  carry  out  a  normal  life,  irrespective  of  the  extent  of  their  injuries. 
3.4.3.1  Society  and  the  economy 
In  the  event  of  an  accident,  there  are  costs  to  society  as  a  whole  and  the  economy  is 
also  adversely  affected.  The  cost  of  absence  due  to  occupational  injury  is  said  to  cost 
employers  £400m  per  annum  (Davies,  1994).  It  is  known  that  18m  days  are  lost  in 
the  UK  per  annum  due  to  injuries  at  work.  It  is  estimated  that  the  total  cost  of  work 
accidents  to  employers  in  the  UK  per  annum  is  between  £3823m  and  £8711m.  The 
costs  to  society  and  the  economy  could  otherwise  be  redistributed  for  a  more  positive 
purpose  such  as  improving  health  standards  and  developmental  work. 
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compensation,  and  will  be  treated  under  the  National  Health  Service.  These  costs  are 
paid,  in  effect,  by  the  rest  of  society  to  the  individual  via  taxation  and  National 
Insurance  contributions.  Under  the  principles  of  all  insurance,  the  losses  of  the  few 
are  borne  by  the  majority.  As  a  result  of  an  accident,  society  has  lost  valuable 
resources  in  terms  of  materials,  labour,  services,  and  capital  that  would  otherwise  be 
utilised  within  the  economy.  The  economy  will  lose  the  service  and  contribution  of 
victims  of  fatal  and  major  industrial  accidents.  An  investment  has  been  placed  in 
each  individual  within  a  society  such  that  a  major  or  fatal  accident  will  result  in  the 
loss  of  experience,  expertise  and  the  cost  of  the  education  of  that  individual.  There 
will  be  a  loss  of  welfare  of  society  due  to  the  pain,  suffering  and  grief  of  that 
individual,  or  his  relatives  due  to  injury  or premature  death. 
Premature  death  will  also  cause  a  major  change  to  the  financial  and  social 
circumstances  enjoyed  by  dependants.  The  costs  of  accidents  at  work;  in  particular 
those  that  are  uninsured  will  be  seen  as  operating  costs  by  a  company.  The  cost  of 
these  accidents  will  be  passed  back  into  society  via  the  consumer  in  form  of  a  price 
increase.  Therefore  the  loss  will  be  borne  by  society  twice,  both  from  the  product 
and  secondly,  under  the  National  Insurance  system. 
3.4.3.3  Customers  and  suppliers 
The  cost  of  accidents  will  also  have  impact  upon  customers  and  suppliers.  A  supplier 
will  be  required  to  quote  minimum  prices  if  a  company  is  trying  to  reduce  its  costs. 
Particularly  on  products  with  low  unit  costs,  the  price  of  an  accident  will  have  a 
large  impact  on  the  efficiency  of  an  operation.  Customers  will  be  adversely  affected 
by  the  cost  of  accidents,  as  orders  are  late  or  incomplete,  causing  the  customer  to  fail 
to  meet  his  own  obligations  and  contracts  to  supply. 
3.4.4  DEFINITION  OF  TERMINOLOGY 
The  terminology  used  by  the  Health  and  Safety  Executive  was  also  used  in  the  J&B 
Scotland  study  with  the  exception  of  the  classification  of  accidents. 
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The  term  'accident'  refers  to  any  unplanned  event  that  results  in  injury  or  ill  health  of 
people,  or  damage  or  loss  to  property,  plant,  materials  or  the  environment,  or  a  loss 
of  business  opportunity. 
First  Aid  injury  accident 
An  unplanned  event  that  leads  to  an  injury  that  requires  first  aid  treatment  but  no 
other  time  is  lost  from  the  normal  place  of  work. 
Minor  injury  accident  (with  no  associated  lost  time) 
An  unplanned  event  that  leads  to  an  injury  where  there  is  less  than  one  shift  lost 
from  normal  work.  Requires  treatment  from  a  first  alder  or  occupational  nurse. 
Lost  time  injury  accident 
An  unplanned  event  that  leads  to  an  injury  which  results  in  the  injured  party  losing 
more  than  one  shift  but  less  than  four  days  from  his  or  her  normal  place  of  work. 
Reportable  accident  (injury) 
An  unplanned  event  that  leads  to  an  injury  which  results  in  the  injured  party  losing  at 
least  four  days  from  his  or  her  normal  place  of  work,  or  as  otherwise  defined  by  the 
Reporting  of  Injuries,  Diseases  and  Dangerous  Occurrences  Regulations  1985. 
Reportable  accident  (non-injury) 
An  unplanned  event  that  leads  to  an  uncontrolled  release,  explosion,  spillage  or  other 
non-injury  event  as  defined  by  the  Reporting  of  Injuries,  Diseases  and  Dangerous 
Occurrences  Regulations  1985. 
Property  Damage  incident 
An  unplanned  event  that  leads  to  damage  to  property,  plant,  materials  or  the 
environment. 
3:  119 Near  Miss  incident 
An  unplanned  event  that  had  the  potential  to  cause  injury  or  damage,  but  did  not  in 
this  instance. 
Insured/  Direct  Costs 
The  cost  of  insurance  cover,  paid  as  insurance  premiums  by  the  company  is  the 
direct  cost  relating  to  risk  and  accidental  loss. 
Uninsured/  Indirect  Costs 
The  costs  of  uninsured  losses  to  the  company  may  result  from  a  variety  of  sources, 
and  fall  into  two  main  categories  of  cost:  tangible  and  intangible.  These  costs  are  as 
a  result  of  an  accident  but  are  not  insured  or  in  many  cases,  not  insurable  under  an 
insurance  policy. 
Internal  costs 
Internal  costs  will  affect  a  system  such  as  a  department  or  a  company,  as  a  contrast 
to  a  direct  impact  on  external  parties.  These  internal  costs  may  include  lost  time, 
damaged  equipment  and  may  well  be  passed  on  to  other  parties  via  increased  prices 
or  inability  to  complete  orders  on  time. 
External  costs 
The  impact  of  external  costs  will  be  borne  by  parties  external  to  the  company  such  as 
the  consumer,  customer,  the  supplier,  general  public,  or  society  at  large. 
3.4.5  REVIEW  OF  RELEVANT  LITERATURE 
3.4.5.1  Total  cost  of  accidents 
Accidents  have  a  direct  impact  on  productivity, 
efficiency  and  profitability.  Accidents  increase  the 
investment  that  is  required  in  order  to  achieve  the 
desired  output,  for  example  the  purchase  of  a 
replacement  part  for  a  piece  of  machinery  involved  in 
"The  question  is  not 
what  effective  health 
and  safety  management 
costs,  but  rather  what 
it  saves?  " 
Mike  Everley 
3:  120 an  accident,  as  a  result  of  which  production  has  been  stopped  and  overtime  is 
required  to  make  up  the  production  deficit.  Accidents  also  create  an  opportunity  cost 
-  perhaps  the  cost  of  paying  a  group  of  workers  during  a  production  stoppage  during 
which  time  they  produce  zero  return  on  investment.  An  opportunity  cost  can  be  used 
constructively  in  training,  development,  and  production.  The  overall  cost  of  an 
accidents  is  made  up  of  several  components,  some  direct  and  insurable  and  others 
less  visible,  and  in  many  cases  uninsured. 
The  true  cost  of  accidents  can  be  determined  by  considering  both  its  insured  and 
uninsured  costs.  It  is  key  to  consider  the  effect  of  uninsured  costs  of  accidents  as 
they  have  been  recognised  in  previous  research  studies  as  having  a  considerable 
impact  relative  to  insured  losses. 
The  insured  costs  are  the  cost  of  having  insurance  cover  -  the  cost  of  all  relevant 
insurance  premiums  paid  by  the  company,  including  Employer's  Liability,  Public 
Liability  or  Property  risk  cover.  The  premium  paid  is  the  direct  cost  relating  to  an 
accident.  This  premium  in  turn  pays  for  all  `insured  costs'  relating  to  an  accident  - 
for  example,  repair  to  property,  cost  of  interrupted  operations  -  but  only  the 
premium  cost  is  borne  (or  seen)  by  the  company. 
As  a  contrast,  uninsured  costs  to  a  company  may  result  from  a  variety  of  sources, 
and  fall  into  two  main  categories:  tangible  and  intangible  costs.  These  costs  result 
from  an  accident  but  are  not  insured  or  are  uninsurable  under  an  insurance  policy. 
Tangible  costs  may  include  the  cost  of.  sick  pay,  replacement  of  damaged  product; 
repairs;  investigation;  lost  product;  lost  packaging;  material  damage;  plant  damage; 
fines;  lost  production;  additional  overtime;  site  clearance  and  demolition; 
administrative  effort;  replacement;  penalties;  lost  orders;  lost  bonuses;  increased 
overheads;  emergency  costs;  counselling;  rehabilitation;  consultants  fees  and  the  cost 
of  hiring  and  training  replacement  staff.  Intangible  costs  including  the  loss  of: 
goodwill;  expertise  or  experience;  public  image;  brand  image;  sales;  customer 
satisfaction,  as  well  as  poor  industrial  relations;  increased  absenteeism;  reduced 
productivity  due  to  morale;  and  potentially  lost  future  orders. 
3:  121 If  any  of  the  uninsured  costs  actually  occur,  they  are  retained  by  the  company,  unless 
there  is  a  method  of  risk  transfer  other  than  insurance  in  place.  It  has  been  suggested 
by  Heinrich  (1959)  that  there  is  a  ratio  of  £1  of  insured  cost  for  every  £4  of 
uninsured  cost.  Other  research  has  been  carried  out,  all  of  which  suggests  that  hidden 
costs  are  a  considerably  larger  proportion  of  overall  accident  cost  than  insured  costs. 
Sinclair  (1967)  suggests  that  for  every  £1  insured,  there  is  another  £6.70  uninsured. 
The  ratio  between  insured  to  uninsured  costs  has  been  described  by  Heinrich  as  the 
Iceberg  theory.  The  Iceberg  Theory  describes  that  where  the  insured  cost  (premium) 
as  the  tip  of  the  iceberg  (-20%)  that  is  the  visible  cost  of  accidental  loss  :  the 
uninsured  loss  (-80%)  is  the  submerged  or  hidden  cost,  absorbed  by  maintenance 
and  operations  budgets.  Therefore,  a  full  investigation  into  the  total  cost  of  accidents 
can  determine  what  proportion  of  costs  are  hidden  and  absorbed  by  the  company, 
and  enable  more  effective  risk  financing  strategies  to  be  employed.  The  ratio  of 
insured  to  uninsured  loss  will  help  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  the  current  risk 
financing  strategy.  Instead  of  reliance  on  traditional  insurance,  certain  risks  may  be 
transferred,  perhaps  to  contractors  or  suppliers,  and  contingencies  can  be  made  for 
other  risks  through  a  risk  retention  budget.  Alternatively,  a  cost-benefit  analysis  may 
indicate  that  preventative  strategies  to  avoid  loss  will  lead  to  optimisation  of 
resources. 
Continuous  improvement  as  described  by  Carnegie  is  based  upon  small,  evolutionary 
steps  rather  than  revolutionary  innovations.  The  Carnegie  Process  Maturity  model 
provides  a  framework  for  organising  these  evolutionary  steps  into  5  Maturity  levels 
that  lay  successive  foundations  required  for  continuous  process  improvements.  These 
5  Maturity  levels  define  an  ordinal  scale  for  measuring  the  maturity  of  an 
organisation's  process  and  for  evaluating  its  process  capability. 
Each  maturity  level  is  a  layer  in  the  foundation  for  continuous  process  improvement. 
Level  3,  or  the  Defined  process  is  that  all  activities  are  documented,  standardised  and 
integrated  into  a  standard  process  for  the  organisation.  All  projects  use  an  approved, 
tailored  version  of  the  organisation's  standard  process  for  developing  and 
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staff  perform  more  effectively.  A  'well  defined'  process  has  standardised  and 
consistent  capability,  where  cost,  quality  and  safety  are  tracked. 
As  part  of  Process  Maturity,  the  costing  of  accidents  will  not  directly  enable  the 
company  to  reduce  the  number  of  accidents  that  exist,  but  will  enable  more 
understanding  of  the  true  cost  of  accidents.  This  will  act  as  a  benchmark  for  building 
further  knowledge  about  the  cost  of  non  conformance's,  in  terms  of  safety,  and  in 
impact  on  production.  The  cost  of  accidents  study  also  aims  to  provide  better 
information  for  cost  benefit  analysis,  to  determine  the  optimum  expenditure  required 
to  balance  the  cost  and  potential  cost  of  an  accident  with  the  cost  of  effective  control 
measures.  For  example  if  it  is  revealed  that  a  certain  type  of  accident  occurs  on 
average  10  times  annually,  it  is  worthwhile  investigating  exactly  how  much  this 
accident  costs  the  company  each  time.  On  the  surface  it  may  appear  that  the  accident 
has  a  minimal  cost,  but  a  thorough  costing  may  show  that  while  each  incident  has  a 
direct  (but  insured)  cost  of  £500,  it  has  a  further  indirect  cost  of  £20,000.  Therefore, 
instead  of  a  total  annual  cost  of  £5000  for  these  incidents,  the  overall  cost  is  in  fact 
£25,000. 
Having  calculated  the  true  cost  of  this  type  of  incident,  cost  benefit  analysis  may  be 
performed.  It  will  now  add  a  different  perspective  when  potential  control  measures 
are  considered,  if  a  one-off  investment  of  £5000  will  eliminate  this  type  of  incident. 
The  additional  knowledge  of  the  actual  cost  of  accidents  will  provide  key  accurate 
information  for  cost-benefit  analysis. 
Another  benefit  is  that,  with  knowledge  of  the  average  ratio  between  insured  and 
uninsured  costs,  assumptions  about  the  total  cost  of  an  accident,  where  there  is 
incomplete  knowledge  of  hidden  costs,  can  then  be  made  in  the  future. 
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The  method  used  by  the  HSE  in  1990/91  has  been  described  in  detail  of  the  start  of 
this  section.  Several  studies  into  the  cost  of  accidents  were  carried  out  prior  to  the 
Health  and  Safety  Executive  study,  in  particular  (Heinrich  1959;  Fletcher  and 
Douglas  1971;  Blake  1963;  Sinclair  1972). 
There  are  many  similarities  between  the  studies  that  have  been  carried  out  and  there 
are  also  several  critical  differences.  Bird,  Sinclair,  and  Blake  all  used  the  list  of 
'uninsured'  factors  originally  proposed  by  Heinrich.  These  factors,  written  in  1929, 
were  used  without  modification.  Sinclair  and  Fletcher  &  Douglas  also  used 
Heinrich's  ratio  of  Uninsured  to  Insured  costs  (4:  1),  and  Heinrich's  Accident 
triangles  as  a  basis  for  their  study. 
In  terms  of  differences,  many  of  the  studies  were  carried  out  using  different  methods 
of  collecting  cost  figures,  and  using  different  categories  or  classes  of  'loss'.  The 
critical  similarities  and  differences  are  discussed  in  Table  8.  A  brief  summary  of  the 
main  studies  is  discussed  below: 
Heinrich 
Heinrich  was  responsible  for  carrying  out  much  of  the  original  work  on  the  'cost  of 
accidents'.  He  wrote  an  extensive  list  of  uninsured  and  insured  cost  factors  which  has 
been  used  in  many  other  research  studies.  His  initial  work,  presented  in  1929  stated 
that  there  was  a  ratio  of  $4  uninsured  cost  for  each  $1  insured.  Heinrich  considered 
the  results  of  his  costing  studies  and  proposed  an  accident  ratio  for  three  classes  of 
accident:  permanent  injury;  minor  injury;  no  injury,  as  follows  in  Table  6. 
Table  6 
Disability 
)ility  or  Fatality 
ºr  Injury 
Property  Damage 
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As  an  update  to  Heinrich's  work,  Frank  Bird  (1986)  carried  out  seven  years  of 
exploration  into  90,000  different  accidents  to  determine,  amongst  other  things,  the 
ratio  of  accidents  between  classes.  Using  the  classes:  permanent  injury,  minor,  no 
injury,  Bird  proposed  that  the  ratio  was  in  fact  1  permanent  injury,  for  every  100 
minor  injuries  and  500  non-injury  accidents.  In  further  work,  Bird  later  used  a  four 
category  ratio  of  1:  10:  30:  600.  The  additional  category  was  created  by  separating 
fatality,  from  permanent  and  temporary  disability.  It  is  not  clear  why  emphasis  was 
put  on  `permanence'  of  injury  as  this  is  neither  a  guide  to  severity  or  magnitude. 
Sinclair 
Sinclair  separated  costs  related  to  accidents  into  objective  costs  (loss  of  wages,  loss 
of  production  etc)  and  subjective  costs  (life  evaluation,  pain  and  suffering).  He 
commented  that  there  was  a  wide  differential  in  the  ratios  of  insured  to  uninsured 
costs  across  companies  and  industries  that  he  evaluated.  He  recommended  that 
particular  attention  be  paid  to  prevention  costs  that  is,  the  cost  of  safety  design, 
personnel,  planning,  safe  operations,  medical  team,  control  systems  and  other  similar 
factors.  Three  classes  of  incident  were  suggested  for  a  costing  study, 
1  Over  three  days  lost  from  normal  work 
2  Minor  injury 
3  Property  damage  only 
He  suggested  that  Classes  2  and  3  could  be  predicted  from  Class  1,  using  the  concept 
of  Heinrich's  accident  ratio  triangles,  but  he  did  not  calculate  these  ratios.  Again, 
Sinclair  noted  that  property  damage  incidents  are  very  difficult  to  capture  fully  for 
analysis. 
Fletcher  and  Douglas 
Fletcher  and  Douglas  (1971)  emphasised  that  many  companies  project  true  costs  of 
accidents  using  Heinrich's  original  1:  4  ratio  for  insured  to  uninsured  loss,  but  that 
this  is  hugely  inaccurate  due  to  a  wide  difference  of  these  ratios  within  companies. 
They  suggested  that  specific  studies  must  be  carried  out  within  a  company  in  order  to 
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will  vary  widely  according  to  the  risk  financing  arrangements  in  place,  legal  system 
and  requirement  to  pay  compensation,  to  name  just  a  few.  They  suggested  that  a 
study  must  determine  the  average  cost  of  each  of  four  classes  of  accident,  then  divide 
these  costs  into  insured  and  uninsured  loss.  It  was  specified  that  a  minimum  25 
accidents  in  each  class  are  required  to  provide  accurate  information.  The  accidents 
were  divided  into  the  following  classes, 
1  Permanent,  partial  disability  or  temporary  total  disability  of  1  day  or  more,  death 
2  Hospital  or  medical  attention  but  no  lost  time  beyond  a  shift 
3  First  aid  treatment  only,  no  lost  time  other  than  treatment  time 
4  No  injury  -  property  damage  or  material  damage  only 
Class  3  incidents  were  captured  by  sampling  100  attendees  at  the  medical  room,  due 
to  the  difficulty  in  capturing  this  information  otherwise.  The  US  National  Safety 
Council's  list  of  uninsured  costs  was  used  for  the  study  and  samples  for  each  class 
were  costed  to  capture  uninsured  cost  per  incident.  The  average  figures  per  class  in 
1971:  were, 
Class  1:  $52  Class  2:  $21.50  Class  3:  $3.10 
These  average  costs  for  each  class  were  then  used  as  multipliers  for  the  total  number 
of  accident  in  each  class.  Fletcher  and  Douglas  observed  difficulties  in  obtaining 
accurate  information  about  Class  4  incidents  -  noting  that  these  are  of  a  different 
nature  to  injury  accidents  -  and  used  Frank  Bird's  accident  ratio  to  estimate  the 
number  of  incidents  of  this  type,  and  used  an  average  cost  of  $34.67.  This  study 
suggested  that  there  was  an  average  direct  to  indirect  cost  ratio  of  1:  6. 
Blake 
Blake  (1963)  carried  out  initial  cost  of  accidents  studies  using  the  definition  of 
accidents  as  'unintended  occurrences  arising  out  of,  or  connected  with  plant 
operations  that  interfere  or  hinder  efficient  operations'.  He  determined  from  this 
experience  that  studies  would  have  to  span  a  considerable  time  period  if  they  are  to 
avoid  seasonal  fluctuations  and  are  to  capture  useful  information.  Blake  used 
3:  126 Heinrich's  list  of  uninsured  cost  factors  as  a  standard,  as  many  other  researchers  had 
in  previous  studies.  He  carried  out  several  studies  that  lasted  for  a  period  of  a  year 
that  were  largely  self  administering,  excluding  non-injury  losses.  He  commented  that 
"almost  without  exception,  the  higher  the  frequency  rate,  the  higher  the  uninsured 
cost".  It  is  intuitive  that  the  most  frequently  occurring  incidents  are  the  least  likely  to 
be  insured,  due  to  an  `excess'  on  an  insurance  policy. 
Blake  applied  an  alternative  method,  the  Simonds  method  (Blake,  1963),  which 
established  average  costs  for  each  of  four  classes  of  incident  within  a  plant.  These 
averages  were  then  applied  to  the  total  number  of  accidents  in  each  class  in  a  year,  to 
get  the  total  uninsured  cost  per  annum.  The  average  figures  were  then  applied  to 
each  year's  accident  figures,  unless  there  was  material  change  within  the  plant.  The 
classes  of  accident  were, 
1  Permanent  partial  disability  and  temporary  total  disability 
2  Medical  treatment  required  off  site 
3  Medical  treatment  but  first  aid  only  or  property  damage  <  $20  or  <8  Hrs  lost 
time 
4  No  injury  accident  or  minor  injury  only,  no  doctor  required,  property  damage 
>$20  or  more  than  8  Hrs  lost  time. 
Using  Simonds,  Blake  produced  accident  frequency  ratio  of: 
Table  7 
cl 
Simonds  Method 
Class  3 
Class  4 
3:  127 He  commented  that  the  method  used  to  determine  the  cost  of  accidents  is  less 
important  than  consistency  of  methodology  and  a  reliable  sample  size  over  a  period 
of  time.  He  discovered  difficulty  in  the  complete  collation  of  non-injury  data  as  the 
study  was  self-administering. 
3.4.5.3  Comparison  of  studies 
It  is  noteworthy  that  most  effort  has  been  put  into  the  numerical  frequency  of  events, 
rather  than  cost.  Most  studies  seem  content  with  Heinrich's  ratio  of  costs  with  only 
Blake  offering  a  different  approach.  The  effort  put  into  counting  events  does  not, 
however,  produce  clarity  or  uniformity  of  results. 
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3:  129 As  can  be  seen  in  Table  8  there  is  a  considerable  difference  in  classification  of 
accidents  in  the  different  studies.  First  Aid  accidents,  as  one  example  have  been  put 
into  three  different  categories.  The  categorisation  of  accidents  differs  widely  in 
several  cases  rendering  numerical  comparisons  and  comparisons  of  ratios  fairly 
meaningless. 
Heinrich,  has  selected  a  wide  band  for  accidents  that  he  categorises  as  Class  1.  Bird 
follows  this  model  and  used  the  same  insured/uninsured  loss  factors  and  method  as 
Heinrich.  In  both  of  these  cases,  Class  1  encompassed  fatal  accidents,  permanent  and 
temporary  disabilities  and  accidents  where  the  injured  party  loses  more  than  one 
shift  from  normal  work.  Both  of  these  studies  have  then  combined  all  remaining 
injury  accidents  where  there  is  less  than  one  shift  lost  as  Class  2  and  non-injury 
accidents  as  Class  3. 
Sinclair,  by  contrast,  has  not  included  accidents  where  there  is  less  than  three  days 
lost  in  Class  1,  but  has  instead  combined  all  other  injury  accidents  into  Class  2,  and 
non-injury  accidents  into  Class  3.  Fletcher  and  Douglas  followed  Heinrich  and  Bird 
by  taking  a  wide  band  1  and  included  all  injury  accidents  with  more  than  one  shift 
lost.  They  then  subdivided  more  frequently  into  less  than  a  shift  lost,  first  aid  only 
and  no  injury  for  classes  2,3  and  4  respectively. 
Blake  kept  only  fatal,  reportable  and  disability  related  accidents  in  Class  1,  breaking 
the  other  three  classes  down  to:  off-site  medical  treatment;  first  aid  treatment  and 
minor  or  non-injury. 
It  is  possible  that  the  studies  were  originally  performed  under  different  Class 
headings,  but  that  results  were  collated  under  broader  groups  after  the  results  were 
analysed.  Heinrich  and  Bird,  for  example,  may  have  selected  broader  Class  1  bands 
to  produce  more  effective  visual  aids  to  convince  management  that  action  against 
accidental  loss  is  needed.  It  is  also  possible  that  their  studies  simply  did  not  define 
the  type  of  accidents  precisely  enough  to  make  the  distinction  into  different  classes 
of  accident. 
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example,  Sinclair  puts  all  injury  accidents  with  less  than  3  days  lost  into  the  same 
band,  only  separating  out  accidents  where  there  is  only  property  damage.  Again  this 
is  not  ideal  for  a  comparison  of  relative  costs.  Assuming  that  there  are  dependant 
factors  linking  different  types  of  injury  accidents,  then  the  study  cannot  demonstrate 
a  numerical  or  financial  comparison  with  such  broad  bands. 
Similarly  there  were  several  studies  that  combined  relatively  minor  injuries  into  the 
same  class  as  non-injury  and  property  damage.  This  cannot  provide  useful  figures,  as 
there  is  no  dependant  relationship  between  severity  of  property  damage  and  severity 
of  injury. 
To  meet  these  problems  the  J&B  study  used  smaller  class  categories  that  could  be 
combined  at  a  later  date.  It  separated  out  reportable  injury  (fatal,  immediately 
notifiable  and  over  three  days  lost)  accidents  from  other  lost  time  accidents.  The 
other  classes  chosen  were  lost  time  over  a  shift  but  less  than  3  days,  less  than  one 
shift,  first  aid  injury  only  and  finally  in  a  separate  category  property  damage  and 
other  non-injury.  The  larger  class  1  band  reflected  the  accident  experience  in 
previous  years,  where  few  accidents  have  even  been  immediately  notifiable,  so  it  is 
inappropriate  to  split  this  band  up  any  further. 
As  a  result  of  the  different  bands  chosen,  most  accident  ratios  and  triangles  are  not 
directly  comparable,  and  this  will  have  to  be  kept  in  mind  during  later  discussion. 
3.4.6  DESIGN  AND  METHODOLOGY  OF  STUDY 
3.4.6.1  Introduction 
This  methodology  was  developed  to  suit  the  specific  needs  of  J&B  Scotland  for  the 
performance  of  a  cost  of  accidental  loss  study  in  1994-1995. 
The  Health  and  Safety  Executive  and  other  studies  were  considered,  but  the 
approach  that  previous  studies  adopted  required  extensive  resources  and  created 
additional  administrative  tasks  for  many  parties,  or  were  unsuitable  for  other  reasons. 
3:  131 It  was  decided  that  a  tailored  approach  would  be  most  appropriate  to  ensure  that  the 
study  within  J&B  Scotland  was  not  only  suitable  for  its  organisational  and  reporting 
structure,  but  also  cost-effective. 
3.4.6.2  Methodology 
Critical  cost  factors 
At  the  outset,  critical  cost  'factors'  were  identified  from  the  findings  of  previous 
studies.  Costs  associated  with  accidental  loss  can  be  described  in  several  ways.  This 
research  explores  costs  under  the  headings:  insured  and  uninsured  costs;  and 
financial  against  opportunity  costs. 
Insured  costs  are  the  cost  of  the  annual  insurance  premiums  paid  by  the  company. 
J&B  Scotland's  Combined  Liability  premium  is  the  annual  insured  cost  to  the 
company.  Uninsured  costs  however,  are  those  self-insured  or  retained  by  the 
company  either  intentionally  or  otherwise,  and  these  have  a  direct  impact  on  the 
bottom  line.  Uninsured  costs  can  be  tangible,  for  example:  sick  pay;  rectification 
costs;  overtime;  lost  production  and  damage,  however  they  often  may  be  intangible: 
low  morale  and  industrial  relations  problems;  loss  of  corporate  image;  loss  of 
expertise;  poor  customer  satisfaction. 
There  are  no  clear  guidelines  on  the  costing  of  intangible  losses,  by  their  very  nature 
any  calculation  would  be  speculative  and  so  these  costs  were  excluded  from  the 
study.  Intangible  costs  might  be  expected  to  increase  in  some  exponential  fashion  as 
the  perceived  severity  of  the  accident  increases  as,  for  example,  the  HSE  has 
proposed  for  societal  aversion.  Therefore,  intangible  cost  is  a  function  of  financial 
cost.  However,  reference  will  be  made  to  the  added  cost  of  intangible  losses  to  the 
overall  cost  of  accidental  loss.  All  other  uninsured  costs  were  accounted  for  in  the 
study. 
At  the  design  stage  for  this  method,  the  most  critical  uninsured  cost  factors  were 
considered  to  be:  lost  production;  lost  time  from  normal  place  of  work;  sick  pay; 
overtime  payments;  plant  and  equipment  damage;  and  rectification  costs.  The  study 
3:  132 was  designed  to  enable  these  costs  to  be  captured  as  well  as  other,  less  significant, 
factors  that  add  to  the  overall  cost  of  accidental  loss. 
Method  of  data  collection 
It  was  recognised  that  the  Cost  of  Accidents  study  should  be  as  self-administering  as 
possible  to  avoid  imposing  additional  administrative  burdens  on  individuals  within 
the  company.  A  study  that  measures  lost  time  from  normal  work  should  not  also 
contribute  to  this  loss  of  time  itself,  where  this  can  otherwise  be  avoided.  It  was  also 
recognised  that  a  higher  level  of  co-operation  would  be  achieved  if  the  study  created 
secondary  benefits  that  offset  any  additional  burdens  imposed  at  the  time. 
Historically  J&B  Scotland  had  different  accident  report  forms  at  each  site.  All  of 
these  forms  required  the  following  details:  the  injured's  name;  location  of  accident; 
time  and  date  of  accident;  safety  representative's  comments;  Department  Manager's 
comments  and  Safety  Department's  comments.  It  was  recognised  that  although  the 
forms  were  inadequate  for  the  requirements  of  the  study,  they  provided  a  useful 
vehicle  for  the  communication  of  accident  information. 
The  study,  therefore  also  provided  an  opportunity  to  redesign  the  injury  accident  and 
property  damage/  near  miss  report  forms  and  create  a  uniform  data  collection  format 
across  all  of  J&B's  operations.  The  critical  cost  factors  would  be  captured  by 
additional  questions  on  these  forms. 
At  first  three  accident  costing  forms  were  developed:  first  aid  injury;  other  injury  and 
property  damage/  near-miss  incidents.  The  first  aid  injury  form  aimed  to  collect  cost 
information  on  accidents  that  required  only  first  aid  treatment,  the  second  form  to 
collect  information  about  all  other  injury  accidents  and  the  third  form  to  collect 
information  about  accidents  that  did  not  result  in  injury  but  led  to  damage  or  other 
loss.  These  forms  were  discussed  within  the  Risk  Control  Department  and  it  was 
recognised  that  the  first  aid  report  form  would  create  an  administrative  cost  at  least 
equal  to  the  actual  cost  of  the  accident  itself.  A  study  was  carried  out  to  evaluate  a 
series  of  first  aid  accidents.  It  was  reported  that  an  average  first  aid  accident  led  to  15 
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another  party.  First  aid  accidents  were  then  to  be  captured  using  a  total  figure  rather 
than  evaluating  each  one  individually,  requiring  only  counting  of  the  incidents.  Any 
property  damage  costs  that  related  to  such  an  accident  would  be  captured  by  a 
property  damage/  near  miss  form. 
Data  for  the  Cost  of  Accidents  study  was  therefore  collected  using  2  forms  -  injury 
accident  and  property  damage/  near  miss.  The  injury  accident  form  included 
questions  that  covered  the  following  areas:  location  of  accident;  type  of  injury; 
severity  of  injury;  lost  time  by  the  injured;  investigation  time;  rectification  cost; 
property,  plant,  equipment,  product  and  packaging  cost;  lost  time  of  other  parties; 
lost  production;  Health  and  Safety  Department  costs  and  miscellaneous  costs. 
The  property  damage/  near  miss  form  aimed  to  capture  cost  information  about 
accidents  where  there  was  no  injury,  unless  this  was  a  first  aid  only  injury.  The  cost 
factors  captured  by  this  form  were:  property  damage;  loss  of  product;  plant  damage, 
equipment  damage;  material,  product  and  packaging  loss;  rectification  cost;  lost  time 
from  normal  work;  lost  production;  investigation  costs  and  Health  and  Safety 
Department  costs. 
Both  of  the  accident  cost  forms  were  further  improved  by  the  addition  of  questions 
which  prompt  and  guide  accident  investigation.  These  sections  aimed  to  benefit 
those  carrying  out  accident  investigations  e.  g.  safety  representatives,  Department 
Mangers  and  the  Risk  Control  Department.  The  forms  provided  for  the  collection  of 
a  greater  range  of  information  that  would  be  available  in  the  event  of  an  Employer's 
Liability  claim. 
3.4.6.3  Assumptions  about  costs  during  the  study 
There  was  extensive  consultation  with  the  Personnel  Department  and  the  Finance 
Department  once  the  format  of  the  data  collection  forms  were  finalised. 
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There  existed  a  complex  organisational  and  pay  structure  at  J&B  Scotland.  The 
workforce  was  divided  into  three  groups  -  monthly  paid,  weekly  paid  and  hourly 
paid.  Generalisations  were  made  to  simplify  calculations  of  sick  pay  and  other 
opportunity  costs.  After  consultation  with  the  Finance  Department  on  the  subject  of 
average  rates  of  pay,  it  was  decided  that  the  workforce  could  be  divided  into  three 
categories:  shop  floor  workers;  supervisory  grade  and  managerial  staff. 
Shop  floor  workers  (level  1)  encompassed  hourly  paid  workers,  unskilled  workers 
and  some  contractors.  It  was  estimated  that  the  average  cost  to  the  company, 
including  National  Insurance  and  other  contributions,  was  £7  per  hour.  The 
supervisory  grade  (level  2)  included  supervisors,  team  leaders,  tradesmen,  skilled 
manual  workers,  technicians,  some  contractors  and  weekly  paid  employees.  It  was 
estimated  that  the  average  cost  to  the  company,  including  all  contributions,  was  f  1O 
per  hour.  The  managerial  grade  covered  all  managerial  positions  and  executives 
within  the  company.  It  was  recognised  that  there  may  be  a  wide  difference  in  the 
hourly  rate  of  pay  in  this  bracket.  However,  it  was  expected  that  there  would  rarely 
be  involvement  at  Executive  level  in  accidents  or  related  investigations,  so 
discrepancies  would  be  minimal.  The  average  cost  per  hour  to  the  company 
(including  all  contributions)  was  estimated  to  be  £15  per  hour. 
Sick  Pay 
In  event  of  absence  due  to  an  accident,  occupational  ill  health  or  any  other  absence, 
the  company  pays  to  the  employee  his  or  her  normal  basic  salary,  without  overtime, 
plus  the  normal  National  Insurance  contribution.  The  exception  to  this  is  if  the 
individual  has  a  contractual  overtime  agreement,  where  the  company  pays  overtime 
in  relation  to  this  agreement.  For  the  study,  sick  pay  is  the  cost  of  an  individual  being 
unable  to  attend  work  as  a  result  of  an  accident. 
First  Aid  Accidents 
Extensive  costing  investigations  into  first  aid  accidents  were  not  considered  to  be 
cost-effective.  A  short  study  of  first  aid  accidents  had  showed  that  the  amount  of 
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overall  cost  of  an  accident  of  this  type.  The  average  amount  of  time  spent  away  from 
the  normal  place  of  work  due  to  an  accident  of  this  type  was  estimated  to  be  15 
minutes  for  the  injured  party  and  15  minutes  lost  by  another  party,  perhaps  a  first 
aider.  It  was  decided  that  instead  of  completing  an  accident  form,  each  first  aid 
accident  would  be  accounted  for  as  30  minutes  lost  time,  which  would  be  calculated 
against  the  appropriate  rates  of  pay.  The  number  of  first  aid  accidents  and  to  whom 
they  occurred  would  be  captured  by  First  Aid  books  either  in  the  medical  room  or  in 
First  Aid  boxes  on  site.  Any  additional  lost  time  or  damage  costs  were  to  be  captured 
by  an  additional  property  damage/  near  miss  form. 
Material  and  Spirit  Costs 
The  Finance  and  Purchasing  Departments  were  consulted  periodically  on  a  variety  of 
costs  relating  to  the  overall  production  process  to  determine  the  cost  of  damaged  or 
lost  materials  and  spirits.  The  financial  costs  of  casks  used  for  the  storage  of  raw 
spirit,  packaging  materials  for  finished  product  and  the  cost  of  the  spirit  itself  as  well 
as  other  material  costs  were  established  by  consultation  of  the  Finance  Department 
in  event  of  damage  or  loss  occurring. 
Production  Costs 
In  event  of  a  loss  of  production,  the  Finance  Department  and  the  relevant  operating 
department  were  consulted  to  establish  the  estimated  cost  of  this  loss.  The  fixed 
costs  of  the  production  area  were  established  by  considering  overhead  costs  for  this 
period  of  time  including  heating  and  lighting.  The  production  rate  at  the  time  of  the 
accident  was  established. 
3.4.6.4  Consultation 
A  successful  cost  of  accidents  study  was  dependent  upon  the  co-operation  and 
participation  of  those  who  were  required  to  complete  the  data  collection  forms.  It 
was  important  therefore,  to  enlist  the  involvement  and  assistance  in  the  study  of 
various  key  parties  within  the  work  force.  Initially  this  involvement  was  required  to 
help  the  researcher  with  the  design  and  wording  of  the  data  collection  forms. 
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explain  the  purpose  of  the  proposed  study  and  the  method  of  data  capture.  The 
feedback  from  these  presentations  was  considered  and  the  forms  amended  where 
appropriate. 
The  Risk  Control  Group,  composed  of  all  of  the  health  and  safety  advisors  and 
specialists  within  J&B  Scotland  were  consulted  again  at  this  stage  to  carry  out  a  final 
review  of  the  data  collection  forms.  At  this  point  the  Trade  Unions  were  consulted  to 
emphasise  that  there  would  continue  to  be  a  No-Blame  policy  in  relation  to  accidents 
during  the  period  of  study. 
Finally,  all  departments  at  the  Strathleven  site  were  advised  of  the  purpose  of  the 
Cost  of  Accidents  study,  and  that  data  would  be  collected  using  new  accident  report 
forms.  Time  was  allowed  for  comments  and  feedback  on  the  proposed  study  before 
the  commencement  of  the  Pilot  Study  at  Strathleven. 
3.4.6.5  Pilot  study 
A  pilot  study  was  considered  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  data  collection  forms  could 
adequately  capture  cost  information,  and  that  there  were  no  ambiguous  questions.  An 
appropriate  sample  group  and  study  period  had  to  be  selected  that  would  provide 
enough  data  to  allow  analysis  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  data  collection  forms.  The 
Strathleven  site  was  chosen  as  the  sample  group  -  it  had  600  employees  and  therefore 
a  higher  number  of  incidents  than  the  other  sites  for  analysis.  The  length  of  the  pilot 
study  was  chosen  to  be  one  working  month,  as  this  financial  period  was  also  covered 
by  the  monthly  accident  report. 
The  pilot  study  was  also  intended  to  help  identify  problems  with  the  interpretation  of 
the  responses,  and  to  identify  the  appropriate  cost  figures. 
3:  137 3.4.7  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  STUDY 
3.4.7.1  Pilot  study 
The  pilot  study  was  implemented  on  October  1  1994  at  J&B  Scotland's  Strathleven 
site.  The  Nurse  disseminated  injury  accident  cost  forms  (Form  1)  at  the  First  Aid 
room  and  by  first  aiders  and  department  Managers  on  site.  The  majority  of  injury 
accidents  at  this  site  are  reported  to  the  Nurse,  with  the  exception  of  first  aid 
accidents,  which  are  also  or  instead  reported  to  first  aiders  or  supervisors.  Form  2 
was  distributed  by  department  Managers  who  held  copies,  and  from  the  Risk  Control 
Department. 
The  forms  were  intended  to  be  self-explanatory  and  directed  the  respondent  to 
complete  certain  sections  before  passing  the  form  to  the  next  relevant  party.  They 
were  also  intended  to  facilitate  and  guide  accident  investigations.  Once  completed, 
the  respondent  signed  and  returned  the  form  to  the  Risk  Control  Department  who 
completed  any  additional  information  and  costed  the  incident. 
3.4.7.2  Redraft  of  data  collection  forms 
After  the  pilot  study  was  complete,  the  forms  were  amended  as  a  response  to  defects 
that  had  been  highlighted.  The  most  significant  alteration  to  the  data  collection 
forms,  in  relation  to  actual  costing,  was  to  increase  the  amount  of  space  allocated  for 
each  written  response.  In  addition  to  this,  questions  on  the  training  received  by  the 
injured  party  on  tasks  and  risk  assessments  performed  were  included,  but  these  were 
not  intended  to  impact  on  the  cost  of  accidents  study. 
3.4.7.3  The  actual  study 
The  implementation  of  the  full  Cost  of  Accidents  study  was  carried  out  on  November 
the  Ist  1994.  The  study  and  new  accident  report  forms  were  implemented  at  all  7 
sites  within  J&B  Scotland.  The  study  was  to  last  for  the  period  of  a  full  financial 
year. 
The  same  method  of  data  collection  was  used  as  was  tested  at  Strathleven.  All 
accident  forms  at  the  Distilleries  were  sent  to  a  circulation  list  that  included  the  site 
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Control  department  at  the  end  of  each  month  for  evaluation. 
At  the  Blythswood  and  Bonhill  sites,  the  Safety  Advisor  was  notified  when  an 
accident  occurred.  An  accident  report  form  was  then  sent  out  and  returned  to  the 
Safety  Advisor  who  forwarded  a  copy  to  the  Risk  Control  Department  for  analysis. 
The  Risk  Control  Department  analysed  the  data  collection  forms  when  they  were 
received.  Accidents  with  missing  values  or  continuing  costs  were  separated  from  the 
completed  cost  studies,  and  updated  until  they  were  complete. 
3.4.8  RESULTS  OF  THE  STUDY 
3.4.8.1  Overall  results 
The  cost  of  accidents  study  was  carried  out  for  a  period  of  52  weeks.  During  this 
period  a  total  of  410  accidents  were  recorded.  Of  these  410  accidents,  389  resulted  in 
injury  to  employees,  the  remaining  19  resulted  in  property  damage  but  no  injury. 
The  breakdown  of  accidents  by  Class  is  illustrated  in  Table  9: 
Table  9 
Class 
Number  of  Incidents  Accident  Frequency 
per  Class  Ratio 
1)  Reportable  injury,  >  3 
21  1  8 
days  lost  time  . 
2)  Minor  injury  with  <3  12  1 
days  lost  time 
3)  Minor  injury  with  no  74  6.2 
lost  time 
4)  First  Aid  injury  284  23.7 
5)  No  injury  -Property  19  1.6 
damage/  near  miss 
TOTAL  410 
3:  139 It  is  recognised  that  the  reporting  system  used  to  collect  data  on  property  damage 
and  near  miss  accidents  did  not  collect  all  data  on  small  events.  There  is  confidence 
however,  that  the  study  collected  data  on  a  large  percentage  of  the  injury  accidents. 
The  greatest  proportion  of  accidents  was  first  aid  incidents.  A  first  aid  accident,  such 
as  a  paper  cut,  can  be  treated  by  a  first  aider  or  from  a  first  aid  box.  An  interesting 
result  was  that  there  were  more  reportable  accidents  than  minor  accidents  with 
associated  lost  time.  This  factor  however  may  be  due  to  morale  or  industrial  relations 
issues  specific  to  the  company  at  the  time  of  the  study.  The  work  force  may  not  feel 
obliged  to  return  to  work  at  the  earliest  possible  time  after  being  injured.  There  may 
even  be  a  financial  incentive  to  stay  at  home.  Alternatively,  the  result  may  just 
indicate  that  there  are  actually  a  greater  number  of  more  serious  accidents.  This 
figure  distorts  the  accident  triangle. 
3.4.8.2  Overall  costs  of  the  study 
The  overall  costs  of  all  the  injury  accidents  that  occurred  during  the  study  period  are 
illustrated  in  Table  10: 
Table  10 
Category  of  Accident 
Total  Cost  of  Average  cost  per 
Incidents  in  Class  £  Incident  in  Class  £ 
1)  Reportable  >3  days  lost 
30,358  1446 
time 
2)  Minor  (with  <3  days 
1276  106 
Lost  time) 
3)  Minor  (with  no  lost  time)  2730  37 
4)  First  aid  injury  996  3 
5)  No  injury  -  Property  35600  1874 
Damage  or  near  miss 
TOTAL  INSURED  COST 
462  70 
(Insurance  Premium)  , 
TOTAL  UNINSURED  COST  70,960 
TOTAL  COST  OF  RISK  141,422 
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damage  and  other  costs,  with  the  exception  of  first  aid  accidents,  where  property 
damage  is  accounted  for  in  separate  calculations. 
The  insurance  arrangements  used  by  J&B  included  an  excess  on  the  first  £25,000  of 
each  and  every  property  damage  claim.  As  a  result  this  arrangement  offers  only 
protection  against  catastrophic  losses  relating  to  such  claims. 
There  were  only  12  minor  accidents  with  associated  lost  time  and  the  average  cost  of 
such  an  accident  was  far  lower  than  that  of  a  reportable,  at  £  106.  One  of  the  critical 
differences  between  a  lost  time  accident  and  a  reportable  injury  accident  is  the 
amount  of  lost  time  from  normal  work  as  would  be  expected  from  the  definition  of  a 
reportable  accident  as  a  more  serious  event.  In  addition,  reportable  accidents  also 
require  a  greater  amount  of  investigation  and  rectification  costs.  The  period  of 
absence,  and  therefore  the  amount  of  sick  pay  paid  out  by  the  company  for  no  return 
is  however  the  dominant  reason  for  the  difference  between  the  average  cost  of 
different  classes  of  accidents. 
Minor  accidents,  where  there  had  been  no  lost  time,  had  an  average  cost  of  £37.  A 
minor  accident  has  a  maximum  of  one  shift  of  lost  time,  whereas  a  minor  with  lost 
time  is  at  least  one  shift  lost,  up  to  4  working  days  lost  from  normal  work.  Similarly, 
although  there  were  many  first  aid  accidents,  the  average  cost  was  low  at  £3  as  there 
was  a  minimal  amount  of  related  lost  time  and  critically,  all  related  damage  costs 
were  calculated  separately.  In  this  study,  no  direct  relationship  between  the  severity 
of  property  damage  and  period  of  time  absent  from  normal  work  could  be  identified. 
Although  there  were  only  19  property  damage/  near  miss  accidents  reported,  the 
average  cost  of  these  accidents  was  relatively  high  at  £  1874.  As  explained  before, 
small  property  damage  events  were  not  adequately  captured  by  the  study.  It  is 
significant  that  many  incidents  in  this  class  did  not  result  in  any  physical  damage 
requiring  repair,  only  lost  opportunity  such  as  down  time,  and  that  these  costs  were 
still  significant.  The  accidents  that  were  reported  tended  to  be  more  major  incidents. 
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excess  on  the  insurance  policy.  However,  in  cumulative  terms  it  is  expected  that  they 
cost  the  company  a  considerable  amount  every  year. 
Insured  v  Uninsured  Costs 
The  'insured'  cost  to  the  company  during  the  study  period  was  £70,462.  This  is  the 
cost  of  the  combined  risk  insurance  premium  apportioned  to  J&B  through  IDV.  In 
this  study,  in  addition  to  the  insured  cost,  there  was  £70,960  of  uninsured  costs, 
bringing  the  total  cost  of  risk  up  to  £141,427  in  the  period  of  study.  In  this  study,  the 
ratio  of  insured  to  uninsured  loss  is  approximately  1:  1. 
Injury  Accident  Ratio 
The  analysis  of  accident  rates  suggests  that  there  is  a  correlation  between  serious 
accidents  and  less  severe  injury  accidents.  That  is,  that  they  have  similar  distribution 
and  could  be  grouped.  Equally,  the  minor  and  first  aid  accidents  seem  to  be  different 
from  more  severe  events  but  capable  of  being  grouped  together.  The  data  from  the 
J&B  study  suggests  that  for  every  2  reportable  injuries  that  occur,  there  will  be  one 
lost-time  injury  accident  and  33  first  aid  (and  minor)  injury  accidents.  Relative  to 
other  studies  into  accident  ratios,  the  result  of  2  reportable  injuries  for  every  one 
lost-time  injury  is  unusual,  but  there  may  be  underlying  causes,  and  these  discussed 
below.  By  separating  accidents  with  lost  time  from  those  with  no  lost  time,  the  lost 
time/  no  lost  time  ratio  is  1:  11.  That  is  a  ratio  of  minor  to  serious  injury  events  of 
about  11  to  1.  This  ratio  can  be  compared  to  Heinrich's  29:  1,  Blakes  20:  1  and  Bird's 
100:  1.  Why  then  are  there  proportionately  more  lost  time  events  at  J&B  than 
reported  by  these  other  studies  ?  There  are  three  possible  contenders. 
First,  the  payment  of  bonuses  or  sick  pay  may  not  encourage  workers  to  return  early 
to  work.  At  the  Blythswood  site,  if  an  employee  is  unable  to  work  due  to  injury  they 
are  paid  in  their  absence,  average  earnings  for  previous  three  months,  which  includes 
bonus  and  overtime.  During  certain  periods  of  the  year  there  will  be  peaks  and 
troughs  of  overtime.  It  is  possible  for  an  employee  to  have  an  accident  in  a  period  of 
low  activity  where  the  total  remuneration  is  relatively  low  and  get  paid  a  rate  based 
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incentive  to  return  to  work  as  the  employee  actually  receives  a  higher  income 
receiving  sick  pay  than  working. 
Secondly,  the  result  could  indicate  low  morale  within  the  work  force  or  an  industrial 
relations  problem.  If  there  is  poor  morale  amongst  the  work  force  they  may  feel  no 
incentive  to  return  to  work. 
Thirdly,  the  result  could  suggest  that  if  certain  events  happen  then  they  produce 
serious  accidents.  This  may  suggest  either  the  nature  of  a  specific  aspect  of  the  work, 
or  a  failure  in  the  physical  control  mechanisms  that  exist  within  the  company's 
operations.  Alternatively,  it  could  suggest  that  there  is  a  lack  of  training  or 
supervision  for  high-risk  activities. 
Further  scrutiny  of  `serious'  events  was  required  to  identify  the  root  causes  of  the 
accidents,  and  assess  which  of  the  three  factors  was  contributing  to  the  relatively 
high  proportion  of  lost  time  accidents.  In  the  J&B  study,  it  appeared  that  each  of  the 
factors  contributed.  At  Blythswood  the  high  rate  paid  for  sickpay  certainly  played  a 
part  -  absence  rates  peaked  and  troughed  throughout  the  year.  At  the  other  sites,  the 
actual  physical  work  -  in  particular  a  large  number  of  manual  based  jobs  leading  to 
back  injuries  -  meant  that  when  an  employee  was  injured,  he  or  she  was  absent  for  a 
long  period  of  time.  It  was  also  clear  that  when  morale  was  poor,  employees  had 
longer  absences.  Finally,  a  company  failure  to  manage  absence  effectively  led  to 
employees,  who  had  received  work  related  injuries,  having  prolonged  absences. 
Further  examination  of  these  factors  is  out  with  the  scope  of  this  study,  however  it  is 
useful  in  building  an  overall  picture  of  accidents. 
3.4.9  CRITICAL  COST  FACTORS 
After  the  study,  it  was  determined  that  there  were  a  number  of  key  factors,  which 
were  responsible  for  contribution  to  the  total  cost  of  accidents.  The  critical  factors 
differed  for  injury  accidents  and  non-injury  accidents. 
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As  is  to  be  expected,  the  principal  factors  that  contribute  to  the  uninsured  cost  of 
injury  accidents  relate  to  the  injured  party.  The  factors  are  in  order  of  importance. 
Had  there  been  a  fatal  accident  or  other  very  severe  injury  accident  however,  it  is 
expected  that  some  of  the  factors  would  be  in  a  different  order  albeit  the  factors 
themselves  would  remain  the  same. 
1  Wages  paid  to  an  injured  employee  for  no  return  (sick  pay). 
2  Wages  paid  to  any  other  employee  with  no  return  for  performing  an  activity 
outside  the  normal  scope  of  their  employment. 
3  Lost  production  and  all  overtime  required  to  recoup  this  production. 
4  Incident  investigation 
5  Property  damage  and  associated  rectification  costs. 
6  Miscellaneous  costs 
A  cost  of  accidents  study  in  the  future  could  be  carried  out  by  further  use  of  the 
Costing  forms.  Alternatively,  estimates  can  be  obtained  quickly  by  costing  the  key 
factors  for  injury  accidents.  The  formula  outlined  below  will  not  capture  all  of  the 
costs  related  to  the  incident  as  it  focuses  on  the  key  cost  factors  but  it  is  far  quicker, 
and  requires  minimum  resource  and  administration  time  to  perform. 
a.  Costing  an  Injury  accident 
Cost  IA  =  Cost  of  Lost  Time  of  Injured  (including  sick  pay)  +  Cost  of  Lost  Time  o 
others  (including  investigation  costs)  +  Cost  of  Lost  Production  (including  overtime) 
3.4.9.2  Non-  injury  accident 
The  primary  factors  significant  to  the  overall  cost  of  a  non-injury  accident  are  listed 
below. 
1  Property  damage  and  replacement  costs. 
2  Rectification  costs 
3  Wages  paid  to  an  employee  with  no  return  for  performing  an  activity  outside 
their  normal  scope  of  employment. 
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5  Incident  investigation 
6  Miscellaneous  costs 
Importantly,  it  was  discovered  that  whilst  some  factors  are  dependant  upon  each 
other,  others  are  completely  independent. 
Certain  cost  factors  are  dependent.  In  injury  accidents,  the  more  serious  the  injury, 
the  greater  the  length  of  absence  by  the  employee  and  so  the  greater  the  amount  of 
sick  pay  that  will  be  paid  out.  Also  related  is  that  the  more  serious  the  injury,  the 
greater  amount  of  time  that  is  lost  by  other  employees  whilst  investigating  this 
accident  and  whilst  carrying  out  other  activities  related  to  the  accident  which  are  not 
part  of  normal  activities. 
In  property  damage  incidents,  the  more  serious  the  extent  of  damage,  the  higher  the 
costs  will  be  to  rectify  this  damage,  and  the  greater  amount  of  time  that  will  be  lost 
from  normal  work  whilst  the  rectification  takes  place. 
It  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the  more  serious  the  level  of  injury,  the  greater  the 
loss  of  production.  Loss  of  production  is  dependent  on  the  area  the  accident  occurs 
and  the  level  of  automation  of  this  area.  Similarly,  there  is  no  connection  between 
the  severity  of  injury  and  the  extent  of  property  rectification  costs  as  these  costs  are 
dependent  on  the  circumstances  of  the  accident,  not  its  severity. 
It  is  possible  for  an  accident  to  result  in  permanent  disablement  but  neither  stop 
production  (unless  stopped  by  the  HSE)  or  cause  property  damage.  However  it 
would  definitely  result  in  high  sick  pay,  high  investigation  costs  and  high  amounts  of 
lost  time  from  other  employees 
Similarly  to  injury  accidents,  a  simple  formula  can  be  applied  to  calculate  the  key 
costs  linked  to  a  property  damage  incident. 
b)  Costing  a  Property  damage  accident 
Cost  PD  =  Cost  of  Lost  Production  (including  overtime  costs)  +  Cost  of  Lost  Time 
from  normal  work  +  Cost  of  Repair,  replacement  or  rectification  costs 
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caused  both  injury  and  property  damage.  This  formula,  like  the  previous  two  cannot 
capture  all  information,  but  focuses  on  establishing  key  costs.  Because  the  severity 
of  injury  and  the  level  of  property  damage  are  not  interrelated,  a  different  calculation 
must  be  applied. 
c)  Costing  an  Accident  with  both  injury  and  property  damage 
Cost  IPD  =  Cost  of  Lost  Time  of  Injured  (including  sick  pay)  +  Cost  of  Lost  Time  of 
others  from  normal  work  +  Cost  of  Lost  Production  (including  overtime  costs)  +  Cost  of 
Repair,  replacement  or  rectification  costs 
3.4.10  DISCUSSION 
The  study  has  determined  that  the  company  suffered  significant  uninsured  losses  of 
£70,760  in  the  12-month  study  period.  The  study  did  not  account  for  all  non-injury 
losses,  so  it  is  expected  that  this  total  uninsured  loss  figure  is  a  conservative 
underestimate.  In  addition,  during  the  study  period  an  insurance  premium  of  £70,462 
was  paid  -  therefore  there  was  a  total  cost  of  risk  of  £141,422,  and  the  ratio  of 
insured/  uninsured  loss  was  1:  1. 
The  main  benefit  of  the  Cost  of  Accidents  study  was  that  it  provided  useful 
information  with  which  to  make  decisions  on  financial  risk  management.  The 
following  recommendations  were  made: 
1  Consideration  of  Risk  Finance  Arrangements: 
J&B  should  consider  alternative  arrangements  to  finance  losses  as  a  result  of  injury 
accidents.  Under  the  existing  insurance  arrangements,  J&B  retained  a  significant 
share  of  costs  resulting  from  injury  accidents.  Many  of  the  costs  relating  to  injury 
accidents  are,  however,  uninsured  and  others  are  uninsurable.  J&B  Scotland  retained 
the  first  £25,000  on  every  property  insurance  claim,  but  there  was  no  formal  excess 
on  the  liability  insurance  policies.  This  decision  had  been  made  by  out  with  J&B 
Group  Risk  Finance.  It  was  proposed  that  J&B  Scotland  negotiate  a  formal  'excess' 
to  their  Liability  insurance  policies,  and  formnally  retain  costs  below  a  threshold.  Any 
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the  risk  of  the  insurance  company.  It  was  felt  that  this  would  result  in  a  significant 
reduction  in  the  annual  premiums  paid.  In  a  year  where  there  is  poor  accident 
experience,  however,  the  company  would  have  to  absorb  larger  amounts  of  financial 
risk  providing  an  incentive  to  improve. 
Analysis  was  then  carried  out  to  determine  the  effect  of  a  deductible  using  a 
hypothetical  excess  of  £  10,000  on  each  and  every  claim.  Most  Employer's  Liability 
claims,  were  for  noise  induced  hearing  loss  however  and  it  was  found  that  this  option 
would  not  be  cost-effective  because  the  vast  majority  of  such  claims  are  settled  at 
amounts  less  than  £  10,000,  and  all  of  these  costs  would  be  retained  by  the  company. 
In  addition,  many  injury  claims  were  also  settled  at  below  £  10,000.  In  short,  for  a 
marginal  reduction  in  premium  (insured  cost),  there  would  be  a  substantial  increase 
in  retained  (uninsured)  cost.  Further  work  was  performed  to  analyse  the  effect  of 
different  levels  of  retention  on  uninsured  cost,  but  there  was  marginal  difference  in 
insured  cost  for  accepting  additional  risk. 
A  key  benefit  of  this  Cost  of  Accidents  study  to  J&B  was  that  useful  cost  and 
accident  information  was  collected  and  analysed.  This  enabled  examination  of  the 
existing  risk  finance  arrangements,  and  a  number  of  alternatives  to  be  considered 
although  no  changes  were  made. 
2  Redistribution  of  Insured  Costs 
At  the  time  of  the  study,  the  insurance  premiums  charged  to  the  individual 
businesses  within  IDV  did  not  reflect  their  relative  risk  and  loss  experience.  The 
study  recommended  that  premiums  should  be  allocated  to  reflect  the  relative  levels 
of  risk,  and  reward  improving  or  deteriorating  performance. 
In  addition,  this  study  recommended  that  there  should  be  further  redistribution  of 
premium  to  individual  operating  units  and  sites  based  on  accident  experience  and 
manpower  levels.  Each  unit  should  be  charged  equitable  premiums  in  relation  to 
their  risk  and  experience,  and  each  would  be  subject  to  a  deductible  on  accidental 
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retention  of  accidental  losses.  This  was  still  being  considered  at  Executive  level 
when  the  study  finished. 
3  Improvement  of  non-injury  reporting 
It  was  recommended  that  J&B  carried  out  an  exercise  to  identify  potential  causes  of 
business  interruption  and  property  damage  within  operations,  determine  the  financial 
and  other  impacts,  and  implement  preventative  measures.  The  study  demonstrated 
that  injury  and  property  damage  incidents  are  independent  in  respect  of  severity.  In 
other  words,  a  serious  injury  accident  will  not  necessarily  be  accompanied  by  serious 
property  damage,  and  vice  versa.  An  example  of  this  is  a  person  falling  from  a  height 
-  there  may  be  a  fatal  accident  but  there  is  no  associated  damage. 
The  study  had  indicated  that  significant  financial  losses  result  from  property  damage 
and  business  interruption,  but  that  the  incidents  and  costs  were  not  being  captured. 
Property  damage  incidents  were  inadequately  reported  unless  they  were  very  serious 
in  nature.  As  a  result,  the  reporting  system  was  modified  so  that  the  Security  team 
provided  the  Risk  Control  Department  with  details  of  property  damage  found  on  site 
during  their  site  inspections,  therefore  enabling  action  to  be  taken  to  prevent 
recurrence. 
4  Accident  Triangles  and  Absence 
The  study  showed  that  the  famous  'accident  triangles'  that  existed  within  other 
studies,  were  not  repeated  by  this  study.  In  J&B,  there  were  more  'reportable' 
accidents  (4  or  more  days  lost)  than  there  were  lost  time  accidents  with  less  than  3 
days  lost  time  and  the  ratio  of  no  lost  time/  lost  time  events  was  less. 
The  study  then  considered  why  these  figures  did  not  appear  to  fit  into  traditional 
models  and  accident  ratios.  One  factor  certainly  was  that  there  was  a  bonus  scheme 
operating  at  the  Blythswood  site,  which  at  certain  times  of  the  year,  paid  people 
more  money  to  be  at  home  than  at  work.  It  paid  absent  employee's  average  wages 
over  a  12-week  period,  rather  than  the  average  pay  for  that  week.  As  a  result  of  the 
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responsibility  for  pursuing  protracted  absenteeism. 
Another  interesting  finding  was  that  at  the  Strathleven  site,  if  an  individual  has  an 
injury  with  lost  time,  he  or  she  often  stays  absent  for  the  remainder  of  that  week. 
Employees  can  self-certificate  an  absence  for  1  week  before  requiring  a  Doctors 
Certificate.  It  was  recognised  that  reasons  for  continued  absenteeism  at  the 
Strathleven  site  were:  low  employee  morale;  lack  of  discipline;  lack  of 
communication  between  the  HR  Dept  and  Management  team.  This  is  borne  out  by 
the  fact  that  there  were  no  issues  of  sustained  absenteeism  at  the  Distilleries  sites, 
where  culture  is  different  and  employees  with  unnecessarily  extended  absence  would 
be  discovered  in  a  close  community  environment. 
The  Cost  of  Accidents  study  provided  the  information  with  which  to  query  some  of 
the  current  practices,  and  make  necessary  improvements. 
The  study  provided  an  annual  cost  of  accidental  loss  for  comparison  with  future 
experience.  The  study  highlighted  the  costs  of  safety  and  the  financial  impact  of 
safety  failures  over  the  period  of  a  year.  The  overall  financial  costs  were  not  as 
significant  as  had  been  expected.  In  truth,  when  the  study  started,  the  researcher  had 
hoped  to  discover  significant  cost  of  accidents  figures  that  would  provide  a  lever  to 
make  changes  in  the  workplace.  The  total  costs  determined  by  this  study  did  not 
match  the  huge  costs  found  in  other  studies.  There  were  no  immediately  obvious 
reasons  for  this. 
The  process  with  which  cost  data  was  captured,  even  using  a  simplified  process,  was 
time  consuming  and  relatively  resource  intensive.  It  is  recommended  that  a  cost  of 
accidents  study  should  not  be  part  of  an  ongoing  programme,  instead  accident 
costing  should  be  carried  out  on  significant  injury  and  non-injury  incidents  as  case 
studies.  These  case  studies  can  be  used  to  highlight  the  cost  of  poor  loss  control  and 
may  be  used  to  help  build  a  cost-benefit  analysis  case  for  specific  safety 
improvements.  This  study  has  proposed  shortened  methods  for  costing  accidents,  and 
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will  not  capture  all  costs  related  to  an  incident,  but  they  are  accurate  enough  to 
capture  the  key  data,  and  are  certainly  more  cost  effective  and  practical  in  an 
industrial  setting. 
Interestingly,  rather  than  demonstrate  the  large  annual  costs  resulting  from  accidental 
loss,  rather  different  benefits  resulted  from  the  detailed  Cost  of  Accidents  study.  The 
study  provided  detailed  information  with  which  to  make  decisions  about  the  risk 
finance  arrangements.  In  addition,  and  also  very  usefully,  it  produced  a  list  of  key 
costs  in  relation  to  accidents,  and  identified  failures  in  the  existing  non-injury 
reporting  and  absence  management  systems.  From  this  perspective,  it  was 
worthwhile  carrying  out  a  detailed  one-off  study. 
Finally,  it  was  illuminating  to  review  the  `iceberg'  and  `triangle'  paradigms.  Their 
basis  is  not  as  solid  as  industrial  mythology  and  their  place  in  literature  suggests.  The 
study  of  insured/  uninsured  loss  is  limited  with  most  accepting  Heinrich  in  some 
form  or  other.  Heinrich's  1:  4  iceberg  becomes  a  1:  1  icesheet  at  J&B. 
The  triangles  at  J&B  also  differ  from  others.  They  are  less  pointed  at  the  top  with 
proportionately  more  serious  outcomes  than  others  suggest.  Reasons  have  been 
suggested  for  this  and  the  most  probable  relates  to  incentive  to  work  -  as  the  risk  of 
serious  injury  does  not  differ  by  a  factor  of  2  from  other  sites-  at  any  level  of  the 
triangle. 
3.5  THE  SAFETY  AUDIT  -CASE  STUDY 
3.5.1  INTRODUCTION 
The  main  disadvantages  of  accident  data  analysis  as  a  safety  performance  measure, 
especially  in  relation  to  negativity  and  the  difficulty  of  collecting  data,  has  been 
shown.  Auditing  was  also  evaluated.  This  has  a  long  history.  Certainly  from  the  70's 
external  audit  for  insurance  purposes  by  external  consultants  was  common  in  the 
chemical  and  other  high-risk  industries.  The  Loss  Control  Institute,  that  developed 
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others,  although,  interestingly  even  in  1986,  Bird  was  not  explicitly  recommending 
management  systems  audit  in  his  book,  Practical  Loss  Control  Leadership  (Bird, 
1986).  Here,  as  with,  for  example,  Lees  (1980),  the  emphasis  was  on  internal 
processes  and  standardisation  although  by  that  time  management  audits  were  being 
developed.  Certainly,  by  the  mid  80's  Dawson  and  others  were  concentrating  more 
precisely  on  management  systems  to  control  safety  rather  than  technical  control 
systems  (Dawson,  1988).  Perhaps  this  emphasis  or  lack  of  emphasis  was  based  on 
the  nature  of  the  industries  that  pioneered  safety  where  the  hazard  was  very 
obviously  technical. 
A  management  audit  system  has  the  tremendous  advantage  in  an  industry  like  the 
drinks  industry  in  identifying  gaps  in  knowledge  and  procedures.  The  highest  risk  is 
technical,  but  the  most  active  safety  failures  at  J&B  were  connected  with  people  - 
training,  knowledge,  communication,  procedures.  The  way  work  was  done  rather 
than  the  type  of  work  done.  The  engineering  work  of  providing  guards  or  other 
physical  barriers  had  been  done  in  the  detail,  but  there  had  been  little  attempt  (or, 
perhaps,  time)  to  step  back  and  look  at  the  reasons  why  accident  still  occurred.  It 
was  felt  that  an  audit  system  of  some  sort  was  essential  in  order  to  target 
management  of  safety  and  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  formal  Safety 
Management  System  that  was  being  developed. 
Most  auditing  systems  follow  the  same  general  pattern,  obviously  with  variations  of 
content  and  it  is  assumed  here  that  the  general  form  of  these  is  known.  HSE,  for 
example,  provide  a  summary  of  a  typical  audit  system  in  Successful  Health  and 
Safety  Management  (HSE,  1997). 
HASTAM'S  CHASE  (Complete  Health  and  Safety  Evaluation)  II  Audit,  version  5.1 
was  selected  as  an  appropriate  off-the-shelf  system  on  the  basis  that  it  was  suitable  in 
content,  inexpensive  in  terms  of  cost,  and  simple  to  perform.  The  CHASE  Audit 
system  was  first  implemented  within  J&B  in  1994. 
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As  preparation  for  an  audit,  a  list  of  documents  to  be  inspected  is  issued  along  with  a 
list  of  individuals  to  be  formally  interviewed.  The  auditor  selects  these  individuals 
after  consultation  with  the  organisation,  to  ensure  breadth  and  depth  of  coverage.  For 
J&B,  an  audit  schedule  was  then  issued  for  each  of  the  7  operational  sites.  The  total 
audit  across  the  sites  took  a  total  of  7  days,  and  at  each  site  the  process  used  was  the 
same. 
The  external  auditor  (a  Registered  Safety  Practitioner)  carried  out  inspections  of 
relevant  safety  documentation  for  each  area.  Interviews  were  conducted  for 
personnel  spread  across  company  levels,  including  the  managing  director,  senior 
managers,  supervisors,  engineers,  operators  and  health  and  safety  representatives  and 
these  were  focused  around  the  CHASE  II  manual. 
The  manual  itself  is  split  into  12  sections,  each  section  allocated  a  certain  member  of 
points,  and  then  these  sections  further  subdivided  into  individual  questions.  These 
questions  are  given  weightings  in  relation  to  their  perceived  level  of  importance. 
Table  11 
Section  Available  Points  %  Weighting 
1  Legal  Requirement  233  12.9 
2  Tools,  Equipment  and  Fixtures  190  10.5 
3  Machinery  and  Plant  136  7.6 
4  Chemicals  and  substances  145  8.0 
5  Vehicles  135  7.5 
6  Energy  116  6.4 
7  Health  175  9.6 
8  Tasks  169  9.4 
9  People  157  8.7 
10  Feedback  on  health  and  safety  150  8.3 
11  Management  of  Change  110  6.1 
12  Emergencies  90  5.0 
TOTAL  1806  points  100% 
Interviewees  are  asked  questions  from  a  variety  of  sections  relevant  to  their  position 
-  these  being  identified  at  the  planning  stage  of  the  audit.  A  positive  response 
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physical  evidence.  Unless  all  interviewees  respond  positively  to  each  individual 
question,  no  points  are  gained.  For  example,  if  the  interviewees  are  asked  if  there  is 
an  up  to  date  Health  and  Safety  policy  on  site,  not  only  must  they  all  answer  yes,  but 
such  a  policy  must  also  be  in  evidence.  This  three  part  process  is  key  to  the  audit  -  it 
checks  that  an  adequate  system  exists,  that  the  system  is  understood  and  that  the 
system  is  in  place  and  operating. 
After  the  interviews  are  complete,  the  auditor  performs  a  comprehensive  physical 
inspection  of  site,  plant,  equipment  and  documentation  and  uses  the  opportunity  to 
carry  out  additional,  more  informal  interviews.  This  aims  to  check  to  what  extent 
safety  messages  and  rules  are  being  communicated  to  relevant  personnel.  An  audit 
report  is  then  issued  summarising  what  has  been  found  under  each  section,  both 
positive  and  negative,  and  proposes  the  key  areas  for  improvement.  A  final 
percentage  score  is  awarded  according  to  the  overall  conformance  with  the  CHASE 
system. 
3.5.3  OBSERVATIONS  ON  CHASE  II  SYSTEM 
Whilst  the  CHASE  system  was  selected  as  being  the  most  appropriate  audit  system 
for  the  company  at  the  time,  it  shares  many  common  disadvantages  with  other 
auditing  systems,  and  some  flaws  individual  to  it.  The  following  discussion, 
therefore,  is  in  two  parts;  a  comparison  with  another  leading  assessment  system, 
TRIPOD  (Gall,  1999),  and  a  discussion  of  common  or  generic  flaws  that  are  implicit 
to  use  of  audits  and  regular  use  as  measuring  tools. 
3.5.3.1  Comparison  of  CHASE  with  TRIPOD  &  specific  CHASE  issues 
One  of  the  principles  behind  TRIPOD  is  identification  of  underlying  causes  of  errors 
so  that  faults  in  the  organisational  system  can  be  identified  and  eradicated.  Safety 
behaviour  observation  systems  focus  on  the  identification  of  unsafe  acts  and 
behaviour  and  then  implementing  action  to  prevent  them  recurring.  Focus  on  unsafe 
behaviour  or  errors  after  they  have  occurred  is  reactive  rather  than  proactive,  and 
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reporting  unsafe  behaviours). 
In  contrast,  TRIPOD  focuses  on  factors  that  can  be  controlled.  It  is  a  questionnaire 
study  where  a  number  of  closed  questions  (Yes/No)  are  put  to  all  levels  of  the 
workforce.  These  questions  focus  on  what  has  actually  been  experienced  by  each 
respondent,  not  on  perceptions.  The  total  of  275  questions  is  listed  under  11  Basic 
Risk  Factors  (BRF),  as  seen  in  the  table  below.  The  questionnaire  is  held  on  a 
computer  database  -  the  computer  generates  a  random  sample  of  questions  and 
afterwards  performs  analysis  of  the  answers  so  additional  patterns  can  be  identified. 
A  TRIPOD  Condition  Survey  shows  by  histogram  the  BRF  profile,  and  describes  the 
reasons  for  these  scores  -a  low  score  against  a  BRF  shows  that  improvement  is 
required  in  the  control  of  that  risk  factor,  for  example  maintenance  arrangements. 
The  Condition  Survey  lists  each  BRF  and  the  reasons  that  control  is  substandard 
whether:  drivers;  resources;  methods  or  outputs,  and  an  improvement  action  plan  is 
built  against  this  Survey  report. 
Table  12 
Basic  Risk  Factors  (11)  Basic  Risk  Factors  (11) 
-  25  questions  each  BRF  =  Total  275 
Design 
Tools  &  Equipment 
Specific  (5)  Maintenance 
Housekeeping 
Error  Enforcing  Conditions 
Procedures 
Training 
Generic  (5)  Incompatible  goals 
Organisation 
Communications 
Preventative  (I)  Defences 
There  are  a  number  of  specific  aspects  of  the  CHASE  II  system  that  we  shall  now 
examine  against  TRIPOD. 
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Section  1  (Legal  Requirement)  accounts  for  12.9%  of  the  maximum  overall  points 
that  can  be  achieved  in  the  CHASE  audit  system.  It  is  too  easy  to  obtain  points  for 
having  a  safety  policy  at  all  -  the  actual  content  and  communication  of  the  policy  is 
not  investigated  until  later  sections  in  the  audit.  In  the  interest  of  scoring  `easy' 
points,  sites  may  copy  another  policy,  or  get  one  written  by  a  consultant,  with  no  buy 
in  to  the  policy  itself.  The  number  of  points  allocated  to  having  a  policy,  and  to 
section  1  in  general  is  too  high.  It  is believed  that  it  is  the  implementation  of  a  safety 
strategy  that  will  lead  to  a  good  safety  performance.  In  contrast,  all  275  questions 
under  the  22  Basic  Risk  Factors  of  TRIPOD  have  the  same  weighting,  and  focus  on 
what  the  respondents  have  actually  experienced,  i.  e.  what  has  been  implemented.  In 
business  however,  not  all  occupational  safety  risks  are  equal  -  within  J&B,  having 
an  effective  planned  maintenance  and  test  system  for  fire  detection  and  sprinkler 
systems  would  merit  a  higher  weighting  than  having  a  VDU  assessment. 
Section  12  of  CHASE  is  one  example  of  a  section  that  did  not  reflect  the  risk  level  of 
the  Study  Company.  J&B's  greatest  risk  is  that  of  fire  and  explosion  due  to  the 
potentially  flammable  nature  of  its  product  and  the  contents  of  its  warehouses.  Fire 
has  the  potential  to  destroy  any  of  the  sites  and  cause  multiple  injuries.  Within  the 
CHASE  system,  this  section  is  the  shortest  and  has  least  weighting,  with  only  5%  of 
the  total  available  score.  It  also  deals  scantily  with  crisis  management,  which  is 
another  priority  for  this  type  of  organisation.  It  is  key  that  the  audit  system  used  by  a 
site  reflects  the  risk  profile  of  that  organisation  -  it  would  be  equally  inappropriate 
for  a  clothes  retailer  to  be  audited  against  HAZOP  arrangements. 
2  Management 
The  CHASE  formal  interviews  appear  to  be  aimed  at  higher  levels  of  management, 
rather  than  those  directly  responsible  for  implementing  health  and  safety 
arrangements  -  the  line  managers,  supervisors,  safety  reps,  co-ordinators  and  safety 
practitioners.  When  employees  at  less  senior  levels  were  interviewed  in  the  audit, 
many  of  the  questions  asked  were  beyond  the  scope  of  that  individual's  knowledge 
and  influence.  For  example,  the  CHASE  interview  often  focuses  on  the  existence  of 
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standards.  In  this  audit,  operational  staff  and  supervisors  are  only  appropriately 
involved  in  the  CHASE  system  when  the  effectiveness  and  communication  of 
procedures  are  being  verified.  In  contrast,  the  TRIPOD  system  focuses  on  what  each 
individual  has  actually  experienced,  rather  than  on  their  opinions  and  perceptions,  so 
employees  at  all  levels  can  be  involved  at  each  stage. 
3  Site  size 
CHASE  II  was  appropriate  for  the  largest  of  the  sites,  which  employed  550  people 
and  had  a  layered  management  structure.  However,  it  was  found  to  be  inappropriate 
for  the  smaller  sites  that  had  flatter  management  structures.  The  audit  results  were 
potentially  misleading  for  the  smaller  sites  as  only  a  couple  of  individuals  could  be 
questioned  for  each  section,  so  there  was  limited  cross  checking.  If  additional  people 
had  been  questioned  then  the  questions  would  have  gone  outside  their  sphere  of 
influence  and  knowledge.  It  was  found  that  when  this  was  done,  interviewees 
became  defensive  and  therefore  their  answers  were  inconsistent. 
Another  version  of  CHASE  has  been  written  for  smaller  sites,  and  is  more 
appropriate.  As  all  7  sites  had  different  policies,  procedures,  management  and  safety 
standards  at  the  time  of  the  first  audit,  it  would  not  have  been  practical  or  accurate  to 
amalgamate  the  whole  company  into  one  'site'.  This  was  proved  when,  as  a  trial,  the 
4  Distilleries  were  audited  under  the  one  umbrella.  The  results  and  action  plan  was 
often  found  to  be  misleading  and  inappropriate  -  in  some  cases  action  improvements 
would  only  relate  to  1  site  out  of  4.  In  general  the  overall  score  did  not  reflect 
individual  efforts  or  status,  and  the  audit  the  following  year  dealt  with  each  site 
separately.  It  should  be  noted  that  on  large  sites,  different  business  or  production 
units  might  also  have  different  practices  and  standards,  which  must  be  captured  by 
the  audit. 
4  YES/No  only 
Both  CHASE  and  TRIPOD  only  allow  for  Yes  (full  points)  or  No  (zero  points). 
Neither  system  indicates  if  there  is  partial  compliance  and  awareness  of 
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their  efforts  had  not  been  recognised  at  all,  when  they  had  spent  a  very  significant 
period  of  time  tackling  detailed  projects  such  as  risk  assessments. 
Without  practical  experience  of  TRIPOD,  it  is  hard  to  identify  failings  in  that  system 
but  it  is  likely  that  all  such  systems  will  have  individual  flaws.  CHASE  then,  does 
not  reward  effort  that  continues,  is  aimed  at  managers  rather  than  implementers  and 
had  inappropriate  weighting  for  J&B.  These  flaws  are  specific  to  CHASE,  but  there 
are  broader  criticisms  of  audit  systems  that  are  generic  by  nature. 
3.5.4  GENERIC  ISSUES  WITH  AUDITING 
1  Technical  content 
Many  audit  systems  have  been  written  with  an  industry  or  a  set  of  risks  in  mind,  so 
often  there  will  be  irrelevant  questions  and  sections  or  just  a  general  focus  that  is 
either  not  relevant  or  not  adequate  for  the  company's  requirements.  The  focus  of 
different  audits  system  should  be  considered  before  one  is  selected. 
In  some  cases,  irrelevant  questions  or  subject  areas  cause  confusion  in  interviews, 
however  under  the  CHASE  system,  the  company  automatically  lost  points  for  not 
having  certain  things  in  place,  even  when  they  were  not  applicable.  This  can  be 
influenced  by  the  stance  of  the  auditor  and  leads  to  subjectivity. 
2  Positive  Acquiescence  and/or  defensive  responses 
During  an  audit  interview  (for  most  audits),  it  becomes  evident  to  an  interviewee  that 
the  desired  response  is  `Yes'  if  points  are  to  be  achieved.  There  is  a  risk  then  that  the 
interviewee  will  answer  'Yes'  automatically,  regardless  of  the  real  status,  and 
possibly  without  thinking  about  the  question.  This  was  witnessed  in  many  of  the 
CHASE  interviews,  primarily  at  management  level.  Some  individuals  were  aware 
that  it  would  gain  them  additional  points,  and  others  were  simply  assuming  that  the 
situation  was  in  control  and  did  not  actually  know  what  the  reality  was.  This  factor 
cannot  completely  alter  an  audit  score,  as  in  many  audits  the  points  are  also  based  on 
physical  verification,  but  it  can  mislead  the  interviewer.  It  also  means  that  a  very 
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process  is  that  it  can  help  raise  awareness  by  drawing  interviewee's  attention  to  gaps 
in  the  safety  systems.  If  an  individual  is  feeling  attacked  and  defensive,  however, 
these  lessons  will  not  be  taken  on  board.  This  creates  a  problem  as  the  true  attitude; 
level  of  awareness  and  knowledge  of  that  individual  will  not  be  captured  in  the 
interview.  The  interviewer  may  only  get  the  answers  that  he  or  she  wants  to  hear. 
3  `Honesty'  of  answers 
If  people  within  a  company  have  the  belief  that  safety  standards  are  good  they  will 
answer  positively  for  most  questions.  It  is  not  practical  for  each  and  every  line  of 
questioning  in  the  CHASE  system  to  be  physically  verified  on  site.  In  this  and  other 
audit  systems,  many  questions  are  answered  subjectively,  and  these  perceptions  can 
produce  an  inaccurate  picture  of  actual  safety  standards.  It  can  also  lead  to  a  false 
impression  of  the  level  of  commitment  within  a  company  and  screen  underlying 
issues  or  problem  areas.  In  many  cases,  managers  who  are  committed  to  safety  and 
admit  the  failure  of  specific  safety  aspects  within  their  control  are  penalised  against 
those  who  are  motivated  to  gain  a  'good'  personal  score,  regardless  of  the  actual 
status  of  their  area.  There  is  then  some  enticement  to  answer  dishonestly.  It  is  critical 
then  that  praise  or  rewards  for  good  and  improved  safety  performance  is  based  on 
verification  at  all  employee  levels  and  with  hard  physical  evidence. 
4  Subjectivity  of  auditor 
Although  in  some  audits  an  interviewee  can  answer  directly  yes  or  no,  it  is  generally 
expected  that  this  response  be  justified.  In  some  audits  it  is  up  to  the  interviewer  to 
determine  if  the  response  given  was  adequate  to  be  worth  a  point  or  not.  Clearly,  the 
skill,  experience,  site  knowledge  and  bias  of  the  auditor  can  have  a  huge  impact  upon 
the  final  scores.  This  would  cause  even  more  disparity  if  there  were  more  than  one 
auditor  -  either  at  the  one  time,  or  over  a  period  of  time. 
Problems  are  also  caused  by  the  physical  verification,  where  a  situation  is  defined  as 
satisfactory  or  unsatisfactory.  What  may  be  satisfactory  to  one  auditor  may  be 
unsatisfactory  to  another,  and  even  an  individual  may  change  his  or  her  opinion  over 
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An  inherent  flaw  of  many  audit  systems  is  that  an  audit  may  be  carried  out  one  year 
with  say  30%  achieved.  The  following  year  after  significant  improvements  but  with 
a  different  auditor  the  score  may  only  reach  35%,  not  reflecting  the  progressions 
made.  Unless  a  comprehensive  set  of  notes  is  written  to  indicate  the  rationale  behind 
the  points  awarded,  the  following  audit  is  difficult  for  the  auditor.  The  auditor  is 
highly  significant  not  only  to  the  score,  but  also  to  the  impact  of  the  audit  upon 
safety  standards  (which  is  the  audit  purpose),  and  on  the  improvement  action  plan.  A 
couple  of  auditors  with  expertise  would  reduce  the  impact  of  personal  bias,  and 
could  provide  a  common  link  over  time.  Alternatively,  the  same  auditor  should  be 
used  year  on  year.  Clearly  it  is  key  to  the  usefulness  of  an  audit  that  the  auditor  is  an 
experienced  and  competent  individual.  Subjective  awarding  of  points  and  issues 
without  consistency  and  continuity  over  time  are  key  disadvantages  of  auditing. 
5  Ambiguity 
Some  audit  questions  are  ambiguous,  vague,  and  confusing  for  interviewees,  even 
when  read  with  the  explanations  in  the  handbook.  In  the  CHASE  manual,  the 
language  was  often  vague  and  academic  rather  than  written  for  safety  practitioners, 
making  the  questions  difficult  to  answer.  In  some  cases,  the  wording  of  the  audit 
may  be  appropriate  for  the  top  end  of  a  management  scale,  but  may  not  be 
particularly  appropriate  for  supervisory  level  and  below.  The  interviewer  will  then 
interpret  the  questions  for  each  interviewee,  introducing  further  subjectivity,  both  his 
own  and  that  of  the  respondent. 
6  Repetition 
In  some  audits,  including  CHASE,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  repetition  of  similar 
questions  within  the  audit  interviews,  for  both  the  auditor  and  auditee.  It  was  noted 
that  this  led  to  boredom  on  both  sides  and  less  thought  was  then  put  into  responses. 
7  Interrogation 
Audit  interviews  can  lead  to  a  feeling  of  interrogation  of  the  interviewee,  who  can 
become  defensive.  During  the  CHASE  process,  many  interviewees  across  levels 
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questions  were  directed  at  their  inadequate  knowledge  or  performance  in  health  and 
safety  terms.  After  the  first  day's  interviews,  all  further  interviewees  were  told  that 
the  audit  intended  to  determine  the  performance  of  the  company.  Although  the 
intention  of  an  audit  is  to  establish  the  actual  current  safety  standards  and 
deficiencies  so  that  improvements  can  be  made,  defensiveness  can  lead  to  that  aim 
being  all  but  eliminated.  As  an  observation,  those  most  guilty  of  feeling  personally 
attacked  were  in  middle  to  senior  management. 
8  Does  it  actually  indicate  performance  ? 
After  this  general  critique,  there  is  the  question  of  what  an  audit  such  as  CHASE 
actually  measures.  There  is  a  basic  assumption  that  the  questions  it  asks,  and  the 
direction  in  which  it  focuses  the  company  and  the  auditor,  will  indicate  whether  the 
performance  is  good  or  bad,  better  or  worse.  There  is,  however,  a  possibility  that  all 
it  measures  is  compliance  with  CHASE  itself,  and  that  this  does  not  necessarily 
indicate  a  deteriorating  or  improving  safety  performance.  However,  the  audit  does 
cover  all  aspects  of  health  and  safety  management  and  legal  compliance,  and 
includes  a  physical  and  documentary  inspection.  An  analysis  of  health  and  safety 
focus  and  general  awareness  within  the  company  post  audit  indicated  that  the  audit 
process  had  a  positive  contribution  to  the  improvement  of  safety  standards,  and  that 
it  could  be  further  improved  on  the  basis  of  Drucker's  maxim  :  'What  gets  measured 
gets  done'. 
3.5.5  CUSTOMISATION  OF  THE  AUDIT  PROCESS  &  SYSTEM 
Although  these  are  significant  criticisms  of  CHASE,  many  of  them  could  be 
addressed  by  the  Company  and  the  auditor  without  undermining  the  basic  principles 
of  the  audit. 
It  was  decided  that,  in  the  interests  of  continuity,  the  same  auditor  would  be  used  to 
perform  the  audit  each  year.  The  Risk  Control  function  were  able  to  sit  in  on 
interviews  and  participate  in  the  physical  inspection,  and  discuss  the  findings, 
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were  clearly  identified  and  understood. 
Irrelevant  questions  were  removed  before  the  audit,  in  the  interest  of  fairness.  The 
audit  interviews  focused  on  the  failures  of  the  previous  audit  and  the  action  plans 
that  resulted  from  this  audit,  reducing  both  the  length  and  repetitiveness  of  the 
interviews.  Physical  evidence  was  checked  to  ensure  that  previous  measures  were 
still  in  place. 
It  was  difficult,  without  complete  modification  of  the  CHASE  audit,  to  change  any  of 
the  fundamental  sections  or  questions  that  had  been  identified  as  being  deficient. 
Therefore  in  the  period  1994-1997,  the  system  was  only  modified  in  terms  of 
relevance  and  interview  style,  ensuring  that  an  accurate  benchmark  of  performance 
was  maintained. 
3.5.6  RESULTS  AND  DISCUSSION 
3.5.6.1  Accident/incident  results 
After  the  initial  audit  in  1994  the  audit  was  repeated  annually  until  1997.  After  each 
audit,  action  plans  were  developed  and  a  realistic  but  demanding  target  was  set  for 
each  site,  and  for  the  7  sites  as  a  whole.  The  objective  for  the  Executive  Team  at 
each  site  was  to  achieve  the  target  scores  for  the  audit  and  this  attracted  a  salary 
bonus.  The  targets  were  reset  annually.  The  target  scores  could  be  achieved  through 
the  completion  of  action  plans  focusing  on  the  deficiencies  of  each  site,  and  within 
that,  each  department. 
Table  13 
ST  EN 
YEAR 
STRATHLEVEN  TARGETS 
RESULTS 
CHASE  II  TARGET  % 
CHASE  II  ACTUAL  % 
1994  39  40 
1995  55  55 
1996  66  72 
1997  76.6  77 
1998  Revised  system  N/A 
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So  was  there  an  impact  on  the  standard  of  safety  management  as  a  result  of  the 
implementation  of  the  CHASE  II,  and  would  there  be  any  impact  with  an  alternative 
system  of  this  type  ?  Did  the  improvement  of  the  scores  achieved  in  the  Audit  have  a 
positive  correlation  with  a  decrease  in  accident  rates  ? 
There  has  been  a  significant  impact  on  safety  management  on  site,  as  a  result  of  the 
implementation  of  the  CHASE  II  Audit  programme.  It  helped  to  provide  impetus  and 
focus  to  safety  management  within  the  company. 
Each  year,  after  the  annual  audit  was  carried  out  on  the  sites,  a  report  was  produced 
by  the  Auditor  that  identified  areas  of  deficiency;  aspects  of  safety  that  had  been 
improved;  and  examples  of  Best  Practice  that  had  been  implemented  in  the  audit 
year.  The  report  allowed  areas  of  weakness  to  be  identified,  and  where  minor  or 
major  improvements  were  required,  as  well  as  passing  on  credit  for  progress  and 
projects.  Action  plans  were  written  in  conjunction  with  Department  Managers,  and 
commitment  to  targets  was  gained  at  this  stage.  All  departments  on  the  sites  were 
involved  in  this  process,  and  the  targets  set  were  intended  to  be  stretching,  but 
realistic.  The  Risk  Control  Department  then  issued  action  plans  for  each  of  the  sites, 
by  department,  and  target  scores  for  each  site  to  measure  overall  improvement. 
The  targets  for  improvement  for  each  of  the  sites  aimed  to  ensure  continuous 
improvement  of  safety  management,  employee  awareness  and  safety  standards  on 
site.  The  targets  were  communicated  to  all  employees,  and  focused  on  the 
achievement  of  specific  improvements  in  each  department.  To  maintain  commitment 
to  the  achievement  of  the  agreed  goals,  targets  were  placed  in  the  personal  objectives 
of  the  Management  team.  The  objectives  were  given  to  the  Executive  of  the 
company,  who  in  turn  placed  responsibility  on  their  management  team  for  the 
achievement  of  these  objectives.  The  use  of  personal  objectives  (with  attached 
bonuses)  placed  and  maintained  focus  on  the  achievement  of  health  and  safety  goals 
for  each  full  year.  Unfortunately  only  members  of  the  management  team  were  in  the 
bonus  scheme,  but  the  team  delegated  specific  tasks  and  responsibilities  in  turn  to 
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CHASE  system  improved  the  focus  on  occupational  health  and  safety  management 
on  site. 
Progress  against  the  action  plans  was  checked  on  a  quarterly  basis,  and  in  the 
meantime  monthly  safety  inspections  were  carried  out  on  site  by  Department 
Managers  and  their  safety  reps.  This  helped  to  ensure  that  the  general  standards  of 
health  and  safety  were  maintained. 
So  did  the  improvement  of  the  scores  achieved  in  the  Audit  have  a  positive 
correlation  with  a  decrease  in  accident  rates  ?  The  table  below  shows  a  comparison 
of  the  number  of  accidents  experienced  against  the  CHASE  score  achieved  in  each 
year.  The  comparison  takes  into  account  only  minor  and  reportable  accidents  -  first 
aid  accidents  are  excluded  as  they  are  shown  to  form  a  different  population. 
Table  14 
Year  Minor  Accidents 
Reportable 
Accidents 
Total 
Accidents 
CHASE  Actual 
Scores  % 
1992/3  100  15  115  N/A 
1993/4  73  12  85  40 
1994/5  66  9  75  55 
1995/6  58  6  64  72 
1996/7  90  10  100  77 
1997/8  89  12  101  N/A 
There  was  certainly  no  significant  decrease  in  the  number  of  minor  accidents  or  lost 
time  accidents  between  1990  and  1995,  although  there  were  significant  decreases  in 
monthly  figures. 
So  was  there  an  impact  on  accident  statistics  as  the  CHASE  scores  improved  ?  Was 
there  a  reduction  in  accidents,  or  an  improvement  in  safety  standards,  or  just  an 
improvement  in  management  systems  -  or  is  this  just  the  same  thing  ?  Does  the 
system  eventually  outlive  its  usefulness,  and  when?  And  what  do  you  do  about  it? 
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shift  system  was  introduced  increasing  the  number  of  employees  and  hours  of 
production  worked.  However,  this  did  not  appear  to  affect  the  accident  data  in 
1997/8.  In  1998,  as  a  result  of  a  merger,  there  were  many  organisational  restructures 
and  a  significant  impact  on  morale,  spiralling  to  a  new  low  in  June  1998  when  the 
site  closure  was  announced.  Culturally,  at  Strathleven,  most  accidents  that  are 
reported  turn  into  liability  claims  against  the  company.  This  `claims  culture'  does  not 
exist  at  the  other  sites.  The  claims  culture  and  the  on  site  Medical  Department 
provide  a  higher  reporting  rate  of  accidents  at  Strathleven  than  at  the  other  sites.  This 
is  one  of  the  reasons  that  accident  monitoring  cannot  be  taken  in  isolation  as  a 
measure  of  safety  performance. 
The  use  of  the  CHASE  II  audit  system  also  promoted  the  use  of  Safety  Co- 
ordinators.  The  system  identified  that  to  achieve  proactive  safety  management  on 
site,  more  than  one  trained  voice  must  be  used.  In  the  five  main  areas  on  site,  safety 
co-ordinators  were  appointed  and  trained  to  NEBOSH  Certificate  level.  The  safety 
co-ordinators  were  selected  at  middle  management  level  to  provide  focus  in  their 
individuals  departments,  or  zones,  they  also  therefore  had  decision-making 
responsibility  within  their  areas  for  safety  and  other  improvements.  The  safety 
standards  in  each  of  these  areas  increased,  as  there  was  day  to  day  focus  in  each  of 
these  areas.  This  allowed  the  Risk  Control  Department  to  provide  specialist  advice, 
company  strategy,  and  training.  The  system  provided  a  more  effective  use  of 
resource  than  a  safety  policeman  having  to  cover  a  whole  site  on  his  or  her  won,  with 
no  provisions  in  time  for  developmental  work. 
The  interviews  of  employees  on  site  clearly  demonstrated  that  there  was  a  perceived 
benefit  of  the  Audit  system,  it  was  often  cited  as  the  tool  that  provided  the  impetus 
for  continuous  improvement.  Employees  at  all  levels  within  the  organisation,  from 
the  Executive  to  employees  on  the  shopfloor  cited  the  CHASE  system  as  having  had 
a  clear  impact  on  safety  standards  and  in  particular  safety  awareness  on  site.  Some 
employees  commented  that  the  company  had  improved  its  verbal  commitment  to 
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through  on  issues. 
3.5.7  REVIEW  AND  RE-FOCUS  OF  THE  AUDIT  SYSTEM 
In  1998,  the  audit  system  was  completely  revised.  The  original  audit  system  had 
been  very  successful,  but  it  was  recognised  that  it  had  outlived  its  useful  life,  and 
there  was  no  longer  the  same  challenge  to  achieve  targets.  There  was  a  concern  that 
individuals  or  departments  would  become  complacent  after  a  period  of  time,  as  they 
believed  that  the  achievement,  particularly  of  70%,  had  already  been  made.  Some  of 
the  criticisms  of  the  system  itself  were  taken  into  account  to  make  it  more  relevant 
for  the  company  and  for  the  drinks  industry  as  a  whole. 
The  Risk  Department  had  been  moving  towards  integrated  risk  management  for 
some  time,  finally  integrating  all  aspects  of  risk  management  into  the  function  in 
January  1997.  It  was  determined  that  the  revised  audit  should  cover  other  aspects  of 
risk  management  than  health  and  safety,  whilst  not  reducing  the  safety  content  of  the 
audit.  The  audit  included  new  sections  on  security,  business  interruption,  crisis 
management,  HACCP  (product  safety),  and  environmental  management  to  reflect  the 
revised  scope  of  the  department.  The  integrated  system  removed  the  number  of 
auditors  on  site,  the  frequency  of  audits  and  the  lost  time  of  employees  on  site.  The 
revision  of  the  system  then  raised  another  question:  who  would  audit  the  company 
against  a  risk  management  system?  Clearly  an  auditor  using  this  revised  system 
would  either  be  a  multi-skilled  risk  management  professional,  rather  than  a  single 
discipline  specialist,  or  alternatively  the  company  could  be  audited  by  a  small  group 
of  specialists. 
The  section  on  Fire  and  Emergency  was  rewritten,  as  it  was  perceived  to  be 
inadequate  in  depth  and  focus  for  the  risks  faced  by  the  drinks  industry.  This  section 
aimed  to  bring  focus  to  the  major  risk  to  health  and  safety  of  employees,  and  to  the 
continuity  of  business  operations  of  the  company.  Similarly,  questions  and  sections 
that  were  deemed  irrelevant  were  removed  from  the  audit,  helping  to  shape  the 
system  specifically  for  the  J&B  Scotland. 
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the  audit,  as  this  weighting  appeared  inappropriate  in  some  cases.  For  example,  there 
were  20  points  attached  to  having  a  safety  policy,  but  only  5  points  for  its 
communication,  and/  or  contents  of  the  policy.  The  researcher  and  the  external 
auditor  considered  each  question  in  the  CHASE  II  system  for  its  relevance  and  its 
relative  weighting,  removing  irrelevant  questions,  modifying  weighting,  and  adding 
new,  more  probing  questions.  Many  of  the  questions  added  related  to  previously 
identified  deficiencies,  others  specifically  to  the  industry,  and  others  to  new  pieces  of 
legislation.  The  overall  effect  was  that  the  revised  audit  system  was  more  relevant, 
more  focused  more  probing  and  therefore  it  was  more  difficult  to  achieve  targets. 
The  system  aimed  to  provide  a  genuine  focus  to  risk  management  within  the 
company  on  a  minimum  of  a  3-year  period,  with  particular  emphasis  on  deficiencies 
that  had  been  previously  identified. 
It  was  recognised  that  an  audit  system  must  be  consistent  for  a  period  of  time,  to 
provide  a  benchmark  from  year  to  year.  However,  to  facilitate  continuous 
improvement,  this  system  must  be  revised  or  changed  regularly  -  perhaps  every  three 
years-  to  ensure  it  continues  to  have  impact.  The  greatest  benefit  of  this  audit  system 
is  the  focus  on  safety  that  it  provided  (HSC,  1993). 
3.6  SUMMARY  :  MODEL  OF  SAFETY  PERFORMANCE  INDICATORS 
3.6.1  SAFETY  PERFORMANCE  MODEL 
A  comprehensive  safety  measurement  system  must  encompass  a  number  of  different 
components  to  gain  an  accurate  picture  of  safety  performance.  The  overall  aim  of  a 
measurement  system  is  to  capture  relevant,  usable  information  that  informs  whether 
the  safety  management  system  and  processes  are  working  or  not. 
To  get  an  accurate  performance  measurement,  the  system  must  include  both  hard  and 
soft  performance  measures  -  the  soft  measures  to  assess  awareness,  knowledge  and 
indeed  perhaps  attitude  and  the  hard  measures  focusing  on  physical  evidence  and 
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working  or  failing  and  what  action  that  is  required  on  deficiencies. 
The  following  model  illustrates  the  Safety  Management  system  and  the  performance 
measurement  system. 
If  a  safety  management  system  is  working,  hard  measures  such  as  audits,  safety 
inspections,  and  behaviour  observation  will  identify  safe  behaviour,  compliance  with 
policies  and  procedures  and  a  safe  work  place.  Soft  measures  such  as  interviews, 
questionnaires  and  surveys  will  indicate  awareness  and  knowledge  of  safety 
requirements. 
In  contrast,  if  the  safety  management  program  is  not  effective,  hard  measures  might 
be  expected  to  identify  unsafe  behaviour,  increased  accident  rates,  non- 
conformances  with  policies  and  procedures,  and  hazards  -  all  of  which  will  be 
backed  up  by  a  lack  of  knowledge  and  awareness.  Employee  `real'  attitudes  (not 
expressed  attitude)  can  also  impact  upon  safety  performance,  but  because  we  are 
unable  to  relate  attitude  to  a  resultant  behaviour,  it  is  not  a  useful  measure. 
If  a  safety  management  system  has  failed,  there  will  be  non-conforming  behaviour  or 
a  lack  of  safety  awareness.  The  effect  may  be  latent  in  that,  although  no  incident  has 
occurred,  the  potential  for  an  accident  has  increased.  If,  for  example,  safety  rules  are 
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working  at  height,  or  safety  control  systems  are  being  circumvented  -  then  the 
potential  for  an  accident  increases.  In  some  cases  there  may  be  non-conforming  or 
unsafe  behaviour  but  the  control  systems  in  place  are  adequate  to  prevent  injury  or 
harm,  for  example  platform  guard  rails  or  machinery  guarding.  However,  an  injury 
or  a  near-miss  will  easily  occur  in  the  event  of  such  a  control  system  being  removed, 
damaged  or  if  it  proves  to  be  inadequate.  The  system  defences  fall  back  on 
contingent  protection.  It  is  the  combination  of  a  number  of  factors  and  events  that 
results  in  an  accident. 
3.6.2  PROPOSED  SYSTEM 
3.6.2.1  HSE  Guidance 
In  the  1997  edition  of  Successful  Health  and  Safety  Management  (HSE,  1997)  the 
Health  and  Safety  Executive  propose  that  a  business  implements  a  combination  of 
active  and  reactive  measures.  They  propose  that  a  company  measures  and  rewards 
achievement  instead  of  focusing  purely  on  safety  failures  and  deficiencies.  They 
suggest  that  whilst  investigation  into  deficiencies  creates  an  opportunity  to  `learn 
from  mistakes',  valuable  knowledge  should  also  be  gained  with  proactive  techniques 
such  as  behavioural  observation,  inspections  and  auditing.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the 
first  edition  of  this  HSE  publication  in  1991,  where  the  focus  had  been  on  reactive 
(negative)  measures  of  safety  performance,  that  is  mainly  accident  and  incident 
investigation. 
There  is  little  to  disagree  with  in  the  intent,  but  there  is  still  precious  little  discussion 
or  guidance  given  about  the  use  of  proactive  measurement  tools  in  HS  (G)  65.  HSE 
still  focuses  the  vast  bulk  of  its  effort  on  providing  detailed  guidance  on  the  negative 
tool  of  reactive  investigation.  It  is  stated  that  reactive  systems  should  focus  on 
monitoring  safety  objectives  and  compliance,  and  should  include:  routine  procedures 
to  monitor  specific  objectives;  periodic  examination  of  documentation;  frequent 
physical  inspection;  health  surveillance;  direct  observation  of  work  by  supervisors; 
implementation  of  an  audit  system;  and  regular  reporting  on  performance  to  Senior 
Management.  There  is  however,  no  guidance  on  the  techniques  to  be  used  or 
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given  on  reactive  investigation,  and  it  is  suggested  that  the  following  be  investigated: 
injuries,  ill  health;  sickness  and  absence  records;  property  damage;  near-misses; 
hazards;  weakness  in  standards;  and  incidents  with  potential.  The  intention  of  each 
of  the  investigations  is  to  identify  the  immediate  and  underlying  causes,  with  specific 
focus  on  events  that  may  be  repeated. 
3.6.2.2  This  Study 
This  study  proposes  that  a  combination  of  soft  and  hard  performance  measures  will 
provide  a  positive  performance  measurement  system.  An  effective  measurement 
system  has  to  provide  useful,  timely  information  that  will  highlight  the  successes  and 
failures  of  the  overall  safety  management  system,  and  enable  specific  focused 
improvements  to  be  implemented.  It  is  central  to  the  effectiveness  of  the 
measurement  system  that  the  right  measures  are  used  at  effective  intervals  -  neither 
too  often  nor  too  infrequently. 
3.6.2.3  Inspections  and  checks 
To  be  effective,  physical  inspections  and  hazard  notification  must  be  carried  out  on 
an  ongoing  day  to  day  basis.  Key  inspections  (of  plant,  premises  and  equipment) 
should  be  included  in  a  Planned  Maintenance  system  and  carried  out  daily,  weekly 
or  monthly  dependant  upon  the  level  of  risk.  Other  more  regular  checks  and 
inspections  will  be  included  in  work  instructions  and  safe  systems  of  work.  Hazard 
notification,  for  example,  should  be  carried  out  on  an  ongoing  day  to  day  basis, 
interlock  checks  and  inspections  carried  out  daily  on  start-up,  and  physical 
inspections  with  safety  representatives  carried  out  monthly.  It  is  very  important  that 
documentation  is  kept  of  these  checks  and  inspections,  and  these  records  should  be 
monitored  regularly  by  Supervisors,  and  again  during  audits  and  Executive  safety 
tours. 
3.6.2.4  Investigation  of  events  and  simplified  costing 
This  study  proposes  that  all  incidents  and  near  misses  should  be  investigated  and 
assessed  as  and  when  they  occur.  The  investigation  should  aim  to  identify  root 
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of  trends,  overall  accident  and  incident  data  should  be  evaluated  annually  to  identify 
trends  in  types  or  locations  of  accidents.  Trends  in  incidents  will  help  to  build  a 
picture  of  specific  areas  that  require  focus  and  improvement,  and  will  also  show 
areas  where  performance  may  have  improved,  perhaps  as  a  result  of  a  campaign.  As 
has  been  discussed  previously,  to  provide  an  accurate  picture  of  the  accident  rates,  a 
minimum  of  5  years  data  should  be  used  during  the  annual  review  of  data.  Every  3 
years,  overall  trends  in  accident  data  should  be  evaluated.  It  is  critically  important 
that  equivalent  information  on  production,  staff  levels  and  hours  worked  is  collated 
with  the  incident  information. 
Costing  each  and  every  accident,  even  with  the  simplified  methods  proposed,  can  be 
extremely  time  consuming  and  in  truth,  not  particularly  useful  for  the  safety 
practitioner.  It  is  recommended  that  simplified  accident  costing  studies  be  carried  out 
on  specific  accidents/  incidents  to  illustrate  the  financial  impact  of  an  accident  in  the 
workplace.  One  option  would  be  to  cost  all  Reportable  accidents;  another  would  be 
to  cost  significant  incidents  as  and  when  they  arose. 
3.6.2.5  Observation 
Intensive  observation  of  behaviour  in  the  workplace  is  resource  intensive  but  can  be 
useful  to  provide  a  specific  focus  where  employees  are  not  following  procedures  or 
failing  to  wear  safety  equipment.  An  area,  task  or  activity  to  be  observed  may  have 
been  highlighted  in  the  annual  accident  trend  review.  To  be  effective  (in  terms  of 
cost  as  well  as  time),  observation  should  be  used  on  a  specific  issue  or problem  only, 
rather  than  on  an  ongoing  basis.  Behavioural  observation  was  not  used  by  J&B 
during  this  study  due  to  its  demands  on  time,  resources  and  the  skills  required  to 
conduct  such  a  study.  There  are  also  doubts  over  the  real  contribution  to  knowledge 
given  that  human  behaviour  changes  so  readily  according  to  circumstance.  It  seems 
likely  that  those  observed  will  be  influenced  by  the  Hawthorne  Effect  during  the 
period  of  observation,  and  thus,  will  not  demonstrate  'normal'  behaviour.  Moreover, 
as  internal  auditing  and  safety  inspections  provide  feedback  on  compliance  with 
safety  procedures  and  the  use  of  control  measures,  if  the  auditors  are  made  aware  of 
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into  their  audit  or  survey. 
3.6.2.6  Awareness  studies 
Specific  awareness  surveys  by  questionnaires  and  interviews  should  be  carried  out  in 
problem  areas  when  required.  On  a  periodic  basis,  perhaps  every  3  to  4  years,  they 
also  provide  a  useful  focus  to  determine  if  improved  results  indicated  by  the  hard 
measures  reflect  a  real  change,  or  a  co-incidental  numerical  improvement.  The 
results  will  indicate  if  previous  campaigns  have  actually  been  successful,  and 
identify  training  needs. 
3.6.2.7  Audit  of  Safety  Related  Management  and  its  development 
This  study  proposes  that  a  safety  audit  including  an  employee  interview,  thorough 
physical  inspection  and  verification,  and  documentation  check  should  be  carried  out 
on  an  annual  basis  to  provide  a  benchmark  for  safety  performance.  The  audit  would 
be  carried  out  verify  that  management  and  control  systems  and  documentation  exist, 
are  being  used,  and  that  all  reviews  and  improvements  are  being  made.  The  annual 
audit  provides  a  snap  shot  over  time  to  compare  medium  term  progress. 
It  is  key  that  this  audit  system  is  updated  every  3  years  to  maintain  the  impetus  for 
improvement.  The  updated/new  audit  system  must  be  refocused  -  it  should  improve 
on  the  previous  systems  gaps  and  weaknesses,  reflect  internal  and  external  changes, 
and  most  importantly  set  new  safety  performance  standards  and  expectations.  It 
should  be  remembered  that  by  changing  the  audit  system,  the  previous  benchmark 
can  no  longer  be  used,  and  there  must  be  clear  communication  surrounding  the  new 
audit  to  avoid  it  having  a  demotivating  effect. 
3.6.2.8  Annual  formal  review,  planning  and  incorporation  in  reward  structure 
Finally,  there  should  be  an  annual  formal  Safety  Review,  which  encompasses  all 
aspects  of  safety  performance  measurement  and  indicates  whether  the  overall  safety 
management  system  is  working  or  failing.  The  Safety  Review  should  cover  accident 
data  trends;  survey  results,  safety  audit  results,  and  put  forward  an  action  plan  for 
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this  review  should  form  part  of  the  management  bonus  scheme. 
Table  15 
The  following  table  summarises  the  Proposed  Model  : 
Frequency  Hard  Measure  Soft  Measure 
Physical  inspection 
Ongoing/  DailyQ 
Hazard  Notification 
Accident/  Incident/  Near-Miss 
Investigation 
Safety  Representative  Inspection 
Management  monthly  documentation 
Monthly  checks 
Collection  and  processing  of  incident 
and  production  data 
Accident  Data  Trends  Review 
Annual  Safety  Performance  Review  -  Safety  Audit  -awareness  Annually[]  covering  all  techniques  interviews 
Safety  Audit  -  physical  inspection  & 
documentation  checks 
Safety  Performance  Review  -  accident  H&S  Awareness  benchmark 
3  Years  trends,  3  year  audit  results,  3  year  plan 
questionnaire/interview  study  for  improvement 
Specific  workplace  Intensive  Behaviour  observation 
Interview 
study  Q  Survey  Q  Questionnaire 
safety  Issues[]  Q  Y  Accident  Costing 
study 
This  study  recommends  that  an  effective  performance  measurement  system  will 
include  a  number  of  different  tools  that  will  combine  to  build  an  accurate  picture  of 
OHS  performance.  The  model  includes  short,  medium  and  long-term  measures  that 
provide  feedback  at  different  times,  and  on  different  issues  -  all  of  which  enable 
safety  standards  and  objectives  to  be  set.  The  model  illustrates  the  combination  of 
tools  and  the  frequency  with  which  they  were  used  at  J&B. 
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4.1  ATTITUDES  AND  BEHAVIOUR 
4.1.1  BACKGROUND 
There  is  no  value  in  implementing  elaborate  safety  management  systems,  training 
schemes,  procedures  and  control  systems  if  they  will  have  no  effect  on  safety 
performance  in  the  workplace. 
There  has  been  extensive  discussion  of  the  measurement  and  development  of  a 
'safety  culture'  (McSween,  1997).  The  question  remains  -  even  if  a  safety  culture 
actually  exists,  is  it  tangible?  We  have  to  consider  what  aspects  of  safety 
performance  are  actually  'visible'  in  the  work  force  so  that  they  can  be  measured  to 
help  evaluate  if  any  changes  have  actually  affected  standards.  Such  performance 
indicators  will  attempt  to  evaluate  either  safety  attitude  or  safety  behaviour. 
Conventional  safety  performance  measures  rely  upon  the  visible  effects  of  safety  in 
the  workplace,  that  is,  they  focus  on  the  results  of  safety  behaviour.  Behaviour  is 
very  visible  in  the  work  place,  although  the  results  of  behaviour  can  be  hidden  -  such 
as  unreported  near-misses.  It  is  difficult  however,  to  hide  all  behaviours  and 
certainly  appropriate  skilled  supervision  and  auditing  will  identify  failure  to  follow 
rules,  failure  to  wear  PPE,  accidents  etc.  What  supervision  cannot  identify  is  the 
intent  or  reasons  behind  any  mode  of  behaviour  or  action  in  the  workplace  -  this 
requires  deeper  knowledge  of  the  people  involved  and  much  of  the  theory,  however, 
and  certainly  much  of  the  rhetoric  is  around  safety  cultures  -  that  is  safety  attitude. 
Behaviour  is  far  easier  to  measure  than  attitude  and  it  is  certainly  less  complex  to 
understand.  Measurement  of  attitude  relies  on  the  premise  that  expressed  attitude  is 
linked  to  behaviour.  This  implies  that  there  is  always  an  intention  to  act,  before 
action  is  taken. 
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however,  be  carried  out  in  'auto-pilot' 
without  conscious  thought.  The 
requirement  for  an  intent  to  act  before 
action  also  suggests  that  the  individual 
has  complete  control  over  his  or  her 
actions  without  interference  from  other 
parties,  or  from  other  constraints  such 
CASE  STUDY  ONE 
At  plant  1,  with  a  95%  male  work  force  there 
is  no  issue  of  wearing  protective  footwear  in 
the  workplace.  There  is  100%  compliance  and 
zero  medical  exemptions.  Whether  all 
individuals  perceive  the  footwear  to  be 
beneficial  or  not,  the  compliance  (or 
behaviour)  is  positive.  The  cost-  benefit 
equation  is  weighed  up,  and  the  risk  of  being 
disciplined  has  led  to  full  wearing  of  these 
shoes,  leading  to  the  modification  of 
behaviour,  and  arguably  a  change  in  attitude 
after  personal  experience  suggest  that  it  may 
be  of  higher  real  benefit  after  all.  as  :  lack  of  personal  capability;  lack  of 
concentration;  lack  of  training  or 
understanding  -  even  fatigue.  Further  it 
implies  that,  in  some  way,  the  intention  will  be  unusual  and  can  be  differentiated 
from  `rational'  thought. 
Clearly  there  is  not  always  a  conscious  intention  to  act  in  a  certain  manner  before 
action  is  taken,  and  all  individuals  are  governed  by  internal  and  external  constraints 
upon  their  behaviour.  The  direct  link  between  attitude  and  behaviour  becomes  less 
and  less  clear. 
CASE  STUDY  TWO  : 
The  options  in  determining  the  influences  on 
an  individuals  'intention  to  act'  are: 
i)  Capturing  expressed  attitudes  or 
intentions. 
ii)  Determining  the  external  influences  in 
non  conformance  incidents  and  accidents 
that  led  away  from  this  good  'intention'. 
iii)  Determining  extent  of'control'  that  an 
individuals  has  over  his  or  her  actions 
iv)  Determining  methods  of  addressing  these 
attitudes,  although  there  are  difficulties  in 
changing  attitude  directly. 
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At  Plant  2,  there  is  an  altogether  different 
situation.  With  a  40/  60  female/male 
workforce,  there  are  120  individuals  with 
'medical  exemptions'  from  wearing  safety 
footwear  and  many  others  fail  to  comply 
with  the  compulsory  wearing  of  protective 
footwear.  What  is  the  difference  between 
these  situations  ?  It  may  appear  to  be  a  case 
illustrating  the  non  compliance  of  females 
in  the  workplace.  On  closer  inspection, 
however,  it  is  related  to  the  aesthetic  value 
of  protective  footwear.  The  female  work 
force  are,  in  general,  more  concerned  with 
their  appearance  in  the  workplace  and  more 
competitive.  The  cause  of  the  unsafe 
behaviour  is  not  that  it  is  of  no  perceived 
benefit,  but  that  it  does  not  'look'  acceptable. 
The  strategy  to  deal  with  the  non- 
compliance  then,  is  clearly  not  to  change 
attitudes  -  they  already  know  it  is  safer  - 
but  to  deal  directly  with  behaviour: 
enforcing  the  rules,  and  offering  a  more 
sympathetic  choice  of  styles. However,  if  only  unsafe  behaviour  or  circumstances  can  lead  to  an  accident,  then  we 
must  focus  on  this  -  it  does  not  matter  what  type  of  attitude  the  person  has  if  there  is 
no  direct  correlation  between  that  and  behaviour. 
We  can  measure  and  assess  behaviour  by, 
￿  Analysis  of  non-conformance,  conformance  and  accidents  via  sampling, 
investigation,  auditing,  observation,  and  hazard  notification. 
￿  Determining  why  an  unsafe  act  took  place  as  opposed  to  a  safe  act  -  was  it  a 
lack  of  knowledge,  information,  training,  due  to  external  pressures,  internal  or 
external  factors. 
￿  Addressing  these  issues  by  implementing  appropriate  corrective  action. 
How  practical  are  these  options? 
4.1.2  MEASUREMENT  OF  ATTITUDES 
One  school  of  thought,  held  by  Gilby  and  others,  believe  that  safety  culture  and 
attitude  are  always  linked  to  behaviour  (Gilby,  1996).  Lee  (1995)  states  that  `all 
changes  in  attitudes,  by  definition,  should  result  in  changed  patterns  of  behaviour'. 
This  builds  on  an  assumption  that  an  individual  has  constant  attitudes  with 
circumstance  that  lead  directly  to  related  behaviour.  It  also  implies  that  where  there 
is  intention,  there  is  also  control  and,  if  expressed  attitude  always  led  to  a  predictable 
behaviour,  then  this  suggests  that  conscious  thought  must  be  involved. 
And  yet  there  are  obvious,  intuitive  counters  to  this.  Consider  an  individual  is  asked 
if  they  want  to  do  a  bungee  jump,  they  say  no.  If,  however,  in  the  circumstances  they 
are  told  that  'all  the  others  are  doing  it'  they  may  fall  victim  to  peer  pressure  and 
actually  do  the  jump.  Here  the  expressed  attitude  says  it  is  unsafe,  but  behaviour  is 
the  performance  of  the  jump.  Another  individual  asked  as  part  of  a  group  may 
initially  say  'yes',  but  when  the  day  for  the  jump  arrives  they  may  not  do  the  bungee 
jump.  The  converse  applies,  the  expressed  attitude  is  yes,  but  the  behaviour  implies 
it  is  not  safe. 
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prediction  of  what  they  would  do  in  the  actual  situation.  When  faced  by  an  actual 
threat/state,  the  expressed  attitude  (held  beforehand)  may  be  dismissed,  leading  to 
different  behaviour  at  the  time.  The  threat  may  be  physical,  imagined  or  emotional 
where  the  last  category  includes  loss  of  social  `face'. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  attitudes  are  very  much  based  on  (Atkinson  1993; 
Glendon  1995) 
i)  Learning  through  experience  of  similar  events 
ii)  Clusters  of  consistency  -  that  is,  based  on  past  expressions  or  past 
behaviour. 
iii)  Factors  specific  to  an  object  or  situation. 
Attitudes  to  health  and  safety  may  then  be  specific  to  work  areas,  social  situations  or 
risk  and  this  is  most  obvious  in  the  wearing  of  safety  footwear  or  hearing  protection. 
Ajzen  and  Fishbein  concluded  in  their  1977  study  (Ajzen,  1977)  that  behaviour  can 
be  predicted  if  attitudes  are  known,  but  only  where  the  attitudes  are  extremely 
specific  to  that  behaviour.  Following  this  line,  campaigns  to  alter  attitudes  should 
focus  on  specific  issues  rather  than  safety  as  a  whole  in  order  to  avoid  the  difficulties 
of  general  social  influence.  A  great  deal  has,  however,  been  published  about  the 
ability  to  change  attitudes  from  which  the  main  conclusions  relevant  to  this  study 
are, 
a)  One  cannot  change  deeply  held  beliefs  (faiths)  and  opinions  -  these  may 
remain  constant  over  a  lifetime  despite  disproof. 
b)  One  can  change  superficial  views  as  these  change  frequently  according  to 
the  most  recently  acquired  information  or  the  present  situation. 
c)  In  between  there  are  views,  beliefs  that  are  more  or  less  resistant  to  change 
depending  upon  how  they  were  formed  and  how  important  they  are  to  an 
individual's  psyche 
Attitudes  towards  health  and  safety  are,  therefore,  contingent  ones,  making  it 
difficult  to  modify  them  unless  the  influencing  factors  are  fully  known  and 
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behaviour.  A  general  health  and  safety  poster  campaign  will  have  no  impact  on 
specific  attitudes  -  campaigns  must  focus  on  specific  risks  and  try  to  modify 
awareness  towards  a  specific  risk. 
Attitudes  may  or  may  not,  therefore,  have  a  direct  influence  on  behaviour  in  the 
workplace.  Largely,  the  extent  of  influence  of  attitude  on  safety  performance  will 
depend  upon  the  strength  and  number  of  internal  and  external  pressures,  firstly  on  an 
individual  and  secondly  on  a  social  group. 
There  are  two  sides  to  such  a  debate.  Firstly,  that  individuals  are  individual  and  will 
be  more  or  less  directly  influenced  by  external  pressures  according  to  the  extent  of 
their  compliance,  motivations,  intelligence,  background  and  other  individual 
differences.  A  more  compliant  person  will  be  more  influenced  by  peer  pressure  than 
a  non  compliant  individual.  Secondly,  the  social  group  will  have  norms  of  attitude 
(and  of  certain  behaviours).  Not  all  individuals  within  the  group  will  agree  with,  or 
comply  with  the  group  norms,  but  depending  upon  internal  factors  such  as  age, 
background,  education  and  other  characteristics,  they  may  be  more  or  less  inclined  to 
do  so.  So,  when  measuring  attitude,  is  it  more  accurate  to  determine  the  attitude  of 
individuals  or  that  of  a  peer  social/  work  group? 
When  dealing  with  individuals  in  isolation,  their  personal  attitude  to  safety  will  be 
influenced  by  personal  factors  such  as  experience  and  background.  An  individual 
may  be  able  to  coherently  explain  why  they  have  a  certain  attitude,  and  this  may 
directly  lead  to  foreseeable  behaviour  as  a  result.  For  example,  if  you  asked  an 
individual  why  he  or  she  smokes  they  will  be  able  to  explain  or  justify  the  reason  for 
doing  so,  even  if  there  is  cognitive  dissonance.  Alternatively,  if  one  was  to  ask  them 
what  they  thought  of  protective  safety  footwear,  they  would  likely  comment  that  it 
was  a  good  idea.  Individuals,  however,  do  not  operate  in  isolation.  They  also  form 
part  of  a  social  or  work  group,  and  individual  views  will  be  influenced  by  these 
external  influences. 
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but  in  a  group  situation  he  may  be  more  defensive  and  state  that  it  is  'my  choice  and 
nothing  to  do  with  anyone  else'.  In  the  case  of  the  safety  footwear,  the  individual 
may  state  that  'it  is  a  good  idea  but  it  uncomfortable'  and,  therefore,  it  is  not  worn. 
Closer  analysis  may  show  that  in  a  workplace  with  a  high  proportion  of  women, 
protective  safety  footwear  is  seen  as  unattractive  and  is  not  worn  for  aesthetic 
reasons. 
This  can  be  summarised  as: 
Individual  attitude: 
positive 
Group  pressure: 
negative 
Effect  on  behaviour  ? 
'footwear  is  a  good  idea'  'it  looks  out  of  place  with  To  wear  or  not  to  wear? 
others'  Strongly  mediated  by  the 
involvement/integration 
with  the  group 
One  very  critical  thing  to  note  is  that  although  individuals  in  a  work  situation  cannot 
operate  in  a  completely  independent  way  because  they  will  be  influenced  by  others, 
their  behaviour  is  still  independent. 
The  measurement  of  a  group  attitude  towards  specific  safety  issues  may  be  a  more 
accurate  predictor  of  safety  behaviour  than  any  expressed  individual  preference. 
This  largely  depends  upon  strength  of  leadership,  extent  of  group  compliance,  type 
of  group,  management,  cohesion  of  group  (Asch,  1958)  and  affiliations,  education 
and  many  other  factors. 
It  may,  therefore,  be  valuable  to,  determine  the  strength  of  a  social  group  in  terms  of 
the  above  as  an  indicator  of  the  extent  of  group  pressure  and  strength  of  cohesion  to 
norms  and  identify  if  the  group  norm  is  strong  or  weak  -  that  is,  whether  the 
individual  has  less  or  more  power  to  make  individual  decisions  without  peer  pressure 
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Here  we  need  to  measure  the  group  'norms'  towards  safety  issues.  The  more  specific 
the  issue,  such  as  hearing  protection,  the  more  accurately  it  should  predict  behaviour. 
For  example,  we  should  measure  attitudes  as  a  group  together  rather  than  individuals 
being  assessed  independently.  The  results  may  give  a  strong  indication  of  expressed 
attitude  whilst  actually  functioning  as  a  group,  and  may  also  indicate  in  some  cases 
the  likely  behaviour.  On  the  other  hand,  the  results  have  to  be  treated  with  a  degree 
of  scepticism  as  there  is  no  definitive  evidence  that  the  individuals  displaying  such 
attitudes  in  a  group  situation  are  either  temporarily  or  permanently  complying  with 
group  norms.  If  this  compliance  is  temporary  for  the  group  situation,  the  individual 
will  act  on  his  or  her  own  initiative  when  alone  and  knowledge  of  group  attitude  will 
not  be  of  benefit  in  the  prediction  of  unsafe  behaviour. 
4.1.2.2  Case  Two  :  Group  with  Weak  Norm 
Here  we  need  to  measure  individual  attitudes  to  a  specific  safety  issue  as  the  group 
norm  will  not  have  the  same  influence  over  the  actual  attitude  and  behaviour  of 
individuals.  That  is,  we  measure  attitudes  as  individuals.  The  problem  with  this  is 
that  it  is  not  known  when  external  factors,  such  as  a  manager  or  the  group,  are  going 
to  have  influence  and  there  are  also  factors  internal  to  the  individual,  such  as 
motivation,  which  may  change  over  time. 
It  should  now  be  clear  that  measuring  attitude  is  more  complex,  perhaps,  than 
observing  behaviour,  and  the  actual  benefit  of  doing  so  is  probably  negligible.  The 
benefits  of  determining  social/work  groups  -  their  extent  of  influence  and  group 
norms  (if  any)  has,  however,  other  uses.  The  knowledge  could  be  used  to  'know  thy 
enemy"  in  that  training  can  be  specific  against  incorrect  group  norms  or  beliefs,  can 
attempt  to  influence  the  group  leader  as  a  means  of  influencing  the  group  and  can 
encourage  active  participation  of  a  group. 
It  is  reasonable  to  surmise  that  if  a  group  has  cohesion  and  there  is  a  strong  group 
norm  of  attitude  and  behaviour,  then  an  individual  who  goes  against  this  will  be 
chastised  by  the  group  internally,  without  interference  by  the  supervisor  or  safety 
4:  179 personnel  and  this  may  be  active  or  passive  correction.  A  classic  example  would  be 
a  social  group  of  friends  who  drink  together  but  strongly  believe  that  drink  driving  is 
unacceptable  under  any  circumstances.  A  member  of  the  social  group  who  then 
attempts  to  drink  drive  is  likely  to  be  subject  to  heavy  pressure.  If  the  individual 
actually  drink  drives,  the  others  in  the  group  may  ostracise  the  individual.  In  many 
cases,  it  is  the  fear  of  being  ostracised  that  is  influential  enough  to  prevent  non- 
compliant  (with  the  group)  behaviour  in  the  first  place. 
4.1.3  MEASUREMENT  OF  BEHAVIOUR 
It  would  be  interesting  to  measure  attitudes,  but  we  have  concluded  that  they  will  not 
necessarily  indicate  an  improved  or  reduced  safety  performance,  so  let  us  focus  on 
safety  behaviour. 
If  one  investigates  an  accident,  the  investigation  will  reveal  the  non-conformance 
that  led  to  the  accident.  By  focusing  on  the  near  miss  or  error  aspect  of  a  non- 
conformance,  we  can  perhaps  capture  information  before  an  accident  has  actually 
taken  place.  Naively  we  could  state  that,  if  effective,  comprehensive  safe  systems  of 
work  and  training  are  in  place,  and  if  an  individual  conforms  to  these  guidelines, 
then  this  behaviour  will  be  safe  and  should  not  result  in  an  accident.  This  neglects, 
however,  the  difficulty  that  certain  work  practices  may  normally  be  safe  but  may  in 
certain  conditions  become  unsafe. 
However,  it  is  difficult  to  consider  all  possibilities  that  may  occur,  therefore  it  is 
most  likely  that  accidents  will  occur  when  an  operator  has  to  react  to  conditions  that 
have  changed  from  normal  and  is  not  aware  of  the  correct  action  to  take.  Very 
detailed  procedures  cannot  cope  with  changed  or  changing  circumstances,  but  the 
more  open  to  interpretation  that  they  are,  the  more  reliance  there  is  on  operator 
`awareness'.  For  a  very  hazardous  task,  such  as  entry  to  confined  spaces,  the  safe 
system  of  work  should  be  very  precise;  for  normal  operations,  the  safe  system  will 
be  more  general. 
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an  irrelevant  topic  or  at  least  one  that  is  not  influential  in  focusing  improvement  of 
safety  performance.  Attitude  or  awareness  may  still  be  measured  at  infrequent 
intervals.  Focus  instead  should  be  on  the  modification  of  safety  related  behaviour 
through  a  series  of  stages.  People  clearly  do  not  want  to  have  accidents  and  hurt 
themselves,  this  would  not  be  human.  However,  it  is  possible  that  for  a  variety  of 
different  reasons  people  are  either  unaware  that  their  behaviour  may  result  in  an 
injury  or,  that  they  are  gambling  and  willing  to  take  this  chance  (it  is  cost  benefit 
decision,  a  shortcut),  or  that  it  is  due  to  accident  'proneness',  carelessness,  laziness, 
lack  of  knowledge,  habit/  luck  ('I've  always  done  it  this  way  and  I  haven't  been  hurt 
before').  In  addition,  there  may  be  underlying  physical/cognitive  aspects  to  an 
individual  that  makes  them  more  likely  than  others  to  be  involved  in  certain  types  of 
accident.  Whatever  the  cause  of  the  incorrect  or  uninformed  thought  that  led  to 
unsafe  behaviour,  it  is  only  the  behaviour  (action  or  omission)  that  can  lead  to  an 
accident,  whether  this  results  in  an  injury  or  not. 
It  does  not  matter  how  positive  an  expressed  attitude  is,  this  does  not  indicate  or 
remove  the  possibility  of  negative  behaviour.  Focus  should  be  on  modification  of 
behaviour  whilst  improving  education  and  awareness. 
Therefore,  the  focus  on  modification  of  behaviour  should  be  to, 
i)  Identify  the  risks  from  incorrect  behaviour. 
ii)  Eliminate  the  chance  of  faulty  behaviour  occurring  by  removing  the  dangerous 
component,  equipment,  vehicle,  substance. 
iii)  Implement  physical  control  to  prevent  the  behaviour  happening.  This  aims  to 
modify  behaviour  so  that  the  individual  will  not  behave  in  an  unsafe  manner, 
such  as  using  ergonomically  designed  equipment,  controls  and  information. 
iv)  Produce  physical  control  to  prevent  harm  if  behaviour  is  faulty-  such  as 
machinery  guarding. 
v)  Monitor  accident  data,  audit  and  observation  results  to  determine  where  faulty 
behaviour  has  occurred  and  how  it  should  be  modified. 
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Research  suggests  that  there  are  only  tenuous  links  between  attitude  intention  to  act 
and  the  action  itself  (Ajzen,  1977).  It  suggests  that  expressed  attitude  in  general 
cannot  be  treated  as  an  accurate  indicator  or  predictor  of  behaviour 
(Sutherland,  1993).  Most  people  have  a  positive  attitude  towards  safety  in  the 
workplace  and  yet  accidents  due  to  a  breach  of  safety  rules  happen.  After  all  who 
would  actually  like  to  be  involved  in  an  accident  that  may  lead  to  injury,  pain, 
suffering  or  financial  loss  ?  It  is  fair  to  say  that  attitude  to  safety  will  often  be 
positive,  but  that  both  internal  and  external  factors  will  influence  an  individual's 
intentions  to  act. 
Table  16 
INTERNAL  FACTORS  EXTERNAL  FACTORS 
Internal  factors  for  each  individual  that  may  External  factors  that  may  influence  attitude 
affect  attitude:  specific  situation,  social  include  :  management  or  supervision,  group 
background,  education,  class,  intelligence,  'leader',  group  norm  or  peer  pressure. 
experience,  motivation,  personality, 
accident-proneness,  extroversion,  gender,  Most  individuals  will  be  affected  to  some 
carelessness,  awareness.  extent  by  the  influence  of  external  parties  in 
the  workplace.  It  would,  however,  be 
These  will  be  the  primary  influences  when  inaccurate  to  focus  on  behaviour  in  the 
an  individual  acts  independently  of  others  workplace,  treating  employees  purely  as 
and  is  unaffected  by  the  attitude  of  others.  It  independent  individuals,  when  they  are  in 
should  be  remembered  that  in  a  work  fact  influenced  by  their  interaction  with 
environment  there  is  constant  interaction  others. 
between  personnel. 
In  fact,  the  theory  of  reasoned  action  (Ajzen,  1991)  proposes  that  there  are  a  number 
of  complex  processes  influencing  attitudes  and  behaviour  including  individual 
perception  of  a  risk  or  situation,  understanding  of  the  group  norm,  subjective  norm. 
These  influence  the  relative  importance  of  these  attitudinal  and  normative  factors  for 
that  individual  and  therefore  his  or  her  intention  to  behave  in  a  certain  manner,  and 
all  of  these  influence  the  resulting  behaviour. 
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will  not  be  an  accurate  indication  of  attitude 
either.  It  is  possible  that  cognitive 
dissonance  exists  within  the  individual,  that 
is,  the  person  acts  unsafely  and  realises  the 
Experience  in  a  real  industrial 
setting  suggests  that  the  best  guide 
to  current  behaviour  is  past  action. 
behaviour  to  be  unsafe.  For  example,  almost  all  smokers  understand  the  risks  of 
smoking  to  their  long-term  health  but  smoke  anyway.  Some  reasons  for  this  may  be 
that  they  are  influenced  by  their  peer  group,  they  are  truly  addicted,  or  that  they 
believe  the  immediate  benefits  outweigh  the  longer  term  costs.  In  a  work  context,  an 
individual  may  be  heavily  influenced  by  the  behaviour  of  his  or  her  colleagues  who 
are  not  wearing  PPE  -  she  realises  PPE  is  for  a  good  reason  but  that  wearing  it  leaves 
her  open  to  ridicule.  Another  example  would  be  an  individual  who  takes  a  short  cut 
in  a  job  at  risk  of  injury,  to  create  time  for  relaxing  after  the  task  has  been  complete. 
The  author's  experience  in  a  real  industrial  setting  suggests  that  the  best  guide  to 
current  behaviour  is  past  action.  For  example,  if  failure  to  wear  safety  equipment  is 
detected  -  even  failure  that  resulted  in  an  accident,  it  is  likely  that  there  will  still  be 
failure  to  wear  safety  equipment.  It  may  take  a  serious  personal  experience  to  change 
this  behaviour. 
It  may  be  relevant  to  measure  both  attitude  and  behaviour  in  the  workplace,  but  it  is 
not  accurate  to  say  that  an  improved  'attitude'  to  safety  will  lead  directly  to  an 
improved  behaviour  towards  safety.  It  is  the  integration  of  attitude  with 
circumstances  that  leads  to  the  outcome  and  because  there  may  be  varying  attitudes 
for  different  circumstances,  the  outcome  will  appear  unpredictable.  In  any  event,  it  is 
the  behaviour  that  results  in  unsafe  actions  which  lead  to  errors,  accidents  or  near- 
miss  situations.  That  is,  behaviour  has  a  visible  effect,  and  that  is  the  very  reason  that 
it  is  measurable. 
So,  if  attitude  is  not  an  accurate  predictor  of  behaviour  and  behaviour  cannot 
necessarily  be  used  to  establish  attitude,  what  can  be  measured? 
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can  be  influenced  through  changing  awareness.  A  possible  solution  to  this  may  be  to, 
"  Determine  a  social  group,  its  norms  and  its  leaders 
"  Involve  the  leader  in  the  development  of  training  or  an  awareness  session 
"  Train  the  social  group  as  a  group  in  attempt  to  gain  influence  through  it's 
leaders  and  to  raise  awareness  through  this  individual 
"  Feed  back  to  this  social  group  as  a  group. 
Instead  of  trying  to  fragment  the  social  group,  this  can  be  used  as  a  strength.  The 
cohesion  of  a  group  may  be  used  to  your  advantage  by  changing  the  social  norm  in  a 
constructive  way.  This  is  usually  called  team  building  and  suffers  from  many 
problems  as  well  as  advantages.  First,  teams  are  hard  to  form,  but  once  formed  resist 
change,  resist  outside  influence  and  have  a  `shelf  life'  before  stagnation.  They  must 
be  managed  and  subject  to  careful  overview.  In  the  workplace,  team  building  is  used 
but  impacts  on  safety  -  good  and  bad  have  not  been  assessed.  In  so  far  as  teams  can 
improve  productivity  and  innovation,  it  is  likely  that  they  can  also  improve  safety  - 
if  used  with  care. 
The  other  positive  use  of  attitudes  and  measures  of  human  factors  is  by  influencing 
awareness.  One  can  attempt  to  raise  awareness  and  understanding  of  safety  issues 
through  training,  and  establish  whether  the  level  of  understanding  has  increased. 
Experience  at  J&B  shows  that  there  is  a  direct  link  between  an  increased  awareness, 
knowledge  and  understanding  of  a  risk  and  the  behavioural  reaction  to  it. 
Broad  based  `attitudinal'  studies,  therefore,  are  of  little  real  benefit  in  improving 
safety  performance.  Such  studies  should  instead  focus  on  knowledge,  understanding, 
awareness  of  safety  issues  rather  than  on  the  measurement  of  attitude  itself. 
Having  said  this,  one  of  the  more  interesting  questions  about  individuals  is  whether 
there  are  people  who  are  not  susceptible  to  this  group  normalisation  whether  they  are 
out  of  the  group  because  of  personality  factors  or  because  they  are,  for  whatever, 
reason  attract  risk  -  that  is  they  are  accident  prone. 
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INDIVIDUAL  RISK 
4.2.1  INTRODUCTION 
This  is  an  interesting  subject  because  there  exists  research  that  finds  quite 
categorically  that  accident  prone  individuals  or  personalities  do  not  exist  (Hale, 
1987).  On  the  one  hand,  some  employees  have  accidents  on  a  regular  basis,  other 
employees  may  only  have  one  in  a  working  lifetime,  and  many  will  never  have  an 
accident  in  the  work  place. 
From  the  outset,  one  could  argue  that  employees  are  exposed  to  different  levels  of 
risk.  The  risk  to  a  machine  operator  or  a  maintenance  technician  will  be  significantly 
higher  than  the  risk  to  an  administrator.  However,  when  comparing  like  employees 
to  like  by  occupation  and  location,  there  is  still  a  significant  difference  between 
employees. 
Glendon  and  Hale  (1995),  for  example,  explained  the  concept  of'accident  proneness' 
as  having  two  major  factors  and  observed  that, 
1)  People  exposed  to  equivalent  hazards  do  not  have  equal  numbers  of  accidents 
2)  Observed  differences  in  personal  accident  experience  result  from  enduring 
personal  differences. 
The  difference  between  the  accident  experience  of  comparable  employees  may  be 
due  to  single  or  combined  factors. 
4.2.2  FACTORS  INFLUENCING  ACCIDENT  EXPERIENCE 
A  variety  of  factors  may  influence  accident  experience.  These  can  be  separated  into 
internal  factors  and  external  factors.  Internal  factors  are  those  that  relate  to  the 
personality  and  characteristics  of  the  individual.  External  factors  may  be  outwith  the 
individuals  control,  but  less  likely  to  affect  one  individual  only.  An  indication  of 
specific  external  influencing  factors  would  be  a  cluster  of  individuals  in  a  specific 
workplace  having  unusually  high  levels  of  accidents.  These  might  be  reinforced  by 
other  indicators  such  as  high  levels  of  absenteeism,  or  poor  work  performance. 
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individual  behaviour  and  actions  described  by  Whalley  (1991)  and  others,  but  we  do 
cover  the  principal,  classes  of  factors  that  are  not  internal  to  an  individuals 
personality  and  that  are  relevant  to  the  J&B  sites  as  a  whole.  We  are  trying  to 
separate  out  the  factors  that  are  not  influencing  an  accident  prone  individual. 
4.2.2.1  External  factors 
The  following  external  factors  may  influence  accident  experience  in  a  plant  or  firm. 
1  Levels  of  Overtime  -  show  me  the  money 
An  extended  shift  on  a  regular  basis  may  create  additional  problems  of  fatigue, 
stress,  and  a  lack  of  concentration.  Individuals  who  have  been  working  excessive 
amounts  of  overtime  may  have  more  minor  accidents.  Grouped  here  are  fatigue, 
boredom,  familiarity  and  an  effect  that  is  not  often  recognised  -  that  is  relaxation 
(for  paid  overtime  at  least)  when  there  is  a  feeling  that  it  is  not  real  work!!. 
2  Time  of  day  -  the  siesta  effect 
Accidents  may  occur  at  different  times  of  the  day  due  to  the  effects  of  tiredness,  or 
haste  to  complete  a  task  before  the  end  of  a  shift.  A  serious  accident  occurred  at 
Strathleven  when  a  contractor  fell  off  ladder  whilst  taking  a  shortcut  at  4.30  pm  one 
afternoon.  Accidents  often  occur  due  to  a  lack  of  concentration  early  in  the  morning 
or  just  before  breaks  and  there  are  clear  effects  on  human  abilities  at  different  times 
of  day  (Smith,  1992) 
3  Resource  issues  -  work  pressure 
There  may  be  particular  resource  problems  in  certain  areas  due  to  the  nature  of  work 
requiring  specific  skills  where  work  pressure  exists.  Employees  in  this  area  may  be 
under  a  great  deal  of  pressure  compared  to  those  in  other  areas,  and  this  stress  may 
lead  to  higher  accident  experience.  Multi-skilling  may  lead  to  such  pressure  if  an 
important  skill  is  not  well  understood. 
4  Location  of  work  -  working  environment 
The  workplace  itself  may  create  additional  risks  to  the  individuals  who  work  there 
due  to  the  specific  nature  of  the  working  environment.  This  external  factor  can 
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to  change  the  situation  at  reasonable  cost. 
5  Increased  production  -  speed  of  work 
There  may  be,  for  example,  a  greater  number  of  cases  produced  per  man  hour  than 
there  was  in  a  previous  period.  It  may  be  the  case  that  people  have  less  time  for 
conscious  thought  and  action,  they  start  to  react  instinctively.  Unless  there  is  the 
sufficient  knowledge  and  understanding  at  a  subconscious  level,  perhaps  through 
training,  accidents  may  be  more  likely  to  happen. 
6  Reporting  of  accidents  -a  confusing  factor 
It  may  be  more  likely  that  accidents  are  reported  in  areas  with  a  safety  aware 
manager,  or  in  areas  that  are  close  to  a  medical  room.  In  more  outlying  areas  of  a 
plant  only  the  more  serious  accidents  are  reported.  This  can  in  part  explain  the 
difference  in  'reported'  experience  in  J&B's  Unit  One  as  opposed  to  Case  Goods  - 
there  may  not  actually  be  as  wide  a  difference.  Often  there  is  a  lack  of  consistency  in 
accident  reporting  on  site. 
7  Manager/  supervisor  -  leading  by  example  (or  not) 
Certain  managers  or  supervisors  may  apply  pressure  to  their  team  to  achieve  results 
at  a  certain  speed,  and  by  a  certain  time,  and  in  some  cases  there  will  be  pressure  to 
work  unsafely.  Others  may  strongly  encourage  or  place  priority  on  safe  working  - 
although  this  has  not  been  observed  or  isolated  in  J&B! 
8  Discipline  or  threat  of  discipline  -  control  of  habit 
The  threat  of  disciplinary  action  -  whether  formal  or  informal  -  can  be  used  to  coerce 
individuals  to  follow  rules  (whether  work  practices  or  safe  systems  of  work)  and  will 
affect  safety  behaviour. 
9  Group  Norm  -  influence  by  the  work  group 
The  influence  of  the  working  group  and  the  group  norm  may  impact  upon  the 
attitude  and  behaviour  of  an  individual. 
10  Systems  -  written  and  real  procedures 
There  may  be  inadequate  or  incorrect  safe  systems  of  work  that  relate  to  specific 
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of  individuals. 
All  of  the  factors  discussed  above  -  with  the  exception  of  safe  systems  of  work  - 
would  affect  all  of  the  individuals  in  a  particular  location  or  area  or  occupation.  A 
group  of  individuals  will  have  the  same  manager,  working  the  same  shift,  the  same 
level  of  overtime,  under  the  same  extent  of  pressure  to  produce,  in  the  same  location 
and  tasks,  with  the  same  group  norms.  So,  if  the  external  factors  exist  at  the  same 
level  for  all  individuals  in  a  certain  work  location  and  task,  then  this  leaves  only  the 
internal  factors.  The  personalities  of  individuals,  and  their  individual  differences  - 
that  will  cause  them  to  experience  different  rates  of  accidents. 
4.2.2.2  Internal  and  personality  factors 
There  are  a  variety  of  internal  factors  that  can  influence  safety  behaviour  : 
1  Carelessness  -  oops! 
Some  individuals  may  be  more  careless  or  pay  less  attention  to  detail  than  others, 
which  may  lead  directly  to  a  higher  accident  experience. 
2  Awareness  -I  didn't  know  it  was  loaded. 
Repeated  accident  experience  may  be  due  to  a  lack  of  awareness  or  the  wrong 
'attitude'.  An  actual  attitude  is  very  difficult  to  define,  and  even  harder  to  accurately 
measure.  It  is  also  very  difficult  to  compare  individuals  in  the  same  work  area  as 
their  expressed  attitude  may  be  unilaterally  positive,  but  certain  individuals  will  still 
act  unsafely.  The  level  of  awareness  or  understanding  of  a  task,  the  related  risks  and 
the  safe  systems  of  work  may  be  more  useful  in  understanding  accident  experience. 
3  Capability  -  just  naturally  uncoordinated. 
The  physical  capability  to  actually  perform  task.  Some  individuals  may  perform 
tasks  that  cannot  be  or  are  not  adjusted  to  suit  them  ergonomically,  as  a  result  of 
which  they  struggle  to  lift  items  and  pick  up  physical  strains;  muscular  and  back 
injuries. 
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Certain  individuals  seem  to  be  unable  to  translate  their  current  knowledge  and 
training  to  enable  them  to  react  correctly  to  situations  outwith  the  ordinary,  thereby 
creating  potential  accident  situations. 
5  Intelligence  -  IQ  or  "g"  factor 
The  loose  term  of  'intelligence'  may  impact  safety  performance.  In  this  case, 
intelligence  could  be  defined  as  the  ability  to  process  and  act  on  information.  It  is 
suggested  by  research  that  more  `intelligent'  people  are  more  likely  to  make 
mistakes  in  repetitive  tasks,  but  less  likely  to  have  mistakes  in  tasks  requiring  skill 
and  precision. 
6  Extroversion  -  look  at  what  I  can  do. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  extroverts  are  more  likely  to  have  accidents  in  tasks  which 
require  premeditation  and  analysis  beforehand  (Powell,  1971).  Extroverts  have  a 
tendency  to  be  risk  seekers  rather  than  risk  averse,  searching  for  additional 
experiences.  It  has  also  been  suggested  that  extroverts  report  accidents  more  readily 
than  introverts,  therefore  biasing  accident  experience  figures. 
7  Gender  -  vive  la  difference! 
It  has  been  suggested  that  there  are  differences  between  the  way  in  which  males  and 
females  behave,  therefore  creating  a  difference  in  accident  experience. 
8  Age  -  experience  versus  ability 
There  is  debate  about  whether  age  has  an  affect  on  accident  experience.  It  is 
suggested  that  younger  people  have  more  accidents,  reducing  with  age  and  therefore 
experience,  until  physical  capabilities  are  gradually  reduced  at  older  age.  Although 
older  people  have  a  tendency  to  be  more  cautious  and  experienced,  they  will 
eventually  have  reduced  visual  and  psychomotor  skills. 
9  Aggression  -  Oh  for  God's  sake  give  it  to  me! 
It  has  been  suggested  that  more  aggressive  individuals  are  less  willing  to  suffer  the 
inconvenience  of  taking  adequate  safety  precautions,  therefore  displaying  risk 
seeking  behaviour.  As  a  consequence  of  this,  aggressive  individuals  are  more  likely 
to  have  accidents  than  passive  ones. 
4:  189 10  Anxiety  and  neuroticism  -  did  you  switch  all  the  lights  off  and  lock  the 
door? 
Anxiety,  worry  and  neurotic  behaviour  can  lead  to  considerable  importance  being 
placed  on  the  checking  of  environment,  circumstances  and  of  actions  taken.  This 
behaviour  may  reduce  the  likelihood  of  unsafe  behaviour,  and  therefore,  accidents. 
11  Psychomotor  and  visual  skills  -  3D  Spatial  awareness 
Individuals  have  varying  levels  of  skills  relating  to  perception,  which  can  affect  their 
action  in  the  working  environment.  Even  at  a  basic  level,  an  individual  who  is  short 
sighted  but  does  not  wear  glasses  will  be  more  likely  to  have  accidents  than  an 
individual  with  normal  eyesight,  if  the  task  requires  this  skill  for  it  to  be  performed 
safely  and  correctly. 
12  Attention  and  concentration  -  sorry,  I  missed  that. 
Those  individuals  who  have  a  higher  level  of  concentration  and  attention  to  a  task  or 
situation,  will  be  less  likely  to  have  accidents  than  those  with  a  limited  concentration 
span.  This  may  be  especially  true  of  `slips'  where  an  action  is  performed  wrongly 
because  of  distraction. 
13  Life  Events  -  sad  or  happy 
Although  'life  events'  are  specific  to  each  individual,  they  are  often  created  by  an 
external  party  or  parties  or  an  external  set  of  circumstances.  Each  individual  has  a 
range  of  coping  mechanisms  and,  due  to  these  individual  differences  their  ability  to 
cope  with  major  life  events  will  differ  widely.  Major  life  events  have  been 
associated  with  an  increased  accident  rate  in  a  number  of  studies  (Selzer,  1974). 
Those  individuals  who  have  better  coping  mechanisms  will  be  less  affected  in  terms 
of  an  increased  accident  experience. 
14  Compliance  -  are  you  sure  it'll  be  OK? 
Individuals  who  are  compliant  or  passive  are  more  likely  to  feel  pressurised  to 
follow  rules,  and  other  orders  given  by  the  manager  or  others  in  the  group,  whether 
this  is  to  take  safety  precautions  or  discard  them.  Such  an  individual  is  also  more 
likely  to  comply  with  the  views  and  behaviour  of  the  natural  group  leader  and  group 
norm,  in  some  cases  creating  a  conflict  with  the  requirements  of  the  manager.  A 
compliant  individual  is  more  likely  to  diverge  in  behaviour  from  his  or  her  expressed 
4:  190 attitude,  due  to  the  views  and  behaviour  of  others,  than  a  non-compliant  individual. 
This  type  of  individual  may  have  more  or  less  accident  experience  than  would 
otherwise  be  expected  depending  upon  whom  he  or  she  is  complying  with. 
4.2.3  ACCIDENT  PRONENESS 
In  a  work  environment,  individuals  may  be  highly  influenced  by  group  dynamics  and 
by  group  norms.  An  individual's  attitude  will  be  formed  by  the  joint  influences  of  his 
or  her  personality  and  the  behaviour/attitudes  of  the  group.  That  is,  his  or  her 
expressed  attitudes  will  be  formed  in  this  way.  However,  as  discussed  before,  the 
linkage  and  influences  between  expressed  attitude  and  actual  behaviour,  if  they  exist 
at  all,  are  not  only  tenuous  but  also  extremely  complex. 
Assuming  that  an  expressed  attitude  is  intended  by  an  individual  to  describe  his  or 
her  intended  behaviour,  the  model  shows  that  although  individuals  may  have  the 
same  intention,  their  actual  behaviour  may  differ. 
Table  17 
Expressed 
Attitude 
Attitude  of  9 
Group 
Attitude  of  9 
Individual 
Assume 
positive 
intention 
Assume 
positive 
intention 
Actual 
Behaviour 
Behaviour 
L  10 
Behaviour  9  Actual 
-  As  a  group  Behaviour  of 
-  as  individual  Individuals 
L 
Unsafe 
14 
Behaviour 
These  individuals  may  be  part  of  the  same  work  group,  and  while  the  expressed 
attitude  of  both  the  group  and  the  individual  may  be  positive,  other  'external'  or 
'internal'  factors  may  outweigh  these  attitudes  and  influence  the  actual  behaviour. 
The  external  factors  exist  for  all  individuals  in  the  same  workplace.  Assuming  that 
Safe 
Behaviour 
4:  191 this  is  the  case,  there  is  no  explanation  for  the  fact  that  individuals  have  varying 
levels  of  accident  experience,  some  never  having  had  an  accident,  and  at  the  other 
extreme,  some  who  have  had  a  high  accident  experience,  in  a  comparable  set  of 
circumstances.  Different  levels  of  accident  experience  in  a  work  place  therefore  must 
relate,  at  least  in  part,  to  individual  differences.  This  directly  disputes  the  theory  that 
by  modifying  a  group  attitude  to  safety,  one  will  then  directly  modify  the  risk  taking 
behaviour  and  accident  experience  of  these  individuals  in  the  workplace. 
It  is  suggested  then  that  it  is  not  necessarily  an  inaccurate  or  negative  'expressed' 
attitude  to  safety  that  leads  directly  to  risk  taking  behaviour  in  the  first  place,  and 
second,  that  due  to  individual  differences,  some  people  are  more  prone  to  having 
accidents  than  others,  who  would  otherwise  be  in  a  comparable  situation. 
4.2.4  ACCIDENT  REPEATER  CASE  STUDY 
This  study  aimed  to  determine, 
1  If  people  exposed  to  equivalent  hazards  on  site  have  equal  numbers  of 
accidents 
2  If  there  are  individuals  on  site  that  can  be  considered  to  be  accident  repeaters 
3  If  these  individuals  have  any  common  characteristics,  or  whether  experience 
is  purely  down  to  individual  differences. 
The  study  was  conducted  in  three  stages,  the  collation  of  accident  data,  the 
identification  of  any  'accident  repeaters'  and  the  identification  of  common 
characteristics. 
4.2.4.1  Accident  data 
Accident  data  for  the  Strathleven  site  was  collated  for  a  five  year  period  1990-1995, 
focusing  firstly  on  reportable,  lost  time  and  minor  accidents.  Individuals  who  had 
had  repeated  accident  experience  at  this  level  were  identified  from  a  total  site 
population  of  around  550.  It  was  determined  that  the  study  must  take  account  of 
what  is  an  expected  accident  experience  for  the  average  employee  on  this  site,  and 
what  by  inference  would  be  an  unusually  high  experience.  This  was  done  by  the 
application  of  the  formula, 
4:  192 =  Total  no  of  Ic»t  time/  minor  accidents  in  five  year  period 
Average  number  of  employees 
Table  18 
Year  Total  Accidents  No  of  Employees 
1990/1  116  600 
1991/2  133  580 
1992/3  121  580 
1993/4  121  580 
1994/5  107  550 
Giving  a?  of  1.0346,  the  average  number  of  reportable  or  minor  accidents  per 
person  in  a  five  year  period,  at  the  Strathleven  site. 
In  principle,  given  this  base  occurrence  rate,  the  probability  of  any  individual  having 
X  accidents  in  the  five  years  would  be, 
Table  19 
Number  of  accidents  Probability  of  occurrence 
2  0.19 
3  0.068 
4  0.0176 
5  3.64*  10"3 
6  6.28*  10-4 
7  9.28*10-5 
8  1.20*  10-5 
For  comparison  the  odds  on  winning  the  lottery  with  one  ticket  at  each  draw  are 
2*  10-8  so  having  8  or  more  accidents  is  obviously  possible!  In  this  study,  however, 
we  have  accepted  that  a  value  of  1*  10-4  is  a  reasonable  cut-off  for  unlikely  events. 
The  accident  data  was  analysed  again  and  only  those  individuals  with  accident 
experience  of  5  or  more  accidents  were  plotted  into  a  database,  noting  that  the 
4:  193 probability  of  any  individual  having  5  or  more  accidents  in  this  5  year  period  is  3  in 
1000. 
There  were  a  total  of  13  employees  out  of  a  work  force  of  approximately  550  that 
had  accident  experience  of  5  or  more  accidents  in  a5  year  period.  Even  at  7  or  more 
accidents,  with  a  probability  of  9.28*  10-5  ,  there  are  4  individuals.  These  individuals 
and  others  were  then  analysed  for  experience  of  first  aid  accidents  and  this 
experience  was  plotted  in  a  database  for  analysis. 
4.2.4.2  Identification  of  accident  repeaters 
From  the  study  of  the  work  force,  therefore,  it  was  determined  that  13  individuals 
could  be  identified  who  had  had  5  or  more  minor  or  reportable  accidents,  in  a  period 
of  five  years.  These  were  examined  in  more  detail, 
Table  20 
Case 
Number 
Reportables  Minors 
Sub-total 
M&R 
First  Aid 
Total 
Accidents 
1  1  5  6  2  8 
2  1  5  6  7  13 
3  0  5  5  2  7 
4  0  5  5  0  5 
5  0  5  5  7  12 
6  0  5  5  3  8 
7  0  5  5  4  9 
8  0  6  6  21  27 
9  0  6  6  6  12 
10  0  7  7  13  20 
11  0  8  8  5  13 
12  2  10  12  4  16 
13  0  12  12  4  14 
It  would  seem  that  there  is  at  least  some  evidence  for  at  least  4  accident  repeaters, 
who  have  had  between  7  and  12  minor  and  reportable  accidents  each  in  this  period  - 
considerably  more  if  first  aid  events  are  included.  The  13  highlighted  individuals 
also  had  a  total  of  87  first  aid  accidents  between  them  in  this  five  year  period. 
4:  194 Incorporation  of  first  aid  events  would  however  create  another  issue  as  the  first  aid 
accident  data  is  statistically  unstable,  as  discussed  in  the  earlier  statistics  chapter. 
However,  as  an  example,  Case  8  had  6  minor  accidents,  but  also  had  21  first  aid 
accidents,  that  is  an  overall  total  of  27  accidents.  As  previously  discussed,  first  aid 
accidents  can  be  skewed  by  an  individual's  area  of  work.  Those  individuals  who 
work  near  the  Medical  room  will  appear  to  have  had  more  first  aid  accidents,  but 
experience  suggest  this  is  more  likely  to  be  an  effect  from  more  accurate  reporting. 
Due  to  the  inconsistency  of  first  aid  figures,  only  minor  and  reportable  accidents 
were  used  as  indicators. 
Certainly,  the  probability  of  having  more  than  7  accidents  is  very  low  at  9.28*  10-5 
and,  therefore,  the  history  of  these  individuals  was  examined.  All  four  worked  in 
different  areas  in  the  plant.  Cases  11,12  and  13,  however,  all  worked  in  bottling 
areas  on  the  site  although  in  different  units,  so  they  would  have  different  external 
factors  in  terms  of  location,  tasks,  manager  etc,  but  they  would  share  these  external 
factors  with  others  in  their  own  area  -  there  may  be  up  to  50-200  other  employees  in 
each  of  their  units  who  are  influenced  by  the  same  external  factors.  Clearly,  there 
are  wide  differences  in  the  number  of  accidents  that  employees  in  these  areas  have, 
when  the  risk  exposure  is  the  same. 
There  is,  therefore,  evidence  that  these  Cases  10,11,12  and  13  qualify  under 
Glendon  and  Hale's  definition  of  accident  repeater  or  accident  prone. 
4.2.4.3  Case  studies 
Cases  10  and  11  both  worked  in  the  main  bottling  area  -  Units  One  and  Two,  but 
their  experience  was  rather  different.  The  accessibility  of  the  nurse  for  all  employees 
in  this  area  leads  to  a  high  level  of  reporting.  Both  Cases  had  similar  numbers  of 
minor  accidents,  but  case  10  reported  a  far  greater  number  of  first  aid  accidents. 
The  accident  rate  was  proportionately  higher  in  these  Units  compared  to  elsewhere 
on  site  -  due  to  the  nature  of  the  work.  However,  there  are  many  different  external 
factors  -  there  were  no  clusters  on  particular  lines  within  the  Units.  In  addition,  there 
were  another  14  employees  with  more  than  3  accidents  in  this  5  year  period. 
Although  there  were  around  200  employees  in  Units  One  and  Two,  only  2  had  had 
more  than  7  accidents  in  the  last  5  years.  This  suggests  individual  factors. 
4:  195 Case  12  worked  in  Unit  3,  with  a  total  of  12  minor  or  reportable  accidents  and 
several  reported  first  aid  accidents.  First  of  all  we  examined  if  there  was  a  cluster  of 
employees  in  this  area  with  a  similar  accident  experience,  to  identify  if  it  was  job  or 
task  factors,  managerial  factors,  location,  or  any  other  common  external  pressures. 
There  were  another  4  employees  who  had  had  2  minor  accidents  each,  but  this  could 
be  expected  (statistically)  in  an  area  where  50  employees  work,  over  5  years.  There 
was  little  evidence  of  a  cluster  of  bad  experience  in  this  area,  which  discounted 
external  factors,  leaving  only  internal  factors  to  account  for  the  difference  in  accident 
experience. 
Case  13  worked  in  the  Palletiser  area  and  had  12  minor  accidents  in  a  period  of  5 
years  and  several  reported  first  aid  accidents.  There  were  no  other  employees  based 
in  this  area  who  are  listed  on  the  database  top  30.  However,  it  has  to  be  mentioned 
that  the  Engineers  in  this  area  said  that'  small  accidents  like  cuts  are  part  of  the  job' 
and  stated  that  they  would  not  go  to  the  nurse  to  report  it.  It  is  also  true  that  the 
Pallestiser  is  positioned  far  from  the  Medical  Room.  It  is  still  true,  however,  that 
there  were  no  other  employees  from  this  area  listed,  so  why  this  employee?  The 
answer,  even  if  it  is  only  that  certain  personalities  report  accidents,  must  be  due  to 
individual  characteristics. 
4.2.4.4  Common  characteristics  of  accident  repeaters 
Other  research  studies  have  failed  to  identify  an  'accident  prone'  personality  trait  or 
'gene'.  The  identification  of  such  a  personality  trait  is  outwith  the  scope  of  this  study, 
but  it  is  interesting  to  discover  if  there  are  common  characteristics  shared  by  the  4 
`main'  accident  repeaters. 
It  has  been  argued  in  other  studies  such  as  Selzer  and  Vinokur  (1974),  that  temporary 
stressors  or  major  life  events  are  a  main  cause  of  high  accident  rates.  In  fact 
Porter  (1988)  suggests  that  an  accident  proneness  is  not  a  constant  trait  of  an 
individual,  instead  it  is  dependant  upon  circumstances  and  events.  However,  in  this 
study,  all  four  of  the  accident  repeaters  have  had  a  continued  high  level  experience 
over  a  five  year  period.  The  effect  of  major  life  events  cannot  be  discounted,  but 
should  not  be  responsible  for  continued  accident  experience  at  this  level  over  such  an 
extended  period  of  time. 
4:  196 Several  parties  have  proposed  characteristics  or  traits  of  individuals  who  are  prone  to 
accidents.  The  Shaw  Sichel  model  (1971),  that  appears  to  be  based  on  original 
material  by  Eysenck  (1964),  is  below  modified  to  attempt  a  prediction  of  accident 
repeaters  based  on  J&B  staff. 
Table  21 
Proposed  Model  of  an  'accident  repeater' 
PEOPLE  MANAGEMENT 
-  ISOLATED 
-  WORK  ALONE 
-  RELUCTANT 
-  HARD  TO  MOTIVATE 
-  DEPENDENCIES 
MOODY 
ANXIOUS 
RIGID 
SOBER 
PESSIMISTIC 
RESERVED 
UNSOCIABLE 
QUIET 
INTROVERTED 
ACCIDENT  REPEATERS 
-  VOLUNTEERS 
-  SHAPE  GROUP  NORMS 
-  LEADERS 
UNSTABLE 
TOUCHY 
RESTLESS 
AGGRESSIVE 
EXCITABLE 
CHANGEABLE 
IMPULSIVE 
OPTIMISTIC 
ACTIVE 
EXTRAVERTED 
PASSIVE  OUTGOING 
CAREFUL  SOCIABLE 
THOUGHTFUL  TALKATIVE 
PEACEFUL  RESPONSIVE 
CONTROLLED  EASYGOING 
RELIABLE  LIVELY 
EVEN-TEMPERED  CAREFREE 
CALM  LEADERSHIP 
STABLE 
The  conclusion  from  J&B  experience  is  that  accident  repeaters  do  exist  and, 
moreover,  they  exist  in  some  quantity  -  at  least  1  in  100  and,  perhaps,  more.  Even 
more  alarming  is  the  fact  that  this  does  not  include  those  who  might  deliberately  seek 
to  harm  others. 
4:  197 4.2.4.5  Effect  of  accident  repeaters 
The  Shaw  Sichel  model  suggests  that  the  common  characteristics  of  people  who 
have  had  repeated  accident  experience  include  poor  attention,  extroversion  and  over 
confidence.  If  these  individuals  have  accidents  because  of  their  internal  and 
personality  factors,  then  it  is  also  fair  to  assume  that  generally  their  behaviour  will 
fail  to  conform  with  procedures.  In  a  safety  context,  even  when  there  is  non 
conforming  behaviour,  the  circumstances  must  also  combine  to  allow  a  serious 
accident  to  happen,  otherwise  the  individuals  may  have  a  hidden  record  of  'near' 
misses. 
If  individuals  do  not  pay  attention  to  safety  precautions,  or  fail  to  follow  them,  then 
it  is  a  fair  assumption  that  they  will  behave  similarly  in  relation  to  their  actual 
occupation.  For  example:  they  may  make  errors  in  judgement,  follow  incorrect 
procedures,  and  make  other  mistakes  -  more  often  than  others  on  the  same  or  a 
similar  task,  these  will  result  in  an  effect  on  the  quality  of  the  product  or  task  rather 
than  on  an  accident.  Accidents  are  in  most  cases  reported  for  legislative  reasons  and 
are  therefore  recorded  and  examined  -  but  errors  made  in  tasks  are  rarely  recorded  in 
this  way.  In  many  cases  it  may  be  difficult  to  connect  specific  errors  with  particular 
individuals.  It  is  unlikely,  however,  that  poor  performance  would  be  unknown  to  the 
local  Supervisor. 
It  is  only  theoretical,  but  it  may  be  worth  investigating  the  connection  between 
accident  'prone'  /repeater  individuals,  with  their  errors  in  judgement  or  behaviour  in 
a  more  general  context  of  tasks.  If  they  are  making  many  errors  due  to  a  combination 
of  personality  characteristics,  then  it  may  be  beneficial  to  move  this  person  to  a  task 
or  environment  more  suited  to  their  skills,  or  where  damage  is  minimal  to  the 
production  process,  and  to  themselves.  If  the  errors  are  task  specific  then  it  may  be 
an  issue  of  capability,  training  or  reskilling.  This  study  could  be  extended  to  evaluate 
the  general  performance  of  the  13  cases  listed  in  the  table,  to  determine  if  there  was  a 
direct  association  between  accident  performance  and  production  or  quality 
performance.  If  characteristics  linked  to  general  errors  could  be  identified,  they 
could  be  built  into  the  recruitment  process. 
4:  198 A  critical  issue  is  that  when  a  company  aims  for  zero  defects  within  the  production 
process,  these  scattered  individuals  may  have  an  impact  on  otherwise  improved 
results.  This  is  certainly  the  case  with  the  accident  statistics  at  J&B  Scotland 
because,  as  they  reduce  annually,  the  poor  experience  of  a  relative  few  is  having  an 
impact  on  the  overall  figures.  The  critical  difference  between  safety  and  quality,  is 
that  while  there  are  humans  in  a  plant,  there  will  never  be  zero  accidents,  but  zero 
defects  is  theoretically  possible  within  a  quality  environment.  Therefore,  it  is 
possible  that,  due  to  their  personality  characteristics,  a  minority  of  error  prone 
individuals  may  have  a  major  impact  on  the  satisfaction  of  the  customer,  both 
internal  or  external.  The  impact  of  this  may  be  very  wide  ranging  indeed  in  a 
competitive,  quality  and  customer  related  market  place. 
4.3  PEOPLE  AND  PARTICIPATION 
4.3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The  previous  two  sections  have  suggested  that  the  focus  for  improvement  of  health 
and  safety  performance  should  be  upon  behaviour,  awareness  and  understanding 
rather  than  on  `attitude'  to  safety.  There  does  not  appear  to  be  a  conclusive  link 
between  attitude  and  behaviour,  and  in  addition  there  are  impacts  due  to  individual 
differences.  In  essence,  even  if  you  have  ensured  that  employees  have  a  positive 
attitude  to  safety,  safe  behaviour  does  not  necessarily  follow  and  it  cannot  be 
guaranteed  that  no  errors  will  result. 
So  what  then  can  be  done  to  improve  standards  of  safety,  and  how  can  safe 
behaviour  be  achieved  ?  It  has  been  a  strong  thread  of  belief  throughout  this  study 
that  improvement  could  not  be  achieved  without  the  active  participation  of  people  at 
all  levels  within  the  company.  A  multi-faceted  approach  was  required  to  ensure 
effective  involvement. 
4:  199 4.3.2  SAFETY  CO-ORDINATORS 
4.3.2.1  General 
In  J&B,  safety  co-ordinators  were  appointed  from  middle  management  at  the 
Strathleven  site  in  the  early  years  of  the  study  (1995/6)  based  on  recommendations  in 
the  University  study,  the  outcome  of  the  first  CHASE  audit  and  consideration  of 
effective  mechanisms.  They  were  all  Line  Managers,  and  from  a  range  of 
departments  covering  the  whole  site  -  Production,  Back  shift,  Warehousing,  Spirit 
Supply  and  Laboratories. 
They  were  appointed  as  an  interim  step.  It  was  recognised  that  ideally  all  Line 
Managers  should  take  full  responsibility  for  occupational  health  and  safety  in  their 
own  area,  but  that  they  required  the  skills  to  manage  this  effectively.  This  would 
take  time. 
An  additional  reason  for  their  appointment  was  that  the  current  health  and  safety 
manager  was  retiring  after  around  18  years  service.  A  decision  had  been  taken  that 
health  and  safety  must  no  longer  been  seen  as  the  safety  'policeman's'  responsibility, 
and  it  should  instead  be  placed  fairly  and  squarely  with  each  and  every  individual  on 
site.  It  was  decided  that,  as  Managers  had  responsibility  for  their  sub-ordinates,  they 
should  be  trained  to  supervise  safe  operations  whilst  ensuring  that  their  team  took 
full  responsibility  for  their  individual  actions.  The  interim  step  ensured  that  5 
Managers  had  the  skills  and  expertise  combined  with  local  knowledge. 
It  was  recognised  however  that  the  Managers  did  not  all  have  the  necessary  skills  to 
perform  the  role  as  competent  person,  and  so  an  interim  stage  would  be  required. 
The  Safety  Co-ordinators  were  sent  on  examinable  NEBOSH  Certificate  courses, 
and  attended  specific  safety  training  to  match  their  departmental  risk  profile.  The  site 
was  then  split  into  6  main  areas  with  a  Safety  Co-ordinator  responsible  for  each,  with 
the  central  Risk  Function  providing  strategic  lead  and  specialist  support  as  and  when 
required.  It  had  been  anticipated  that  the  individuals  selected  as  Co-ordinators  would 
move  internally  over  time  and  could  take  this  expertise  with  them  to  another  role  of 
department.  This  did,  in  fact,  occur  when  the  Back-shift  Safety  Co-ordinator  took  up 
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became  a  Production  Line  Manager,  and  the  White  Spirits  Safety  Co-ordinator 
became  the  Process  Improvement  Manager.  The  Brown  Spirits  Manager  shared  the 
Co-ordinator's  role  and  has  eventually  reached  Executive  level  as  Manager 
responsible  for  all  spirit  production.  Initially,  the  Risk  Department  provided  regular 
support  and  input  to  safety  decisions,  but  this  support  was  required  less  and  less  as 
the  Co-ordinators  grew  in  confidence. 
4.3.2.2  Overall  strategy 
The  overall  strategy  was  that  all  Line  Managers  would  have  OHS  training  and 
competence  and  that  safety  should  be  managed  `on  the  line  by  the  line'.  There  had 
to  be  a  gradual  change  from  centrally  managed  safety.  It  was  planned  that  the  initial 
Co-ordinators  would  first  settle  into  their  roles,  and  then  the  Production  and  other 
line  managers  would  be  trained  to  NEBOSH  Certificate  level,  this  process  being 
staggered  over  a  period  of  time.  These  Line  Managers  would  then  be  supported  by 
the  designated  Co-ordinator  and  by  the  central  Risk  function.  In  practice,  because  of 
the  job  moves  and  promotions  discussed  above,  a  number  of  key  managers  now  have 
both  NEBOSH  Certificate  training  and  experience  as  a  safety  co-ordinator. 
In  line  with  the  strategy,  however,  a  custom  designed  specialist  5  day  safety  course 
for  Managers  and  Supervisors  was  sponsored  by  J&B  through  the  Scottish  Whisky 
Association  with  RoSPA.  This  was  intended  to  be  an  alternative  to  the  NEBOSH 
Certificate  as  it  was  to  be  tailored  to  the  needs  of  the  drinks  industry.  As  with  all 
Industry  initiatives,  however,  the  course  development  was  prolonged  and  the  content 
diluted. 
J&B  also,  therefore,  set  out  to  develop  a  more  intensive  and  directed  three  day 
course  with  a  specialist  training  provider.  This  became  operational  just  as  the 
merger  (and  subsequent  plant  closure)  was  announced.  Executive  authority  had  been 
given  for  all  Line  Managers  to  take  this  course  over  a  twelve  month  period. 
Although  the  various  training  schemes  set  out  to  provide  managers  with  technical 
training  and  a  better  understanding  and  awareness,  an  additional  benefit  was  clear. 
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strongly  committed  advocates  of  safety  management  within  the  company.  Although 
the  study,  therefore,  did  not  set  out  to  achieve  a  change  in  expressed  attitude,  it  was 
achieved  anyway,  as  well  as  a  clear  measurable  change  in  behaviour,  awareness  and 
understanding.  Indeed,  during  the  annual  audits,  the  Co-ordinator  function  has  been 
picked  out  by  both  the  external  auditor  and  internal  parties  at  all  levels  as  the  single 
most  important  reason  for  the  company's  strong  safety  management  performance  and 
improving  standards.  This  view  was  repeated  in  the  individual  Interview  Study. 
4.3.2.3  Local  tactics 
Clearly,  selection  of  the  right  individuals  to  take  on  the  Co-ordinator  function  was 
critical.  They  developed  strongly  in  their  careers,  but  were  chosen  for  their  character 
and  potential  -a  chicken  and  egg  situation.  In  a  people  business,  selection  of  people 
is  critical  and  the  Co-ordinator  function  had  to  be  sold  to  ambitious  and  competent 
people.  The  selling  point  was  career  development.  It  was  pointed  out  that  the 
Company  was  expressing  a  commitment  to  OHS  in  the  foreseeable  future  and  that 
Occupational  Health  and  Safety  would  always  be  seen  as  a  positive  (or  at  worst  a 
neutral)  item  of  experience  in  a  career  profile.  This  could  be  contrasted,  for 
example,  with  specialist  experience  that  offers  no  wider  perspective  and  an 
impression  of  insularity.  The  selling  team  would  appear  to  have  been  very  good  in 
both  target  identification  and  sales!!  Of  the  five  Safety  Co-ordinators  appointed  and 
trained,  four  out  of  five  received  job  promotions  within  three  years  of  taking  on  the 
Co-ordinators  role. 
4.3.3  SAFETY  COMMITTEES 
4.3.3.1  Historical  situation 
The  safety  committees  were  seen  as  key  to  achieving  involvement  of  people  at 
operator  level  in  decisions  about  safety  management  and  gaining  their  commitment 
to  policies.  The  biggest  challenge  was  the  safety  committee  at  Strathleven,  that 
represented  the  health  and  safety  of  550-600  employees  on  a  large  single  site. 
Initially,  in  1993,  the  Strathleven  Safety  Committee  had  a  less  than  diverse 
representation,  with  the  Financial  Director  (as  Chair),  the  Health  and  Safety  Manager 
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day-to-day  safety  issues  such  as  broken  guards  and  other  low  level  issues  and  no 
attention  was  paid  to  strategy  and  improvement  of  health  and  safety  standards. 
Indeed,  when  the  Chairman  did  not  attend  (and  that  was  relatively  often)  only 
discussion  took  place  with  virtually  no  actions. 
4.3.3.2  Change  actions 
A  conscious  decision  was  taken  to  involve  the  committee  in  progress  and  strategy 
rather  than  with  the  daily  issues  that  could,  and  should  be  resolved  at  local 
departmental  level.  The  safety  committee  members  were  encouraged  to  get  issues 
resolved  by  notifying  their  manager,  and  raising  a  request  form,  and  bringing  only 
urgent  or  unresolved  issues  to  the  committee.  Inappropriate  issues  raised  at  the 
Committee  meetings  were  politely  refused  and  the  member  directed  to  a  more 
appropriate  forum  where  the  issue  should  be  discussed  and  resolved.  This  gradually 
changed  the  focus  of  the  safety  committee. 
The  committee  membership  was  then  broadened  to  deal  with  its  changing  role  for 
employee  involvement. 
At  the  same  time  and  with  the  joint  intention  of  developing  understanding  of  safety 
management  and  producing  cohesion  in  the  Committees,  a  training  course  was 
developed  by  J&B  with  the  Trade  Union  Training  Centre  at  Reid  Kerr  College  in 
Paisley.  All  members  of  the  Committee  attended  -  both  management  and  workforce. 
Prior  to  this,  attempts  to  drive  trade  union  appointed  Representatives  to  undertake 
union  sponsored  training  had  met  little  success  -  falling  foul  of  entrenched  pay  and 
condition  priorities  and  parochial  vision.  (At  one  meeting  the  author  was  called  a 
*******  liar  and  a  manager  although  there  was  some  doubt  about  which  was 
intended  as  the  biggest  insult.  ) 
The  safety  committee  membership  at  Strathleven  was  modified.  The  new  Committee 
consisted  of  a  new  executive  level  chairman,  the  Risk  Control  Manager,  site  nurse, 
representatives  from  all  Union  groups,  plus  Safety  Co-ordinators,  representatives 
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represent  the  site  fully. 
The  Executive  team  nominated  the  Quality  and  Blends  Director  as  chairman.  He  was 
later  replaced  by  the  Quality  Director.  The  changes  were  intended  to  provide  strong, 
senior  leadership  and  representation  at  Executive  level  at  the  safety  committee.  The 
Risk  Control  Manager  provided  technical  strategic  leadership,  direction  and 
expertise.  The  Safety  Co-ordinators  represented  the  5  main  geographical  zones  of  the 
site,  and  input  from  a  management  perspective.  The  three  Union  Groups  and  their 
members  were  represented  by  Safety  Representatives.  In  addition,  as  the  Facilities 
Department  were  often  asked  to  solve  the  physical  problems  raised  at  the  committee 
they  also  had  representation.  Finally,  the  Training  team  were  represented  to  provide 
input  to  the  training  required  to  help  implement  the  strategy  and  the  safe  systems  of 
work.  Other  parties  appeared  as  'guests'  for  presentations  or  to  help  resolve  specific 
issues.  The  new  committee  represented  and  consulted  a  far  wider  range  of 
individuals  and  had  the  authority  to  make  real  decisions  at  meetings. 
4.3.3.3  Committee  activities 
Key  issues  were  selected  for  the  new  committee  to  provide  early  focus  and  `team' 
behaviour  based  on  shared  tasks  and  goals  (Klause,  1996). 
i)  implementation  of  a  hearing  conservation  programme, 
ii)  the  No-Smoking  policy, 
iii)  the  Hazard  Notification  book 
iv)  the  development  of  the  new  Safety  Management  system. 
It  has  to  be  noted,  however,  that  some  committee  members  adapted  to  the  changing 
role  of  the  committee  better  than  others.  Most  members  appreciated  the  change  to 
proactive  safety  management  from  the  reactive,  confrontational  style  of  previous 
safety  committees,  but  the  new  committee  faced  difficulties,  as  a  minority  prevented 
it  from  taking  on  its  new  direction  fully.  Indeed,  several  members  still  believed  the 
committee  to  be  a  forum  to  air  grievances  against  general  management  decisions  and 
raise  employment  and  pay  and  condition  issues.  With  conflict  of  this  nature,  this 
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There  were  difficulties  in  the  appointment  of  Safety  Representatives  as  traditionally 
b 
the  Representatives  on  site  had  always  been  Union  appointed  (HSE,  1996).  There 
was  opposition  from  an  existing  Safety  Representative  in  an  area  where  new 
Representatives  were  to  be  appointed.  She  was  asked  to  request  nominations  for 
Safety  Representatives  for  the  area  and,  on  her  refusal  to  assist  with  the  process,  the 
other  Unions  were  approached  to  provide  representatives  but  were  not  forthcoming. 
In  the  end,  appointments  of  two  new  Safety  Representatives  were  made  by  the  Line 
Managers  (as  permitted  by  the  Employee  Consultation  Regulations  1996 
b 
(HSE,  1996).  The  Line  Managers  approached  keen,  safety-conscious  individuals 
and,  after  a  short  period  of  adjustment,  the  original  Safety  Representatives  accepted 
their  new  colleagues. 
4.3.3.4  Outcomes 
One  of  the  aims  of  the  overall  study  was  to  overcome  this  conflict  and  seek  the 
positive,  constructive  involvement  of  employees  at  all  levels.  The  Safety  Committee 
should  have  provided  a  good  vehicle  for  this  participation.  A  comprehensive 
training  programme  had  been  developed  for  all  committee  members  to  include  : 
teamwork,  meetings  skills,  and  other  technical  safety  training  such  as  risk 
assessments  and  auditing.  The  training  aimed  to  increase  the  skills  and 
understanding  of  the  safety  committee  members  beyond  the  legally  required 
standards.  The  membership  had  been  changed  to  provide  impetus  and  expertise. 
And  yet.....,  an  element  of  conflict  remained  to  the  end.  Most  members  are 
committed  and  positive  members  of  the  Team  and  the  physical  presence  of  a  senior 
management  chair  is  no  longer  essential  as  responsibility  for  action  is  taken  by 
individual  Committee  members. 
By  1997  a  direct  relationship  could  be  observed  between  a  positive  expressed 
attitude  to  involvement,  the  active  participation  of  the  safety  committee  member,  and 
the  safety  standards  in  their  area  of  responsibility.  This  correlation  was  identified  by 
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a  reduction  in  the  number  of  unresolved  safety  issues. 
4.3.4  HAZARD  NOTIFICATION  AND  RISK  ASSESSMENT 
4.3.4.1  Hazard  notification 
The  safety  committee  members  and  all  employees  were  encouraged  to  use  a  hazard 
notification  book.  This  system  had  been  in  place  for  several  years  before  the  period 
of  study  but  had  been  seldom  used.  It  was  intended  that  any  employee  could  draw 
attention  to  a  hazard  by  completing  a  notification  form,  and  passing  a  copy  of  the 
sheet  to  the  Department  Manager  and  another  through  the  maintenance  system  for 
the  improvement  to  be  carried  out. 
It  was  established  that  many  employees  were  not  being  allowed  access  to  the  books, 
and  others  were  simply  not  using  them.  A  Subgroup  from  the  Safety  Committee  was 
set  up  to  revamp  and  reissue  a  Hazard  Notification  system  and  developed  a  new 
system  after  consultation  with  employees,  the  Management  team,  and  the  safety 
committee.  This  was  probably  the  first  positive  development  by  the  new  committee 
and  was  a  direct  outcome  of  their  training  course  where  a  project  was  required. 
The  forms  which  were  internally  generated,  could  be  completed  by  any  employee, 
and  were  sent  direct  to  the  Facilities  Team.  Each  hazard  raised  was  assessed  and 
ranked  in  order  of  risk  priority  and  actioned  accordingly.  The  system  ensured  that  all 
risks  were  communicated  but  the  system  would  not  be  abused.  Actions  were  planned 
into  the  Planned  Maintenance  system,  and  jobs  requiring  improvement  action  were 
issued.  Feedback  was  given  to  the  individual  who  placed  the  hazard  report.  At  the 
monthly  safety  committee,  outstanding  `hazards'  were  discussed.  The  book  was 
launched  with  a  communications  campaign  that  encouraged  employees  to  raise  any 
safety  issue. 
The  system  encouraged  the  participation  of  all  employees,  and  added  priority  to 
issues  that  were  not  being  resolved  at  Departmental  level  -  in  the  first  instance 
through  the  personal  involvement  of  a  Safety  Co-ordinator  and  a  Safety 
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further  discussion  at  the  safety  committee. 
Previously  some  of  these  concerns  had  been  lost  as  Managers  had  not  given 
employees  the  opportunity  to  raise  a  hazard  form  -  perhaps  taking  any  complaint  as 
an  implicit  criticism. 
The  system  also  acted  as  a  cost  effective  method  of  behavioural  analysis.  It  has  been 
commented  earlier  that  while  concentrated  behavioural  analysis  has  some  benefits, 
these  benefits  could  not  justify  the  introduction  of  such  as  resource  and  time 
intensive  system.  In  addition,  specific  skills  and  expertise  would  also  be  required  but 
were  not  available  within  the  company  at  that  time.  Hazard  notification,  however, 
allowed  all  employees  to  observe  and  comment  on  unsafe  action,  behaviour  and 
situations,  and  demand  that  improvement  action  is  carried  out.  The  notification 
system  required  discussion  of  whether  a  hazard  exists  or  not,  and  of  what  level  of 
risk  it  represents  against  other  hazards  and  this  discussion  provided  active 
participation  of  all  employees  on  the  improvement  of  safety  standards.  It  was 
important,  however,  that  employees  were  encouraged  to  resolve  local  day  to  day 
issues  at  departmental  level  first  and  only  to  raise  hazard  forms  for  unresolved  or 
repeated  issues. 
4.3.4.2  Risk  assessment 
Another  method  used  was  that  of  the  risk  assessment  -  over  and  above  that  required 
ti 
by  the  Management  of  Health  and  Safety  at  Work  Regulations  (HSE,  1992). 
Apart  from  the  use  of  planned  risk  assessments  for  all  tasks  on  site,  additional  risk 
assessments  were  carried  out  when  a  hazard  was  communicated  to  a  departmental 
manager  or  Safety  Representative.  Risk  assessments  were  also  integrated  into  the 
equipment  purchasing  system.  All  tasks,  projects  or  equipment  with  potential  safety 
implications  were  risk  assessed  before  being  authorised  for  purchase  or 
implementation,  and  the  assessment  was  accepted  by  the  Risk  Control  Manager. 
Indeed,  in  practice,  all  projects,  tasks  and  equipment  were  approved  by  the  Risk 
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expert  at  the  outset.  Thus,  risk  and  task  assessments  were  used  as  a  tool  to  improve 
current  tasks  on  an  ongoing  basis,  to  justify  safety  improvement,  to  prioritise 
improvements  to  hazards  and  on  request  by  any  employee.  The  risk  assessment 
process  became  integral  to  the  identification  and  improvement  of  risk  control  within 
the  company  with  the  active  involvement  of  employees  at  all  levels.  It  enabled  risks 
to  be  prioritised  with  key  risks  actioned  via  the  Facilities  Team's  maintenance 
system  to  ensure  that  risks  were  not  overlooked. 
The  risk  assessments  were  generally  carried  out  by  the  local  Safety  Representative 
(who  had  received  training  on  conducting  risk  assessments)  and  Safety  Co-ordinator 
or  the  Risk  Control  Manager. 
4.3.4.3  Resistance  overcome 
An  important  issue  was  confronted  here.  Many  union  appointed  Representatives 
refused  to  be  involved  in  risk  assessments  as  no  additional  monetary  reward  had 
been  nor  would  be,  agreed  with  the  Unions  for  this  involvement.  The  Management 
Regulations  imply,  however,  that  the  safety  representatives  (and  the  individuals  who 
perform  the  work)  should  be  involved  in  any  task  risk  assessment  and  there  is 
obvious  value  in  this.  There  was  in  addition,  however,  a  mystique  attached  to  risk 
assessment  that  seemed  to  inhibit  starting  the  assessment.  The  tactic  developed  by 
the  Risk  Manager  and  the  Safety  Co-ordinators  was  to  turn  up  and  talk  about  the 
task  thus  forcing  the  Representative  into  collaboration. 
4.3.5  SAFETY  INSPECTIONS 
At  the  outset  of  the  study,  safety  inspections  were  carried  out  by  the  Safety 
Representatives  (usually  alone)  on  a  sporadic  basis,  with  physical  inspections  being 
carried  out  by  the  Health  and  Safety  Manager  in  his  policeman's  role.  The  company 
policy  was  changed  in  1995  to  require  Safety  Representatives  to  carry  out  monthly 
inspections  as  a  minimum  with  the  Line  Manager  or  safety  co-ordinator.  This 
complemented  the  approach  to  risk  assessment.  This  system  worked  effectively 
where  there  was  an  adequate  number  of  Safety  Representatives  in  an  area  and  a 
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The  external  audit  in  1997  reinforced  the  link  between  safety  inspections,  safety 
standards  and  the  effective  enforcement  of  policies.  In  the  areas  on  site  where  good 
regular  inspections  were  carried  out  and  improvement  actions  implemented,  the 
safety  standards  were  judged  to  be  highest  and  accident  rates  lowest.  The  areas 
where  the  program  was  most  successful  combined  a  trained  Safety  Co-ordinator  and 
a  committed  Safety  Representative. 
By  contrast,  a  deficiency  was  pinpointed  in  one  area  on  site  where,  due  to 
organisational  restructuring,  there  was  one  Safety  Representative  for  a  large  area 
where  nearly  200  employees  worked.  The  Representative  was  not  performing 
thorough,  regular  audits,  and  there  was  little  management  commitment  to 
improvement  of  the  inspections  in  the  area.  The  safety  audit  had  suggested  these 
production  units  were  deficient  in  safety  standards  and  the  highest  in  terms  of 
frequency  of  accidents  (although  the  severity  of  these  accidents  tended  to  be 
relatively  low).  It  was  clear  that  positive  action  was  needed  to  improve  these  areas. 
The  first  step  was  to  appoint  additional  Safety  Representatives  for  the  area,  and 
provide  them  with  adequate  training  and  skills.  The  three  production  line  managers 
agreed  that  they  each  needed  a  Safety  Representative  allowing  them  to  build  up  a 
direct  relationship  with  the  Representative  on  safety  issues. 
The  safety  management  system  had  been  devised  in  ISO  style  and  was  intended  to  be 
audited  as  such,  with  procedures  being  audited  both  internally  and  externally.  The 
next  stage  of  the  system  was  to  audit  against  checklists  for  what  was  physically 
there,  almost  like  a  structured  safety  inspection.  All  Safety  Representatives  were 
trained  to  carry  out  audits  which  were  intended  to,  in  part,  replace  the  safety 
inspection  system.  Due  to  the  organisational  changes,  however,  the  new  system 
never  wholly  replaced  the  original  safety  inspection  system  and  it  is hard  to  judge  its 
merits. 
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4.3.6.1  Training  matrix 
A  comprehensive  system  of  safety  training  was  put  together  to  ensure  that  all 
employees  received  proactive  training  in  health  and  safety  issues.  The  training  was 
put  together  in  matrix  form  (see  figure  16)  with  compulsory  training  and 
recommended  training  for  employees  in  different  positions  in  the  company. 
It  was  proposed  by  the  Executive  that  all  line  managers  receive  the  5  day  ROSPA 
accredited  health  and  safety  awareness  course  for  managers  -  later  replaced  by  the 
intensive  J&B  three  day  course.  To  supplement  this  training,  the  Managers  would 
then  receive  specialist  training  on  areas  of  particular  concern  to  them  -  for  example, 
control  of  contractors  for  the  Facilities  Team,  permits  to  work  for  the  Engineering 
Dept,  electrical  safety  for  the  Services  Co-ordinator  and  for  Engineering. 
This  matrix  listed  mandatory  courses  for  employees  by  position  or  trade,  then 
specific  supplementary  courses  for  this  position  or  trade.  The  safety  management 
system  requires  that  to  perform  a  certain  job  or  role,  the  individual  must  have  a  set  of 
safety  skills  which  can  then  be  built  upon  and  refreshed.  These  skills,  as  provided  by 
the  training  course  were  listed  in  the  matrix.  In  many  ways  these  requirements 
would  transfer  directly  into  competencies  as  defined  within  the  various  SVQ 
structures.  In  the  mid  1990's  there  had  been  a  UK  national  initiative  to  set  up  a  lead 
body  for  safety  within  the  NVQ  framework,  but  this  was  not  moving  quickly  enough 
for  J&B's  purposes  nor  was  it  focused  upon  J&B's  needs. 
The  Safety  Co-ordinators  were  the  first  recipients  of  the  NEBOSH  Certificate  - 
albeit  the  Certificate  was  not  specific  to  the  drinks  industry.  It  was  planned  that 
future  Co-ordinators  and  Managers  would  take  the  ROSPA  accredited  -  later  the 
J&B  intensive  -  industry  specific  courses.  All  of  the  training  listed  in  the  matrix 
targets  safety  awareness  and  modification  of  behaviour  rather  than  'attitude'  and  there 
were  clear  examples  of  individuals  who  had  clearly  improved  their  awareness  as  a 
result  of  high  impact  training. 
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mentioned  a  one-day  in-house  safety  course  for  Supervisors  that  really  hit  home  with 
the  potential  consequences  of  neglecting  their  responsibilities  for  safety.  This  had 
been  intended  to  raise  interest  and  awareness  in  the  next,  more  detailed  courses. 
Interestingly,  both  the  staff  and  Managers  mentioned  in  interviews  a  change  in 
'attitude'  around  this  time  which  had  lasting  effect. 
It  cannot  be  determined  whether  this  was  indeed  a  change  in  attitude  or  a  response  to 
a  stimulus,  but  there  was  certainly  an  observable  display  of  different  behaviour  and 
expressed  attitude  due  to  increased  understanding  of  the  legal  position  if  not  of 
safety  requirements.  Either  way  the  net  effect  of  the  improved  awareness  was 
improved  safety  standards  due  to  more  safety  conscious  Managers.  It  appears, 
therefore,  that  by  providing  even  limited  training  that  targets  safety  behaviour  a 
change  can  be  produced  in  understanding  and  behaviour. 
4.3.6.2  Safety  induction  and  recruitment 
Responsibility  for  occupational  health  and  safety  was  written  into  all  job  descriptions 
and  job  adverts  from  1996.  Prior  to  this  time,  OHS  responsibility  had  only  been 
specifically  listed  for  roles  that  had  a  direct  input  into  the  function  -  that  is,  the  OHS 
Specialists.  An  opportunity  for  change  was  seized  in  1996  with  the  launch  of  the  Job 
Evaluation  Scheme.  The  Job  Evaluation  Scheme  listed  all  of  the  responsibilities 
attached  to  a  job  under  key  categories  -  such  as  budgetary  control,  responsibility  for 
assets,  responsibility  for  people,  work  environment,  technical  skill,  and  occupational 
health  and  safety  -  and  assessed  each  role  against  each  of  those  categories.  Jobs  or 
roles  that  had  greater  responsibility  for  occupational  health  and  safety  received  a 
higher  rating  for  that  category,  in  turn  this  was  rewarded  by  a  higher  grading  overall, 
and  therefore  a  higher  salary  band. 
One  positive  output  of  the  Job  Evaluation  process  was  that  those  who  had  greater 
levels  of  responsibility  for  occupational  health  and  safety  were  rewarded,  and 
another  was  that  as  an  outcome  of  this  process,  all  employee  job  descriptions 
contained  clear  OHS  responsibility.  From  1996,  all  job  advertisements  -  whether 
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responsibilities  attached  with  that  role.  In  interviews  for  management  and 
supervisory  roles,  part  of  the  interview  process  focused  specifically  on  occupational 
health  and  safety  responsibility  and  management.  The  Human  Resources  team  were 
given  training  and  support  from  the  Risk  Manager  in  identifying  appropriate 
questions  and  the  desired  responses. 
Another  vehicle  for  delivery  of  the  safety  message  was  the  Health  and  Safety 
Induction.  All  employees  -  whether  temporary  or  permanent  -  received  a  company 
and  site  induction  when  they  started  work  with  the  business.  The  employee  induction 
covered  all  aspects  of  work  including  holiday  entitlements,  company  rules, 
disciplinary  action,  and  occupational  health  and  safety.  After  a  site  tour,  the  OHS 
induction,  led  by  the  Risk  Department,  covered  all  general  aspects  of  health  and 
safety  including  company  policies,  site  rules,  key  risks,  accident  reporting  system, 
and  personal  protective  equipment.  A  more  detailed  discussion  of  local  risks  took 
place  during  the  area  induction  with  the  Departmental  Manager. 
In  1996,  to  ensure  that  Occupational  Health  and  Safety  was  regarded  as  having  an 
equal  footing  with  other  key  areas  of  management  and  integrated  with  `the  way 
things  were  done',  the  responsibility  for  the  general  health  and  safety  induction  was 
transferred  to  the  Human  Resources  Department.  The  OHS  induction  then  became 
part  of  the  overall  company/site  induction  process.  The  Risk  Department  provided 
the  Human  Resources  team  with  appropriate  training  and  induction  notes.  One  of  the 
objectives  of  transferring  responsibility  for  OHS  induction  to  the  Human  Resource 
Team,  was  to  gain  their  direct  involvement  in  Occupational  Health  and  safety,  from 
recruitment,  to  induction,  to  training  and  in  the  worst  case,  enforcement.  Again,  a 
more  specific  OHS  induction  was  carried  out  by  the  Departmental  Manager  and 
focused  on  area  specific  risks,  rules  and  procedures.  The  local  manager  also 
discussed  specific  and  general  risk  assessments  in  that  workplace,  the  hazard 
notification  process  and  the  communications  forums  used  for  occupational  health 
and  safety. 
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4.3.7.1  The  way  it  was 
A  vehicle  of  mass  communication  on  each  site  was  the  monthly  site  team  brief. 
Each  Line  Manager  communicated  the  site  brief  to  their  team  and  this  was  in  turn 
communicated  to  that  employees  team.  At  the  start  of  the  study,  this  brief  was 
dominated  by  production  needs,  change  management  and  pay  and  condition  matters. 
4.3.7.2  Change 
The  brief  eventually  contained  a  section  on  safety  policies,  and  other  site-wide  issues 
such  as  designated  smoking  areas,  enforcement  of  safety  policies  and  studies  or 
initiatives  being  carried  out.  The  brief  remained  a  top  down  communication,  but  it 
provided  the  opportunity  for  the  central  risk  management  function  to  communicate 
its  policies  as  discussed  at  the  safety  committee  meetings  -  with  the  authority  of  the 
Executive.  There  was  also  a  section  for  employee  Questions  and  Answers  which 
were  fed  back  for  response.  The  Safety  Representatives  and/or  Managers  of  each 
area  brought  the  comments  and  issues  raised  at  the  brief  to  the  next  safety  committee 
meeting.  Perhaps  30%  of  the  information  disseminated  was  connected  directly  to 
OHS  and  much  of  the  additional  material  was  related  in  some  way.  This  was  a  huge 
improvement. 
In  addition,  there  were  newsletters,  notice  boards  and  TV  screens  all  of  which  were 
used  to  communicate  health  and  safety  information  and  news.  The  awareness 
questionnaire  had  suggested  that  employees  found  these  of  limited  value,  and  they 
were  certainly  not  a  preferred  medium,  but  all  routes  were  used.  It  was  felt  that  the 
TV  screens  probably  had  the  highest  impact  as  they  were  placed  in  the  canteen  areas 
where  people  sat  in  rest  periods,  and  therefore  communicated  to  a  captive  audience. 
Whether  the  information  had  any  benefit  in  terms  of  understanding  and  awareness 
other  than  increasing  information  available,  is  again  uncertain. 
Changes  in  Safety  Rules  and  policies  were  communicated  to  managers  and 
supervisors  for  communication  at  local  briefs  via  the  internal  mail  (e  mail)  system 
and  the  Management  meeting.  This  ensured  a  consistent  message  was  given  to  all 
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Management  meeting  and  the  Management-Executive  forum,  to  discuss  and  gain 
commitment  to  specific  safety  policies.  The  same  communication  processes  and 
systems  were  used  to  communicate  changes  at  all  sites. 
An  additional  forum  for  discussion  of  changes  between  sites  was  the  Risk  Control 
forum  hosted  by  the  Risk  Control  Manager,  and  attended  by  the  Blythswood  and 
Distilleries  Safety  Advisors,  the  Strathleven  Safety  co-ordinators  and  the  company 
nurse.  The  meeting,  held  every  two  months,  aimed  to  ensure  that  company  policies 
were  being  implemented  consistently,  to  discuss  current  issues  and  future  strategy, 
and  to  share  best  practice  between  operating  centres.  Eventually,  the  Risk  forum 
included  other  risk  management  issues  on  the  agenda  such  as  environmental 
management,  risk  finance  and  security. 
The  structure  between  the  sites  was  such  that  the  Central  risk  department  provided 
the  strategic  leadership  and  standards  -  determined  after  consultation  -  then  each 
different  operating  centre  developed  their  own  methods  of  achieving  these  standards, 
with  assistance  from  the  other  sites.  It  was  recognised  that  site  Safety  Advisors,  and 
their  respective  sites,  would  have  greater  ownership  if  they  developed  their  own 
systems. 
4.3.8  ENFORCEMENT 
There  was  a  significantly  higher  rate  of  compliance  with  Safety  Rules  at  Blythswood 
relative  to  compliance  at  Strathleven.  The  difference  between  these  two  sites  was 
that,  at  the  Blythswood  site,  there  was  strict  enforcement  of  Safety  Rules  including 
taking  disciplinary  action  where  required.  During  the  study  period,  disciplinary 
action  was  taken  against  a  number  of  individuals  at  Blythswood  for  failing  to  adhere 
to  safety  policies.  This  may  not  exactly  be  participation,  but  it  is  a  modification  of 
safety  behaviour  of  individuals,  irrespective  of  their  'attitude'  given  that  they  have 
the  knowledge  and  awareness  not  to  behave  like  in  a  certain  manner. 
As  a  contrast,  at  Strathleven,  Safety  Rules  were  rarely  enforced.  The  extent  of 
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taking  disciplinary  action  for  fear  that  this  action  would  be  overturned  on  appeal. 
Their  fear  was  based  on  genuine  (bitter)  experience  of  general  disciplinary  matters  - 
with  strong  Unions  and  a  relatively  weak  Human  Resources  team  -  and  therefore  few 
Managers  believed  that  they  had  the  power  of  enforcement  on  their  side.  This  led  to 
a  working  environment  where  safety  infringements  were  often  `overlooked'  rather 
than  actioned  and  resolved.  Although  enforcement  should  be  viewed  as  a  last  resort, 
the  absence  of  enforcement  can  lead  to  an  even  more  negative  safety  environment. 
4.3.9  SUMMARY  -  PEOPLE  AND  PARTICIPATION  AND  THE  FOOTBALL 
ANALOGY 
Accidents  cannot  be  prevented  by  focus  on  human  factors  such  as  attitudes  alone. 
Concentration  on  `hard'  control  measures  will  significantly  reduce  the  number  of 
accidents  that  occur.  Although  the  Norwegians,  for  example,  use  an  analogy  of 
barriers  that  is  quite  successful,  an  analogy  that  has  proved  useful  in  J&B  is  that  of 
the  football  team  and  dimensions  of  the  pitch. 
On  the  right  hand  end  of  the  pitch  lie  the  proactive  measures  (human  interventions) 
that,  in  principle,  prevent  errors  being  made  in  the  first  instance.  This  is  the 
selection  of  a  squad  of  players  with  sufficient  skills  and  blend  of  skills  to  form  a 
good  team.  In  safety  terms,  these  include  knowledge  and  awareness  of  safe  working 
and  training  to  provide  competence.  In  an  ideal  world,  a  positive  impact  on 
awareness  would  affect  behaviour,  but  analysis  of  accident  proneness  suggests  that 
unsafe  behaviour  and  therefore  accidents  will  still  happen  even  when  there  is  correct 
knowledge  and  awareness  -  even  the  best  squad  can  field  a  losing  team.  These 
human  aspects  should,  therefore,  be  treated  as  nice  to  have,  but  not  as  the  sole  means 
of  preventing  accidents  -  some  teams  cannot  afford  a  squad  with  all  the  necessary 
playing  qualities.  Another  team  might  have  a  player  of  great  skill,  but  with 
unfortunate  characteristics.  This  study  recognises  that  even  the  best,  positive 
attitude  to  safety  will  still  not  lead  to  zero  accidents. 
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The  point  of  interface  between  man  and  machine  in  an  industrial  setting  -  the  task 
level  -  is  analogous  to  supervision  or  coaching  in  a  football  squad.  In  the  `midfield', 
effective  coaching  and  enforcement  of  tactics  can  prevent  unsafe  behaviour  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  poor  or  inexperienced  or  tactically  unaware  coach  can  promote  or 
overlook  unsafe  behaviour.  The  output  of  effective  coaching  is  competent  play  to 
provide  a  basis  for  winning  the  game  -  by  setting  up  positions  to  score  and  by 
denying  the  opposition  the  opportunity  to  get  close  enough  to  score.  In  industry  we 
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rules  -  still  with  the  intention  of  producing  a  profit  -  and  taking  disciplinary  action 
against  safety  offences.  It  is  clear  that  the  `midfield'  is  critical  to  safe  behaviour  in 
the  work  place.  Positive  training  will  focus  on  the  safe  and  correct  use  of 
operational  rather  than  physical  safeguards  and,  therefore,  on  safe  systems  of  work. 
The  `coach',  however,  is  not  usually  on  the  field  to  'man-mark'  the  team  of 
individuals  and  they  have  to  act  on  their  own  -  we  are  not  yet  in  the  American 
football  situation  of  control  by  radio.  In  industry,  the  workforce  must  also  be  free  to 
work  -  and  make  mistakes  -  as  constant  supervision  or  even  monitoring  is 
practically  and  financially  impossible.  The  first  control  system  that  is  in  place, 
therefore,  is  made  up  of  operational  safeguards  that  set  limits  on  an  operator  whilst 
performing  a  task,  such  as  an  emergency  stop  button  to  be  used  before  entry  to  a 
machine,  or  a  lock-off  device.  Prior  thought  -  risk  analysis  -  defines  these  systems. 
In  football,  the  defence  (and  midfield)  are  constantly  positioning  themselves  to 
counter  any  moves  forward  by  the  opposition  -  whether  stemming  from  a  mistake  by 
their  own  attack  or  a  spark  of  brilliance  by  the  normally  plodding  but  persistent 
opposition. 
These  systems  rely  on  the  operator  understanding  the  purpose  of  the  defence  systems 
and  knowing  when  and  how  to  use  operational  safeguards.  Further,  (s)he  must 
actually  use  the  safeguard,  (which  relates  to  the  individuals  personal  characteristics), 
when  circumstances  require.  If  the  operator  is  put  under  pressure,  (s)he  may  forget. 
Given  these  factors,  the  operational  safeguard  must  work  when  required  to  do  so, 
and  thus  be  carefully  maintained.  In  the  midfield  and  defence  tactical  awareness  is 
critical.  Everything  relies  on  thinking  ahead  and  on  being  able  to  put  knowledge  into 
action. 
In  certain  circumstances,  where  there  has  been  human  error  or  a  violation  of 
procedures  on  the  part  of  the  operator,  he  or  she  manages  to  bypass  the  operational 
safeguard  or  'defence'  -a  defender  may  miss  a  tackle,  may  lose  concentration  or  may 
make  a  miserable  pass-back  to  the  keeper.  The  final  line  of  defence  or  the  'keeper' 
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trip  switch  or  other  fail  safe  device.  Clearly,  these  must  work  and  have  an  extremely 
high  level  of  reliability.  They  separate  the  operator  from  the  danger  zone  itself  and 
are  contingent  on  a  mistake  having  been  made. 
It  has  been  noted  elsewhere  that  focusing  upon  awareness  alone  is  not  sufficient  to 
prevent  accidents.  To  prevent  injury  accidents,  focus  should  first  be  on  elimination 
of  a  hazard  (removing  the  goal  mouth  by  playing  the  game  in  the  opponents  half!  ). 
Assuming  that  this  is  not  possible  -  and  it  never  is  -  focus  should  be  on  the  'defence' 
and  building  a  'defensive  midfield'. 
There  should  be  operational  safeguards  in  place  that  define  normal  operation  -  the 
correct  way  to  carry  out  a  task.  This  safe  system  of  work  will  have  been 
communicated  during  training  and  the  supervisor  (coach)  will  try  to  ensure  that  the 
task  is  performed  in  this  manner.  As  a  means  of  mechanical  intervention,  in  event  of 
human  error,  there  must  be  a  last  line  of  defence  between  the  operator  and  the  hazard 
that  must  be  fail-safe,  well  maintained  and  impossible  to  bypass. 
On  the  positive  side,  further  attempts  can  be  made  to  educate,  raise  awareness  and 
raise  competence,  although  these  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  prevent  accidents  or 
unsafe  behaviour.  There  may  be  clear  limits  on  the  ability  to  influence  these  factors. 
In  principle,  in  a  highly  competent  work  team,  the  defence  is  pulled  further  forward 
on  the  pitch  -  where  knowledge,  understanding  and  competence  prevent  incorrect 
actions  and  the  last  line  of  defence  is  only  in  place  to  protect  against  pure  'accidents', 
rather  than  to  protect  against  errors. 
With  all  these  measures,  the  interface  between  the  mechanical  factors  and  human 
factors  is  the  most  important  focus  for  training  and  enforcement  of  correct 
behaviour.  The  `keeper'  or  guard  only  has  effect  when  a  mistake  has  already  been 
made,  and  clearly  it  is  better  to  have  influence  upon  an  individual  who  has  yet  to 
make  an  error.  Training  should  focus  upon  the  correct  use  of  operational  safeguards 
and  the  interface  between  man  and  machine,  and  the  use  of  safe  systems  of  work. 
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prevent  accidental  injury  or  loss.  Another  important  aspect  of  training  is  to  ensure 
that  people  understand  the  link  between  unsafe  acts/behaviour  and  accidents. 
Procedures  should  be  implemented  to  eliminate  the  risk  at  all,  to  reduce  and  control 
the  risk  by  operational  safeguards. 
Excluding  the  impact  of  pure  human  error,  if  all  employees  in  a  workplace  could  be 
guaranteed  to  act  safely,  the  final  line  of  defence  would  not  be  required.  However, 
error  is  a  very  real  issue  and  most  accidents  are  caused  by  a  combination  of  initiators 
and  circumstances.  The  extent  and  type  of  physical  control  measures  required  are 
dependant  upon  the  level  of  'risk'  (potential  severity  and  probability).  In  some  cases, 
the  last  line  of  defence  may  be  personal  protective  equipment  such  as  gloves  or  a 
mask. 
In  summary,  this  study  suggests  that  to  increase  safety  standards  and  reduce 
accidents,  a  company  should  focus  first  and  foremost  on  physical  control  systems, 
effective  supervision  and  practical  training  on  safe  systems  of  work.  If  there  is  a 
knock-on  effect  of  a  positive  change  in  expressed  attitude,  then  this  should  be  treated 
as  an  added  bonus  rather  than  as  a  desired  outcome.  Participation  by  employees 
within  the  business,  at  all  stages  of  this  process  is  key  to  continuous  improvement  of 
safety  standards. 
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5.1  INTRODUCTION 
Many  things  were  considered  for  J&B  Scotland  and  many  things  were  tried.  It  was 
clear  from  the  start  that  some  things  were  essential  -  sine  qua  non.  Thus,  a 
formalisation  of  policy  and  the  writing  of  procedures  that  reflected  real  working  life 
had  to  be  part  of  the  scheme  of  work. 
The  goal  was  to  involve  the  workforce  in  safety.  This  meant  that  they  had  to 
changed  in  some  way,  but  was  this  possible?  No.  All  that  could  be  done  was  to  set 
up  structures  that  steered  the  workforce  to  involvement  through  safety  committees, 
risk  assessment,  and  training.  Management  needed  to  be  trained,  scared  into 
accepting  their  role,  encouraged,  bribed  and  even  coerced.  Senior  management  in 
theory,  need  to  be  competent,  committed  and  to  provide  resources  (Dawson,  1988). 
However,  one  cannot  rely  upon  senior  management  commitment  as  Executive  Teams 
change  by  the  year  and  therefore,  perhaps  at  an  even  faster  pace,  the  management 
team  changes. 
What  can  be  done  ?  The  inertia  of  the  plant  workforce  helped  -  the  lack  of  change  in 
the  overall  team,  reduced  the  impact  of  the  `coach'  or  `midfield'.  How  then  can 
success  be  measured  -  we  need  to  get  some  feed  back  so  we  know  if  we  are  doing 
the  right  thing.  We  don't  learn  what  to  do  from  the  output  of  accidents.  What  can 
we  use? 
Not  every  initiative  taken  succeeded,  and  not  every  proposal  proved  practical  to 
implement.  In  fact,  some  ideas  were  tried  (costs  of  accidents)  and  yet  will  not  be 
used  again.  The  management  of  OHS  within  J&B  was  however,  moved  on. 
Processes  were  defined,  standardised  across  the  company  and  moved  towards 
proactive  management,  measurement  and  control. 
The  objective  of  the  study  was  to  develop  a  formal,  structured  and  measurable  safety 
management  system  appropriate  for  the  company.  This  system  had  to  be  suitable  and 
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integration  with  ISO.  The  system  had  to  be  consistent  and  appropriate  for  effective 
integration.  Alongside  the  management  system,  a  comprehensive  system  of 
performance  measurement,  incorporating  both  positive  and  negative  measures  was  to 
be  developed,  to  provide  a  system  for  ensuring  continuous  improvement.  Again,  the 
system  had  to  be  practical  and  workable  within  the  operating  environment,  although 
not  all  measures  would  necessarily  be  performed  locally.  The  study  also  set  out  to 
consider  the  roles  of  the  individuals  within  a  working  environment  in  relation  to 
safety  and  pursue  the  active  involvement  and  participation  of  employees  in  safety 
management.  Each  aspect  of  this  study  will  be  discussed  in  turn. 
5.2  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  SYSTEM 
At  the  outset,  a  status  review  was  conducted  to  establish  a  benchmark  position  for 
the  company  -  in  terms  of  management,  organisation,  systems  and  standards  in 
place,  safety  awareness,  accident  and  audit  results,  and  most  importantly  physical 
evidence  from  the  seven  sites. 
In  summary,  it  was  determined  that  there  were  no  formal  safety  management  systems 
in  place,  and  therefore  vast  inconsistencies  in  standards,  management  styles  and 
policies  existed  between  sites  and  Departments.  Another  key  finding  was  that  the 
only  performance  measure  being  used  was  negative  (accident  data),  and  this 
information  was  collected  and  analysed  inconsistently.  Finally,  it  was  clear  that  the 
management  of  safety  was  seen  to  be  the  sole  responsibility  of  the  Health  and  Safety 
Manager. 
At  the  same  time,  to  some  extent  because  of  the  organisational  position,  an  attempt 
was  made  to  examine  whether  there  were  clear  links  and  synergies  between  quality 
management  and  safety  management.  Important  synergies  were  identified,  but  there 
were  also  significant  differences  in  that  there  are  legal  requirements  for  safety, 
quality  management  focuses  on  products  not  people  and  there  are  inherent 
difficulties  in  capturing  information  on  safety  errors  that  do  not  exist  for  quality 
errors.  A  systems  based  approach,  however,  is  of  equal  benefit  to  safety 
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baseline  of  good  management  practice.  This  study  then  set  out  to  develop  a  safety 
management  system  similar  to  the  ISO  product  quality  system  already  in  existence 
within  J&B. 
A  safety  management  system  was  developed  and  later  compared  with  the  Guidance 
Standard  BS  8800.  The  first  consultative  document  for  the  British  Standard  was 
issued  during  the  research  process,  and  proposed  that  either  the  ISO  14,000 
Environmental  management  standard  or  HS  (G)  65  be  used  as  a  model  for  a  safety 
management  system.  As  this  study  was  already  using  the  Quality  Management 
standard  ISO  9002  for  guidance,  there  was  a  good  match  in  approaches. 
The  development  of  the  safety  management  system  required  the  development  of  a 
new  safety  policy,  safety  procedures,  safe  systems  of  work  with  related 
documentation  and  a  review  process.  The  task  was  an  onerous  one  as  there  was 
precious  little  in  place  to  work  from,  and  the  system  had  to  be  appropriate  and  of 
benefit  to  all  seven  operating  sites  -  reflecting  cultural  differences  but  ensuring 
consistency  of  standards  and  approach.  It  was  important  that  the  safety  policies  were 
all  the  same,  but  the  work  instructions  and  local  procedures  could  and  did  differ, 
albeit  they  set  out  to  achieve  the  same  standards.  The  key  to  the  effective 
development  of  this  system  was  establishing  cross-site  working  parties  that  had  input 
to  and  ownership  of  the  overall  system  from  the  outset.  Communication  of  the  new 
safety  policy  and  safety  management  system  overall  was  critical  -  the  cross  site 
working  party  communicated  the  messages  together  at  each  site,  with  executive 
backing  and  presence  at  each  forum.  Groups  of  key  individuals  were  involved 
during  the  development  phase  -  safety  co-ordinators,  safety  reps,  Line  Managers, 
Executive  team-  to  help  gain  buy-in  after  the  first  phase  (Policy  and  Procedures)  was 
launched. 
The  involvement  of  these  individuals  was  important  as  during  the  second  phase  of 
system  development,  almost  all  of  them  were  involved  in  writing  and  drafting  work 
instructions  and  safe  systems  of  work  for  their  work  area.  It  is,  perhaps  of  interest 
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discussion  at  the  end  of  the  project. 
Overall,  the  main  benefit  of  the  safety  management  system  was  that  it  formalised  and 
standardised  safety  management  standards  and  policies  across  sites.  Involvement  of 
the  production  staff  in  development  of  the  system  and  safety  standards  increased  the 
level  of  knowledge  and  awareness  of  policies,  legislation,  standards  and  procedures 
of  all  of  those  involved.  This  was  definitely  a  positive  outcome. 
5.3  SAFETY  PERFORMANCE  MEASUREMENT 
The  second  phase  of  the  study  was  the  development  of  a  comprehensive  system  of 
safety  performance  measurement  -  to  allow  a  performance  review  as  a  follow  on  to 
the  initial  status  review,  and  to  enable  continuous  improvement.  A  number  of 
different  tools  were  evaluated.  It  was  recognised  that  the  tools  used  for  other 
business  processes  were  not  generally  suitable  for  safety  management,  and  that  the 
tools  selected  must  be  both  appropriate  to  safety  management  and  to  the  culture, 
risks,  management  structure,  expertise  and  resources  of  J&B.  There  are  some 
techniques  available  that  are  just  not  commercially  suitable  because  of  the  resources 
required.  Cost-efficiency  is  important  in  Safety  Management  as  well!  It  was  also 
recognised  that  the  measurement  system  should  record  both  negative  and  positive 
measures  -  for  example,  accidents  and  targets  achieved. 
The  three  main  techniques  used  in  industry  -  monitoring,  auditing  and  intensive 
studies  were  all  considered.  Monitoring  of  accident  statistics  is  the  most  commonly 
used,  and  abused,  tool  for  the  measurement  of  safety  performance.  It  can  be  a 
dangerous  measure  as  it  is  used  by  almost  all  businesses,  whether  large  or  small,  and 
understood  by  very  few.  It  was  found  at  J&B  -  and  it  is  almost  certainly  true  of 
other  drinks  companies  -  that  all  manner  of  matters  confounded  the  statistics  so  that 
the  effects  of  individual  factors  could  not  be  distinguished.  The  most  important  of 
these  confounding  effects  were  the  regular  change  in  management  organisation,  the 
constantly  changing  business  targets  imposed  by  the  group  and  the  consequent 
changes  in  systems  of  work  and  staff  levels.  Initiative  overload! 
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difficult  to  capture  consistent  accident  data  from  Department  to  Department,  and  site 
to  site.  As  there  are  relatively  few  accidents  within  J&B  Scotland,  in  order  to  have 
any  statistical  significance  accurate  consistent  data  had  to  be  analysed  over  a  5-year 
period.  Often  accurate,  consistently  collected  data  could  not  be  derived  (just  did  not 
exist  and  could  not  be  made  to  exist)  for  all  sites  over  such  a  timescale,  and  there  is 
no  value  in  comparing  inconsistent  data  for  trends.  Even  with  such  information  it 
would  take  several  years  to  establish  if  there  had  been  a  significant  change  in 
performance  -  not  useful  when  trying  to  see  if  safety  campaigns  or  training  are 
working.  Probably  the  biggest  difficulty  was  the  amount  of  statistical  knowledge 
that  a  practitioner  would  require  to  draw  useful  conclusions  for  the  data. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  event  recording  remains  the  most  common  measure  of  safety 
performance,  but  the  strongest  use  is  to  pinpoint  trends  in  types  and  locations  of 
incidents.  That  is  in  a  comparative  rather  than  an  absolute  sense  and  it  is 
investigation  rather  than  counting  of  events  that  is  important. 
Linked  to  this  was  a  study  of  the  Cost  of  Accidents.  There  was  expected  to  be  a 
huge  financial  loss  as  a  result  of  accidents  each  year.  An  intensive  study  over  a  12 
month  period  costed  every  recorded  incident  in  detail.  The  process,  although 
simplified  to  save  manhours  and  the  cost  of  resource,  was  still  time  consuming. 
There  were  a  number  of  positive  outcomes,  but  not  the  expected  ones!  First,  it  was 
discovered  that  the  total  cost  of  accidents  in  a  12  month  period  was  £141,422,  trivial 
in  terms  of  turnover,  much  less  than  had  been  expected  and  unlikely  to  have  much 
impact  on  the  Executive  Team  in  any  competition  for  resources!  On  the  other  hand, 
a  great  deal  of  information  was  uncovered  on  the  risk  finance  alternatives,  including 
the  redistribution  of  insured  cost  to  sites  and  units  in  line  with  the  level  of  risk. 
There  was  also  evidence  of  failure  to  report  incidents  within  the  business.  A 
shortened  costing  method  was  developed  for  specific  case  studies,  and  to  form  part 
of  cost  benefit  case  studies.  It  was  concluded  that  the  shortened  costing  exercises 
have  their  place  for  specific  incidents,  but  that  a  full  Costing  exercise  will  not 
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are  already  in  place. 
Auditing,  the  second  main  technique,  was  examined  in  detail.  This  technique  is  both 
positive  as  well  as  negative  in  concept  in  that  it  captures  what  has  been  done  instead 
of  measuring  only  system  failures.  A  number  of  proprietary  systems  were  examined, 
and  an  audit  system  that  was  suitable  in  terms  of  time,  cost  and  resource  was 
selected.  The  system  was  built  around  individual  interviews  of  a  number  of  key 
players  at  all  levels  of  the  business,  a  documentation  check  and  physical  verification 
of  safe  systems  and  work  practices  on  site.  The  technique  of  auditing  was  very 
useful  for  J&B  -  it  provided  a  focus  on  health  and  safety  that  had  not  been  there 
before,  and  it  acted  as  a  catalyst  for  change.  The  safety  audits  required  a  number  of 
people  to  be  involved,  both  in  audit  preparation  and  during  the  audit  process  itself, 
and  it  provided  an  opportunity  to  link  safety  performance  to  performance  linked  pay. 
A  very  important  conclusion,  however,  is  that  all  systems  have  a  useful  lifetime  and 
the  audit  system  should  be  changed  or  modified  before  this  is  reached.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  important  that  this  system  is  not  changed  too  often  or  there  will  be  nothing 
to  benchmark  against. 
Intensive  studies  were  carried  out  in  the  forms  of  questionnaire  and  interview 
surveys  of  attitude  and  awareness.  It  is  a  conclusion  of  this  work,  discussed  below, 
that  expressed  attitudes  do  not  determine  behaviour  and  so  there  is  no  merit  in 
capturing  safety  attitudes.  It  is  of  more  benefit  to  capture  safety  awareness  and  the 
extent  of  knowledge.  Safety  `culture'  therefore  is  something  that  a  company  will 
recognise  that  is  has,  or  has  not,  rather  than  a  measurable  quality. 
In  essence,  the  questionnaire  study  was  useful  in  that  it  captured  the  extent  of 
knowledge  of  a  specific  safety  issue  from  a  number  of  employees.  Thus,  this  is  a 
useful  technique  for  specific  issues  only,  perhaps  repeated  over  a  set  period  of  time, 
or  to  check  if  training  has  had  an  impact  on  knowledge.  The  second  technique  -  an 
interview  study  -  was  extremely  time  consuming  but  revealed  useful  insights  to 
safety  management  within  J&B.  This  is  judged  to  be  a  useful  technique  if  carried 
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value,  but  it  is  not  a  true  measure  of  health  and  safety  performance. 
Another  form  of  intensive  study  -  observation  of  behaviour  -  was  not  implemented 
within  J&B  due  to  the  resources  and  skills  required.  It  is  seen  to  be  a  useful 
technique  for  specific  tasks  or  issues,  but  not  as  an  ongoing  tool  separate  from  task 
risk  assessment.  For  example,  if  an  accident  happens  without  obvious  cause  then 
intensive  study  of  the  system  of  work  may  indicate  flaws. 
5.4  PEOPLE  AND  PARTICIPATION 
There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  discussion  surrounding  the  role  of  safety  attitudes  and 
behaviour  on  safety  performance.  Conventional  safety  performance  measures  focus 
on  visible  effects  of  safety  in  the  workplace  -  safety  behaviour.  Another  school  of 
thought  believes  that  if  you  can  change  the  safety  culture  (and  mindset),  you  can 
change  accident  experience.  Both  sides  of  this  debate  have  been  discussed  and 
because  there  is  doubt  that  expressed  intention  to  act  is  always  causally  linked  with 
behaviour,  it  is  certainly  more  accurate  to  focus  on  safety  knowledge,  understanding 
and  awareness  rather  than  on  the  measurement  of  an  attitude  itself. 
It  is  also  the  case  that  in  the  workplace,  there  are  a  number  of  external  influences 
upon  an  individual  -  in  particular  the  effect  of  the  group  norm.  It  is  not  correct  to 
focus  on  the  individual  in  the  workplace,  as  the  interactions  with  the  group  have  a 
large  influence  on  behaviour.  This  study,  therefore,  concludes  that  whilst  it  is  nice  to 
measure  attitudes,  to  have  an  impact  on  safety  in  the  workplace,  one  must  influence 
the  group  norm.  This  is  in  disagreement  with,  for  example,  Glendon  and 
McKenna  (1995)  who  see  utility  in  attitude  studies. 
It  is  interesting  that  within  this  context,  some  individuals  still  have  more  accidents 
and  incidents  than  others.  There  are  accident  prone  people  in  the  world!  Experience 
in  J&B  suggest  these  people  are  typified  by  `do  or  say  before  think'  but  the  facts 
certainly  go  against  those  who  would  deny  that  accident  proneness  exists. 
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The  comprehensive  system  for  the  management  of  safety  in  J&B  Scotland  has 
achieved  several  wins 
The  profile  of  safety  management  was  raised  almost  beyond  recognition  within  the 
company;  and  was  eventually  integral  to  the  way  that  the  company  managed  its 
business.  With  the  safety  management  system  in  place,  there  is  a  system  of  control 
upon  which  the  company  can  progress.  Control  can  be  tightened  and  standards  can 
be  improved.  In  other  words,  the  system  is  now  in  control. 
The  study  demonstrates  what  can  be  done,  and  what  cannot.  For  example, 
questionnaires  do  not  work,  but  enforcement  does  (in  the  short  term  at  least). 
An  interesting  by  product  of  the  study  is  that  by  changing  hard  systems,  some  soft 
factors  have  also  changed.  The  study  was  intended  to  impact  upon  the  core  safety 
management  systems  and  control  measures.  However,  a  side  benefit  is  that  over  the 
period  of  study  some  people  have  perhaps  changed  their  attitude  and  certainly 
changed  their  behaviour  as  a  result  of  visible  changes  in  work  systems. 
The  study  provided  a  baseline  so  that  any  improvement  or  decline  could  have  been 
measured.  In  the  future  there  would  have  been  a  basis  for  understanding  where  we 
had  moved  from,  and  future  changes  would  also  have  been  visible.  Obviously  this 
assumption  is  based  on  the  belief  that  the  audit  measurements  really  do  measure  a 
standard  of  safety  management  that  relates  to  accidental  loss.  The  improved  results 
in  the  annual  CHASE  audit  from  40%  in  1993  to  77%  in  1997  show  a  definite 
improvement  in  demonstration,  but  has  it  actually  shown  an  improvement  in  safety 
standards  ?  The  raw  accident  statistics  would  say  not,  evaluation  of  the  audit  process, 
however,  in  conjunction  with  other  safety  measurables  leads  to  a  conclusion  that 
there  was  a  real  improvement  on  safety  standards. 
Another  success  was  the  achievement  of  a  ROSPA  Gold  Award.  However,  there  is 
doubt  and  cynicism  as  to  what  this  actually  means.  After  all,  the  accident  statistics 
5:  227 are  self-reported  and  as  we  are  very  aware,  there  is  not  a  uniform  standard  of 
accident  reporting.  The  main  benefit  is  that  is  acted  as  an  internal  motivator  related 
to  Safety  Committee  team  building,  but  it  does  not  actually  improve  safety  standards 
or  provide  a  commitment  that  was  not  already  there. 
So,  what  has  actually  been  achieved  ?  The  answer  is  a  solid  base  for  further 
improvement  that  is  measurable  and  enforceable. 
5.6  LIMITATIONS,  FAILURES  AND  CONSTRAINTS  TO  STUDY 
The  main  constraint  to  the  study  was  that  production  came  first.  As  Brehmer  (1993) 
noted,  Prospect  Theory  applies  to  apportionment  of  resources.  The  amount  of  money 
available  to  spend  on  the  improvement  of  safety  standards  is  limited  and  also 
secondary  to  the  requirements  of  production.  As  discussed  previously  there  is  a 
limited  return  from  safety,  and  the  return  is  in  terms  of  reduced  loss  rather  than 
increased  profit. 
Within  the  company  there  has  been  an  almost  constant  changes  of  personnel  and 
operating  structure.  There  have  been  many  changes  in  Operations  in  4  years  :  there 
were  3  Operational  Directors,  2  Managing  Directors,  2  Human  Resources  Directors, 
2  changes  in  Risk  Managers/  Safety  Managers,  3  Production  Managers  and  a  variety 
of  other  key  personnel  changes.  On  the  other  hand,  at  the  lowest  level  there  have 
been  less  than  5%  changes  in  operational  staff.  These  changes  in  personnel  have 
meant  that  no  sooner  has  an  individual  been  trained  or  developed  an  understanding 
and  commitment  to  safety  management,  then  their  position  has  changed  and  another 
individual  has  to  be  trained.  There  has  been  a  problem  then  in  consistency,  which  in 
part  has  been  countered  by  the  development  of  consistent,  documented  safety 
management  systems.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  improvements  in  safety  can  also  be 
achieved  by  the  involvement  of  the  actual  operators  themselves,  who  do  not  change 
as  frequently. 
Time  was  also  an  issue,  the  period  of  the  study  was  around  3'/2-  4  years,  and  many 
changes  in  standards  of  safety  management  are  rather  more  long  term  than  that.  In 
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a  constantly  changing  environment.  This  required  goal  posts  to  be  changed.  It  was 
frustrating  that,  just  when  one  group  of  key  players  had  just  been  convinced,  there 
was  an  'all  change'  situation,  so  the  task  of  convincing  and  motivating  had  to  start  all 
over  again.  To  use  the  football  analogy  again,  you  constantly  checked  that  the  size 
of  the  pitch  was  the  same,  and  that  the  goal  posts  were  the  same  size,  but  then  you 
found  that  the  team  itself  had  changed  and  the  rules  and  strategy  have  to  be 
explained  all  over  again.  Often  it  seemed  like  the  coaches  and  players  spoke 
different  languages. 
5.7  WHAT  TO  DO 
5.7.1  Where  to  start 
This  study  has  identified  a  number  of  key  issues  that  are  critical  to  the  success  of  a  safety 
program.  It  is  recommended  that  these  issues  are  addressed  at  the  outset  of  a  new  safety 
management  program  -  for  example,  in  the  event  of  a  change  of  safety  personnel. 
One  of  the  first  issues  to  address  is  the  embedding  of  the  safety  function  within  the 
organisational  structure.  It  is  recommended  that  the  Safety  function  falls  within  the  same 
sphere  of  responsibility  as  Quality  Assurance,  and  that  safety  management  systems  are 
unified  with  those  of  Quality  Assurance.  It  is  essential  that  an  effective  organisational 
structure  is  in  place  to  manage  safety  within  the  business.  An  evaluation  of  resources 
should  be  conducted  to  ensure  that  they  are  appropriate  for  the  business  requirements. 
This  review  should  include  the  role  and  competence  of  safety  representatives  to  ensure 
that  they  are  providing  an  effective  resource  with  which  to  improve  the  safety  program. 
To  ensure  that  there  is  appropriate  commitment  and  visibility  at  Senior  Management 
level  a  Senior  Management  (safety)  Review  Group  should  be  put  together  -  meeting  bi- 
monthly  or  quarterly  -  to  agree  policy  and  objectives  and  measure  performance.  This  is 
critical  to  program  success. 
At  the  outset  a  comprehensive  gap  analysis  (or  safety  audit)  should  be  carried  out  to 
identify  where  the  business  is  failing  to  meet  legislative  or  corporate  standards.  This 
analysis  will  provide  a  baseline  from  which  to  prioritise  actions  and  measure 
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A  comprehensive  safety  management  system  should  be  developed  -  and  it  must 
specifically  address  those  items  identified  as  non-conformances  during  the  gap  analysis. 
Employee  involvement  in  procedural  development,  training,  and  communication  is  vital 
to  effectiveness  -  there  is  no  value  in  safety  procedures  being  issued  and  remaining  on 
Manager's  shelves. 
A  campaign  must  be  initiated  to  ensure  that  all  accidents  and  incidents  are  reported,  and 
can  therefore  be  addressed.  For  this  reason,  it  is  essential  that  employees  are  not  awarded 
bonuses  (or  punished  except  in  extreme  cases)  in  relation  to  accident  performance.  All 
accidents  and  incidents  must  be  thoroughly  investigated  to  identify  root  causes  and  to 
ensure  that  appropriate  preventative  actions  are  taken.  A  simplified  Cost  of  Accidents 
study  should  be  implemented  to  evaluate  the  key  cost  factors  for  the  business.  If  the  costs 
highlighted  by  the  simplified  study  are  significant  or  otherwise  interesting,  then  a  more 
detailed  study  should  be  conducted.  The  Employer's  Liability  insurance  program  should 
be  evaluated  to  identify  opportunities  for  cost-savings  or  rewards  for  improved 
performance. 
The  first  steps  should  be  taken  to  involve  the  Safety  Representatives  by  prioritising  their 
training  and  by  raising  the  profile  of  the  management  input  to  the  meetings 
5.7.2  Continuing  on 
As  the  safety  program  progresses,  a  number  of  other  techniques  should  be 
considered.  It  is  critical  that  the  physical  deficiencies  are  identified  and  eliminated 
from  the  workplace  -  this  can  be  assessed  through  monitoring  the  root  causes  of 
accidents  and  through  general  risk  assessment  findings.  Specific  risk  assessment 
techniques  such  as  HAZOP  and  HAZAN  should  be  considered  for  high  risk 
activities,  where  necessary.  The  program  should  aim  first  to  eliminate  all  accidents 
caused  by  physical  deficiencies  and  management  system  failures,  and  then  address 
those  caused  by  unsafe  or  faulty  behaviour.  Only  at  this  stage  of  Process  Maturity 
can  a  behavioural  program  have  a  true  impact. 
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measure  and  drive  change  over  time,  but  as  the  audit  tool  outlives  its  usefulness  it  must 
be  re-focused.  It  is  essential  that  the  action  plans  identified  by  the  audit  program  are 
managed  to  closure  by  the  Senior  Management  team.  For  the  safety  management  system 
to  work,  Managers  must  be  held  accountable  for  all  aspects  of  safety  management,  as 
they  are  with  all  other  aspects  of  business  management  such  as  budget  control  or 
achievement  of  production  targets. 
Key  Performance  Indicators  must  be  implemented  and  tracked,  although  the  emphasis 
must  not  be  on  accident  performance,  rather  it  must  focus  on  positive  measures  such  as: 
actions  closed  out,  reduced  severity  of  accidents,  reduced  number  of  lost  days,  audit 
scores,  number  of  inspections  conducted,  number  of  non-conformances  identified, 
training  carried  out.  The  numbers  of  accidents  or  incidents  must  still  be  recorded  and  this 
must  be  complemented  by  the  equivalent  production  and  manhour  records.  A  holistic 
performance  measurement  systems  should  be  implemented  that  incorporates  both  hard 
and  soft  performance  measures. 
Accident  investigations,  safety  committee  meetings,  results  of  surveys  and  risk 
assessments  will  provide  useful  information  on  key  issues  in  the  workplace.  Specific 
campaigns  should  be  launched  to  address  key  issues  and  target  and  improve  specific 
behaviours,  for  example  safe  fork  lift  driving,  or  use  of  safety  footwear.  It  is  essential  that 
the  safety  representatives  have  a  key  role  in  these  campaigns  -  perhaps  even  leading  them 
-  rather  than  them  being  Management-led  initiatives.  The  business  should  focus  on 
provision  of  effective,  useful  safety  communication  and  training.  The  safety  committees 
should  be  used  as  a  tool  to  ensure  that  all  safety  information  is  effective  and  useful  to  its 
audience. 
To  ensure  the  continuing  success  of  a  safety  program  it  is  essential  that  safety  is built 
into  the  functions  and  written  into  the  job  descriptions  of  all  employees,  and  all 
employees  must  be  given  objectives  in  relation  to  safety  improvements.  This  process 
of  defining  the  safe  ways  of  working  is  the  most  powerful  way  of  bringing  the 
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of  'the  way  things  are  done  around  here'. 
5.8  FURTHER  RESEARCH 
The  study  answered  some  questions  but  it  raised  even  more.  There  were  several  key 
areas  in  which  the  student  would  like  to  see  further  progress. 
First,  could  the  comprehensive  safety  management  system  transfer  across  the 
different  operating  units  of  IDV,  outwith  the  United  Kingdom?  And  would  the 
system  transfer  to  other  companies  within  the  UK,  but  outwith  IDV? 
Second,  does  the  implementation  of  a  safety  management  system  actually  have  an 
effect  on  hard  measures  (such  as  accident  data)  in  the  medium  to  long  term  outwith 
the  study  period? 
Thirdly,  and  more  importantly,  does  a  controlled  system  for  the  management  of 
safety  actually  reduce  the  number  of  accidents  or  increase  the  standard  of  health  and 
safety,  at  all? 
The  answers  to  these  questions,  just  as  the  search  for  a  Holy  Grail  may  not  be 
definitive,  but  they  are  certainly  intriguing  work  for  further  research. 
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scans  3A!  3elnwnD COST  OF  ACCIDENTS  CASE  STUDIES 
Case  One  :  INJURY  ACCIDENT 
A  line  operator  at  Strathleven  suffered  badly  crushed  fingers  and  subsequently  lost 
51  days  of  work  due  to  this  accident. 
Lost  Time,  and  sick  pay  .  51  days  (390.15)  @  £7  per  hour  =  £2731 
Damage  to  company  property  :  Replacement  Machinery  Guard  =£  10 
Rectification  :3  hours  @  £10  per  hr  =00 
Management  involvement  0.5  hrs  @£  15  per  hr  =  £7.50 
Total  cost  of  rectification  =  £37.50 
Damage  to  product  or  packaging  :  Nil 
Clear-up  costs  :1  hour  @  £7  per  hr  =  £7 
Lost  time  of  other  employees  from  normal  work: 
Management  -4  hours  @£  15  per  hr  =  £60 
Executive  -  1.5  hrs  @£  15  per  hr  =  £22.50 
Occupational  Health  -2  hours  @£  10  per  hour  =  £20 
Other  -1  hour  @£  10  per  hour  =£  10 
Total  cost  =  £112.50 
Effect  on  Production  :1  hour  lost  @  700  cases  per  hour  =  700  cases  @£1.50  each 
Total  cost  of  lost  production  =£  1050 
Transfer  of  personnel  .  Nil 
Investigation  time  spent  on  incident  :  Management  -2  hours  @£  15  per  hour  =  £30 
Supervisory  -2  hours  @£  10  per  hour  =  £20 
Safety  representative  -2  hours  @  £7  per  hour  =£  14 
Total  cost  =  £64 
Action  taken:  Replacement  steps  =£  1100 
Health  and  Safety  Team  costs: 
Incident  investigation  -2  hours  @£  15  per  hour  =  £30 
With  Lawyers  -2  hours  @£  15  per  hour  =  £30 
With  Insurance  companies  -5  hours  @£  15  per  hour  =  £75 
FIGURE  15 In  negotiations  with  the  injured  party  -1  hour  @  15  per  hour  =  £15 
Total  cost  =£  150 
Other  costs  :  Taxi  to  take  the  injured  to  hospital  =  £2 
Insurance  reserve  placed  against  this  accident  by  Commercial  Union 
Reserve  =  £20,000 
TOTAL  UNINSURED  COST  OF  THIS  ACCIDENT  =  £15,264 
Case  Two  :  Near  Miss  INCIDENT 
Units  1  and  2  were  evacuated  due  to  a  suspected  gas  leak. 
Damage  to  company  property  :  Nil 
Damage  to  product  or  packaging  :  Nil 
Clear-up  costs  :  Nil 
Lost  time  of  employees  from  normal  work  (minimum  1.5  hours): 
Management  -  Total  of  15  hrs  @£  15  per  hour  =  £225 
Executive  -  Nil 
Occupational  Health  -  Nil 
Others  -  (190  employees  @  1.5  hours)  @£  10  per  hour  =£  1995 
Total  cost  =  £2220 
Effect  on  Production  : 
1.5  hours  lost  =-  7000  cases  @  £1.50  per  case  (fixed  cost  per  case) 
Total  cost  of  lost  production  =£  10,500 
Transfer  of  personnel  :  Nil 
Investigation  time  spent  on  incident  :  Accounted  for  under  lost  time  from  normal 
work 
TOTAL  UNINSURED  COST  OF  THIS  ACCIDENT  =  £12,720 
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